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the acts emanated should not be held responsible. Who else should be held responsible but the willing personality?

But if character is the necessary product of conditions, why hold any one responsible, even though he feel himself responsible? If man's acts are the effect of causes why punish him for what he cannot help? Because punishment is a powerful determining cause. Why should I be held responsible for my deeds? "The reply is," in Tyndall's words, "the right of society to protect itself against aggressive injurious forces, whether they be bound or free, forces of nature or forces of man." 1

Punishment can have a meaning only in a deterministic scheme of things. We can by education make a moral being out of man, that is, influence his character, determine him to act for the social good. As Riehl expresses it epigrammatically: "Man is not held responsible because he is by birth a moral being; he becomes a moral being because he is held responsible."

11. Determinism and Practice. There are many men who, while acknowledging the arguments of the deterministic theory to be unanswerable, yet reject it on practical grounds. They claim that life would be impossible on such an hypothesis.

The deterministic theory is not, however, a discouraging and paralyzing doctrine. On the contrary, the knowledge that we are determined must 1 Fortnightly Review, 1877, "Science and Man," p. 612.

determine us to avoid certain conditions, and seek others more favorable. Determinism does not destroy the energy of action. Fatalistic nations like the Mohammedans were far more energetic than Christian ascetics, who believed in the will's absolute freedom. Determinism is the strongest motive to action. If I am exceedingly desirous of fame, how can the knowledge that this desire depends upon conditions affect me? Why should it make me less ambitious? If I have been morally educated, I shall continue to strive after certain things in spite of my belief in determinism. I shall go right on deliberating and choosing as heretofore, and make an effort to live an honorable, useful life. "Now when it is said by a fatalist," Butler writes, "that the whole constitution of nature, and the actions of men, that every thing and every mode and every circumstance of every thing, is necessary, and could not possibly have been otherwise, it is to be observed, that this necessity does not exclude deliberation, choice, preference, and acting from certain principles and to certain ends; because all this is a matter of undoubted experience, acknowledged by all, and what every man may, every moment, be conscious of."1 "The author of nature then being certainly of some character or other, notwithstanding necessity, it is evident this necessity is as reconcilable with the particular character of benevolence, veracity, and justice, in him, which attributes are

1 Analogy of Religion, chap. vi, p. 153,

the foundation of religion, as with any other character; since we find their necessity no more hinders men from being benevolent than cruel; true than faithless; just than unjust, or, if the fatalist pleases, what we call unjust."1

1 Analogy of Religion, chap. vi, p. 159.

INDEX

n. STANDS FOR NOTE

A.

Absolute morality, 118, 145.

Action, antecedents of, 209 ff.

Alexander, S., 73.

Bonaventura, on conscience, 31.
Bradley, 142.

Brentano, on conscience, 41 f.
Burckhardt, 87.

Altruism, 126 f.; egoism and, 258 ff. Burton, 87.

Altruists, 258 n. 1.

Anniceris, 159, 177 n. 1.

Antisthenes, on highest good, 183 f.
Antoninus of Florence, on

science, 31.

con-

Approval, feelings of, 82 f.
Aristippus, 158 f., 176.
Aristotle, 109 n. 1, 123, 127 n. 1, 255
n. 1; his definition of an end, 156
f.; on highest good, 184 ff.; on
pleasure-pain as the consequence
of action, 240.
Associationists,
science, 55 f.

theory of

con-

Butler, 36 n. 1, 80, 130 n. 2, 150, 262
n. 7; on conscience, 42 f.; on de-
terminism, 338 f.; on highest
good, 164 f.

C.

Calderwood, 85; on conscience, 34f.
Calvin, 324 n. 1.

Carlyle, on motives to action, 226 f.
Carneri, 73.

Categorical imperative, 61 ff., 133
ff.
Causality, 327 ff.; and will, 319 ff.
Character, 311 ff.

Atheism and teleological theory, Christian conception, 190 n. 1.

150 f.

Augustine, 30, 306.

B.

Bacon, 262 n. 7, 287.
Bahnsen, 289 n. 1.

Bain, 175, 214 n. 2, 230 n. 1, 233 n.
2, 262 n. 7, 329; on conscience, 57
ff.; on motive to action, 218 ff.;
on pleasure-pain as consequence
of action, 240.

Balance of pleasures, 293.
Barratt, 175.

Baumann, 214 n. 2.

Bentham, 177, 262 n.7; on con-
science, 55; on highest good, 168
f.; and Mill, 172 f.

Biology and highest good, 276 ff.

Chrysostom, 29.
Cicero, 187.

Civilization and pessimism, 299 ff.
Clarke, S., 80, 85; on conscience, 33.
Conscience, analysis and explana-

tion of, 74 ff.; differences in, 87 f.,
96 ff.; empirical view of, 47 ff.;
evolutional view of, and morality,
111 ff.; genesis of, 93 ff.; and
heredity, 70 ff.; and inclination,
167 ff.; immediacy and infalli-
bility of, 105 ff.; innateness of, 100
ff.; intuitional view of, 28 ff.;
criticism of intuitional view of,
85 ff.; as judgment, 83 ff.; met-
aphysical view of, 28 ff.; myth-
ical view, 27 f.; as standard of
morals, 116 ff.; and teleological

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