our civilization cannot help disapproving of certain acts immediately, the wrongfulness of which has been impressed upon him from childhood. But there are many courses of conduct which baffle many consciences. We are sometimes in doubt as to what would really be the dutiful course to pursue, until we can bring the case under a general formula. The success with which a person judges the moral worth of an act will often depend upon his ability to refer it to a class concerning which there is no doubt.

11. Conscience and Inclination. Another point deserves to be considered. Kant teaches that such acts are moral as are done from a sense of duty, from a respect for the moral law. Acts which are done from inclination have no moral worth. If you do good from a love of it, there is no merit in your act. If you delight in being kind to others, and help them because you love them, you are not moral. If, however, you have no such inclination, or if you have an antipathy against doing it, and still aid others from a sense of duty, then you are moral.1

Of course, in a matter of this kind everything depends upon one's standpoint. If the criterion of morality is the sense of duty, or obligation, then, to be sure, no act can be moral that is not prompted by reverence for the law. But it is begging the entire question to insist upon this thesis. Do we really call only such acts moral as are held by Kant to be

1 See Kant's Metaphysik der Sitten.

moral? If we do, we must regard as moral the murderer who acts from a sense of duty. No, Kant would object, you cannot call the murderer moral, nor can he call himself moral, because he cannot I will that his conduct become universal law. Well, we ask, why not? Why cannot he will that the killing of tyrants become universal, so long as it is prompted by a sense of duty? Besides, Kant here introduces a new principle or criterion: the fitness of the act to become a universal maxim. First he says that an act is moral when it is prompted by the sense of duty, then he tells me to "act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law." If he adheres to the first proposition, the murderer is moral; if to the second, then the sense of duty is not the criterion; if to both, we have either a contradiction or two criteria which must be harmonized in some way.1

The main thing, it seems to me, is that a man do the right. Now, if he does it from inclination, because he loves to do it, why should he not be adjudged moral? Spencer believes that the time will come when the sense of duty or moral obligation will pass away. "The observation is not infrequent," he says, "that persistence in performing a

1 For criticism of the Kantian view, see Paulsen, Ethics, pp. 350 ff.; Janet, Theory of Morals, Bk. III, chap. v; Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, chap. iv; Muirhead, Elements of Ethics, § 56; Bradley, Ethical Studies, IV.

duty ends in making it a pleasure; and this amounts to the admission that, while at first the motive contains an element of coercion, at last this element of coercion dies out, and the act is performed without any consciousness of being obliged to perform it.”1 It is evident, then, that "that element in the moral consciousness which is expressed by the word obligation will disappear." However this may be, I see no reason why a man should be called non-moral because he loves to do the right.

Of course, the feeling of obligation, the feeling that an act ought to be performed, will be a great incentive to the doing of it, and possibly owes its existence to this fact. A man in whom this sentiment is very strong will do the right in the face of the strongest temptations, provided, of course, the feeling is connected with right actions. It is an excellent reënforcer of morality; it pushes itself in between the desire to violate the law and the desire to obey it, and helps the latter to gain the victory. Humanity instinctively recognizes this truth. In times of moral degeneracy, reformers point out the danger of listening to the seductive voice of inclination, and appeal to the sense of duty. It is also to be observed that we love conflict, and admire the man who struggles. There is nothing dramatic in an

1 Data of Ethics, p. 128. Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. I, chap. x: "For it may be added that a person is not good if he does not take delight in noble actions, as nobody would call a person just if he did not take delight in just actions," etc.

even, quiet life that is free from storms of passion and temptation. But the sense of duty does not play the rôle in life which moralists of Kant's pietistic training assign to it. Life is not a continuous conflict between our inclinations, desires, or impulses, and the sense of duty. If it were, it would soon consume itself. Men do not do everything from a sense of duty, or because they feel that they must. Men are trained to righteousness, and then act from force of habit. Where the training is complete, character is formed, and acts follow from character. The conflicts which Kant regards as forming the very essence of character are rare in a healthy moral life. A good man does not have to call out the inner police force every time he acts. An appeal to authority is not always necessary in his case. The "thou shalt" is superseded by the "I will," and the rule of law gives way to the rule of love.1

Many men form ideals of conduct, that is, reach certain general principles, which aim to give their life a unity. The ideal is like the flag that leads the hosts to battle. It may be followed for many reasons, from love, or from a sense of obligation, or

1 See Spencer, Inductions, p. 338; Münsterberg, Ursprung der Sittlichkeit, last chapter; Wundt, Ethik, Part III, chap. iii: "Whereas a moral law which demands that the good. be done without inclination, i.e., without motives, asks more than can be accomplished, it is, on the contrary, the genuine mark of the mature character to perform the moral act, without deliberation, from pure inclination."

from force of habit. I compare my acts with this ideal and may feel obliged to perform those agreeing with it, or I may do them from love. Often a line of reasoning is required to discover the acts which are necessary to the realization of my ideal.

12. The Historical View and Morality.-In conclusion, I should like to consider an objection which is frequently urged against the historical view of conscience by those who regard the moral faculty as of supernatural origin. They hold that to deny the supernatural character of conscience is to rob it of its sacredness and authority. When we know that and how a thing has originated, we are apt to lose respect for it. The knowledge that conscience is not a descendant of the gods, but an earth-born child, a plebeian, so to speak, deprives it of the respect necessary to make it effective, and renders it less aweful than before. Hence, these persons hold, the historical view of conscience is dangerous to morality.1

We reply: (1) Even if all this were so, it would not affect the truth of the teaching. Truth is one thing, expediency another.

(2) But why should the belief that conscience is a child of nature and not the direct voice of God make us lose respect for morality? If I believe in God and believe that He is a good God, I shall surely

1 Even Guyau, an evolutionist, is of the same opinion: "The scientific spirit," he says, "is the enemy of all instinct; it tends to destroy the sense of obligation on which instinct is based. Every instinct disappears upon consciousness."