(1) According to Lord Shaftesbury,1 man possesses "self-affections which lead only to the good of the private,” “natural, kind, or social affections," which lead to the public good, and “unnatural affections" which lead neither to public nor private good. Virtue consists in eliminating the latter, and establishing a proper harmony or balance between the others. But how can we tell whether these affections are properly balanced or not? By means of the moral sense, the sense of right and wrong, a natural possession of all rational creatures, which "no speculative opinion is capable immediately and directly to exclude or destroy." "In a creature capable of forming general notions of things," he says, "not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the sense are the objects of affection, but the very affections themselves; and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude, and their contraries, being brought before the mind by reflection, become objects, so that by means of this reflected sense there arises another kind of affection toward those very affections themselves which have been already felt, and are now become the subject of a new liking or dislike." 2 "No sooner are actions viewed, no sooner the human affections and passions

1 1671-1713. "Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit," contained in the second volume of the Characteristics. See especially Martineau ; Stephen; Jodl; Gizycki, Die Philosophie Shaftesbury's; Fowler, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson.. Selections in Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, Vol. I. 2 Inquiry, Bk. I, Part II, Section III.

discerned (and they are most of them discerned as soon as felt), than straight an inward eye distinguishes and sees the fair and shapely, the amiable, the admirable, the foul, the odious, or the despicable. How is it possible, then, not to own that as these distinctions have their foundation in nature, the discernment itself is natural and from nature alone?"1

(2) Francis Hutcheson 2 follows in the same path. He regards man as being moved by two kinds of affections: self-love and benevolence. In case a conflict arises between these two motive principles, an internal principle, intuitive and universal in man, the moral sense, appears and decides in favor of the latter. The moral sense has always "approved of every kind affection," has pronounced "morally good" all actions which flow from benevolent affection, or intention of absolute good to others. What is the nature of this faculty? It does not, like the conscience of the rationalists, evolve general propositions out of itself, but perceives virtue and vice as the eye perceives light and darkness. It is a "regulating and controlling function," "the faculty of per

1 The Moralists, Part III, Section III. As Jodl says: "The manner in which Shaftesbury speaks of this self-reflection upon which the moral judgment is said to depend, is somewhat indefinite and vacillating." Still, he apparently means to point out that an emotional element enters into the process by which such judgments are formed. We may, therefore, call Shaftesbury an "emotional intuitionist." 2 1694-1747. Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, etc.-Selections from Hutcheson's writings in SelbyBigge, op. cit., Vol. I.

8 Inquiry, Section I, § 8; System of Moral Philosophy, Bk I.

ceiving moral excellence.”1 "Some actions have to men an immediate goodness;" "by a superior sense, which I call a moral one, we perceive pleasure in the contemplation of such actions in others, and are determined to love the agent (and much more do we perceive pleasure in being conscious of having done such actions ourselves) without any view of further natural advantage from them." 2

(3) David Hume3 agrees with Hutcheson. He discusses the question "whether 'tis by means of our ideas [reason] or impressions [feelings] we distinguish between vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blamable or praiseworthy," and finds that reason as such is wholly inactive and can never be the source of so active a principle as conscience, or a sense of morals Vice and virtue are not discoverable merely by reason, or the comparison of ideas. Our decisions concerning moral rectitude and depravity are perceptions.

1 System, Bk. I.

2 Inquiry, Introduction. See especially Martineau, Types, Vol. II, Bk. II.

81711-1776. Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, etc. For bibliography see Weber, History of Philosophy, 417, note.

• Treatise on Morals, Bk. III, Part I, § 1; Inquiry, Section I: "There has been a controversy started of late concerning the general foundation of morals: whether they be derived from reason or from sentiment; whether we attain the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all sound judgment of truth and falsehood, they should be the same to every rational, intelligent being; or whether, like the perception of beauty and deformity, they be founded entirely on the particular fabric and constitution of the human species.". Selections by Hyslop.

Morality is more properly felt, than judged of; though this feeling or sentiment is commonly so soft and gentle that we are apt to confound it with an idea.1 "The final sentence, it is probable, which pronounces characters and actions amiable or odious, blamable or praiseworthy; that which stamps on them the mark of honor or infamy, approbation or censure; that which renders morality an active principle, and constitutes virtue our happiness, and vice our misery: it is probable, I say, that this final sentence depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in the whole species." 2 And what is the nature of the feeling by which we know good and evil? To have the

1 Treatise on Morals, Bk. III, Part I, § 2.

2 Inquiry, Section I. See also Appendix I: "Now, as virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own account, without fee or reward, merely for the immediate satisfaction which it conveys, it is requisite that there should be some sentiment which it touches; some internal taste, or feeling, or whatever you choose to call it, which distinguishes moral good and evil, and which embraces the one and rejects the other. Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of reason and of taste are easily ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood, the latter gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one discovers objects as they really stand in nature, without addition or diminution, the other has a productive faculty, and, gilding or staining all natural objects with the colors borrowed from internal sentiment, raises, in a manner, a new creation. Reason, being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination, by showing us the means of attaining happiness or avoiding misery. Taste, as it gives pleasure or pain, and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to action, and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition."

sense of virtue is nothing but to feel a particular kind of satisfaction, a peculiar kind of pleasure.1

(4) To the same school belong also J. J. Rousseau,2 Kant (before the critical period), Adam Smith,1 and J. F. Herbart.5 F. Brentano has attempted to strengthen the theory in a peculiar manner. There are, he holds, certain self-evident judgments, which carry their self-evidence in them, which it would be absurd to deny, like, Things equal to the same thing are equal to each other; and certain instinctive or blind judgments, which may or may not be true, about which there can be dispute. Similarly, there are certain higher or self-evident feelings, feelings which are valid for all human beings, feelings about which there can be no dispute, and lower feelings, which lack this self-evident character, about which there can be dispute. Thus we love knowledge and truth, and dislike error and ignorance, and there can be no dispute about the value of this feeling. Should a different human species love error and hate truth, we should regard its loving and hating as fundamentally wrong. That a man should love knowledge and hate ignorance is self-evident; that he should prefer champagne to Rhine-wine is

1 See Treatise, loc. cit., Section II; also Part III.

2 1712-1778.

8 See his Ueber die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natür lichen Theologie und Moral, 1764. Cf. Förster, Der Entwick lungsgang der Kantischen Ethik; Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik. A Theory of Moral Sentiments. 5 1776-1841. Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntniss, 1889.

4 1723-1790. 6 Born 1838.