urable feelings. When, however, too severe a drain is made upon the parts in action, the blood does not carry enough nourishment, and the lost energy not restored. Pain ensues. The breaking down of the cells reacts upon the movement of the arteries; the greater the demand made upon them, the less they can do; they become constricted. Hence, intense bodily pain may produce a swoon, “and the tortures of the rack have sometimes put the victim to sleep."1

Now to say that pleasure is the end, would mean, when translated into physiological language, that the entire body, with all its complicated organs, was nothing but a means for keeping the nervous energy in such a state that destruction should not exceed construction.? This is manifestly absurd. The sanest view to take is that the physiological condition corresponding to pleasure is a sign of the proper functioning of the system, that the health and integrity of the entire system is the end which is realized by the proper functioning of the nervous and every other system.

16. Metaphysical Hedonism. Much harder would it be to prove that pleasure is the highest end

1 Külpe, Psychology, p. 273. See Sutherland, The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct, Vol. II, chap. xxii.

2 Or, if we assume the existence of special pain and pleasure nerves, the hedonistic physiology would mean that all the other nerves and all the other parts of the body were means to the excitation of the pleasure nerves, and that the excitation of these nerves was the end and aim of life.

aimed at by nature or by God. We should have the same problem as before, complicated with all the difficulties belonging to the teleological argument in metaphysics. We should have to prove (1) that an end is really realized; (2) that pleasure is that end, which we have not been able to do so far; (3) that it is the end desired by God or by some intelligent principle in nature; and (4) that everything else is an appropriate means of realizing it. It would have to be shown that God made the world and everything in it in order to procure pleasure or happiness for his creatures. Can that be done? Countless numbers of living beings perish in the struggle for existence.

Many

are called but few are chosen. Only those survive who can meet the requirements of their surroundings, whose natures are adapted to the conditions of the world.

To assume that the end aimed at by God is pleasure, is to assume that everything in this world, the complicated bodies of the animals and everything in existence, was made in order that living beings might get pleasure. One feels like asking in this connection, why so much effort was wasted to produce this result tant de bruit pour une omelette when it might have been attained with less trouble. Perhaps the jellyfish has less to grumble at than

man.

1 For an excellent critique of teleology, see Paulsen's Introduc tion to Philosophy, English translation, pp. 158 ff

17. Pleasure as the Moral End. But, it might be said, although pleasure or happiness is not the end at which men aim, consciously or unconsciously, they ought to aim at it. Why, however, ought they to aim at it? we ask. To say that one ought to do a thing can mean: (1) that, if one desires to realize a certain end, one ought to use certain means; or (2) that one is absolutely bound to do a certain thing. Now if we say that man ought to make pleasure the goal, taking the ought relatively as in the first case, then we are practically making pleasure a means to some other end. If the ought is taken in the second sense, and we say that man is bound unconditionally to seek his happiness, that he is obliged to seek it, morally obliged, perhaps, -we are simply making a dogmatic assertion which cannot be proved, and which will not be accepted by every one without qualification. It cannot be proved that one ought to strive after some highest good; this is a matter of feeling. Now, do all human beings feel that they ought to seek pleasure regardless of everything else, and do they feel that they ought to seek everything else for the sake of pleasure?

CHAPTER IX

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Egoist oraltruirt?

THE HIGHEST GOOD1

1. The Question of Ends or Ideals. Our exami nation has shown us that pleasure cannot be regarded as the end of action, in whatever sense we take the word end. Then what is the end? If we mean by the question, What is the motive to action? we cannot answer in a single word. All ideas are more or less impulsive, indeed every conscious state tends to translate itself into movement; consciousness is motor. If we mean by the question, What is the final goal at which human beings are consciously and deliberately aiming? then our answer must be, Human beings have not a definite end in view toward which they are consciously and methodically moving. We do not plan our lives so carefully, we do not first set up an ideal and then try to realize it. Individuals and nations may be said to have certain ideals, but not in the sense that they are clearly conscious of them.

1 See the authors mentioned in chap. vii, especially Stephen, Science of Ethics, chaps. iv, ix, x; Jhering, Zweck im Recht, Vol. II, 95 ff.; Wundt, Ethics, pp. 493 ff.; Höffding, Ethik, VI; Paulsen, Ethics, Introduction, also pp. 275 ff.; also Ziegler, Sittliches Sein und sittliches Werden; Williams, Evolutional Ethics, Part II, chaps. vii, viii, ix. See also my article, "The Moral Law," in the International Journal of Ethics, January, 1900.

We can say, however, that every animal desires to live in its own peculiar way. The lion desires to live the life of a lion, man the life of a man. The brute is, of course, not conscious of the ultimate consequences of its strivings. It desires food and cares for its young not because it has before its consciousness the idea of individual and race preservation. It is not necessary that it should know all these things; the important thing is that it should do

them.

When we examine the acts desired by animals, we find that they are purposive, that they realize a purpose. The lion roams over the desert seeking for prey, and when he finds it he acts in a manner appropriate to his purpose. The lioness cares for her young much like a human mother. We may say that the actions of these animals tend toward their self-preservation as well as toward the preservation of the species. And we may, therefore, say in a certain sense that these animals desire their own and their species' good, not, however, that they have in consciousness an ideal toward which they are working, and for the realization of which they are using everything else as a means. Their desires are directed toward concrete acts, which we may embrace under different classes, not toward abstract ideals.

Now, human beings, like other animals, have their minds fixed upon specific acts without being necessarily conscious of the ultimate consequences of these acts. They desire these acts, not for the sake of any