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At first it makes active pleasure, pleasure of a posi tive sort, the goal, then gradually diminishes its intensity until it becomes painlessness, repose of spirit, peace of mind, in Hegesias and Epicurus. Again, at first it is the pleasure of the moment which is sought after, then the pleasure of a lifetime is conceived as the highest good. Forethought, or prudence, is also insisted on in the course of time as a necessary means of realizing the goal.

5. Democritus.—All these ideas, however, had been advanced by Democritus,1 of Abdera, the materialistic philosopher, long before the appearance of the Cyrenaics. Though this thinker is the first consistent hedonist among the ancients, and the intellectual father of Epicurus, I have placed him at the end of the exposition of ancient hedonism, because his teachings seem to me to be more matured than those of his followers.

According to Democritus, the end of life is pleasure or happiness (εὐέστω, εὐθυμία, ἀθαυμασία, ἀθαμβία, αταραξία, ἁρμονία, ξυμμετρία, εὐδαιμονία), by which he means an inner state of satisfaction, an inner harmony, fearlessness.2 This feeling does not depend upon external goods, on health or sensuous pleasures. In order to attain it man must use his reason. He must be moderate in his desires, because the less he desires, the less apt he is to be disap

1 Bibliography in Weber, p. 55, note 3. See especially Münz, Vorsokratische Ethik.

2 Fragments, 1, 2, 5, 7.

8 Ib., 15, 16.

pointed. He must also distinguish carefully between the different kinds of enjoyment, and select such as preserve and promote health. He must be temperate, for excess defeats itself. Again, sensuous pleasures are of short duration and require repetition, which disturbs one's peace of mind.1 We should seek to obtain the pleasures produced by reflection and the contemplation of beautiful acts. Indeed, the best way to reach the goal is to exercise the mental powers.

All other virtues are valuable in so far as they realize the highest good, pleasure. Justice and benevolence are chief means of doing this. Envy, jealousy, and enmity create discord, which injures everybody. We should be virtuous, for only through virtue can we reach happiness. But we should not only do the right from fear of punishment, since enforced virtue is likely to become secret vice. It is not enough to refrain from doing evil; we should not even desire to do it. Only by doing the right from conviction and because you desire it, can you subserve the ends of virtue and be happy. Happiness, then, is the end; virtue the means of reaching it. 6. Locke. Let us now look at a few pronounced modern representatives of this school. We have already seen that, according to John Locke, every

1 Fragments, 47, 50.

2 Ib., 45, 20, 21, 26, 36.

• Ib, 117: μὴ διὰ φόβον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν δέον χρεὼν ἀπέχεσθαι ἁμαρτημάτων.

4 Chap. ii, § 6 (2).

one constantly pursues happiness, and desires what makes any part of it. "Virtue," he says, "as in its obligation it is the will of God, discovered by natural reason, and thus has the force of law, so in the matter of it, it is nothing else but doing of good, either to oneself or others; and the contrary hereunto, vice, is nothing else but doing of harm."2 "Thus, I think-It is man's proper business to seek happiness and avoid misery. Happiness consists in what delights and contents the mind; misery in what disturbs, discomposes, or torments it. I will therefore make it my business to seek satisfaction and delight, and avoid uneasiness and disquiet; to have as much of the one, and as little of the other, as may be. But here I must have a care I mistake not, for if I prefer a short pleasure to a lasting one, it is plain I cross my own happiness." The most lasting pleasures in life consist in (1) health, (2) reputation, (3) knowledge, (4) doing good, (5) the expectation of eternal and incomprehensible happiness in another world.3

7. Butler.- Bishop Butler, too, has hedonistic tendencies, as may be seen from certain significant passages in his sermons. Conscience and self-love,"

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1 Essay, Bk. II, chap. xx, §§ 1 ff.; chap. xxi, §§ 42 ff.; Bk. I, chap. iii, § 3; Bk. II, chap. xxviii, §§ 5 ff.

2 See passage in Locke's Common-Place Book, first published by Lord King, The Life of John Locke, pp. 292–293.

8 Lord King, p. 304; Fox Bourne's Life of Locke, Vol. I, pp. 163-165. With this view, Leibniz (1646-1716) practically agrees. See his New Essays, translated by Langley, Bk. I, chap. ii, §§ 1, 3; Bk. II, chap. xx, § 2; chap. xxi, § 42; also some notes published in Erdmann's edition of his works (Duncan's translation, p. 130).

he says, "if we understand our true happiness, always lead us the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly coincident; for the most part in this world, but entirely and in every instance if we take in the future and in the whole; this being implied in the notion of a good and perfect administration of things." 1 "It may be allowed without any prejudice to the cause of virtue and religion, that our ideas of happiness and misery are of all our ideas the nearest and most important to us. Let it be allowed, though virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is right and good, as such, yet, that when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it." 2

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8. Hutcheson. - Francis Hutcheson calls an action "materially good when in fact it tends to the interest of the system, so far as we can judge of its tendency, or to the good of some part consistent with that of the system, whatever were the affections of the agent." "An action is formally good when it flowed from good affection in a just proportion.' But what is the good? "That action is best which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers, and worst which in like manner occasions misery."

1 Sermon iii, end.

2 Sermon xi.

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* See Martineau, Types, Vol. II, pp. 514 ff.; Albee, "Shaftesbury and Hutcheson," Phil. Review, Vol. V, number 1.

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9. Hume. -We have already examined David Hume's doctrine of the moral sense. We feel or perceive the rightness or wrongness of an act,1 we feel a peculiar kind of pleasure or pain in the contemplation of characters and actions, in consequence of which we call them right or wrong. Now the question behind this is, Why does any action or sentiment, "upon the general view or survey," give this satisfaction or uneasiness? 2 In other words, what is the ultimate ground of moral distinctions? 'Qualities," Hume answers, "acquire our approbation because of their tendency to the good of mankind." We find that most of those qualities which we naturally approve of, have actually that tendency, and render a man a proper member of society; while the qualities which we naturally disapprove of, have a contrary tendency and render any intercourse with the person dangerous or disagreeable. Moral distinctions arise, in a great measure, from the tendency of the qualities and characters to the interests of society, and it is our concern for that interest which makes us approve or disapprove of them. Now we have no such extensive concern for society but from sympathy; and consequently it is that principle which takes us so far out of ourselves as to give us the same pleasure or uneasiness in the characters of others, as if they had a tendency to our own advantage or

1 Treatise on Human Nature, Bk. III, Section II.

2 Ib., Bk. III, Section III, end.

3 Ib., Bk. III, Part III, Section I; Hyslop's Selections, p. 226.

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