is because many other things have been what they were. In this sense we may say that it is determined. I have a human body and not an animal's, because I am the child of human parents; I have a particular human body because I am the child of a particular race, of a particular nation, a particular family. Similarly I may say that I have a human mind, a human will, a particular human mind and a particular will, because I am the child of a particular race, nation, age, and family.

The mind, then, is, in a certain sense, determined by the past. But it is likewise determined by the present. Just as a seed needs certain favorable conditions in order to grow and thrive, a character needs an environment suitable to its development. To express it physiologically, a brain needs stimuli in order that it may act out its nature. It will develop from immaturity to maturity only under the proper conditions. Just as a man must exercise his muscles properly in order to develop them, he must exercise his mental powers in order to develop them.

As was said before, we must give due weight to both the inside and the outside, the character and its physical and social environment. The brain requires stimulation in order to act at all; it will not develop without being incited to action from without. But it is not merely a puppet in the hands of the external world; it does not merely receive, but gives; it strikes back. That is, it reacts upon stimuli according to its own nature. Similarly, the mind is

not merely a passive thing, but an active thing; character is not merely a creature, but a creator. The manner in which a person will think, feel, and act will depend not merely upon the outward circumstances, but upon the inner. Stating the matter psychologically and applying it to the subject of the will, we may say: Whether an idea or feeling is to have motive power or not, depends altogether upon the character of the individual, which has been formed by a multitude of influences and conditions.

Scientific psychology, then, is deterministic in the sense of claiming that states of consciousness, like other facts in the universe, have their invariable antecedents, concomitants, and consequents. Mental phenomena are inserted into the general system of things like all other phenomena. They are not isolated and independent processes without connection with the rest of the world, but parts of an interrelated whole.

5. Theological Theories. Now that we have considered the psychological answer to the question of free will and determinism, let us briefly examine the attitude of theology and metaphysics toward the problem. Theology is either deterministic or libertarian, according to the conceptions from which it starts out. The great thesis of Christian theology has always been that Christ came to save man from sin. Now, reasoned Augustine, if Christ came to save man from sin, then evidently man was not able to save himself, he was unable not to sin; he was

determined to sin, and hence not free.1 This is the doctrine of original sin. Other theologians make the same thesis their starting-point, and reach a different conclusion. If Christ saved man from sin, then evidently man was a sinner. But man cannot be a sinner unless he has the power of freedom to sin or not to sin, for sin implies freedom. Hence, if sin is to mean anything, man must be free.2

Or, the theologian may make the conception of God his starting-point, and reach either freedom or determinism. God is all-powerful, say some, and man wholly dependent upon Him. If man were free, then God could not determine him one way or the other, man would represent an independent entity in God's universe; which would rob God of some of His power. No, say others, God is all-good, hence He cannot have determined man to sin. If man were determined by God to sin, then God would not be an all-good God; He would be responsible for the evil in the world. But as He is not responsible for the evil, this must be the result of man's choice. Hence, man is not determined, but free.

6. Metaphysical Theories.- Metaphysics, too, may be either deterministic or indeterministic. Materialism assumes that matter is the essence or principle of reality, that everything in the world is matter in motion, and that nothing can happen without cause. If these premises are true, then of course mind is

1 See also Luther and Calvin.

2 See Pelagius and the Jesuits.

the effect of motion, or only a different form of motion, and is governed or determined by the laws of matter.

According to spiritualism or idealism. mind is the principle of reality, and everything is a manifestation of mind. According to monistic spiritualism, there is one fundamental mind or intelligence in the universe, of which all individual intelligences or minds are the manifestation. Kant calls this principle the intelligible or noumenal world, the thing-in-itself or freedom; Fichte calls it the practical ego; Hegel calls it the universal reason; Schopenhauer calls it the will. The principle itself is regarded as free, uncaused, self-caused, or self-originative. But if man's mind is a manifestation of this principle, then man's mind depends upon it, cannot be without it, must act in accordance with its nature, is determined by it. Kant and Schopenhauer both hold that man's empirical character, that is, his phenomenal character, his character as we know it, is determined by the intelligible character, the noumenal character, the principle of which it is the manifestation.1

Duns

According to pluralistic or individualistic spiritualism, there are many minds or principles. Scotus, the schoolman, regards every human being as an individualistic principle, absolutely free to choose and to act, not bound to choose or act in any particular way. If this standpoint is strictly adhered to, and it is the only possible standpoint for those

1 See also Green, op. cit.

who accept the freedom of indifference, then each individual is practically a creator. Leibniz, too, is a pluralist, but his pluralism differs somewhat from the pluralism of Duns Scotus. The world consists of monads or metaphysical points, or spiritual substances, each one of which is free in the sense of not being determined from without, that is, by any power outside of itself. Each spirit is, as Leibniz puts it, "a little divinity in its own department." But since whatever happens in the monad happens in accordance with its own nature, the monad is really determined by its own nature. I must think, feel, and act as I do because it is my nature or character so to think, feel, and act.

If we reject both spiritualism and materialism, and regard mental and physical processes as two sides of an underlying principle which is neither mind nor matter, but the cause of both, then both mind and matter are determined by this principle, and are not free. The principle itself, however, may be free or uncaused or self-originating.

According to dualism we have two principles, mind and matter, each one differing in essence from the other. Each person is a corporeal and spiritual substance. Dualism may be either deterministic or indeterministic, according as it is claimed that the mental realm is governed by law or not. Some thinkers have reasoned that, since mind and matter go together or run parallel with each other, and since matter is governed by law, mind must be governed