In 1786, a meeting took place at Annapolis, of delegates from several of the states, on this subject, and on their report the convention was formed at Philadelphia, the ensuing year, from all the states, to whose deliberations we are indebted for the present constitution.

"In none of these measures was the subject of internal improvement mentioned, or even glanced at. Those of 1784, '85, '86, and '87, leading, step by step, to the adoption of the constitution, had in view only the obtaining of a power to enable Congress to regulate trade with foreign powers. It is manifest that the regulation of trade with the several states was altogether a secondary object, suggested by and adopted in connexion with the other. If the power necessary to this system of improvement is included under either branch of this grant, I should suppose that it was the first rather than the second. The pretension to it, however, under that branch, has never been set up. In support of the claim under the second, no reason has been assigned which appears to have the least weight."

Such is a brief history of the origin, progress, and consequences of a system which, for more than thirty years after the adoption of the constitution, was unknown. The greatest embarrassment upon the subject consists in the departure which has taken place from the early construction of the constitution, and the precedents which are found in the legislation of Congress in late years. President Jackson, in his veto of the Wabash river bill, declares, that "to inherent embarrassments have been added others, from the course of our legislation concerning it." In his vetoes on the Maysville road bill, the Rockville road bill, the Wabash river bill, and other bills of like character, he reversed the precedents which existed prior to that time on the subject of internal improvements. When our experience, observation, and reflection, have convinced us that a legislative precedent is either unwise or unconstitutional, it should not be followed.

No express grant of this power is found in the constitution. Its advocates have differed among themselves as to the source from which it is derived as an incident. In the progress of the discussions upon this subject, the power to regulate commerce seems now to be chiefly relied upon, especially in reference to the improvement of harbors and rivers.

In relation to the regulation of commerce, the language of the grant in the constitution is, "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." That to "regulate commerce" does not mean to make a road or dig a canal, or clear out a river, or deepen a harbor, would seem to be obvious to the common understanding. To "regulate" admits or affirms the preexistence of the thing to be regulated. In this case it presupposes the existence of commerce, and of course the means by which and the channels through which commerce is carried on. It confers no creative power; it only assumes control over that which may have been brought into existence through other agencies, such as state legislation, and the industry and enterprise of individuals. If the definition of the word "regulate" is to include the provision of means to carry on commerce, then have Congress not only power to deepen harbors, clear out rivers, dig canals, and make roads, but also to build ships, railroad cars, and other vehicles, all of which are necessary to commerce. There is no middle ground. If the power to regulate can be legitimately construed into a power to create or facilitate, then not only the bays and harbors, but the roads and canals, and all the means of transporting merchandise among the several states,

are put at the disposition of Congress. This power to regulate commerce was construed and exercised immediately after the adoption of the constitution, and has been exercised to the present day, by prescribing general rules by which commerce should be conducted. With foreign nations it has been regulated by treaties, defining the rights of citizens and subjects, as well as by acts of Congress imposing duties and restrictions, embracing vessels, seamen, cargoes, and passengers. It has been regulated among the states by acts of Congress relating to the coasting trade, and the vessels employed therein, and for the better security of passengers in vessels propelled by steam, and by the removal of all restrictions upon internal trade. It has been regulated with the Indian tribes by our intercourse laws, prescribing the manner in which it shall be carried on. Thus each branch of this grant of power was exercised soon after the adoption of the constitution, and has continued to be exercised to the present day. If a more extended construction be adopted, it is impossible for the human mind to fix on a limit to the exercise of the power other than the will and discretion of Congress. It sweeps into the vortex of national power and jurisdiction, not only harbors and inlets, rivers and little streams, but canals, turnpikes, and railroads-every species of improvement which can facilitate or create trade and intercourse "with foreign nations, among the several states, and with the Indian tribes."

Should any great object of improvement exist in our widely-extended country, which can not be effected by means of tonnage-duties, levied by the states, with the concurrence of Congress, it is safer and wiser to apply to the states, in the mode prescribed by the constitution, for an amendment of that instrument, whereby the powers of the general government may be enlarged, with such limitations and restrictions as experience has shown to be proper, than to assume and exercise a power which has not been granted, or which may be regarded as doubtful in the opinion of a large portion of our constituents. This course has been recommended successively by Presidents Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and Jackson; and I fully concur with them in opinion. If an enlargement of power should be deemed proper, it will unquestionably be granted by the states; if otherwise, it will be withheld; and, in either case, their decision should be final. In the meantime, I deem it proper to add, that the investigation of this subject has impressed me more strongly than ever with the solemn conviction that the usefulness and permanency of this government, and the happiness of the millions over whom it spreads its protection, will be best promoted by carefully abstaining from the exercise of all powers not clearly granted by the constitution.

SPECIAL MESSAGE.

JANUARY 4, 1848.

with accom

To the House of Representatives of the United States :— I COMMUNICATE herewith a report of the secretary of war, panying documents, being in addition to a report made on the twentyseventh of February, 1847, in answer to a resolution of the house of representatives, of the first of that month, requesting the president "to communicate to the house of representatives all the correspondence with

General Taylor, since the commencement of hostilities with Mexico, which has not yet been published, and the publication of which may not be deemed detrimental to the public service; also, the correspondence of the quartermaster-general, in relation to transportation for General Taylor's army; also, the reports of Brigadier-Generals Hamer and Quitman, of the operations of their respective brigades on the twenty-first of September last" (1846).

SPECIAL MESSAGE.

JANUARY 12, 1848.

To the House of Representatives of the United States:

I HAVE carefully considered the resolution of the house of representatives of the fourth instant, requesting the president to communicate to that house" any instructions which may have been given to any of the officers of the army or navy of the United States, or other persons, in regard to the return of President General Lopez de Santa Anna, or any other Mexican, to the republic of Mexico prior or subsequent to the order of the president or secretary of war, issued in January, 1846, for the march of the army from the Nueces river, across the stupendous deserts' which intervene, to the Rio Grande; that the date of all such instructions, orders, and correspondence, be set forth, together with the instructions and orders issued to Mr. Slidell at any time prior or subsequent to his departure for Mexico as minister plenipotentiary of the United States to that republic;" and requesting the president also to "communicate all the orders and correspondence of the government in relation to the return of General Paredes to Mexico."

I transmit herewith reports from the secretary of state, the secretary of war, and the secretary of the navy, with the documents accompanying the same, which contain all the information in the possession of the executive which it is deemed compatible with the public interests to communicate.

For further information relating to the return of Santa Anna to Mexico, I refer you to my annual message of December, 8, 1846. The facts and considerations stated in that message induced the order of the secretary of the navy to the commander of our squadron in the gulf of Mexico, a copy of which is herewith communicated. This order was issued simultaneously with the order to blockade the coasts of Mexico, both bearing date the thirteenth of May, 1846, the day on which the existence of the war with Mexico was recognised by Congress. It was issued solely upon the views of policy presented in that message, and without any understanding on the subject, direct or indirect, with Santa Anna or any other person.

General Paredes evaded the vigilance of our combined forces by land and sea, and made his way back to Mexico from the exile into which he had been driven, landing at Vera Cruz after that city and the castle of San Juan de Ulloa were in our military occupation, as will appear from the accompanying reports and documents.

The resolution calls for the "instructions and orders issued by Mr. Slidell, at any time prior or subsequent to his departure for Mexico, as minister plenipotentiary of the United States to that republic." The custom

ary

and usual reservation contained in calls of either house of Congress upon the executive for information, relating to our intercourse with foreign nations, has been omitted in the resolution before me. The call of the house is unconditional. It is, that the information requested be communicated, and thereby be made public, whether, in the opinion of the executive (who is charged by the constitution with the duty of conducting negotiations with foreign powers), such information, when disclosed, would be prejudicial to the public interest or not. It has been a subject of serious deliberation with me whether I could, consistently with my constitutional duty and my sense of the public interests involved and to be affected by it, violate an important principle, always heretofore held sacred by my predecessors, as I should do by a compliance with the request of the house. President Washington, in a message to the house of representatives of the thirtieth of March, 1796, declined to comply with a request contained in a resolution of that body, to lay before them" a copy of the instructions to the minister of the United States who negotiated the treaty with the king of Great Britain," "together with the correspondence and other documents relative to said treaty, excepting such of the said papers as any existing negotiations may render improper to be disclosed." In assigning his reasons for declining to comply with the call, he declared that "the nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend upon secrecy; and, even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, and eventual concessions, which may have been proposed or contemplated, would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations, or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the president, with the advice and consent of the senate-the principle on which that body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the house of representatives to demand, and to have, as a matter of course, all the papers respecting a negotiation with a foreign power, would be to establish a dangerous precedent." In that case, the instructions and documents called for related to a treaty which had been concluded and ratified by the president and senate, and the negotiations in relation to it had been terminated. There was an express reservation, too, "excepting" from the call all such papers as related to " any existing negotiations" which it might be improper to disclose. In that case, President Washington deemed it to be a violation of an important principle, the establishment of a "dangerous precedent," and prejudicial to the public interests, to comply with the call of the house. Without deeming it to be necessary on the present occasion to examine or decide upon the other reasons assigned by him for his refusal to communicate the information requested by the house, the one which is herein recited is in my judgment conclusive in the case under consideration.

Indeed, the objections to complying with the request of the house contained in the resolution before me, are much stronger than those which existed in the case of the resolution in 1796. This resolution calls for the "instructions and orders" to the minister of the United States to Mexico, which relate to negotiations which have not been terminated, and which may be resumed. The information called for respects negotiations which the United States offered to open with Mexico immediately preceding the commencement of the existing war. The instructions given to

the minister of the United States relate to the differences between the two countries out of which the war grew, and the terms of adjustment which we were prepared to offer to Mexico in our anxiety to prevent the war. These differences still remain unsettled; and to comply with the call of the house would be to make public, through that channel, and to communicate to Mexico, now a public enemy engaged in war, information which could not fail to produce serious embarrassment in any future negotiation between the two countries. I have heretofore communicated to Congress all the correspondence of the minister of the United States to Mexico which, in the existing state of our relations with that republic, can, in my judgment, be at this time communicated without serious injury to the public interest.

Entertaining this conviction, and with a sincere desire to furnish any information which may be in possession of the executive department, and which either house of Congress may at any time request, I regard it to be my constitutional right and my solemn duty, under the circumstances of this case, to decline a compliance with the request of the house contained in their resolution.

SPECIAL MESSAGE

JANUARY 21, 1848.

To the Senate of the United States :—

I COMMUNICATE herewith a report of the secretary of war, with the accompanying documents, in answer to the resolution of the senate, of the twenty-fourth instant, requesting to be furnished with "copies of the letters, reports, or other communications, which are referred to in the letter of General Zachary Taylor, dated at New Orleans, twentieth July, 1845, and addressed to the secretary of war; and which are so referred to, es containing the views of General Taylor, previously communicated, in r gard to the line proper to be occupied at that time by the troops of the United States; and any similar communication, from any officer of th army, on the same subject."

SPECIAL MESSAGE.

JANUARY 24, 1848.

To the Senate of the United States :—

IN compliance with the request of the senate, in their resolution of the thirteenth instant, I here with communicate a report from the secretary of war, with the accompanying correspondence, containing the information. called for, in relation to forced contributions in Mexico.