the defendant and it should abide the result in a forum of its own seeking. Cir. Ct., N. D. New York, June 6, 1884. Edwards v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. Opinion by Coxe, J.

EASEMENT-IMPLIED RESERVATION-DEDICATION TO PUBLIC.-At common law a dedication does not pass a fee or freehold in the soil, nor give any right to the 'profits of the soil. It only serves as an estoppel in pais to the owner of the soil to assert any rights of possession inconsistent with the enjoyment of the uses to which the dedication was made. Washb. Easem. 220. A dedication may be made without writing by act in pais as well as by deed. It is not at all necessary that the owner should part with the title which he has, for dedication has respect to the possession, and not the permanent estate. Its effect is not to deprive a party of his land, but to estop him, while the dedication continues in force, from asserting that right of exclusive possession and enjoyment which the owner of property ordinarily has. Where as in the case of a highway, the public acquire but a mere right of passage, the owner, who makes the dedication, retains a right to use the land in any way compatible with the full enjoyment of the public easement. Id. 216; Hunter v. Trustees, 6 Hill, 411; Tallmadge v. East River Bank, 26 N. Y. 108; Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 Iowa, 455. The public takes no more than the owner gives. Where a plat of land has been dedicated as a public square, the authorities of the town were prohibited from making use of the land for purposes inconsistent with its use as a public square. Abbott v. Mills, 3 Vt. 521; State v. Catlin, id. 530; Pomeroy v. Mills, id. 279; Cincinnati v. White's Lessees, 6 Pet. 431. It follows that the municipal authorities cannot deprive the owner of land, who has simply dedicated to the public an easement to pass over it, of any use of the land dedicated not inconsistent with the full enjoyment of the easement. Cir. Ct., E. D. Tenn., April, 1884. Stevenson v. Chattanooga. Opinion by Key, J.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS-CONTRACT FOR SALE OF GOODS -MEMORANDUM.-The travelling agent of the defendant company addressed to his principals an order, "send to C. W. S. Banks terms net 30 days; freight allowed," signed by him as agent and followed by a list of the merchandise desired, with prices and directions for shipping, signed by Banks, the plaintiff. Held, that the paper was upon its face merely an order, and not a memorandum of sale signed by the defendant or his agent, within the terms of the statute of frauds. There is no real question but that these instruments sufficiently set forth the terms of the sale, if they show a sale, nor but that the name of the agent is sufficiently signed to the memorandum, if it is a memorandum of a bargain of sale and he had authority to bind the defendant to a contract of sale. Drury v. Young, 58 Md. 546. The memorandum must set forth on its face enough to gather a contract of sale from, as against the party to be charged with the consequences of such a contract in the action. Egerton v. Mathews, 6 East, 307; Cooper v. Smith, 15 id. 103; Bailey v. Ogden, 3 Johns. 399. This memorandum appears to be of an order, and not of a sale, and would so far as it shows for itself, fail to make out a sale without acceptance of the order. Chit. Cont. 349. Cir. Ct., D. Vermont, March 20, 1884. Banks v. Harris Manf. Co. Opinion by Wheeler, J. (See 20 Fed. Rep. 668, note; 47 Am. Rep. 532; 48 id. 110.-ED.)

NEGLIGENCE SPREADING DISEASE DAMAGES.Defendaut took his children when they had whooping-cough, a contagious disease, to the boarding-house of plaintiff to board, and by reason of his negligence her child, and the children of other boarders, contracted the disease, whereby she was put to expense,

care and labor in consequence of her child's sickness, and sustained pecuniary loss by reason of boarders being kept away. Held, that defendant was liable for damages. The carrying of persons infected with contagious diseases along public thoroughfares, so as to endanger the health of other travellers, is indictable as a nuisance. Add. Torts, § 297; Rex v. Vantandillo, 4 Maule & S. 73. Spreading contagious diseases among animals by negligently disposing of, or allowing to escape, animals infected, is actionable. Add. Torts (Wood's Ed.), 10, note; Anderson v. Buckton, 1 Stra. 192. A person sustaining an injury not common to others by a nuisance is entitled to an action. Co. Litt. 56a. Negligently imparting such a disease to a person is clearly as great an injury as to impute the having it; and negligently affecting the health of persons injuriously as great a wrong as so affecting that of animals. Cir. Ct., S. D. New York, July 5, 1884. Smith v. Baker. Opinion by Wheeler, J.

PLEDGE-SECURITIES-REHYPOTHECATION BY BROKER.-Where the owner of securities pledges them with a stock-broker as collateral to a loan, the latter has no right to rehypothecate them in such a way that they cannot be restored to the owner upon payment of the loan, although both parties understood that the broker would have to use the securities to obtain the loan. Usage is inadmissible to destroy a contract. Cir. Ct., S. D. New York, June 21, 1884. Oregon & Transcontinental Co. v. Hilmers. Opinion by Wallace, J.

TRUST-DECLARATION OF MANUAL DELIVERY.In cases of declarations of trust and deeds of conveyance or mortgage, when nothing further is expected to be done by the beneficiary or grantee to complete the transaction as a whole, a formal sealing and delivery, without an actual delivery to the other party, or to a third person for his use, will be sufficient to make the deed or declaration operative immediately, unless something else exist or be done to qualify such formal delivery. In Hope v. Harman, 11 Jur. 1097, Mr. Hope executed a deed to his nephew for a box of jewels, in the presence of a witness, who signed the attesting clause, "signed, sealed, and delivered." The deed never went out of the possession of the grantor, and Lord Denman left it to the jury to say whether it had been duly executed and delivered with intent to operate immediately, and the jury found that it had been. The instruction was held by the court in banc to have been correct. But declarations of trust are often sustained by much less regard to evidence of delivery than is required for establishing deeds of conveyance. Thus in Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare, 67, the testator by a voluntary deed, covenanted with trustees that in case A. and B., his two natural sons, should survive him, his executors and administrators should pay to trustees named £60,000 upon trust for them to be paid at 21 years of age. He retained the deed in his pos session and told no one of it. By his will he bequeathed all his property in trust for his widow and other persons. The deed was found among his papers. It was held by Vice-Chancellor Wigram that it created a trust for A. (who survived the grantor), though the trustee refused to sue at law; and that the retention of the deed in the grantor's custody, and not communicating its existence to the trustee or cestui que trust, did not affect its validity. On the last point the vice-chancellor referred to Dillon v. Coppin, 4 Myln & C. 660, and to Doe v. Knight, 5 Barn. & C. 671. This subject is discussed in Adams v. Adams, 21 Wall. 185; in Bunn v. Winthrop, 1 Johns. Ch. 329; Souverbye v. Arden, id. 255; and in Lewin Trusts, 152. Mr. Lewin, as quoted in Adams v. Adams, gives the following rules on this subject: "On a careful examination the rule appears to be, that whether there

Dill. 340; Good v. Norley, 28 Iowa, 188. This case was overruled in Boyles v. Boyles, 37 id. 592; but in our view the opinion in 28 id. is the better law. Holmes v. Beal, 9 Cush. 223; Norton v. Norton, 5 id. 524; Arnold v. Sabin, 1 id. 525; Howard v. Moore, 2 Mich. 226; Coon v. Fry, 6 id. 506. Seward v. Didier. Opinion by Maxwell, J.

[Decided May 27, 1884.]

REVIVES RIGHT

LIMITATIONS-PROMISE TO PAY TO OPEN AND CLOSE.-(1) A writing sigued by the party as follows: "I am sorry that you have had to pay the notes of Frank Pillond and myself, upon which you were surety for us. I cannot at this time pay you the money, but propose to pay you. my share, which I am told is about $413. I hope to be able to pay you soon, but will let you know in a few days what I can do," held to take the debt out of the statute of limitations.

(2) A partial payment, acknowledgment of the debt, or promise to pay, made after the debt is barred, will revive it. (3) A defendant is not entitled to the opening and closing on a trial, unless he by his answer, admits the allegations of the plaintiff's petition, and relies entirely upon an affirmative defense. Rolfe v. Pillond. Opinion by Reese, J. [(1) See 35 Am. Rep. 576; 30 Eng. Rep. 207. (2) 22 Eng. Rep. 739.-ED.] [Decided May 28, 1884.]

JOINT-STOCK COMPANY ORGANIZATION TO SELL TOWN LOTS-DEED.-Certain owners in severalty of a tract of land laid the same off into a town-site, and organized a company to sell the lots. There was no conveyance to the company of the interests of the several owners of the land, but each shareholder received his quota of stock, and the articles of the association provided that deeds for lots sold were to be executed by the president and secretary. Held (1) to be a jointstock company; (2) that as each partner had authorized a conveyance by the president and secretary, his title passed by such deed. In Fereday v. Wightwick,

1 Russ. & M. 45, it is said that all property acquired for the purpose of a trading concern, whether of a personal or real nature, is to be considered as partnership property, and is to be applied accordingly in satisfaction of the demands of the partnership. Fall River, etc., Co. v. Borden, 10 Cush. 458. But it is said that there has been no conveyance of the legal title by the individual members of this company; hence they still hold the legal title to said lots. Real property acquired with partnership funds for partnership purposes is regarded in equity as personal estate, so far as the adjustment of partnership rights and payment of partnership debts are concerned. In the view of a court of equity it is immaterial in whose name the legal title to such property may be taken, whether in the name of one or all the partners, as the person holding the legal title does so for copartnership purposes. Dupuy v Leavenworth, 17 Cal. 263: Buckley v. Buckley, 11 Barb. 45; Kendall v. Rider, 35 id. 100. In Fowler v. Bailey, 14 Wis. 140, it is said: "It is a familiar principle of the law of partnership that when partners intend to give real estate the character of partnership property, and when they use it and treat it as such, then it will like all other assets of the firm be applied to the payment of the partnership debts, notwithstanding the paper title may happen to be in one partner, or appear to be in all as tenants in common." Fairchild v. Fairchild, 64 N. Y. 471. But while real estate purchased with partnership funds and held as partnership property will be listed as personal property, yet ordinarily in the absence of express authority, one partner cannot convey the whole title to real estate unless the entire title is vested in him. Chester v. Dickerson, 54 N. Y. 1; Van Brunt v. Applegate, 44 id. 544. But an absent partner may be bound by a deed executed by a copartner in the firm

name, if there was either a previous parol authority or a subsequent parol adoption of the act. 3 Kent Com. 48; Skinner v. Dayton, 19 Johns. 513; Cady v. Shepherd, 11 Pick. 405, 406; Bond v. Aitkin, 6 Watts & S. 165. And a deed executed by a partner in the firm name is effectual to convey all his interest. Clement v. Brush, 3 Johns. Cas. 180; McBride v. Hagan, 1 Wend. 326; Nunnely v. Doherty, 1 Yerg. 26; Waugh v. Carriger, id. 31; Morris v. Spence, 4 Harr. (Del.) 428; Jackson v. Stanford, 19 Ga. 15. Therefore had each partner executed deeds in the firm name, without authority from his copartners, to purchasers of lots, the purchasers would have acquired the title of all the partners. The same result would follow from the express authority from such partner, conferred upon the president and secretary, to execute deeds in the name of the copartnership. That this authority was given, not only in the articles of association, but by a separate irrevocable power of attorney by each stockholder and wife, is clearly established. Batty v. Adams Co. Opinion by Maxwell, J. [Decided May 29, 1884.]

MISSOURI SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.*

ECCLESIASTICAL LAW-DECISIONS OF CHURCH CONCLUSIVE--LIBEL--CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--PUBLICATION OF LIBEL.-(1) It is the established doctrine that in matters purely ecclesiastical, not affecting property rights, the decisions of the proper church judicatories made in good faith are conclusive upon civil tribunals. The provision of the Constitution (§ 10, art. 11) that the courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character, in no manner alters this rule. It means only that for such wrongs as are recognized by the law of the land the courts shall be open and afford a

remedy. Harmon v. Dreher, 1 Speers Eq. 87; Robert

son v. Bullions, 9 Barb. 134; Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. Monr. 261; German Reformed Church v. Seibert, 3 Penn. St. 282; State ex rel. v. Farris, 45 Mo. 183; Watson v. Garvin, 54 id. 364. (2) The plaintiff, a member of the Presbyterian Church, was tried by a session of the church in his absence, and without notice to him, upon a charge preferred by the pastor, who was a member of the session, that plaintiff had made false and defamatory statements concerning the pastor, and he was excommunicated by resolution of the session. Held, that unless the charge was false, and the members of the session maliciously, falsely or colorably made the proceedings against plaintiff a pretense for covering an intended scandal, they had not laid themselves open to action for libel. Farnsworth v. Storrs, 5 Cush. 412; Streety v. Wood, 15 Barb. 105; Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51 Vt. 514; S. C., 31 Am. Rep. 698. And the burden of proving express malice is upon the plaintiff. Shurtleff v. Stevens, supra; Town. Sland. 386; 2 Add. Torts, 931; Bradley v. Heath, 12 Pick. 163; Van Wyck v. Aspinwall, 17 N. Y. 190; Lewis v. Chapman, 16 id. 369; Vanderzee v. McGregor, 12 Wend. 545; Klink v. Colby, 46 N. Y. 427; S. C., 7 Am. Rep. 360. (3) The clerk of the session entered the resolution of excommunication and a preamble accompanying it upon the minute book of the session, exhibited them to members of the session for their signature, and sent plaintiff a written copy, and the pastor read both preamble and resolution to the congregation in church. Held, that these acts did not of themselves amount to a publication of a libel, or furnish a foundation for an action against either clerk or pastor. Landis v. Campbell. Opinion by Henry, J. ([1] See Isham v. Fullager, 14 Abb. N. C. 363.-ED.)

*To appear in 70 Missouri Reports.

CARRIER - RESTRICTING LIABILITY ·DUTY AS TO PROVIDING TRANSPORTATION.-(1) A contract by which a common carrier undertakes to relieve himself of all liability for damages occasioned by any delay in transportation and to impose them upon the shipper, will be effectual to protect the carrier only against the consequences of delays not caused by his own negligence. Harvey v. Railroad Co., 74 Mo. 541; Sturgeon v. Railroad Co., 65 id. 569; Rice v. Railroad Co., 63 id. 314; St. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry. Co. v. Cleary, 77 id. 634. (2) It is the duty of a common carrier to provide sufficient facilities and means of transportatiou for all freight which it should reasonably expect will be offered, but it is not bound to provide in advance for extraordinary occasions, nor for an unusual influx of business which is not reasonably to be expected. (3) If he receive property for transportation without any agreement to the contrary, he thereby undertakes to carry and deliver it within a reasonable time, regardless of any extraordinary or unexpected pressure of business upon him. Dawson v. Chicago & Alton R. Co. Opiniou by Hough, C. J.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-NUISANCE-POWER TO ABATE.-Power conferred upon a municipal corporation to abate nuisances is conferred for the public good, and not for any private corporate advantage, and for the failure of its officers to properly exercise the power the municipality is not liable. Citing Murtaugh v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 479. Armstrong v. City of Brunswick. Opinion by Norton, J.

SERVICES REN

CONTRACT-PARENT AND CHILDDERED-PROVISION IN WILL.-(1) Valuable services which would as between strangers raise an implied promise to pay for them, when performed for a person in loco parentis will not of themselves have that effect; and this whether they are performed wholly during minority or partly after majority. Guenther v. Birkicht, 22 Mo. 439; Hart v. Hart, 41 id. 431; Smith v. Myers, 19 id. 443. (2) In an action against the estate of a deceased person for services performed for him during his life-time, held, that his will making provision for the plaintiff was properly admitted in evidence as corroborative of the claim made in defense that the position of plaintiff was that of a member of the family of the deceased, and as bearing upon the supposed undertaking to pay wages for his services. Cowell v. Roberts. Opinion by Martin, Comr.

MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT ABSTRACT.

WILL-GIFT-PER CAPITA.-In this case the words of the will are: "The residue and remainder of the property left by my said wife shall be equally divided among my brothers and sisters and their heirs, after having paid the two last named legacies." The argument of the appellant is that this is a gift to a class; that only those of the class take who survive the testator; and that the words "and their heirs" are words of limitation, and were used to express the intention of the testator to give the absolute property. The argument of the appellees is, that by the use of the plural word "sisters" the testator must have intended not only his sister who was living, but his sisters who had deceased; and as these last could not take, the testator intended that their heirs should take the shares appropriate to them in the division. This question is one of difficulty, but we are inclined to the view of the appellees, for the reasons given in Gowling v. Thompson, L. R., 11 Eq. 336. See also Barnaby v. Tassell, id. 363; In re Sibley's Trust, 5 Ch. D. 494; 22 Eng. R. 246; Widgen v. Mello, 23 Ch. D. 737 ;

Davis v. Taul, 6 Dana, 51; Richey v. Johnson, 30 Ohio, 288. Huntress v. Place. Opinion by Field, J. [Decided June, 1884.]

CONVERSION-INSTRUCTIONS--EXCEPTION TO CHARGE. -The auditor's reports find that the defendant converted to his own use the chattels specified in the declaration, and that he owes the plaintiff upon the various items of account the sum of money respectively opposite each item," setting forth a sum certain in regoods belonged to the plaintiff; and the objection that spect of each. These words plainly import that the the auditor does not find that fact in terms, and that his phraseology is inapt, is too refined, even if it were open here upon exceptions to the refusal to recommit or to the admission of the reports in evidence. Butterworth v. Western Assur. Co., 132 Mass. 489. Or to the refusal to rule upon the sufficiency of the plaint. iff's evidence to maintain the action, or to direct a verdict before the whole testimony was closed on both sides. Wetherbee v. Potter, 99 Mass. 354; Kingsford v. Hood, 105 id. 495. At the close of the argument for the defendant his counsel presented twenty-three requests for instructions, but the court declined to rule upon them on the ground that they were not seasonably presented, at the same time saying, that at the close of the charge, the counsel could ask for such further instructions and except to such parts of the charge as he saw fit. At the end of the charge the court reported that if there were matters which counsel conceived had been omitted, they might call attention to them. This course was exactly in accordance with the decision in Ela v. Cockshott, 119 Mass. 416, 418, as generally understood and acted upon. We do not see sufficient reason for disturbing the now settled practice which leaves it within the discretion of the court, when a multitude of requests are presented after the arguments have begun, to throw the burden on counsel of calling attention to points not dealt with, at the end of the charge, with the right of course to except to such portions of the charge as they deem erroneous. The defendant's general exception to the charge, without pointing out particulars, was bad. Curry v. Porter, 125 Mass. 94. McMahon v. O'Connor. Opinion by Holmes, J.

[Decided May, 1884.]

cation by implication of law results from any change of condition or circumstances except that of a subsequent marriage. See discussion in Warner v. Beach, 4 Gray, 162. This clause as to implied revocations was first introduced in the Revised Statutes, ch. 62, § 9. The other provisions as to revocation were substantially taken from section 2 of chapter 24, of the acts of 1783. The commissioners in their note to this section say: "The clause as to implied revocation recognizes and adopts the existing law as established and understood among us." And their further discussion of this subject shows clearly that they had in mind the rule of the common law, that in case of a man, marriage and the birth of a child, and in the case of a woman, marriage alone, revoked a will previously made. We are of opinion that this provision, as to implied revocations, from its language and the reasons given for its introduction, has substantially the force of an express enactment of the rules of the common law, which we are not at liberty to change, even if the reason for the rule, in case of a woman, no longer exists. This was the view taken in Brown v. Clark, 77 N. Y. 339, upon a similar question under a statute of New York. We are therefore of opinion that the will of Susan E. Hammond was not properly admitted to probate. Swan v. Hammond. Opinion by Colburn, J.

[Decided Oct. 24, 1884.]

CORPORATION-BENEVOLENT-SUSPENSION OF MEMBER-NOTICE.-The plaintiff objects that the notice of his suspension was invalid, because it contained only a printed fac simile of the seal of the lodge, and the constitution of the defendant required that it be under the seal of the lodge. The provisions of the constitution are not fully set out, and we are therefore unable to determine whether, by the constitution, the presence of the seal is made any thing more than a matter of form, or whether a printed fac simile of the seal is not what was intended. There is no evidence that Karcher was misled by the notice, or that it was not in all respects as effectual in giving him information as if it had contained an actual impression of the seal of the lodge. So far as appears, this defect in the notice, if it was a defect, was immaterial. As the constitution and by-laws of the defendant, or of the Golden Rule Lodge, are not fully set out, we cannot construe them, but it appears that Karcher was a member of that lodge, and was "suspended in usual form;" and it must be assumed that this was done according to the rules of the lodge, and that as a member he was subject to these rules. The evidence offered amounts to this, that the lodge, in good faith, and in the manner prescribed by its rules, suspended Karcher for a cause which unexplained warranted suspension, but for which his illness was a justification. It was his duty to exhaust the remedies provided by the society of which he was a member, before appealing to the

courts.

Chamberlain v. Lincoln, 129 Mass. 70. He was suspended by the tribunal which he had chosen to determine the question according to rules to which he assented in becoming a member, and he received notice of the proceedings. The action of this tribunal, according to its rules, on a question which it had authority to decide, honestly taken, after the requisite notice to him, cannot be collaterally reviewed in this suit, on the ground that facts existed which, if brought to the notice of the tribunal, would have warranted or required a different decision. Grosvenor v. United Society, 118 Mass. 78; Dolan v. Court Good Samaritan, 128 id. 437. Karcher v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor. Opinion by Field, J. (See 15 Am. Rep. 24; 67 How. Pr. 38; 27 Eng. R. 595.-ED.)

[Decided June, 1884.]

JURISDICTION-FOREIGN CORPORATION-SERVICE ON -ASSIGNMENT OF LETTERS-PATENT.--In this Common

wealth a foreign corporation, unless jurisdiction is given over it by statute, or unless it voluntarily appears, cannot be sued at law except by means of an attachment of its property. Andrews v. Michigan Central Railroad, 99 Mass. 534; National Bank of Commerce v. Huntington, 129 id. 444. The service of process in this suit was not a legal service upon the corporation, as there is no statute authorizing such a service; at the most it was only equivalent to notice of the suit. It seems that the law is otherwise in England and in some other jurisdictions. Newby v. Von Oppen & Colt Manuf. Co., L. R., 7 Q. B. 293; 1 Eng. R. 323; Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Wightman, 29 Gratt. 431. A corporation may be decreed specifically to perform a contract. Jones v. Boston Mill Co., 4 Pick. 507. And this court has jurisdiction in equity to compel the assignment of letters-patent. Binney v. Annan, 107 Mass. 94. It does not appear that the personal chattels cannot be replevied, and as they are within the Commonwealth, if they are in the possession of any one, they must be in the possession of some person within the Commonwealth, who could be served with process and compelled to deliver up the chattels if the plaintiffs are entitled to the possession of them. No such person has been made a party defendant. So far as the bill asks for an assignment of letters-patent it asks for a personal decree against the defendant. Whatever may be the extent of the jurisdiction of the court over all property and all persons within the Commonwealth, it has never been held to extend to a foreign corporation, not made by statute amenable to process, for the purpose of compelling it specifically to perform a contract by executing a written assignment of letters-patent, unless the corporation voluntarily submits itself to the jurisdiction. The rights conferred by letters-patent have no special locality within the Commonwealth; they exist as well in Maine, where the corporation was created, as in Massachusetts. Carver v. Peck, 131 Mass. 291. We think this case is not within the purview of the Public Statutes, ch. 141, § 22; and that the bill must be dismissed. Spurr v. Scoville, 3 Cush. 578; Moody v. Gay, 15 Gray, 457; Felch v. Hooper, 119 Mass. 52; Walling v. Beers, 120 id. 548; Kansas Construction Co. v. Topeka Railroad, 135 id. 34. Desper v. Cont. Water Meter Co. Opinion by Field, J. (See 15 Eng. R. 270.) [Decided June, 1884.]

NEW JERSEY COURT OF CHANCERY ABSTRACT.*

SURETY-ENTITLED TO INDEMNITY-SUIT TO COMPEL PRINCIPAL TO PAY.-As a general rule, all that the surety is entitled to against the principal debtor is indemnity; in other words, to be made whole. If he pays less than the full amount due, or in depreciated currency, all he can recover is what he paid, or the value of what he gave in satisfaction. He has a right to be reimbursed, but to nothing more. Burge Sur. 359; 2 Dan. Neg. Inst., § 1342; Snyder v. Blair, 6 Stew. Eq. 208. In Fowler v. Strickland, 107 Mass. 552, it was held that an accommodation indorser has the same right to purchase paper on which he is liable that any other person has, and that in case he become the purchaser of such paper, he is entitled to recover the full amount due without regard to what he paid for it. The surety being entitled to nothing but indemnity, it follows necessarily from this limitation of his right that until he has paid something for his principal debtor he has no right to demand any thing of him except that he pay his debt to their common creditor. This right he may enforce in equity. After the debt *Appearing in 38 N. J. Eq. Reports.