« السابقةمتابعة »
APPEAL from the Circuit Court for. Howard county.
$130,000, as appeared from his examination, was an es. this agreement, and other questions incident to it in timate made by him upon the assumption that the
the case. sales for the following three years would be the same, The judgment therefore entered upon the referee's or at least not less per year than they had been during report should be the short period that the agreement was carried out.
Affirmed. This could not be assumed in respect to the sales of this commodity, consisting of manufactured silks and cottons for the long period of three years thereafter, and
NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE CAUSE-CANCER RE. the referee properly refused to find, as requested, that
SULTING FROM INJURY-DAMAGES. it appearing that the yearly sales by the firm of the production of their mills had been $1,000,000 annually,
MARYLAND SUPREME COURT. DECEMBER 20, 1883.* and the annual expenses had been $23,000, the law would
BALTIMORE CITY PASS RAILWAY Co. v. KEMP. presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the future sales would have yielded the same re
In an action brought by husband and wife to recover damages turns under the same expense, and that Talcott was
for personal injuries to wife, caused by negligence of deentitled to bave his damages for loss of prospective
fendants, the wife having testified that shortly after the profits computed upon that basis.
injury complained of, a cancer was developed at the place
on her person where she was injured, and medical testiThe law makes no such presumptiou. Profits are re. mony having been offered on both sides of the question, coverable as damages where it cau be showu with rea- whether the cancer was the result of the injury, it was sonable certainty what the party would have received
held: if the coutract had been fulfilled, as appears in the 1st. That it was for the jury to determine as a matter of fact leading case of Masterson v. Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn,
whether the cancer did result from the injury received. 7 Hill, 52, which the appellant cites and on which he
And in determining this question they were required to relies. The plaintiff there had a contract to furnish
consider all the circumstances and coincidences of the
case in connection with the testimony of the professional marble from a specified quarry at a specified sum for witnesses. the erection of a city hall, which, by a contract made 2d. That if the jury believed from all the evidence before with the owners of the quarry, he was to receive at a them that the cancer was the natural and proximate consmaller sum than he was to get for the marble when sequence of the blow inflicted, by the negligent act of the delivered for use in the building. That difference con- defendant, it would properly form an element to be constituted his profit, the whole of which prospectively
sidered in awarding damages for the pain and injury sufcould be accurately ascertained by the proof of that 3d. That the fact that she may have had a tendency or predis
fered by the female plaintiff. amount, and of the amount of marble he was by the
position to cancer, could afford no proper ground of obcontract to deliver to the defendant, and it is only in
jection to her claim. such cases where the prospective profits can be shown with reasonable certainty that they can be recovered as damages. Mayne on Dam. 15, 18.
of It may have been possible to have ascertained with
Bernard Carter aud A. W. Machen, for appellant reasonable ccrtainty the amount of profits that could John S. Tyson and Henry E. Wootton, for appelhave been obtained on the sale of the goods which R. lees. & H, Adams had manufactured and on hand at the time of the assignment if they had been delivered, by and wife to recover for personal injuries suffered by
ALVEY, C. J. This is an action brought by husband proof of the market price at that time and in accord the wife, caused, as it is alleged, by the negligeut auce with the referee's finding and action for damages
wrong of the defendants. for the won-delivery of these goods may have been
The trial below resulted in a verdict and judgment maintainable against the medibers of the firm. How
for the plaintiffs ; and the defendants have appealed ever that may be, the goods were not delivered, and
for alleged errors in grauting a prayer on the part of this was after the assignment simply a claim for an un.
the plaintiffs, and refusing a prayer on the part of the ascertained amount of damages which was not prova- defendants. ble uuder the assignment as a debt. The appellant requested the referee to find – which tion granted at the instance of the plaintiffs includes
1. It is objected by the defendants, that the instructhe referee would not--that upou the refusal of the as
and authorized the jury to find for a cause of action signee to deliver upon demand the goods manufactured
that should have been sued for by the husband aloue, and on hand at the time of the assignment, he (Tal- without the joinder of the wife. We do not so read cott) was entitled in this proceeding to an order or de
the instruction. It simply directed the jury, that in cree that they make such delivery to him or account
estimating the damages, they were to consider the to him as assiguee for the proceeds of these manufac
health and condition of the female plaintiff before the tured goods. The assignee could not be compelled to fulfill by the injury complained of, as compared with her condition
at the time of the trial, in consequence of the injury; delivery of goods the un performed contract of R. & and whether the injury in its nature was permaH. Adams at the time of the assigument. No author
nent, and how far it was calculated to disable her from ity or power was given them in that instrument to do engaging in those household pursuits and employe
All the property of the firm was, I assume, as is ments, for which in the absence of such injury she usual in such instauces, conveyed to them subject to
would be qualified; and also the physical and mental the trust already referred to, to convert it into money suffering to which she was subjected, by reason of the and apply the mouey to the payment of the just debts injury; and to allow such damages as in the opinion of of the firm, which was what they had to do, and all
the jury would be a fair and just compensation for the they could do.
injury which she sustained." The conclusion from what has been stated is that
Now according to the common law upon this subTalcott's claim does not come under this trust, be
ject, it is perfectly well settled, that in an action cause it was not a debt, but a claim for damages unascertained, which is sufficient to dispose of this appeal husband and wife must join, and the declaration must
brought for personal iujuries suffered by the wife, the without deciding whether the referee was right or wrong in holding that the making of a general assigu- conclude to their damage. But in such action care ment for the benefit of creditors was not a breach of
*To appear in 61 Daryland Reports.
should be taken that there be not included any cause cancer in any given case, yet they all agree in saying
mony given by the professioual witnesses. If there-
mote cause will not be charged with the effect. If a We shall not recite in detail all the evidence upon given result can be directly traced to a particular the subject. Suffice it to state, that the evidence cause, as the natural and proximate effect, why should shows clearly and without contradiction, that Mrs. not such effect be regarded by the law, even though Kemp was, at the time of the accident, and for many such causo may not always, and under all condition years prior thereto, apparently in good health and con- of things, produce like results? It is the common dition. The accident occurred about the middle of observation of all, that the effects of personal physical May, 1880, and a very short time thereafter the cancer injuries depend much upon the peculiar conditions commenced its development on the injured part of
and tendencies of the persons injured; and what may her person. In her testimony, after describing the produce but slight and comparatively uninjurious manner in which the accident occurred, and how she consequences in one case, may produce consequences was thrown against the railing on the platform of the of the most serious and distressing character in car, as she was about getting off, and the hurting of another. And this being so, a wroug.doer is not perher right arm and left breast, she states that the right mitted to relieve himself from responsibility for the arm was bruised and discolored; and “where the consequences of his act, by showing that the injury breast was struck it was sore, and remained so from would have been of less severity if it had been inflicted that time out. Prior to that time she had no pain or upon any one else of a large majority of the human soreness; and two or three weeks afterward, a small family. Hence the general rule is, that in actions of lump appeared in the left breast," which upon being tort like the present the wrong-doer is liable for all shown to ber physicians, was pronounced to be a can- the direct injury resulting from bis wrongful act, and cer. Dr. Smith first operated for its removal on the that too although the extent or special nature 8th of November, 1880, when it was about the size of of the resulting injury could not, with certainty, an orange, and he operated again about the 12th of have been foreseen or contemplated as the probable January, 1881, when the entire breast was removed, result of the act done. 3 Suth. on Dam. 714, 715, and but without success in extirpating the roots of the the cases there cited. disease. The cancer still remains, and is pronounced The general rule is stated by Addison, in his work to be incurable. The two daughters of Mrs. Kemp, in on Torts (3d ed.), p. 5, with as much clearness and their testimony, fully corroborate the statement of precision as will be found in any other text writer, their mother, in regard to her previous good health and he states the rule to be, “that whoever does an and apparent freedom from disease, and the subse- illegal act is answerable for all the consequences that quent appearance and growth of the cancer. And the eusue in the ordinary and natural course of events, professional witnesses, while they all testify that it is though those cousequences be immediately and diimpossible to know and be certain as to the origin of rectly brought about by the intervening agency of
others, provided the intervening agents were set in NOTE.-In Stewart v. City of Ripon, 38 Wis. 584, motion by the primary wrong-doer, or provided their cited in principal case, it was held that "the public acts causing the damage were the necessary or legal streets and sidewalks of a city are for the use of the and natural consequence of the original wrongful act." sick and infirm, and those with organic predisposition If therefore the jury believed from all the evidence to disease, as well as for that of the healthy and robefore them, that the cancer in the breast of Mrs. bust; and the corporation is chargeable with know). Kemp was the natural and proximate consequence of edge that persons of the former classes constantly the blow received ou her breast, by the negligent act travel its highways, and that a bodily injury to such of the defendants, it would properly form au element from a defective highway may be greatly aggravated to be considered in awarding damages for the pain and by their diseased condition. If therefore the diseased injury suffered by her.
condition of plaintiff's arm would not have occurred If by the blow received a severe contusion had been but for his organic tendency to scrofula, still defendproduced, resulting in an ordinary tumor or open ant's negligence must be regarded as the proximate ulcer, we suppose no question would have been raised
cause of the whole injury." as to the right of the plaintiff to show such results of In Oliver v. Town of La Valle, 36 Wis. 592, “plaintiff, the injury received, as indicating the extent of the who was a married woman, and pregpant, was riding injury and the degree of suffering endured. Why with her brother, and when crossing a defective bridge should a different rule be applied to this case? That
in a public highway the team broke through the bridge. the female plaintiff may have had a tendency or pre- The plaintiff jumped from the wagon and assisted her disposition to cancer, can afford no proper ground of
brother in an attempt to extricate the team, Failing objection.
in this at the request of her brother she ran some disShe in common with all other people of the commu
tance to obtain more assistance. The result of her nity had a right to travel or be carried in the cars of fright aud exertions was a miscarriage. She brought the defendants, and she had a right to enjoy that priv- an action against the town, and the principal damages ilege without incurring the peril of receiving a wrong- proved on the trial were the consequences of such misful injury that might result in inflaming and develop- carriage. It was held that such damages were the ing the dormant germs of a fatal disease. It is not
proximate result of the negligence of the towa), for the defendants to say that because they did not, or and & verdict and judgment therefor were could not in fact, anticipate such a result of their neg- tained." ligent act, they must therefore be exonerated from
In Brown v.Chicago,etc.,R.Co.,54 Wis.342, the railway liability for such consequences as ensued. They must
company's servants by mistake told a husband and be taken to know, and to contemplate, all the natural
wife to get off at the wrong place. The wife was pregand proximate consequences, not only that certainly pant. The walking to reach a place of comfort brought would, but that probably might flow from their
on a miscarriage. The court held that in an action wrongful act.
against the carrier for breach of duty, instead of on The defendants must be supposed to know that it
its contract, it was liable for the injuries resulting was the right of all classes and conditious of people, from such miscarriage. whether diseased or otherwise, to be carried in their In Eten v. Luyster, CO N. Y. 233, 259, 260, affirming cars, and it must also be supposed that they knew
37 N. Y. Super. Ct. 486, this court held that where that a personal injury inflicted upon any one with defendants tore down and destroyed a building built predisposition or tendency to caucer, might and prob. by defendant, in which plaintiff had a sum of money ably would, develop the disease. See case of Stewart
in a box, which was lost in the removal, that plaintiff v. City of Ripon, 38 Wis. 584.
was not bound to gather up the fragments of his scato The defendants have cited and relied upon the case tered and broken chattels, but was at liberty to leave of Hobbs V. Landon & South-western R. Co., L. them where defendants placed them, looking to them R., 10 Q. B. 111; 11 Eng. Rep. 181, as maintaining a
for their value; that plaintiff was entitled to recover doctrine differeut from that just stated by us. But in for all losses occasioned bp the trespass, including the several respects that case is quite different from this. destruction of the building, the loss of the money, and In the first place, that was au action upon contract, the value of the unexpired term; that although the seeking a recovery for a breach thereof. There a pas.
money was kept in an unusual place, and defendants senger, who had been set down with his wife at a
may not have suspected its presence, yet that they wrong station, sought to recover from the railway were liable for its loss, which was the direct result of company damages for a cold which his wife had taken
their acts." in consequeuce of the exposure in having to walk
Iu Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Barker, 4 Col. 344; 34 home in the rain. And it was held that the loss so oc
Am. Rep. 89, 92 note, defeudant's palace car, in which casioned was not so connected with the breach of con
plaintiff was sleeping, was burned, through the neglitract as that the carrier breaking the contract would
gence of defendant's servants. The burning was so be liable.
rapid that she had not time to properly clothe herself, As said by the court, the catching cold by the plaint- and she left it in her stocking feet. In doing so she iff's wife was not the immediate and necessary effect
was compelled to stand for a short time on the platof the breach of contract, or was not such an effect as
form of another car, and caught a severe cold which could fairly be said to have been in the contemplation
caused a cessation of her menses and resulted in a of the parties. But we suppose, with Mr. Mayne, in
long period of illness. The court said (p. 347): “Conhis work on Damages, p. 73 (Wood's ed.), that that case
ceding that the appellee was compelled on account of would have been differently decided, if instead of put
the smoke and flames to leave the car in the half-clad ting the plaintiff down safely at the wrong place, the
condition she did, the exposure to the cold was the company had by their negligence caused any personal
direct aud necessary result of the appellant's negliinjury to him.
gence. Her subsequent illness however was not the Without therefore intimating that we should ac
result of the exposure, but the result of the exposure cept the decision as an authority in any case, we in her then condition." think it has no direct application to the case before
That case was expressly disapproved in Brown F.
Chicago, etc., 54 Wis. 360, the court saying: Concurring with the court below in its rulings excepted to, we must affirm the judgment.
“There is, I think, but one case cited by the learned Stone, J., disseuts.
counsel for the appellant which appears to be in direct Judgment affirmed. conflict with this view of the case, except those which
relate to the breaches of contract, and that is the Pull- to give just results and to effectuate the intention of
ATTACHMENT_TITLE OF SHERIFF UNDER-TRANS
FER BEFORE the principles of neither law nor humanity. It in ef
LEVY. - Plaintiff, as assignee of a fect says, that if an individual unlawfully compels a
bond and mortgage given to secure a note, brought sick and enfeebled person to expose himself to the
suit to foreclose. The answer of two defendants, cold and storm to escape worse consequences from his
makers of the mortgage, set up as a defense that the wrongful act, he cannot recover damages from the
mortgage and note bad been attached by the sheriff, wrong-doer because it was his sick and enfeebled con
and were in his possession. It appeared that after the dition which rendered his exposuro injurious. Cer
levy under the attachment the mortgage was assigned tainly such a doctrine does not commend itself to
to plaintiff. Held, that the sheriff acquired no title to those kinder feelings which are common to humanity,
the property assigned. Under the earlier provisions and I know of no other case which sustains its conclu- of the Code a levy upon property capable of manual sions."
delivery, executed by taking it into the actual possesFor another cancer case see Jewell v. Railway, 55 N.
sion of the officer, invested him with the right in deH. 84.-ED.
fense of his levy to assail as fraudulent and void against creditors a previous assignment or transfer
which threatened by its priority the security of the NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.
lien obtained. Rinchey v. Stryker, 28 N. Y. 45. But
this court also held as to the levy permitted to be TAXATION-CORPORATION-DEDUCTION--"ASSESSED made upon choses in action that the attachment VALUE."-(1) Writ of certiorari directed to defendants reached and became a lien upon only such debts as at for the purpose of reviewing their action in assessing the time belonged to the debtor by a legal title, and the capital stock of the relator for the years 1882. The for the recovery of which he could maintain an action relator claims that the amount of the capital stock to at law, and as a consequence, where before levy of the be subjected to taxation should be the residue after attachment he bad parted with the legal title even deducting from the par amount, $600,000, the sum of with intent to defraud his creditors, there remained $405,000 expended in real estate, which would leave in him for their benefit only an equity which the atonly $195,000 assessable as personal estate. The de- tachment could not reach, and so the sheriff could not fendants however claimed that as the stock was at assail the transfer as fraudulent. The doctrine of least fifty per cent above par, and that as the whole Thurber v. Blanck, 50 N. Y. 80, went to that extent, value thereof, estimated according to its selling price, and has since been approved. Castle v. Lewis, 78 N.Y. was $900,000, and it not appearing that the real estate 137; Wait on Fraud. Convey., $ 86. These authorities purchased was of any greater value than the amount establish that the sheriff in the case before us could paid for it, it was proper to deduct such amount from not avoid as fraudulent the transfer or the note and its the actual value of the capital stock estimated accord- collateral made prior to his asserted levy unless their ing to its selling price. Held, that under the provis- doctrine is made inapplicable by the change in the proions of the act of 1857, ch. 456, in relation to the taxa- vision of the Code, section 649. This provision changed tion of corporations liable to taxation, for the purpose merely the mode of making the levy, but in no respect of taxing the capital stock of a corporatiou, it is to be altered the inherent character of the property sought "assessed at its actual value," from which is to be de- to be attached. The note is not turned into a chatducted "the assessed value of the real estate," and tel by the new provision. It remains a chose in action, such other items as are specified in the act. (2) The and when the legal title is in the attachment debtor the provisions of the statutes regulating the details of as- debt may be seized by taking the note or bond which sessments of the property of corporations (1 Rev. Stat. is its evidence, but when the legal title has been trans415, $ 6, as amended by act of 1853, ch. 564) are to be ferred to a third party, and is not in the debtor to be deemed amended so far as is necessary to make them attached, the possession of the note by the officers unconform to and give effect to the act of 1857. A con- der his warrant accomplishes nothing. On the asstruction of a statute which leads to an absurd conge- sumption therefore that no levy was made until after quence must always be avoided, as an absurd purpose the transfer of the note the attachment gave the offiis not to be attributed to the law makers. Com. v. cers no right to assail or control it. The levy did not Kimball, 24 Pick. 370. It will not always be easy to relate back to the time of making the demand, which determine the assessed value of the real estate to be was before the assignment was made. Until the offideducted from the actual value of the capital stock- cer has obtained the actual custody he has no levy, There can be no difficulty when the real estate is situ. and can make none. In Bills v. Nat. Park Bank, 89 ated in the same ward or town where the capital stock N. Y. 351, the effect of sections 648 and 649 of the Code is assessable, or even when it is situated in the same were not considered. Anthony v. Wood. Opinion by city or county. In most cases it will thus be situated, Finch, J. (29 Hun, 239, reversed.) but if it is not, and is yet within the State, it will not [Decided June 3, 1884.] be impracticable to ascertain its assessed value from assessment rolls always accessible. But if the real es
NEGLIGENCE-BURDEN OF PROOF-POSTAL CLERKtate should be in another State or country,or if for any
RIDING ON PASS.-Plaiutiff's husband, who other reason its assessed value cannot be obtained,
postal clerk in the employ of the government, which then as the best and nearest substitute for it the price
had a contract with defendant for the carriage of its paid as the presumed value in the absence of proof or
mails, and the person baving them in charge, obof any other standard, may be taken as the assessable
tained a pass, by the terms of which defendant was not value. We have not overlooked the fact that some of
to be liable under any circumstances, whether of negthese views are in conflict with those expressed by ligence by their agents or otherwise, for any injury to Mason, J., in the case of People v. Board of Assessors,
the person, and this pass was in his possession at 39 N. Y. 81. All that was there said was not necessary
the time of his death, which occurred in consequence to the decision of that case, and we think the con
of the negligent derailing of the train on which he was struction we have given to the statutes is more likely
riding. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to recover.
We think the court committed no error in refusing to promise attaches to the consideration so performed. charge that “the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to and renders the promisor liable. Rapallo, J., again writ. establish the negligence of the defendant.” While it ing the opinion of the court, said : “After the promis is true as a general proposition that the burden of isor has had the benefit of the consideration for which showing negligence on the part of the defendant occa- he bargained, it is no defense to say that the promisee sioning an injury, rests in the first instance upon the was not bound by the contract to do the act. In Marie plaintiff, yet in an action of this character, when he v. Garrison, 83 N. Y. 26, Andrews, J., commenting on has shown a situation which could not have been pro- the same rule said: “When a defendant has actually duced except by the operation of abnormal causes,
received the consideration of an agreement by a voluionus then rests upon the defendant to prove that the tary performance of an act by the other party, upon injury was caused without his fault. Caldwell v. N. J. bis proposition or suggestion, such performance conSteamboat Co., 47 N. Y. 291; Edgerton v. N. Y. & Har. stitutes a consideration which will uphold the defeudR. Co., 39 id. 227; Curtig v. R. & S. R. Co., 18 id. 534. ant's promise,”' and that it was not essential to the The court charged that the defendant was bound to existence of a consideration for the defendant's agreeshow and give some explanation of the cause of the ac- ment that mutuality of obligation should have existed cident. This portion of the charge must be under- between the parties when this agreement was made. stood in reference to the facts of this case and as ap- Soe also Train v. Gold, 5 Pick. 380; Willetts v. Sun plied to such facts. In this view it was bot'erroneous." Mut. Life Ins. Co., 45 N. Y. 45; Sands v. Crooke, 46 See also the J. Russell Mfg. Co. v. N. H. Steamboat id. 564; Barnes v. Perrine, 9 Barb. 202; L'Amoreux v. Co.,50 N. Y. 121; Mullen v. St. John, 57 id. 572; 15 Gould, 7 N. Y. 349. (3) Plaintiff was entitled to recov. Am. Rep. 530; Ginna v. Second Ave. R. Co., 67 N. Y. er the full amount of the note, although that was much
(2) The defendant owed the same degree of care greater than the real value of the services; and for to the clerks and mail agents riding in the postal car, such a rule the cases of Worth v. Case, 42 N. Y. 369, in charge of the mails, as they did to passengers riding and Earl v. Peck, 64 id. 596, are ample authority. Milupon the train. That question was decided in the case ler v. McKenzie. Opinion by Earl, J. of Nolton v. Western Ry. Co., 15 N. Y. 444, and Blair [Decided April 22, 1884.) v. Erie Ry, Co., 66 id. 313; 23 Am. Rep. 55, and we see no reason for questioning the correctness of the dispo. sition then made of the question. The opinion in the UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABcase of the Pernsylvania R. Co. v. Price, 96 Pemu. St.
STRACT. 256, not only does not couflict with the doctrine of these cases, but cites with approval the Nolton case. (3) The pass was a mere voucher issued for the conven
PUBLIC LAND-RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION-LEGAL REPience of the agent and the information of the em
RESENTATIVES.–The legal representative of one who ployees of the defendant, and did not in any seuse
had settled on land in anticipation of the time when it constitute contract between
would be opened for pre-emption, and lived and died
the defendant and the person using it, and the agent's acceptance
on it, may upon pre-emption becoming possible, ' have thereof under the circumstances of this case did
the title to such land made complete in him, and bis not indicate an intention to assent to the provisions
rights cannot be affected by a stranger who meantime therein contained, and even if it might be so construed
occupies the land for the purpose of defeating him. that the want of a consideration for such an agree
Quinn v. Chapman. Opinion by Miller, J. ment reudered it nudum pactum. A promise by one
[Decided April 21, 1884.] party to do that which he is already under a legal obli- JURISDICTION-QUESTION NOT PRESENTED TO STATE gation to perform, has frequently beeu held to be in- COURT.-This was a suit brought by the Santa Cruz sufficient as a consideration to support a contract. Railroad Company to require the board of commisVanderbilt v. Schreyer, 91 N. Y. 392. Seybolt v. N. Y., sioners of the county of Santa Cruz to deliver certain etc., R, Co. Opinion by Ruger, C. J.
bonds, claimed to be due from the county under a con. [Decided April 15, 1881.]
tract with the railroad company. The defenses were,
1, that the contract was unilateral, and therefore not NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-CONSIDERATION - EVI- binding on the county; 2, that the board of supervis. DENCE-PERFORMANCE IN FUTURE-MEASURE OF RE- ors exceeded its authority in making the contract; COVERY.- (1) A statement in a promissory note that it and 3, that a repealing statute, passed after the conwas given for money loaned is not conclusive; it is tract was entered into, took away the power of the open to either party to show the actual consideration. board to make any further deliveries of bonds. No I Pars. N. & B. 194; Abbott v. Hendricks, 1 M. & G. objection whatever was made to the validity of the 791; Wheeler v. Billings, 38 N. Y. 263; Arnot v. statute under which the board assumed to act in mak. Erie Ry. Co., 67 id. 3:21. (2) A promissory note, given ing the contract. The whole defense rested on the iu consideration of future services to be rendered by coustruction and effect to be given to certain statutes, the payee, upon the rendition of the services in reli. which no one denied the constitutional power of the ance thereou becomes valid and binding, although Legislature to enact. The ground of Federal jurisdicthere was no agreement at the time of the giving of tion, relied on in the brief of counsel for the county is, the note upon the part of the payee to render the ser- " that by the issuance of the bonds demanded in this vices, and although the amount of the note be much proceeding, the State would deprive the tax-payers of greater that the value of the services.
In Cottage the county of Santa Cruz of property without due proStreet Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 529, Gray, C. J., cess of law, contrary to the right, privilege, or immus.id: * Where one promises to pay another a certain nity secured by the first section of the Fourteenth sum of money for doing a particular thing, which is amendment of the Constitution of the United States." to be done before the money is paid, and the promisee That was not the question presented to or decided by does the thing upon the faith of the promise, the the State court. In that court the inquiry was, promise, which was before a mere revocable offer, whether the proceedings of the board to charge the thereby becomes a complete contract upon a consider- county were according to law; not whether the law, ation moving from the promisee to the promisor." In under which the proceedivgs were had, was constituWhite v. Baxter, 71 N. Y. 254, it was held that where tional and binding on the tax-payers. The State court one, acting on the faith of a promise, performs the decided that the proceedivgs were in accordance with condition upon which the promise was made, the the requirements of the law, and thus created an obli