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In Sutherland y. Northmore, 1 Dick. 56, a feme “To constitute such unsounduess of mind as should covert had a power under her marriage settlement, to avoid a deed at law the person executing such deed create a term and to raise money after the death of must be incapable of understanding and acting in the her husband. Her execution thereof during her hus- ordinary affairs of life." This statement of the rule is band's life-time was, on the case being sent to the given in the opinion of the House of Lords in Ball v. King's Bench, held to be good; and this holding the Marvin, 1 Dow. & C. 380, and is quoted with apparCourt of Chancery confirmed. See Wandesforde v. ent approval by the Supreme Court of the Uuited Carrick, L. R., 5 Irish Eq. 486.
States in Dexter v. Hall, 15 Wall. 9. In the former of In Duke v. Palmer, 10 Rich. Eq. 380, a testator ap- these cases the court below refused to charge that the pointed his wife and son executors, and gave to his unsoundness of mind must amount to idiocy; and this wife several slaves during her life, and at her death to ruling was sustained first by the Court of King's Bench be sold and equally divided among his lawful heirs. in Ireland, afterward by the Exchequer Chamber, and The son alone qualified as executor, and afterward finally by the House of Lords. The rule is thus stated with his mother's co-operation, sold one of the slaves in Denvett v. Demuett, 44 N. H. 531: “The question. for a full consideration. The mother survived eleven then in all cases where incapacity to contract from de years thereafter. Held, that one of testator's beirs fect of mind is alleged, is not whether the person's could not, after the mother's death, set aside the sale mind is impaired, nor if he is affected by any form of as against a bona fide purchaser of the slave from the insanity, but whether the powers of his mind bare original purchaser, but that bis only remedy was been so far affected by his disease as to render bim inagainst the executor for the proceeds of the sale. capable of transacting business like that in question."
In Bazemore v. Davis, 48 Ga. 339, lands were held in And again: “Every person is to be deemed of unsound trust for A. for life, and at her death to her children. mind who has lost his memory and understanding by The trustee sold and conveyed the whole estate, as old age, sickness or other accident, so as to render him trustee, A. entering on the deed a written consent to incapable of transacting his business and of managing its execution. Held, that A. did not thereby forfeit his property. When it appears that a grantor has not her life estate in the premises, so that a right of action strength of mind and reason to understand the nature immediately accrued to the remaindermen. See also
and consequences of his act in making a deed, it may Champlin v. Champlin, 3 Edw. Ch. 571; Styer's Ap- be avoided on the ground of insanity." Re Barker, ? peal, 2 Grant's Cas. 453; Loomis v. MoClintock, 10 Johns. Ch. 232. In Converse v. Converse, 21 Vt. 168, it Watts, 274; Bartles' case, 6 Stew. Eq. 46; Greeue v.
is said that a person is of unsound mind if "the mind Aborn, 10 R. I. 10.
is inert, the memory is unable to recall and the mind The court has no jurisdiction to order a sale before to retain in one view all the facts upon which the the time designated in the power, on the ground that judgment is to be formed for so long a time as may be it would be beneficial to the parties, Johnstone v. required for their due consideration.” The rule as to Baker, 8 Beav. 233; Bristow v. Skirrow, 27 id. 590; the responsibility of a lunatio or person non compos Blacklow v. Laws, 2 Hare, 40; Troy v. Troy, Busb. Eq. mentis upon his coutracts, is the same in equity as in 85; Simpson v. Cook, 24 Minn. 180; 27 id. 147; nor the law; and if this court is bound to follow the ruling in Legislature, Rodman v. Munson, 13 Barb. 63; Ervine's Dexter v. Hall it is conclusive of the question now Appeal, 16 Pemu. St. 256; see Clarke v. Hayes, 9 Gray, under consideration. It is insisted however that a dif4:26; Mohr v. Porter, 51 Wis. 504; Forster y. Forster,
ferent doctrine has been established in this State by 129 Mass. 564; Cooley's Const. Lim. (4th ed.) *97.-J.
several decisions of its Supreme Court, and that these H. STEWART REP.
decisions constitute a rule of property here, which this [See also 17 Am. Rep. 709; 13 id. 23; 25 Eng. Rep. court should adhere to. It is true that the Supreme 792.]
Court of this State has held that “equity will not in
terfere to set aside a conveyance, on the ground of the UNITED STATES CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT
insanity of the grantor, to one who shall have pur
chased in good faith, and for value, in ignorance of the COURT ABSTRACT.*
mental condition of the grantor.' Ashcraft v. De Ar
mond, 44 Iowa, 229. And also that " MORTGAGE-COVENANTS-AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE
persons of un.
sound inind will be bound by their executed contracts, MARRIED WOMAN-CAPACITY TO CONTRACT-RULE OF
where such contracts are fair and reasonable, and PROPERTY-FOLLOWING STATE COURTS.--A mortgage
were entered into by the other parties without knowlcontaining covenants of general warranty will, as be
edge of the mental unsoundness, in the ordinary course tween the mortgagor and mortgagee, pass an after-ac
of business, and where the parties cannot be placed in quired title. Rice v. Kelso, 7 N. W. Rep. 3; 10 id. 333;
statu quo." Abbott v. Creal, 56 Iowa, 175; S. C., 9N. Jones Mort., $$ 561.682, 825, and cases cited. But this
W. Rep. 115. And see, to the same effect, Behrens . rule does not apply to covenants in the deed of a married woman, for they amount to nothing more than a
McKenzie, 23 Iowa, 333. These cases undoubtedly hold release of dower,and do not estop her to claim au after
a different doctrine from that laid down in Dexter V. acquired interest. Bish. Mar. Wom., $ 603; Childs v.
Hall; and the question is whether they establish a McChesney, 20 lowa, 431 ; Iowa Code, $ 1937. There is
rule relating to land titles within the State of Iowa upon the face of the mortgage no express statement
which this court should follow, notwithstanding a con that the wife shall be bound by the covenants con
trary decision by the Supreme Court of the United tained therein. O'Neil v. Vanderburg, 25 Iowa, 104;
States. It is true that where any principle of law esThompson v. Merrill, 10 N. W. Rep. 796. In order to
tablishing a rule of real property has been settled in set aside a contract upon the ground of unsoundness of
the State courts that rule will be applied by the Fedmind it must appear that there was a total deprivation
eral courts within the same State; and it makes no of reason. E.c parte Barnsley, 3 Atk. 168; Stewart's
difference whether such rule of property grows out of Ex'r v. Lispenard, 26 Wend. 255. The more modern
the Constitution or statutes of the State, or out of rule is that it is only necessary to show that the party
the prmciples of the common law adopted and applied executing the contract was of such weak and feeble
to such titles. Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153. It mind as to be incapable of comprehending its nature.
may be doubted whether the question bere presented This rule is sometimes stated in another form, thus:
is not a question of equity law, and if it is, this court
is not bound by the decision of the State court. Nero * Appearing in 20 Federal Reporter.
es v. Scott, 13 How. 268; United States v. Howland,
4 Wheat. 115; Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 658. The de. is sufficient to give the injured party a right to recisions of the highest court of a State may be said to dress.' Nor need the resemblance be such as would constitute a rule of property when they relate to and deceive persons seeing the two trade-marks placed settle some principle of local law directly applicable to side by side (Manuf. Co. v. Trainer, 101 U. S. 64), or titles. A rule of property is one thing; a rule respect- such as would deceive experts, persons, because of ing the validity of a class of contracts which may or their peculiar knowledge from their being wholesale or may not affect titles to property is another and a dif- retail dealers, or in any other way specially conversant ferent thing. It has been held that the Federal courts with the trade-mark simulated. But the tradesman are not bound by the decisions of the State courts de- brings his privilege of using a particular trade-mark termining whether an instrument is a promissory note under the protection of equity if he proves, or it is ap(Bradley v. Lill, 4 Biss. 473), avd I suppose it would parent or manifest to the court by inspection, that the make no difference if such an instrument were secured | representation employed bears such a resemblance to by mortgage. The Federal courts would still maintain bis as to be calculated to mislead the public generally, the right to decide for themselves all questions as to who are purchasers of the article, to make it pass with its validity, and its force and effect, except such as are them for the one sold by him. If the indicia or signs determined by local statute. Again let us suppose that used tend to that result the party aggrieved will be the State courts establish a rule respecting the right of entitled to an injunction. This principle is sustained purchasers and assignees of negotiable paper, which is by the cases above referred to; by Walton y. Crowley, contrary to a rule upou the same subject established 3 Blatchf. 440; 2 Story Eq. Jur. 951; 2 Kent Comm. by the Supreme Court of the United States. It is 453, and a long and unbroken line of authorities, well settled as a general proposition that this being a American and English. See also Filley v. Fassett, 44 rule of general commercial law the Federal courts de- | Mo. 173. Liggett & Myer Tobacco Co. v. Hynes. Dist. cide upon it for themselves. Would the rule be oth-Ct., W. D. Ark., May, 1882. Opinion by Parker, J. erwise in a case where such an instrument happens
EJECTMENT-POSSESSION OF DEFENDANT-TRESPASS. to be secured by a mortgage? The case of Thomas v.
-In Arkansas, before the plaintiff can recover in Hatch, 3 Sumn. 170, is instructive upon the question, ejectment, he must show that at the time of the comwhat is to be understood by the phrase "rule of prop- mencement of the action the defendant was in posseserty?” The case turned largely upon the construc
sion. Tyler Ej. & Adv. Enj. 472; Owen v. Fowler, 24 tion of a deed. The Supreme Court of the State
Cal. 192; Owen v. Morton, id. 373; Pope v. Dalton, 31 (Maine) had in another case construed the same instru- id. 218; Williamson v. Crawford, 7 Blackf. 12; Pope v. ment; but Mr. Justice Story refused to adopt that Pendergrast, 1 A. K. Marsh. 12. The mere act of cutconstruction, saying: “If this were a question of ting timber on land and hauling it off is not such pospurely local law we should not hesitate to follow the session of the land as will entitle the owner to maindecision of that learned court, for which we entertaintain ejectment against the trespasser, and occasional the greatest respect. But the interpretation of a deed intrusions of this sort do not constitute possession, of this sort is in no just sense a part of the local law.
whether done under claim of title or not. Such acts It must be interpreted everywhere in the same man
are mere trespasses against the true owner, whoever be ner; that is to say, according to the force of the lan
* But it never was supposed that the guage used by the grantor, and the apparent intentions hunter had possession of the forest through which he of the parties deducible therefrom." Edwards v. Dav.
roamed in pursuit of game; and no more cab a wood. enport. Cir. Ct., 8. D. Iowa, May, 1883. Opinion by chopper be said to possess the woods in which he enters McCrary, J.
to cut logs. Thompson v. Burhans, 79 N. Y. 93; Austin TRADE-MARK-INFRINGEMENT-SIMILARITY-INTEN
v. Holt, 32 Wis. 478, 490; Washburn v. Cutter, 17 Miun. TION TO DECEIVE.-The question to be considered in
(Gil.) 361; 3 Washb. Real Prop. 133, 134. There is noththis case is whether the conduct of the defendant ing on the record to show the land is not susceptible of amounts to an infringement of the plaintiff's trade
actual occupation, cultivation and improvement. The mark, or an injury to his legal or equitable rights. As
case is not within the rule of Ewing v. Burujet, 11 Pet. was well remarked by the Kentucky Court of Appeals 41, and Door v. School District, 40 Ark. 237. Under the in the case of Avery v. Mickle, “the object of the
consent rule in the old form of the action of ejecttrade-mark law is to prevent one person from selling ment the defendant was compelled to confess lease, his goods as those of another, to the injury of the lata entry and possession, or pay the costs of suit, and the ter and of the public.” It grew out of the philosophy of plaintiff could bring another action (3 BI. Comm. 205; the general rule that every man should so use his own
Tyler Ej. 458, 472), and in many of the States, by statproperty and rights as not to injure the property or
ute, actions of ejectment may now be brought against rights of another, unless some priority of right or
persons claiming title or interests in real property, alemergency exists to justify a necessarily different man
though not in possession. Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 328, per of use. It is true in this case that the trade-mark 348; Tyler Ej. 458, 472. But neither of these rules, as upon the tobacco of defendant is not a fac simile of
we have seen, have application here. In this State a that upon the tobacco of plaintiff. If it was, it would
verdict and judgment in ejectment is final and conclu. of course be an infringement. They are not exactly sive on the title and right of possession put in issue by similar. But to constitute an infringement exact simi- the pleadings. Where this is the rule it is difficult to larity is not required; there may be an infringement perceive why the possession of the land by the defendwithout it. The Supreme Court of the United States
aut should be an indispensable prerequisite to the in Gorham Co. v. White, 14 Wall. 511, declares: "Two plaintiff's right to have the merits of their respective trade-marks are substantially the same in legal con
titles tried at law. It is probably another instance of templation is the resemblance is such as to deceive an
the continuance of a rule after the reason for it has ordinary purchaser "- giving such attention to the
ceased to exist, and after it bas become an obstruction same as such a person usually gives, and to cause him
rather than an aid to the administration of justice. to purchase the one supposing it to be the other. The However this may be, the old rule is embedded in the same court, in McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 255, says:
statute law of this State, and the courts are powerless “Where the similarity is sufficient to convey a false
to change it. Ozark Land Co. v. Leonard. Cir. Ct., impression to the publio mind, and is of a character to
E. D. Ark., April, 1884. Opinion by Caldwell, J. mislead and deceive the ordinary purchaser in the ex- CARRIER-BILL OF LADING-RESTRICTING LIABILITY ercise of ordinary care and caution in such matters, it -NEGLIGENCE.-In this case the bill of lading exempts
the vessel from liability for loss occasioned by “pi- paper corporation, as a form or shield to cover a partrates, robbers, thieves, * or from any act, neg. nership or joint venture, and where the stockholders lect or default of the master or mariners." The de- are partners in intention. The liberal facilities offendant's vessel was a general ship, aud a common car- fered by the statutes of many of our States for organrier. The clause of the bill of lading exempting her izing such corporations are undoubtedly often utilized from liability for any "act, neglect or default of the by those whose only object is to escape liability as master or mariners” is therefore invalid, and affords partners by calling themselves stockholders or direct. no defense if the loss was occasioned through their Where such a concern is formed, a court of negligence. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; equity might treat the associates as partners in fact, Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co., 93 U. S. 174; disregard the fiction of a corporate relation between The IIadji, 16 Fed. Rep. 861 ; 18 id. 459. It is not nec- them, and subject the title of the property transferred essart to consider the conflictiug views as to the ship's to it by the promoters to any equities which might liability under the exception of “thieves, robbers," have existed as against them. The general rule which etc., that the theft had been committed by one of her charges a principal with the knowledge of his agent is own employees (Spinetti v. Atlas Steamship Co., 80 N. founded on the presumption.that the agent will comY. 71; Taylor v. Liverpool, etc., L. R., 9 Q. B. 546), municate what it is his principal's interest to know por what effect, in the consideration of that question, and the agent's duty to impart. In the language of should be given to the principles laid down by the Su- Mr. Justice Bradley, the rule “is based on the principreme Court in Railroad Co. v. Lockwood; since J., ple of law that it is the agent's duty to communicate who is satisfactorily shown to have committed to his principal the knowledge which he has respectthe theft, was not at this time in the ship's employ, ing the subject-matter of the vegotiation, and the prebut had been previously discharged. The exception sumption that he will perform that duty." The Disof loss by thieves or robbers is valid, unless it be shown tilled Spirits, 11 Wall. 367. The rule has no applicathat there was negligence on the part of the ship which tion when an agent divests himself of his fiduciary contributed to the theft or facilitated it; and upon character and becomes a contracting party with his defendant's proviug that the theft was committed by principal, because there is no reason to presume that a person not belonging to the ship, the burden of he will impart information which it is for his interest proof is upon the libellants to show to the satisfaction to suppress.
“When a man is about to commit & of the court that the loss might have been avoided by fraud it is to be presumed that he will not disclo:e the exercise of reasonable and proper care on the part that circumstance to his colleagues." Kennedy v. of the ship, and that the theft would not have occurred Green, 3 Mylue & K. 699. Accordingly it has been reif such care had beeu exercised. If the carelessness of peatedly adjudged that a corporation will not be the ship was such as to invite the theft, or to make it charged by the knowledge of a director in a transaceasy, or if the attempt would not have been successful tion in which the director is acting for himself, beexcept through the lack of such watchfulness and care cause he represents his own interests, and not those of as was reasonably incumbent upon tbose having charge the corporation. Com. Bank v. Cunningham, 24 Pick. of such treasure, then the loss must be held to be oc- 270, 276; Housatonic & Lee Banks v. Martin, 1 Metc. casioned by the carrier's negligence and inattention to 308; Winchester v. Balt. & S. R. Co., 4 Md. 239; Seneca his duty, as well as through the direct acts of the thief. Co. Bank v. Neass, 5 Denio, 337; La Farge Fire Ins. In Clark v. Barnwell, 12 How. 272, 281, the court say: Co. v. Bell, 22 Barb. 54; Terrell v. Branch Bank of
But if it can be shown that it (the loss) might have Mobile, 12 Ala. (N. S.) 502. Cir. Ct., N. D. New York.
JURISDICTION-U. S. COURTS - ESTOPPEL DENY held liable. It is competent for the libellants to show
AFTER REMOVAL.- All the loircumstances that tbe respondents might have prevented it (the loss)
sary to coufer jurisdiction, as provided in the first by proper skill and diligence in the discharge of their
and second sections of the act of 1875, are found duties." In Transportation ('o. v. Downer, 11 Wail.
to exist in this case; the amount exceeds $500 and the 139, 133, the court say: “If the danger might have been
parties are citizens of different States. Nothing more avoided by the exercise of proper care aud skill on the
is required. Brooks v. Bailey, 9 Fed. Rep. 438; Petpart of the defendant, it is plain that the loss should
terson v. Chapman, 13 Blatchf. 395; Claflin v. Ins. Co., be attributed to the negligence and inattention of the
110 U. S. 81. The subsequent clause of the first seccompany, and it should be held liable, notwithstand
tion, which provides that “no civil suit shall be ing the exception in the bill of lading.' See also Six
brought before either of said courts against any perHundred and Thirty Quarter Casks of Sherry Wine, 14 Blatchf. 517; Dedekin v. Voge, 3 id. 44; Richards
son by any original process or proceeding in any other
district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in v. Hansen, 1 Fed. Rep. 54, 63; The Invincible, 1 Low.
which he shall be found at the time of serving such *225; The Montana, 17 Fed. Rep. 377. The Saratoga.
process or commencing such proceedings,” does not Dist. (t., S. D. N. Y., June, 1881. Opinion by
limit the jurisdiction of the court but relates to the Brown, J.
mode of acquiring it. It is intended for the protecCORPORATION-NOTICE TO STOCKHOLDERS; NOT TO tion of the defendant and confers a privilege which ho CORPORATION.-A corporation can have no agents can waive by appearing without asserting it. Robinuntil it is brought into existence, and after that it
son v. Nat. Stock-yard Co., 12 Fed. Rep. 361 ; Toland acts and becomes obligated only through the iustru
v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300; Sayles v. N. W. Ins. Co., mentality of its authorized representatives. Stock
supra; Flanders v. Ætna Ins. Co., 3 Mas. 158; Gracie holders cannot bind it except by their action at cor
v. Palmer, 8 Wheat. 699; Kelsey v. Penn. R. Co., 14 porate meetings, and it is undoubted law that notice
Blatchf. C. C. 89. If permitted to do so, the plaintto individual stockholders is not notice to the cor- iff would undoubtedly have little difficulty in showing poration, and their knowledge of facts is not notice of that the defendant is found within this district and is them to the corporation. In re Carews, Act, 31 Beav.
therefore in no position to claim the benefit of the 39; Union Canal Co. v. Loyd, 4 Watts & S. 393; Fair
privilege alluded to, but confining the case strictly to field Turnpike Co. v. Thorp. 13 Conn. 182; The Ad
the stipulated facts it must be held that the defendmiral, 8 Law Rep. (N. S.) Mass. 91. Instances may ant has waived any objection which it might have occur where associates combive together to create a taken. The jurisdiction of this court was invoked by
the defendant and it should abide the result in a forum care and labor in consequence of her child's sickness, of its own seeking. Cir. Ct., N. D. New York, June and sustained pecuniary loss by reason of boarders be6, 1884. Edwards v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. Opinion | ing kept away. Held, that defendant was liable for by Coxe, J.
damages. The carrying of persons infected with conEASEMENT-IMPLIED RESERVATION-DEDICATION TO
tagious diseases along public thoroughfares, so as to PUBLIC.-At common law a dedication does not pass
endanger the health of other travellers, is indictable a fee or freehold in the soil, nor give any right to the
as a nuisance. Add. Torts, & 297; Rex v. Vantandillo, profits of the soil. It only serves as an estoppel in pais
4 Maule & S. 73. Spreading contagious diseases among to the owner of the soil to assert any rights of posses
animals by negligently disposing of, or allowing to ession inconsistent with the enjoyment of the uses to
cape, animals infected, is actionable. Add. Torts which the dedication was made. Washb. Easem. 2:20.
(Wood's Ed.), 10, note; Anderson v. Buckton, 1 Stra. A dedication may be made without writing by act in
192. A person sustaining an injury not common to pais as well as by deed. It is not at all necessary that
others by a nuisance is entitled to an action. Co. Litt. the owner should part with the title which he has, for
56a. Negligently imparting such a disease to a person dedication has respect to the possession, and not the
is clearly as great an injury as to impute the having it; permanent estate. Its effect is not to deprivea party
and negligently affecting the health of persons injuriof his land, but to estop him, while the dedication
ously as great a wrong as so affecting that of animals. continues in force, from asserting that right of exclu.
Cir. Ct., S. D. New York, July 5, 1884. Smith v. Baker. sive possession and enjoyment which the owner of Opinion by Wheeler, J. property ordinarily has. Where as in the case of a PLEDGE-SECURITIES-REHYPOTHECATION BY BROhighway, the public acquire but a mere right of pas- KER.–Where the owner of securities pledges them sage, the owner, who makes the dedication, retains a with a stock-broker as collateral to a loan, the latter right to use the land in any way compatible with the has no right to rehypothecate them in such a way that full enjoyment of the public easement. Id. 216; Hun- they cannot be restored to the owner upon payment ter v. Trustees, 6 Hill, 411; Tallmadge v. East River of the loan, although both parties understood that the Bank, 26 N. Y. 108; Dubuque v. Maloney, 9 lowa, 455. broker would have to use the securities to obtain the The public takes no more than the owner gives. loan. Usage is inadmissible to destroy a contract. Where a plat of land bas been dedicated as a public Cir. Ct., S. D. New York, June 21, 1884. Oregon & square, the authorities of the town were prohibited Transcontinental Co. v. Hilmers. Opinion by Walfrom making use of the land for purposes inconsistent lace, J. with its use as a public square. Abbott v. Mills, 3 Vt.
TRUST-DECLARATION OF - MANUAL DELIVERY.521; State v. Catlin, id.-530; Pomeroy v. Mills, id. 279;
In cases of declarations of trust and deeds of conveyCincinnati y, White's Lessees, 6 Pet. 431. It follows
ance or mortgage, when nothing further is expected to that the municipal authorities cannot deprive the
be done by the beneficiary or grantee to complete the owner of land, who has simply dedicated to the public
transaction as a whole, a formal sealing and delivery, an easement to pass over it, of any use of the land
without an actual delivery to the other party, or to a dedicated not inconsistent with the full enjoyment of
third person for his use, will be sufficient to make the the easement. Cir. Ct., E. D. Tenn., April, 1884.
deed or declaration operative immediately, unless Stevenson v. Chattanooga. Opinion by Key, J.
something else exist or be done to qualify such formal STATUTE OF TRAUDS-CONTRACT FOR SALE OF GOODS
delivery. In Hope v. Harman, 11 Jur. 1097, Mr. Hope -MEMORANDUM.-The travelling agent of the defend. executed a deed to his nephew for a box of jewels, in aut company addressed to his principals an order,
the presence of a witness, who signed the attesting "send to C. W. S. Banks: terms net 30 days; freight clause, "signed, sealed, and delivered." The deed allowed," signed by him as agent and followed by a
never went out of the possession of the grantor, and list of the merchandise desired, with prices and direc- Lord Denman left it to the jury to say whether it had tions for shipping, signed by Banks, the plaintiff. been duly executed and delivered with intest to operHeld, that the paper was upon its face merely an
ate immediately, and the jury found that it had been. order, and not a memorandum of sale signed by the
The instruction was held by the court in band to have defendant or his agent, within the terms of the stat
been correct. But declarations of trust are often susute of frauds. There is no real question but that these tained by much less regard to evidence of delivery instruments sufficiently set forth tbe terms of the sale,
than is required for establishing deeds of conveyance. if they show a sale, nor but that the name of the Thus in Fletcher v. Fletcher, 4 Hare, 67, the testator agent is sufficiently signed to the memorandum, if it by a voluntary deed, covenanted with trustees that in is a memorandum of a bargain of sale and he had au
case A. and B., his two natural sons, should survive thority to bind the defendant to a contract of sale. him, bis executors and administrators should pay to Drury v. Young, 58 Md. 516. The memorandum must trustees named £60,000 upon trust for them to be paid set forth on its face enough to gather a contract of
at 21 years of age. He retained the deed in his pos. sale from, as against the party to be charged with the
session and told no one of it. By his will he beconsequences of such a contract in the action. Eger- | queathed all his property in trust for his widow and ton v. Mathews, 6 East, 307; Cooper v. Smith, 15 id. other persons. The deed was found among his pa103; Bailey v. Ogden, 3 Johns. 399. This memoran
pers. It was held by Vice-Chancellor Wigram that it dum appears to be of an order, and not of a sale, and
created a trust for A. (who survived the grantor), would so far as it shows for itself, fail to make out a
though the trustee refused to sue at law; and that the sale without acceptance of the order. Chit. Cont. 319.
retention of the deed in the grantor's custody, and Cir. Ct., D. Vermont, March 20, 1881. Banks v. Harris not communicating its existence to the trustee or Manf. Co. Opinion by Wheeler, J. (See 20 Fed. Rep.
cestui que trust, did not affect its validity. On the last 668, note; 47 Am. Rep. 532; 48 id. 110.-ED.)
point the vice-chancellor referred to Dillon v. Coppin,
4 Myln & C. 660, and to Doe v. Knight, 5 Barn. & ('. NEGLIGENCE-- SPREADING DISEASE DAMAGES.- 671. This subject is discussed in Adams v. Adams, 21 Defendaut took his children when they had whoop- Wall. 185; in Bunn v. Winthrop, 1 Johns. (h. 329; ing-cough, a contagious disease, to the boarding-house Souverbye v. Arden, id. 255; and in Lewin Trusts, of plaintiff to board, and by reason of his negligence 152. Mr. Lewin, as quoted in Adams v. Adams, gives her child, and the children of other boarders, con- the following rules on this subject: “On a careful extracted the disease, whereby she was put to expense, amination the rule appears to be, that whether there
was transmutation of possession or not, the trust will or grade the approach to his premises; but in so do be supported, provided it was in the first instance per- ing he must not obstruct the ditch or the way. (3) It fectly created. * It is evident that a trust is is “ wilfully" obstructing a public ditch for one wbo not perfectly created where there is a mere intention knows its character to purposely and perversely fill it or voluntary agreement to establish a trust, the settler up in a permanent way, even though his object is to himself contemplating some further act for tbe pur- obtain access from his lands to the highway, and the pose of giving it completion. * * It the settler act is done under a mistaken notion of his rights. The propose to convert himself into a trustee, then the word "wilfully," when used to denote the intent with. trust is perfectly created, and will be enforced as soon which an act is done, is a word which is susceptible of as the settler has executed an express declaration of different significations, depeuding upon the context trust intended to be final and binding upon him, and in which it is used. It is employed in penal statutes in this case it is immaterial whether the nature of the more frequently to distinguish between those acts property be legal or equitable. * Where the which are intentional and by desigu and those which settler proposes to make a stranger the trustee, then are thoughtless or accidental. It may sometimes to ascertain whether a valid trust has been created or mean corruptly or unlawfully, or again designedly or not, we must take the following distinctions: If the purposely, with an intent to do some act in violation subject of the trust be a legal interest, and one capable of the law. Com. v. Bradford, 9 Meto. 270; Com. v. of legal transmutation, as land, or chattels, etc., the Brooks, 9 Gray, 303; Com. v. MoLaughlin, 105 Mass. trust is not perfectly created unless the legal interest 463. Sometimes it is used as implying an evil intent be actually vested in the trustee." It seems to us that without justifiable excuse. 1 Bish, Crim. Law, $ 421; the deed in question, regarded merely as a declaration State v. Abram, 10 Ala. 928; McManus v. State, 36 id. of trust, was clearly executed in a manner to fulfill all 285; Com. v. Kneeland, 20 Piek. 206; United States v. the requirements of such an instrument; though we Three Railroad Cos., 1 Abb. 196; State v. Preston, 34 are further of opinion that it was well and sufficiently Wis. 675; 47 Am. Rep. 311. Commissioners v. Ely. executed and delivered as a deed of conveyance to Opinion by Champlin, J. transfer the legal title. Doe v. Knight, 5 B. & C. 671; [Decided June 18, 1884.) Blight v. Schenck, 10 Penn. St. 285; Diehl v. Emig, 15 P. F. Smith, 320. Cir. Ct., W. D. Penn., May 23, 1884. Linton v. Brown's Admrs. Opinion by Bradley, J. NEBRASKA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.
GUARDIAN AND WARD-JURISDICTION — SALE OF MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. INFANT'S ESTATE - SETTLEMENT - RATIFICATION
LIMITATION.- When a petition for the appointment INNKEEPER-BAGGAGE-GUEST DRUNK-PEDDLER- of a guardian for a child six or seven years of age was NOTICE.-An innkeeper's liability for a guest’s bag- signed in the name of the child, and a guardian was apgage is not diminished, but rather increased, by the pointed and gave bond, etc., held, sufficient to give the fact that the guest has got too drunk at his bar to court jurisdiction. When the records of the Probate take care of it himself. A guest's obligation to notify Court showed a license to a guardian to sell the real the innkeeper if he has property of extraordinary estate of his ward, a sale aud coufirmation thereof, value in his baggage does not attach to a peddler stop- and the execution of a deed to the purchaser, it will be ping at an inn with his pack, or with the usual ap- presumed twenty-two years afterward, in an action by purtenances of his business. So held in the case of a the ward to recover the land, that the necessary steps peddler who put up at an inn with a comrade, each were taken to procure the issuing of the license. Bank having a valise and a small box, their baggage amount- of United States v.Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 70; Coombs v. ing to upwards of $300, and whose goods and valise Lane, 4 Ohio St. 112; Ward v. Barrows, 2 id. 241; were taken while in the landlord's care. Rubenstein v. Tecumseh Town-site Case, 3 Neb. 284. This doctrine Cruikshanks. Opinion by Sherwood, J. (21 Eng. is peculiarly applicable to a new State, where from Rep. 561.)
lack of conveniences, and from the ease with which [Decided June 18, 1884.]
access may be had to them, papers cannot or at least Town- DIVIDED- DEBT MANDAMUS.- Where a
are not, as carefully preserved as in older commuvi.
ties. This consideration with others led to the incortownship is divided into two parts, one part taking a new name and the other retaining the old name, the
poration into both our Constitutions of the clause re. latter still exists as the old township, and is charge
quiring sales of real estate by executors, admiuistraable with its obligations, and a writ of mandamus will
tors, and guardians to be licensed by the judge of the issue to compel it to eet them. Courtright v. Brooks
District Court. We therefore hold that in the absence Township. Opinion by Cooley, C. J. (See 11 Am. Rep.
of proof to the contrary the issuing of license to sell 602; 21 Eng. Rep. 267.-ED.)
real estate presupposes the existence of the necessary
steps to authorize its issue. See Grignon v. Aster, 2 [Decided June 18, 1884.]
How. 339; Thompson y. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 162; Ballo F. HIGHWAY--LIABILITY
Hudson, 13 Gratt. 672; McPherson v. Cuuliff, 11 S. & TING OWNERS — DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA—"WIL- R. 422; Lalanne v. Moreau, 13 La. 433. A settleFULLY."--(1) A commissioner of highways, or an over- ment by a ward after he comes of age with his guardseer acting under his direction, incurs no liability to ian, acceptance of the proceeds of sales made by him, abutting owners, if in the proper exercise of his law
and discharge of the guardian and sureties ou his ful discretion, and for the sole purpose of improving bond, is a ratification of his acts. No action can be the highway, he runs a ditch in front of their premi- maintained by a ward to recover lands sold by his ses which they have to bridge in order to reach the guardian unless the action is commenced within five road. The injury, if any, which a lawfully coustructed years next after the ward comes of age. It is claimed ditch occasions an abutting owner, is damnum absque on Didier's behalf what the five years' limitation of the injuria. Acts done by authority of a valid statute, decedents' act only applies in case the sale was valid. and with reasonable care, will not support any liabil- There would seem to be no necessity for a statute of ity for resulting damage. (2) Abutting owners have
limitations to protect a title valid in itself. The statthe right of access to the highway, and one who has
ute without doubt, was intended to apply to all sales been cut off therefrom by the running of a ditch, or made by a guardian,executor,or administrator. Spencer the improvement of the road, may bridge the ditch,
v. Sheehau, 19 Miun, 338 (Gil. 292); Miller v. Sullivan, 4