S on natural ob certain eglasses, and the "Owly inspected, ali E-acquaintance will defective, and the 1 them. a is one of the moft 1 is faid to be th that of the world; but a wife and pious man, before all other kinds of knowledge, prefers that of God and his own foul. But fome kind of knowledge or other the mind is continually craving after, and after a further proficiency in. And by confidering what kind of knowledge it most of all defires, its prevailing turn and temper may easily be known. This defire of knowledge, like other affections planted in our natures, will be very apt to lead us wrong, if it be not well regulated. When it is directed to improper objects, or pursued in an improper manner, it degenerates into a vain and criminal curiofity. A fatal instance of this in our first parents we have upon facred record, the unhappy effects of which are but too visible in all. Self-knowledge is the subject of the enfuing treatise;-a subject which, the more I think of, the more important and extensive it appears; so important, that every branch of it seems abfolutely neceffary to the right government of the life and temper; and so extensive, that the nearer view we take of the several branches of it, the more are still opening to the view, as necessarily connected with it as the other, like what we find in microscopical croscopical observations on natural objects. The better the glasses, and the nearer the scrutiny, the more wonders we explore; and the more surprising discoveries we make of certain properties, parts, or affections belonging to them, which were never before thought of. For in order to a true self-knowledge, the human mind, with its various powers and operations, must be narrowly inspected, all its secret bendings and doublings displayed; otherwise our self-acquaintance will be but very partial and defective, and the heart after all will deceive us. So that, in treating this subject, there is no small danger, either of doing injury to it, by a flight and superficial inquest on the one hand, or of running into a research too minute and philosophical for common use on the other. These two extremes I shall keep in my eye, and endeavour to steer a middle course between them. "Know thyself," is one of the most ufeful and comprehenfive precepts in the whole moral system. And it is well known in how great a veneration this maxim was held by the ancients; and in how high esteem the duty of self-examination, as necessary to it. Thales the Milesian is faid to be the first A 2 first author of it *; who used to say, "That for a man to know himself is the " hardest thing in the world t." It was afterwards adopted by Chylon the Lacedemonian; and is one of those three precepts which Pliny affirms to have been confecrated at Delphos in golden letters. It was afterwards greatly admired, and frequently used by others †, till at length it acquired the authority of a divine oracle, and was supposed to have been given originally by Apollo himself. Of which general * He was the prince of the philosophers, and flourished about A. M. 3330, and was contemporary with Jofiah, king of Judah. + See Stanley's Life of Thales. Respue quod non es: tollat sua munera cerdo. Tecum habita: et noris quam fit tibi curta fupelPerf. Sat. 4. lex. nec te quæsiveris extra. Id. Sat. I. - te confule, dic tibi quis fis. Juv. Sat. II. Te psum concute. Hor. Lib. I. Sat. 3. Bellum eft enim fua vitia nosse. Cic. Epist. ad Atticum. Illud (γνωθι σεαύλον), noli putare ad arrogantiam minuendam folum effe dictum, verum etiam ut bona noftra norimus. Id. Epift. ad Mar. 2. Fratrem, Lit. 3. Epift. 6. Lib. 2. a Id enim maxime quemque decet quod est cujusque fuum maxime. Quisque igitur nofcat ingenium, cremque se et bonorum et vitiorum fuorum judicem præbeat. Id. de Offic. Lib. 1. Intrandum eft igitur in rerum naturam, et penitus; quid ea poftulat pervidendum; aliter enim nof at pervidendum met ipfos noffe non poffumus. Id. Finibus, Lib. 5. de general opinion Cicero gives us this reafon, "Because it hath fuch a weight of " sense and wisdom in it as appears too " great to be attributed to any man *." And this opinion, of its coming originally from Apollo himself, perhaps was the reafon that it was written in golden capitals over the door of his temple at Delphos. And why this excellent precept should not be held in as high esteem in the Christian world as it was in the heathen, is hard to conceive. Human nature is the fame now as it was then. The heart as deceitful; and the neceffity of watching, knowing, and keeping it the fame. Nor are we less affured that this precept is divine: nay, we have a much greater affurance of this than they had. They suppofed it came down from heaven; we know it did. What they conjectured, we are fure of. For this facred oracle is dictated AB * Hæc enim (i. e. Philofophia) nos, cum cæteras res omnes, tum quod eft difficillimum, docuit; ut [NOSMET IPSOS] nofceremus. Cujus præcepti tanta vis, tanta fententia est, ut ea non homini cui piam, sed Delphico Deo tribueretur. Cicero de Legib. Lib. 1. Quod præceptum quia majus erat quam ut ab homine videretur, idcirco affignatum est Deo: Jubet igitur nos Pythius Apollo, nofcere [NOSMET IP505]. Idem de Finibus, Lib. 5. cap. 16. |