loss.1 We have a feeling for the happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery,2 and everything which contributes to the happiness of society recommends itself directly to our approbation and good will.3 10. Paley. According to William Paley, "actions are to be estimated according to their tendency. Whatever is expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral rule which constitutes the obligation of it."4 "Virtue is the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness."5 God wills and wishes the happiness of His creatures. The method of coming at the will of God concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of that action to promote or diminish the general happiness. Happiness does not consist in the pleasures of sense, for these pleasures continue but a little while at a time, lose their relish by repetition, and are really never enjoyed because we are always eager for higher and more intense delights. Nor does happiness con 1 See Hyslop, p. 227; also Treatise, Conclusion, Section VI; also Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, especially-Section V. 2 Inquiry, Appendix I. Ib., Part II, Section V. See also Appendix I, v, and Treatise on Human Nature, Bk. II, Part III, Section I: "The chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind is pleasure or pain; and when these sensations are removed, both from our thought and feeling, we are, in a great measure, incapable of passion or action, of desire or volition." 4 Moral Philosophy, p. 38. 5 Ib., p. 26. • Ib., pp. 36 ff. sist in an exemption from pain, care, business, suspense, etc., nor in greatness or rank. It consists in the exercise of social affections, exercise of our faculties, either of body or mind, in the pursuit of some engaging end, in the prudent constitution of the habits, in health. Pleasures differ in nothing but continuance and intensity.1 11. Bentham. Jeremy Bentham also makes pleasure the end of action. "Pleasure is in itself a good, nay the only good; pain is in itself an evil, the only evil."2 Everything else is good only in so far as it conduces to pleasure. All actions are determined by pleasures and pains, and are to be judged by the same standard. "The constantly proper end of action on the part of every individual at the moment of action is his real greatest happiness from that moment to the end of his life." What kind of pleasure shall we choose? Choose those pleasures which last the longest and are the most intense, regardless of their quality. "The quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry." In estimating the value of a pleasure or a pain, we must also consider, besides the intensity and duration, its certainty or uncertainty, its propinquity or remoteness, its fecundity ("or the chance it has of being followed by sensations of the same kind "), 1 Moral Philosophy, pp. 19 ff. 2 Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. x, Bowring's edi. tion, p. 102; Springs of Action, ii, § 4; Deontology, Vol. I, p. 126. or purity ("or the chance it has of not being followed by sensations of the opposite kind "), and likewise its extent, that is, the number of persons to whom it extends or who are affected by ita My own happiness depends upon the happiness of the greatest number, i.e., the conduct most conducive to general happiness always coincides with that which conduces to the happiness of the agent.2 Hence it is to the interest of the individual to strive after the general happiness, and it is the business of ethics to point this out to him. "To prove that the immoral action is a miscalculation of self-interest, to show how erroneous an estimate the vicious man makes of pains and pleasures, is the purpose of the intelligent moralist." 3 J. S. Mill.-John Stuart Mill accepts the teaching of Bentham in a somewhat modified form. Actions are right in proportion as they tend to pro 1 Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. iv, pp. 29 ff. Bentham expresses his scheme in the following lines. I presume he supposed that at some future time the school children would be compelled to learn them off by heart: 66 Intense, long, certain, speedy, fruitful, pure 2 Tb., chap. xvii, p. 313. 4 1806-1873. Utilitarianism, 1861. 8 Deontology. See also Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, by James Mill. mote happiness; wrong, as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.1 Some kinds of pleasure, however, are more desirable and more valuable than others. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. Now it is an unquestioned fact that those who are acquainted with all pleasures prefer those following the employment of the higher faculties. No intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they with theirs. "It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool or the pig is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides."2 However, the standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether. "As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him (the agent) to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested 1 Utilitarianism, chap. ii, pp. 9, 10. 2 Ib., p. 14. 3 Id., p. 16. 8 and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbor as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality." It is noble to be capable of resigning entirely one's own portion of happiness, or chances of it; but, after all, this self-sacrifice must be for some end; it is not its own end. A sacrifice which does not increase, or tend to increase, the sum total of happiness, is wasted.2 But why should I desire the "greatest happiness altogether" instead of my own greatest happiness, as the standard? Mill is somewhat vague and indefinite on this point. Each person desires his own happiness. Each person's happiness is a good to that person; and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. The reasoning here seems to be this: Everybody desires his own happiness. The happiness of everybody (every particular individual) is a good to everybody (to that particular individual). Hence the happiness of everybody (that is, of all, of the whole) is a good to everybody (that is, to every particular individual).1 A more satisfactory answer is given to the question in another place. I have a feeling for the happiness of mankind, "a regard for the pains and pleasures of 7b., pp. 23 ff. 8 Ib., 1 Utilitarianism, chap. ii, p. 24 4 We have here a beautiful example of the logical fallacy of composition. |