known that the real estate will not be required for the payment of debts. The firm still continues its business under a lawful agreement to that effect. Whenever a dissolution shall be established and a final settlement of accounts shall take place, the positions contended for, and the reasoning by which they are enforced, will become entirely applicable, and will exercise a very potent and possibly a controlling influence upon the questions which will then arise between the present litigants or those who may succeed them. But upon the present state of the record, we think the appellee is clearly entitled to the dividend in question, as the successor to his deceased wife's title. Leaf's Appeal. Opinion by Green, J. [Decided April 28, 1884.]

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS. CORPORATION-SECRETARY --FORGED CERTIFICATE OF STOCK-ESTOPPEL-LIABLE TO TRANSFEREE.-The plaintiff, having purchased for value shares in the defendant's company, discovered, upon application for registration, that his vendor's name was not registered for the shares, and his transfer and certificate had both been forged by the company's secretary. It was part of the secretary's duty to receive and examine transfers and certificates, to have transfers registered, to procure the preparation, execution and signature of certificates with all requisite and prescribed formalities, and thereupon to issue them to the persons entitled to receive them. One of the prescribed formalities was the signature of a director as well as that of the secretary. Held, that the company had authorized their secretary to warrant the genuineness of certificates, and were estopped from disputing their liability upon a certificate issued by him, notwithstanding his forgery of the document. Q. B. Div. May 19, 1884. Shaw v. Port Philip Co., Limited. Opinions by Stephen and Matthews, JJ. (50 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 685.)

WILL-UNEXPRESSED TRUST-LETTER FOUND AFTER TESTATOR'S DEATH.-If a trust of property given by a will is not declared when the will is made, in order to make it binding it is necessary that it should be communicated to the devisee or legatee in the testator's life-time, and that he should accept that particular trust, or possibly it might be sufficient that the trust should be put in writing, and placed in his hands in a sealed packet, and that he should undertake to hold the property upon the trusts so declared, though he did not know what they were. A testator cannot, by imposing an indefinite trust upon a devisee or legatee, the objects of which he does not communicate to him, make a valid declaration of trust of the property given by a letter, not executed as a testamentary instrument, found amongst his papers after his death, and not placed by him in the hands of the devisee or legatee. In such a case the devisee or legatee, admitting himself to be a trustee, will be held to be a trustee for the testator's next of kin. Kay, J., said: "If it had been expressed on the face of the will that the defendant was a trustee, but the trusts were not thereby declared, it is quite clear that no trusts afterward declared by a paper, not executed as a will, could be binding. Johnson v. Ball; Briggs v. Penny, 3 Mac. & G. 546; Singleton v. Tomlinson, 38 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 653; 3 App. Cas. 404. In such a case the legatee would be trustee for the next of kin. There is another wellknown class of cases where no trust appears on the face of the will, but the testator has been induced to make the will, or having made it, has been induced not to revoke it by a promise on the part of the devisee or legatee to deal with the property, or some part of it, in a special manner. In these cases the court has

compelled discovery and performance of the promise, treating it as a trust binding the conscience of the donee, on the ground that otherwise a fraud would be committed; because it is to be presumed that if it had not been for such promise the testator would not have made or would have revoked the gift. The principle of these decisions is precisely the same as in the case of an heir who has induced a testator not to make a will devising the estate away from him by a promise that if the estate were allowed to descend he would make a certain provision out of it for a named person. Stickland v. Aldridge, 9 Ves. 516; Wallgrave v. Tebbs; and McCormick v. Grogan. But no case has ever yet decided that a testator can, by imposing a trust upon his devisee or legatee, the objects of which he does not communicate to him, enable himself to evade the statute of wills by declaring those objects in an unattested paper found after his death. The essence of all those decisions is that the devisee or legatee accepts a particular trust, which thereupon becomes binding upon him, and which it would be a fraud in him not to carry into effect. If the trust was not declared when the will was made, in order to make it binding, it is essential that it should be communicated to the devisee or legatee in the testator's lifetime, and that he should accept that particular trust. It may possibly be that he would be bound if the trust had been put in writing, and placed in his hands in a sealed envelope, and he had engaged that he would hold the property given to him by the will upon the trusts so declared, although he did not know the actual terms of the trust. McCormick v. Grogan. But the reason is that it must be assumed that if he had not so accepted the will would be revoked-suppose the case of an engagement to hold the property, not upon the terms of any paper communicated to the legatee, or put into his hands, but of any paper that might be found after the testator's death. The evidence in this case does not amount to that, but if it did, the rule of law would intervene, which prevents a testator from declering trusts in such a manner by a paper which was not executed as a will or codicil. The legatee might be a trustee, but the trust declared by such an unattested paper would not be good. For this purpose there is no difference whether the devisee or legatee is declared to be a trustee on the face of the will, or by an engagement with the testator not appearing on the will; the devisee or legatee cannot, by accepting an indefinite trust, enable the testator to make an unattested codicil. I cannot help regretting that the testator's intention of bounty should fail by reason of an informality of this kind; but in my opinion it would be a serious innovation upon the law relating to testamentary instruments if this were to be established as a trust in the favor of Mrs. Brown. The defendant however having admitted that he is only a trustee, I must hold, on the authority of Mucklestone v. Brown, 6 Ves. 52; Briggs v. Penny, and Johnson v. Ball, that he is a trustee of this property for the next of kin of the testator. Chy. Div. March 29, 1884. Matter of Boyes. (50 L. T. Rep. [N. S.] 582.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

MR. BACON SAYS HE IS NOT CATO. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Do not imagine that I undervalue the honor of being mentioned in your pages. Even to be evil spoken of by you is not without advantage, for you will surely speak of me again when you are called upon to set me right.

Permit me then to say that I have not. as you imply, arrogated to myself the functions of a permanent censor of my fellow lawyers' morals. Under invitation

from the American Social Science Association, I read to that body, more than two years ago, a short paper upon the ethics of our profession. It was printed in the transactions of the association, and you commented upon it no doubt more favorably than it deserved. 27 Alb. L. J. 361. But it seems to have impressed your soul no more profoundly than is usual with sermons; for when the Century, to no one's astonishment more than mine, exhumed it from the sepulchre of oblivion, you forgot that you had ever heard of it before, and deduced from the Centurian's abstract certain inferences as to my opinions which I think the paper hardly warrants. Accept the new copy I send herewith; and when, after another two years, you are ready to review it again, please read it first. You will then discoyer that I have not said what you sadly judged I must have said.

Yours with sincere respect, THEODORE BACON. ROCHESTER, N. Y., November 1, 1884.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

HAMILTON ON FRACTURES.

A Practical Treatise on Fractures and Dislocations. By Frank Hastings Hamilton. Seventh American edition, revised and improved. Illustrated with 379 wood cuts. Philadelphia, Henry C. Lea's Son & Co., 1884.

This work, for so many years' recognized as the standard, and carefully revised and enlarged by its author, who stands in the foremost rank of his profession, will recommend itself to all medical men, and to all lawyers needing information on this subject. The publisher's part has been well done.

DESTY ON TAXATION.

The American Law of Taxation, as determined in the courts of last resort in the United States. By Robert L. Desty. St. Paul, West Publishing Co., 1884. 2 vols. lvii, 610, lxxvi, 611-1477.

This is an exhaustive and well arranged work by an editor of practical views and experience. Mr. Desty will hardly expect his work to supplant or even rival Judge Cooley's as an authority, but it will prove of practical use, and has some advantages over its celebrated predecessor. The arrangement is in one respect novel and commendable. Each section has its authorities appended to it in the body of the page, so that they do not in any instance form a feuilleton running along the bottom of several pages. The indexes, which are copious, are separately paged in each volume, but we do not perceive any advantage in that. The text is classified in the form of italicised propositions, concise and clear, and the commentary is in larger type under each proposition. We regard this as the model way of writing a law book, and on the whole we think Mr. Desty has produced an admirable work. It is well printed.

RORER ON RAILWAYS.

A Treatise on the Law of Railways. By David Rorer. Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1884. 2 vols. cxix, 739-1618. The death of the author of this work is to be regretted, especially because we believe he could and would have improved it if he had lived. As it stands it is not well classified or arranged, and its style is very bad. "Onto" is more than we can bear. And yet, as the school boy wrote about the horse, the work is "very full of use," and as the student said of Chitty on Pleading," there is a great deal of close law in it." The treatment of the topics is tolerably good. It is vexatious however to see that an author of industry enough to collect all the law on a topic, has not enough

discrimination to classify and arrange it properly. The volumes are fairly printed.

CHURCH ON HABEAS CORPUS.

A Treatise on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, including jurisdiction, false imprisonment, writ of error, extradition, mandamus, certiorari, judgments, etc., with practice and forms. By William S. Church. San Francisco, A. L. Bancroft & Co., 1884. Pp. lx, 702.

This seems to be a judicious treatise on a subject fully deserving special treatment. The subordinate subjects specified on the title page are of course only subordinately treated. But on the principal topic the practitioner will find all the law, very well arranged and expressed, with references to all the decisions of importance. The recent case of Farmer v. Lewis, in Indiana, was probably too recent to be included, and so of the decision of the Federal Supreme Court, in the Robb case, which is adverse to the author's opinion expressed on page 625. The book is well printed, and is likely to prove an important addition to every practicing lawyer's library.

TAYLOR ON CORPORATIONS.

A Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations having capital stock By Henry O. Taylor. Philadelphia, Kay & Bro., 1884. Pp. vii, 714.

We have delayed speaking of this book in order to have an opportunity of giving it the careful examination which the importance of the subject warrants, and now we shall be forced to content ourselves with a mere notice when a review would be well deserved, especially in consideration of the fact that the subject has recently been treated by Mr. Morawetz in an excellent manner. The present treatise is remarkably compact and logically constructed, although in these points we do not think it superior to Mr. Morawetz.' Its superiority, if any, is in the fact of its more numerous citations, including some of importance which Mr.Morawetz missed. It can be recommended as a useful manual. The publisher's work has been handsomely done.

HOWELL'S MICHIGAN NISI PRIUS CASES. Michigan Nisi Prius Cases, decided by the State and Federal courts in Michigan. To which are added brief biographical sketches of the judges of Michigan, past and present, law anecdotes and reminiscences. Also law miscellanies. Edited and compiled by Charles B. Howell. Detroit, Richmond, Backus & Co., 1884. Pp. xxv, 384. The author says in his preface, "For lack of space I have left out of the book at least double the amount of matter found in the book." His main error was in not leaving out half as much more. The book is utterly worthless, made up of memorandums of useless cases, reports of "highfalutin" arguments, meager biographies, and stupid anecdotes, couched in a ridiculous style. We are glad we do not live among lawyers such as one described, who was apt, "like an angry lion, to lacerate himself and his auditors by his own violence of language." It is no pleasure to us to be called on to notice such books as this, and we sometimes say nothing rather than condemn, but if we do speak we will tell the truth, although Mr. Bishop thinks that is what no editor can do. We had omitted to say that the book is coarsely printed and abominably padded.

PREBLE'S PATENT CASE INDEX. Patent Case Index, containing lists of all the cases involving Patents for Inventions as reported in the United States Supreme and Circuit Court Reports, Robb & Fisher's Patent Cases, the Federal Reporter, and the Patent Office Ga

zette, up to January 1, 1884, together with a brief synopsis of the law points decided, arranged alphabetically. By W. P. Preble, Jr. Second edition. Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1884. Pp. 707.

The title page sufficiently explains the scope of the book, which is divided into four parts: (1) Table of Cases, (2) Synopsis of Law Points, (3) List of inventions involved in cases digested, and (4) Tables of Cases arranged under defendants named. We see no good reason for separating a table of cases, and think it preferable that parts 1 and 4 should be combined. Too much praise cannot be accorded the publisher's work.

MOON'S DIGEST OF FEES.

A Digest of Fees of Town and County Officers of the State of New York. Rewritten and adapted to the new Codes. By Clinton A. Moon. Fifth edition. Williamson & Higbe, Rochester, N. Y., 1884.

The above presents in compact form what fees. according to law, officers ars entitled to for their services. As matter of experience, though, the figures in the book are no guide at all. The book should be in the hands of every officer and every lawyer in the State.

BUMP'S PATENTS, TRADE-MARKS, ETC. The Law of Patents, Trade-Marks, Labels and Copyrights: consisting of the sections of the Revised Statutes of the United States, with notes under each section, referring to the decisions of the courts and the commissioner of patents, together with the rules of the patent office, relating to patents, trade-marks and labels, with a selection of forms; also a table of cases cited and a table of patents construed. Second edition. By Orlando F. Bump. Baltimore: Cushings & Bailey, 1884. Pp. ccxviii, 667.

This must be a very useful manual and digest to those interested in these subjects. It seems very well divided and arranged. It is well printed.

LOWELL'S TRANSFER Of Stock.

The Transfer of Stock in Private Corporations. By Abbott Lawrence Lowell and Francis C. Lowell. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1884. Pp. xx, 297.

It is quite suprising that the cases on this subordinate topic should be so numerous as the table of cases, of twelve pages, indicates. The manual would seem justified by this fact alone, and it seems to be an intelligent production, partaking more of the characteristics of a treatise than of a mere digest.

sentials of a very tedious subject. The revision and adaptation has been well done.

THE

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

HE following decisions were handed down Friday, Oct. 31, 1884:

Judgment affirmed with costs-Union Trust Company of New York, appellant, v. Augustus S. Whiton, respondent; William Howe, appellant, v. Boston and Albany Railroad Company, respondent; Lowell Talbott, as trustee, etc., appellant, v. George W. Adams and another, executors, etc., respondents; John Martin, respondent, v. New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, appellant; Charles Stebbins, appellant, v. Albert P. Bennett, impleaded, respondents; John R. Van Buskirk, respondent, v. Andrew Coyne and another, appellants; Stephen O. Barnum and another, respondents, v. Merchants' Fire Insurance Company, appellant; Mutual Life Insurance Company, respondent, v. Anson B. Hoyt, impleaded, etc., appellant; People ex rel. Albert Brisbane and others, respondents, v. John Zoll and others, assessors, etc., appellants; Louisa C. Smith, appellant, v. James Mooney, respondent. Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event-Stephen D. Pringle, respondent, v. Charles D. Leverich, impleaded, appellant; Henry L. Nagle, respondent, v. Robert McFeeters and another, appellant.-Order of General Term affirmed, and judgment absolute rendered for defendant with costs-Hubbard Kalsey, appellant, v. Smith Lyon, respondent.-Order af firmed and judgment absolute ordered for the respond. ent with costs-James Bigler, appellant, v. National Bank of New York, respondent.-Order affirmed with costs-Jabob Crouse, in his own behalf, v. The

Syracuse, Chenango and New York Railroad Com

pany, respondents; George N. Crouse and another, appellants; David Cromwell, treasurer, etc., respondent, v. John Henry Hull et al., appellants; David Carll, respondent, v. Whiston Oakay and another, appellants; Moses May, respondent, v. Nelson Morris, appellant. The order of the county judge and the judgment of the General Term, so far as they direct the judgment of the Court of Sessions to be carried into effect reversed; so far as they direct the prisoner to be remanded to the custody of the sheriff, affirmed, and the prisoner remanded to the sheriff of Otsego county, in order that the Court of Sessions may deal with him according to law-People ex rel. Henry Devol, appellant, v. John Kelly, sheriff, etc., respondent.

-Appeal dismissed with costs-Cyrus H. Wilbur and another, respondents, v. Asa T. Soule, appellant; Leo Neuman v. Third Avenue Railroad Company; The Orden Germania, appellant, v. Charles E. Devender, respondent; James Gilbert, respondent, v. Third Avenue Railroad Company; Alfred L. Simmonson and another v. William Elmer, impleaded, respondent.— Motion to postpone argument granted upon condition that appellant perfect security on appeal within twenty days, as required by order; otherwise deniedWilliam H. Hillis, appellant, v. Peekskill Savings Bank, respondent.

Court adjourned till November 24.

NOTES.

Only two new law journals this week. The Boston Daily Record gives the calendars, and abstracts of the current decisions of the Supreme Court. The Georgia Law Journal, the first number of which is at hand, isa weekly, and has sixteen pages of reading matter, of the same size and form as this journal. It promises well, and the opening number is attractive and valuable.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, NOVEMBER 15, 1884.

CURRENT TOPICS.

COMMENTING

OMMENTING on some recent suggestions in this journal on head-notes and indexes, the Virginia Law Journal observes: "We venture to dissent from a part of this. We think that generally speaking the less the head-notes has to do with the facts of the case the better. This is just the thing, as we have always thought, which renders so many of the head-notes of Grattan's Reports, for example, absolutely useless, and which requires a careful reading of the case to ascertain what it really decides. There are cases of course where it is necessary to state the facts, and then they ought to be stated, as our contemporary says, with the greatest conciseness consistent with clearness. But here is the great difficulty; the faculty of condensation is one of the rarest, and most of those reporters who deal much with facts in their head-notes present a tedious and circumstantial recital of complicated transactions between A., B. and C. which is often quite unintelligible. Every decision proceeds upon some principle of law, often a very old one, applied to the facts of the particular case. In many cases the bare statement of the principle itself is a sufficient head-note, and it is no valid objection that it is a legal truism. The province of a head-note is to state what was decided, no more and no less. But when the facts must be stated we believe that our contemporary has struck upon the very best method, which will be found practicable in most cases, viz.: to impregnate the statement of the legal conclusion with the leading facts. In regard to indices we do not at all agree with the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL and the Chicago Legal Adviser 'that merely reproducing the statements of the syllabi is generally a vicious system.' On the contrary

we think that where the head-notes are even tolerably good it is a very good system, since in such case the examination of the index is generally all that is necessary to ascertain whether the case is such as is needed. The object of an index is to point out where that which is needed may be found; if it can be so constructed as to show also whether that which is pointed to is actually what is wanted, then so much the better. In an index made with reference to the subjects only one may be referred to a dozen or more cases without getting any satisfaction at the end of his search. What the profession needs most in this busy age are time and laborsaving arrangements of all kinds."

The Journal has not precisely comprehended us. We think the best form of index is the reproduction of the head-notes, where the head-notes are constructed properly, but that the mere reproduction of the common head-notes is a bad system. VOL. 30 No. 20.

This is what we said before. As to the recital of facts in the head-note, or the impregnating the head-note with the facts, let us illustrate by a few examples selected at random from the forthcoming volume of American Reports. First, let us take a few, stating the facts: "A father signed a release of a note and mortgage executed by his daughter, put it with them in his safe, and it remained there till his death. Shortly after signing the release he made his will, giving the daughter a much larger amount. Held, that the release did not take effect for want of delivery." "A testator gave all his real and personal estate to his wife, her heirs and assigns forever, 'having full confidence in my said wife, and hereby request that at her death she will divide equally between my sons and daughters all the proceeds of my said property, real and personal, hereby bequeathed.' Held, that the widow took a life estate, with the remainder in trust for the children." "The plaintiff, in the employ of a railway company, went under a car standing alone on a repair track, by order of his foreman, to repair it, and was there injured by the starting of the car by an advancing train. The track was usually protected. There was no proof of any precautions to protect it on this occasion. Held, that a non-suit iff: 'We are authorized to offer Michigan fine salt was improper." "The defendant wrote the plaintin full car load lots of eighty to ninety-five bbls., delivered in your city at eighty-five cents per bbl.' The plaintiff telegraphed: 'Your letter of yesterday received and noted. You may ship me 2,000 bbls. of Michigan fine salt as offered in your letter.' Held, not a binding contract." These seem to us sufficiently to state the facts, and to be superior to any mere statement of the legal conclusions properly derivable from the facts.

Now we will take a few, merely suggesting or impregnated with the facts, the facts being too numerous and complicated to justify a detailed recital, forth the facts: "Tenants in common of land, ownor there being nothing to be gained by setting ing personal property in severalty, may make a joint will disposing of all their property severably,

which will take effect on the death of all." "An insurance company is chargeable with the mistake of its soliciting agent in filling up an application." "A contract for future delivery of merchandise, in warehouse receipts, within a limited time, the seller having an option as to the precise time, the buyer to put up margins, and the measure of damages for breach to be the difference between the contract price and the contract price on the chamber of commerce when the contract is made, is not void as a gambling contract if it is made to appear that the seller intended an actual delivery." "A newspaper publication of the suicide of a man, falsely charging in effect that it was induced by the extravagance and exactions of his wife, and by her fraudulent conduct in taking wages for her son which he had not earned, is libellous, per se." "A city is liable in damages for