interpretation of scripture is given to the world with all the imposing sanction of infallibility, while that infallibility rests upon mere "motives to credibility," according to their own showing. Is there a magic influence in the intervening pretence to infallibility, that renders all on one side sure and certain, while all on the other side is doubt, or at best but plausibility? If the foundation be in ruins and tottering, what intervening materials, resting upon that foundation, have such a potent spell as to render all the superstructure perfectly secure? Surely the idea is absurd.. Our meaning is this: The church without infallibility, is not certainly correct in her interpretation of scripture. She, therefore, looks round for something on which to rest a claim to infallibility. The scriptures furnish no such ground; tradition does not; her own word carries no proof; at length she rests her claim upon mere motives to credibility, and plausible reasons why it should be believed. On this she rests her claim to infallibility. The foundation is admitted to be but plausible, but she is notwithstanding, now able to interpret with infallible certainty. Now we ask, what is there in this claim which makes her interpretations, after it is set up, certainly correct, while the foundation of the claim is uncertain, and only plausible? Is this the "demonstration of her infallibility from other considerations ?" Credat Appella, non ego!"

CHAPTER VIII. >

THE INFALLIBILITY OF THE CHURCH OF ROME CONTINUED.

"Whoso boasteth himself of a false gift, is like clouds and wind without rain." Solomon.

The great and popular argument of the papists in favor of the claim to infallibility is derived from the great diversity of sentiment among protestants. There is, say they, no certainty in their religion. I suppose it will be admitted that there is as much real difference of opinion between papists and protestants, as there is between protestants themselves. It will also be admitted by papists, that when a man becomes a papist, he does it through conviction of the truth, which always implies a previous exercise of reason and judgment, (neither of which, by the way, is he afterwards permitted to exercise.) If then these two points be admitted, we at once see that the diversity of opinion concerning scripture truth, is between two who are equally entitled to the exercise of their own reason and judgment; or at least it is so with the protestant, whom we now suppose to be inquiring after truth on this subject. For if the poor protestant is not allowed the exercise of his reason and judgment, how is he to become a papist upon the ground of rational conviction? And what proselyte will admit that he became one on any other? Here, then, are two parties of opposite opinions, and both equally entitled to the free exercise of reason and judgment. Now, notwithstanding this diversity, the truth either can, or can not, be known. If it can

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be known, then diversity of opinion is no argument against the possibility of knowing it: and if so, seeing the diversity is equal, that is, it is as great between the papist and the protestant as between the protestant and papist, how is it more impossible for the protestant to know the truth, than the papist? and how does diversity between protestants prevent any of their denominations from knowing the truth, and yet the diversity between protestants and papists does not prevent the papist from knowing it? If the truth can not be known where there is such great diversity, then how does the papist know it, since he differs from those who, he admits, have an equal right with himself to their reason and judgment? How does it come that he is so sure of his infallibility, seeing he professes to derive his knowledge from the scriptures, concerning which the diversity in question exists? As then all the rest of christendom deny that the church of Rome is infallible, and since they have an equal right to their own judgment, who is to decide which is correct? If there be a judge, of whose infallibility I am infallibly certain, I will yield to his decisions: but when his infallibility is the subject matter to be determined, I must appeal to some other authority. And if we differ as to what that authority speaks on the point, I am not bound to yield to his claim to infallibility in interpreting it, for that is the thing to be proved. And the very fact of his appealing to authority, concedes to me the use of my reason and judgment in forming an opinion, and implies the right of refusing to submit unless convinced. Now here is diversity of opinion for which I surely cannot be censured, since I was under no obligation to yield consent unless convinced.

If, then, diversity of sentiment is an argument against the certainty of a thing, of which I cannot be infallibly assured, this is demonstration against the certainty of

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infallibility. We have already shown that it would involve an absurdity to appeal to the church herself for infallible proof: To what then shall we appeal but to the scriptures? And if we appeal to this tribunal, I must have the privilege of exercising my own judgment and skill in interpreting scripture, else I should have no advantage by the appeal. Now in this appeal, the infallibility of the church must not give any kind of character or sanction to her interpretation till it be proved to exist, for otherwise it would be taking for granted the very point in debate; for I never would admit the sanction of infallibility, till I had certain proof of its existence. And this certain or infallible proof is the very thing we are now in quest of. Their great argument, therefore, derived from diversity, among protestants destroys their own cause. For we can be at least as certain of the meaning of scripture, as they are that their church is infallible; for the proof is just as infallible in the one case as the other, and no more. And if diversity is proof against the certainty of our knowledge of scripture truth, it is equally so against the certainty of their infallibility: for before the certainty of infallibility is established, being all equally entitled to our reason and judgment, we are all upon an equal footing, and so long as the proof of infallibility is not certain and convincing, so long does diversity of opinion operate against its advocates as much as against protestants; and that the proof is uncertain is admitted by their great oracle Bellarmine, as we have before mentioned.

Papists boast much of the unity of their church, and urge it as a strong argument in favor of her infallibility. We have already shown that diversity of sentiment among protestants does not help their cause; now let us examine their claim to unity of sentiment; and in the first place, is it a fact that such unity really exists? We

venture to affirm and pledge ourselves to prove that it does not. We have already shown that there are át least four different opinions among them with regard to the seat of their imagined infallibility. Let it be remembered that this church claims to be unchangeably the same from the days of the apostles down to the present time, and that this unity of sentiment and doctrine has ever existed in her bosom. Now let any one look at the history even of the first and second centuries of the church; let him look at the various sects which arose during that period, and on down the third, fourth and fifth centuries, and he will find the church continually rent with heresies and schisms: even the fathers of the church differing among themselves on many points. We have before seen that the church once held doctrines that she now rejects, and what were once but mere matters of opinion are now fundamental doctrines. Let any one take this view of the early history of the church, and then tell wherein consists the unity of the church; then let him look at the church after the rise of the papal beast; let him look at the various sects that arose in her bosom; there we find the Franciscans maintaining that Mary was born immaculate; the Dominicans, on the contrary, maintaining that she was born in original sin, but that its effects were soon removed. We next find the Jesuits differing from the Dominicans on the subject of free will, the former holding to conditional, the latter to unconditional decrees. We then find the Jesuits differing from the Jansenists on the extent of the power and jurisdiction of the Pope, the one holding to his infallibility, the other denying it. We next find the order of Jesuits banished by a solemn bull of the Pope, and reprobated as the most pestiferous sect in society, and then again revived and encouraged by another solemn bull of the Pope: We have already noticed the