صور الصفحة
PDF
النشر الإلكتروني

the foregoing; so they are likely to be ensnared inadvertently into an adoption of the shocking fallacy, that "precisely the same kind and degree of divine agency is needed to do evil as to do good." What! did the doctor really forget the existence and operation of di vine agency, through the energy of all that may be denominated motives in the holy scriptures? Or did he consider this agency as of no consequence whatsoever in the government of accountable agents? Good men uniformly confess this divine agency through the word, exciting them to submit to the authority of the divine law, and inducing them to yield obedience to the gospel; and wicked men, sometimes drawn and melted, at other times fearing and awakened to a sense of duty and of danger, afford demonstration of divine agency, through the power of the word on their hearts and consciences. In order then to free the doctor's assertion from this millstone of fallacy and contradiction yoked on its neck, he must prove the experience of both good and bad men to be utterly erroneous; that is, he must prove that no divine agency whatsoever operates through the medium of motives contained in the bible, upon either the one or the other: or else that the operation upon each, is precisely of the same kind and in the same degree; but which is a contradiction unless he can produce two opposite bibles each pos sessed of equal evidence of divine authority and origin. The present bible will serve his purpose as respects good men, because its commandments and exhortations, and its promises, threatenings, and conditions, all afford proof of divine exciting agency to repentance, faith

and obedience. But the other for bad men must be exactly the reverse, it must threaten the punishment of hell as awaiting upon all penitent, believing, obedient and holy persons; and must promise heaven, and eternal life and glory, only to the impenitent, the disobedient, and unholy. And when the doctor shall have produced this latter bible, written by another Moses and other prophets, as evidently sent of God, as they were, and another New Testament written by other Evangelists, and Apostles, sent by some other person, as evidently the only begotten Son of God, as Jesus Christ was, and performing as many and as great miracles as he did, but teaching doctrines perfectly in contradiction to his doctrines, then, and not until then, will the doctor be able to maintain his most extravagant and reprehensible assertion.

But in order to exonerate himself from this intolerable mass of absurdity, no doubt the doctor is ready to reply that the sameness of divine agency both in kind and degree which he meant, was not, the intermediate agency which operates through divine revelation; but, an immediate excitement by the divine spirit operating directly on the heart and producing all its exercises of every description; and for this reason, because he lays it down as a maxim, that, "mind cannot act any more than matter can move, without a divine agency." Having in Letters 1x and x, formally replied to this inertness of mind, I shall not here repeat what was there observed. But, as the doctor has handled the subject of MENTAL MACHINERY with greater ingenuity, (and consequently with more ad

vantage to Hopkinsianism,) than either West or Edwards; I shall in my next letter particularly notice his argument on this point; and then proceed to other particulars of Hopkinsianism.

LETTER XIII.

સઃ

SIR,

THE doctor thus remarks, and reasons. Many suppose, if we were as dependent upon God, "for all our voluntary exercises, as a clock or a watch "is dependent upon weights or springs for all its mo"tions; then we are as incapable of moral agency, as "these, or any other mere machines. But the fallacy "of this mode of reasoning may be easily exposed. "The fallacy lies here. It takes for granted, that the

[ocr errors]

only reason why a watch, or clock, or any other ma"chine, is not a moral agent, is simply because it is "acted upon, or depends upon some power out of it"self for all its motions. But is this true? Let us "make the trial. Suppose a clock, which has hither. "to been dependent, and moved by weights and "wheels, should this moment become independent, " and move of itself. Is this clock now, any more a "moral agent than it was before? Are its motions,

8.6

now, any moral exercises, or any more worthy of "praise or blame, than they were before? By no "means. But why not? Because, notwithstanding it "is now independent, and moves of itself, yet being

W

"still matter and not mind, it moves without percep ❝tion, reason, conscience, and volition, which are at"tributes essential to a moral agent. The reason why "a cloek, or watch, or any other machine is incapable "of moral agency, is not because it is either depen"dent, or independent, but simply because it is sense"less matter, and totally destitute of all the principles "of moral action. As neither dependence, nor inde"pendence can make a machine, a mind; so neither 'dependence nor independence, can make a mind a "machine. It is impertinent, therefore, to reason from "matter to mind on this subject."* (Emmons.)

The errours contained in the above observations and reasonings, although neither few, nor small, yet, are so glossed over with plausible appearances of consistency, that close attention is requisite, in order to unmask the enormities of their true character. These errours may be classed under three distinct, general heads; viz. Deficiency of moral qualifications. Misconception, and consequent misrepresentation of his opponents objection. And, hostility betwixt the doc. tor's maxim and manner of reasoning. These we will notice separately.

First. Deficiency of moral qualifications. A moral agent, according to the foregoing definition, is mind, endued with perception, reason, conscience, and volitions. Had the doctor but substituted soul, or spirit, for mind, and annexed to the above recited endowments, affections and passions, and to these, still ad

*Sermon on Phillippians 11, 12, 13, Pages 216, 217.

ded, susceptibility of impressions on the heart, exquisitely powerful, arising from the intimacy of union, betwixt soul and body; his definition of the moral agency of mankind in this world, would then, have been much more complete. But for want of these, he has exhibited only a meagre skeleton of human moral agency, scarcely deserving to hold rank, with the imaginary cogitating machinery of Priestly, and the materialists.

And whilst his definition is thus mutilated, in respect to enumerated component parts, so it is still further defective, by reason of his meaning in the use of the terms, perception, reason and conscience: which use seems to be but to impose on the understandings of his readers; for having heretofore recognised, that in his view, infants, as soon as born, have perception, reason and conscience sufficient to render them moral agents; consequently these terms with him are but mere sound without sense, shadow without substance, and pretence without reality. It is true he adds volition to these his wood, hay and stubble materials; but then his sense of volition is freedom without liberty, power without ability, and an activity which is passive. Power to choose, (when externally acted upon) but no power to refuse and when reversely acted on, to refuse, but not to chuse, seems to be a kind of liberty much resembling that possessed by poor blind Sampson, who had freedom sufficient to grind in the prison, but no liberty to escape therefrom; whilst he exercised those necessitated volitions, which moved his brawny arms to whirl the ponderous mill.

:

« السابقةمتابعة »