For the facts cited, chapter after chapter, unite in proving that the sentiments and ideas current in each society become adjusted to the kinds of activity predominating in it. A life of constant external enmity generates a code in which aggression, conquest, revenge, are inculcated, while peaceful occupations are reprobated. Conversely, a life of settled internal amity generates a code inculcating the virtues conducing to harmonious coöperation justice, honesty, veracity, regard for others' claims. And the implication is that if the life of internal amity continues unbroken from generation to generation, there must result not only the appropriate code, but the appropriate emotional nature — a moral sense adapted to moral requirements. Men so conditioned will acquire, to the degree needful for complete guidance, that innate conscience which the intuitive moralists erroneously suppose to be possessed by mankind at large. There needs but a continuance of absolute peace externally, and a rigorous insistence of non-aggression internally to ensure the moulding of men into a form naturally characterized by all the virtues."1 (4) With this theory, as worked out by Spencer, the views of M. Guyau, Leslie Stephen, B. Car 1 Inductions, § 191. 2 Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction, 2d ed., 1881; English translation, 1899; La morale anglaise contemporaine, 1885, Conclusion, pp. 423 ff. 8 The Science of Ethics, 1882: "Conscience is the utterance of the public spirit of the race, ordering us to obey the primary con. 6 7 neri,1 H. Höffding, G. von Gizycki, R. von Jhering, W. Wundt, F. Paulsen, S. Alexander, Hugo Münsterberg, Paul Rée, Georg Simmel, 10 and A. Sutherland" practically agree.12 9 ditions of its welfare, and it acts not the less forcibly though we may not understand the source of its authority or the end at which it is aiming." 1 Sittlichkeit und Darwinismus, 1871. 2 Psychology, VI, C, §8; Ethik, 1888. an instinct which has developed in the race. cally, like all instincts. 8 Moralphilosophie, 1889. Conscience, he holds, is 4 Der Zweck im Recht, 1877, 3d ed., 1893. 5 Ethik, 1886, 2d ed., 1892, English translation, in 3 vols., by Titchener, Washburn, and Gulliver. 6 System der Ethik, 1889, 5th ed., 1899, edited and translated by Thilly, 1899. According to Paulsen, duty at first consists in acting in accordance with custom. I perform certain customary acts because it is the will of my surroundings. The will of the people speaks to the individual in custom. In my feeling of duty, as it now exists, the will of my parents, teachers, ancestors, and race is expressed. The authority of the gods whom I worship is also manifested in the feeling. At first man obeys the law because of external authority; in time he comes to feel an inner obligation to the law, he acknowledges the right of others over him. See Bk. II, chap. v. 7 Moral Order and Progress, 1889. 8 Der Ursprung der Sittlichkeit, 1889. 9 Die Entstehung des Gewissens, 1885. 10 Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft, 2 vols., 1892, 1893. See Vol. I, chap. i. 11 The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct, 2 vols., 1898. 12 For evolutional ethics, see Williams, A Review of Evolutional Ethics. чутрой CHAPTER III ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION OF CONSCIENCE 1 1. The Psychological Facts. Now that we have examined the historical attempts which have been made to account for the moral consciousness, let us try to come to some conclusion ourselves. We can not, however, it seems to me, accomplish anything without a thorough understanding of what the fact we are considering is. We must first analyze the psychical processes concerned in this discussion, and then seek to interpret them. The false explanations which have been advanced by so many of the writers whom we have passed in review, are, in my opinion, largely due to their neglect of psychology. To assert that we must study our phenomena psychologically, means simply that we must know what we are talking about. If the science of ethics is 1 See, besides the works mentioned in the course of the last chapter: Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Vol. II, Part VIII, chaps. vii f.; Wundt, Physiological Psychology, Vol. II, chap. xviii, 3; Höffding, Psychology, VI, C, § 8; Baldwin, Feeling and Will, pp. 205 ff.; Sully, The Human Mind, Vol. II, pp. 155 ff.; Ladd, Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, pp. 579 ff. ; Jodl, Lehrbuch der Psychologie, pp. 715 ff.; Sutherland, The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct, especially Vol. II, chaps. xv ff. - Parts of this chapter appeared in the January number of the Philosophical Review, 1900. to achieve any results, it must do what all other sciences are doing it must analyze the facts which it is desirous of explaining. Metaphysical specula tions on ethics will have to follow in the wake of psychology.1 As was said before, we pronounce moral judgments upon ourselves as well as upon others; we approve and disapprove of motives and acts, we call them right and wrong. Certain modes of conduct, we say, ought to be performed, others ought to be avoided. A bankrupt conveys a piece of property to a friend in order to avoid the payment of a just debt, with the understanding that it is to be returned to him later; but when the time comes, the receiver of the property fails to make restitution. I disapprove of the conduct of both parties; I say that they did wrong, that they ought not to have acted as they did. Jean Valjean, the released galley-slave in Hugo's Les Misérables, finds a refuge in the home of the good curé after every one else had refused him shelter, and repays his benefactor by robbing him. The priest forgives him, and even tells a falsehood to save him from punishment. We say the convict Jean Valjean, over did wrong, the priest did right. come by the sweet charity of the good old man, leads a useful and honorable life from that time on. But one day he hears of the apprehension of a supposed Jean Valjean. Now what shall he do? One 1 See Simmel, Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft, Vol. I, Preface. voice within him tells him to let things take their natural course, and not to forsake the position achieved after so much suffering and transgression. The happiness of thousands depends upon his remaining where he is. But another voice, which we call his conscience, blames him for these thoughts, and urges him authoritatively to do what is right and give himself up. After terrible inner struggles, the conscience finally triumphs, and Jean Valjean goes back to the galleys. The conflict is at an end, the moral craving is satisfied, and peace reigns in his heart. Had he allowed the supposed Jean Valjean to be punished in his stead, he would have suffered remorse, stings or pangs of conscience, as we say. He would have looked back upon his conduct and still have recognized the authority of the right over the wrong. We contemplate the misfortune of the real Jean Valjean with the deepest pity, but with all our sorrowing we cannot wish that he had acted differently. Our moral approval rises to moral enthusiasm, in which our respect and love for the moral law reach their height; we bow down humbly before the rule of right as before a higher power, and say, Thy will, not mine, be done. 2. Analysis of Conscience. We have here examples of the phenomenon which we desire to investigate. The idea of a motive or an act arises in my consciousness. At once or after some reflection, peculiar feelings and impulses group themselves around this idea feelings of approval which are pleasura |