a principle of confidence; but in proportion as I give confidence, I must demand responsibility. We are not going upon that sort of inquiry which would justify our declaring that responsibility attaches to any one, and therefore the assertion of the noble lord is not what we should act upon. If it were to be proposed that we should go into a committee to consider of the state of Ireland, it might be that such a committee would be improper, because there were circumstances not fit to be revealed. Even a select committee might be objected to. I shall therefore be compelled, and the House will be compelled, to act upon the principle of confidence. What is the bill that the noble lord desires the House to continue? After the promise that the union would heal all the discords and animosities that existed in the country, after the House has been congratulated by his majesty from the throne, that not only the rebellion, but the hostile spirit that occasioned it, had ceased,-we are called upon to renew a bill for continuing martial law in that country;-a bill, the title of which states it to be for the suppression of rebellion, and for the better protection of his majesty's person; and the preamble of which states the existence of a dangerous conspiracy for the subversion of the government. Surely the noble lord will not say such is the case at present. The bill was afterwards revived by a bill of continuance, and without stating in the preamble the existence of rebellion. I am to suppose he will say rebellion does now exist; but he will not say it did at the period of the bill of revival. It was at a time when both Houses of Parliament were congratulating the lord lieutenant upon the entire suppression of the rebellion, and when there was no pretence for reviving it. What is the necessity for continuing the act now? He says it will expire on the 25th of March. True; but do not the Irish money bills expire at the same time; and can the inconvenience in the one case be greater than in the other? But suppose the act was to be discontinued for a week or two, what would be the consequence? The last bill, being a bill of revival, affords a proof that the act had been suffered to expire. Did any mischief arise in consequence of such expiration? What danger is to be apprehended now? The House has had a year's experience of the union: is it of opinion that the union has had such an effect upon the country, [VOL. XXXV.]

that what was done a year ago without danger, would now be attended with such danger, that, without any recommendation from the crown, it is willing to take the responsibility of this act upon itself? With respect to some other bills, I admit, if they are not renewed, great evils may arise; but what calamity can possibly arise from not renewing this? The delay would not even have the effect of giving the people of Ireland reason to think they were not to have martial law any more. They would be sensible that its suspension was only producedby casual circumstances, and that it would be renewed as soon as possible. The only injury that could happen would be, that for a few days you would not be able to proceed to this species of trial by martial law. The worst that could happen would be your suffering a few persons accused to go to a jury. But the noble lord apprehends danger from rebellion: If that be the case, what prevents the lord lieutenant from exercising the prerogative that he derives from his majesty, and by his proclamation continuing martial law for a week? Under these circumstances, the whole of the question is this-Whether, having every prospect that the recovery of his majesty may enable us to proceed in a constitutional manner, and that we may have a regular communication from the throne, advised by responsible ministers, we ought to proceed without such communication, and without such responsibility? To justify our consenting to do so, a very strong case ought to be made out; and unless such a case is made out, I must consider the present as one of the most indecorous, unconstitutional, and violent propositions ever made in this House. I move," That the House do now adjourn."

am

Lord Castlereagh said:-I shall consider, Sir, the question of adjournment as one which calls on me to submit to the House those reasons which have induced me to propose the present measure; and I trust I shall show that I fully competent to bring forward the pro position, and that the House, in disposing of it, will neither transgress its duty to the crown or to the public. It is a painful duty to call on the House to re-enact a law such as this is. Every man must feel a reluctance at bringing forward any measure which is to trench, as I admit this does, upon the natural rights of the subject. It was reserved for the modern [3 T]

principles of Jacobinism to make it compulsory in the government of Ireland to give existence to a system of judicature founded upon martial law. Such a system became necessary at a period when all law was suspended, when all duties were violated, and when the safety of the chief magistrate and the government depended upon its vigorous application. If there be now the same necessity for continuing that measure, I am sure the House will not forget its duty, or abandon the safety of the constitution, by refusing to sanction it. I thought it my duty to state candidly to the House, that this was a measure, the renewal of which was an act of necessity, which could not be delayed. I own the difficulty of making such a proposition to those who have not the local knowledge necessary to carry conviction to their minds; but, although the House has not in general the local knowledge of the subject requisite to stamp conviction, there are but few circumstances which must not be in the recollection of many individuals in the House who were personally acquainted with them. There are many gentlemen in this House who have passed into Ireland, and who have been enabled to obtain a local and accurate knowledge of the state of that country. This is not the first question in which the parliament of Great Britain has been called upon to take measures with regard to one part of the kingdom, which have not been applicable to that part called England. After the union between Great Britain and Scotland, it was necessary to pass laws for Scotland of unusual severity, and unconstitutional in their nature. It is easy to perceive that I allude to the laws for disarming the Highlanders, those laws were passed by a parliament strenuous in the maintenance of the rights of the subject. They were passed under a whig administration, acting upon the principles on which the revolution was established. I am therefore only calling upon the House to do that for Ireland, which, upon a former occasion, it did for Scotland. I am sure this House will feel that, without a continuance of the same system of prudence and precaution with regard to Ireland, that country would be placed in a most unfortunate predicament. I know what was my opinion when doubts were stated to me as to the consent of this House to such a measure as that of mar tial law. It was urged, that the feelings

of the united parliament would be so actuated by principles of a constitutional tendency, that it would not pass those measures of energy and vigour which the parliament of Ireland had thought necessary. I always ventured to resist that notion; not upon the ground of the precedent relative to Scotland, but from an idea of the wisdom of a united parliament, from a persuasion of its anxiety to preserve the constitution of the country and the liberties of the people, and from a firm conviction that neither our constitution nor our liberties could be preserved but by adopting those measures necessary for the suppression of rebellion. The House would see in what a situation Ireland would be placed, if parliament, from any scruples, should withhold its sanction to a measure on which its safety and existence depend. It would not only withhold the only security the people have for the protection of their persons and property, the only laws on which the tranquillity of the country depends, but it would have the effect of instilling into the government such apprehensions, that it would be impossible for those to whom it is intrusted to discharge their duties to the public in the manner they have hitherto done, under the idea that the local parliament would always give them the means of acting with vigour. This House will see, that it has no less a sacred duty to perform in supporting government in an arduous struggle against Jacobinical principles, which, I am sorry to say are not yet subverted. I beg leave to differ from the hon. gentleman in the principle, that a communication from the crown is necessary. The present measure did not pass in Ireland upon a communication from the crown, or in consequence of the examination of a committee of the House of Commons. I am fully authorized in maintaining these two propositions; first, that no communication is necessary from the crown; and secondly, that no investigation by a committee of parliament is necessary. I contend that it is competent for any member to get up and make any proposition he thinks it his duty to make. I trust that we are not altogether so dependent upon the crown, that we must wait for a communication before we proceed to a legislative act of importance to the country. To admit that notion, would be to admit that the constitution of England is like the constitution of France, where the originating power must be communi

1

cated to the legislative. Parliament is able to proceed either upon notoriety of facts, or general information that carried conviction of itself. The Habeas Corpus suspension act has been frequently renewed without any communication from the crown, or inquiry by a committee, merely upon the idea that the circumstances of the country remained the same as when it first passed. The suspension of the Habeas Corpus in Ireland, in 1799, was without any communication. The principle is this: parliament may go into an inquiry; but where there are grounds for the House to proceed without inquiry, it has never been usual to chain it down to the suspension of its proceedings till an inquiry has taken place. My wish is, that this bill should be only for three months, in order that parliament should have time to go into an inquiry, in case it should be necessary to have the measure further extended. If the hon. gentleman asks, why I do not go into an inquiry now, I answer, that the grounds are so imperative in my mind, that I do not think any previous inquiry necessary. I shall now proceed to state the general reasons which appear to me conclusive for the present measure. I am perfectly aware that it may be fairly asked me, if the fact of a rebellion exists in Ireland, why the executive government wants a law for that which is within the exercise of its own prerogative? I perfectly understand, that the prerogative of the crown authorizes those acting under its authority to exercise martial law. I maintain that it is a constitutional mode for the executive government to exercise martial law in the first instance, and to come to parliament for indemnity afterwards, and is preferable to applying to parliament first. I am the more anxious to assert this proposition, because, by so doing, I render justice to the Irish government. I now come to the relation of facts and circumstances. The rebellion in Ireland broke out in May 1798; the executive government published a proclamation for martial-law; they proceeded from May 1798 till May 1799, exercising martial law wherever rebellion existed, without any express law for that purpose. They did it on the principle, that they were authorized by the king's prerogative, provided they did not transgress the necessity of the case; and sure I am, that nothing could have induced them to have departed from the strict constitutional system, but that they felt they must deny

to a great part of the country, the advantages of the civil law, unless it were incorporated with the martial law. The two systems existing at the same time led to such a conflict of jurisdiction, that it was impossible to give effect to either. The House will feel that it must be impossible for officers to proceed in the execution of martial-law, if they are liable to be overhauled and thwarted by the civil power. There were many instances of individuals being indicted for acts done in consequence of the lord lieutenant's order for martial law. The rebellion was at last so extensive, that it was impossible for courts of justice to sit in any part of the kingdom; but afterwards, by the success of his majesty's arms, they were re-estab lished. The first place in which they resumed their sitting was in the metropolis; and in the court of King's-bench applications were made, which interfered with the exercise of martial-law in places where the rebellion was keenest. It was possible, certainly, for the assizes to have been held under a military guard; but the system of justice administered at the assizes would have been insufficient for the purpose of checking the rebellion. The government, therefore found itself in this situation, that it must withhold one or the other: it was obliged to apply to parliament and say-here is a situation which never happened before-the genius of Jacobinism has infused itself into rebellion, and made it worse than it was before. Though it was put down in the field, yet it continued to afflict the country in a manner not less destructive to the jurisprudence of the country, but more difficult to be attacked by the king's forces in the field. The governor stated this case as a case of rebellion-that the kings courts were likely to remain shut for an indefinite time, if the civil law was not incorporated with the martial-law. I must state to the House, that rebellion is not less rebellion because it is less extended. By the energy of the king's forces it has been restricted; but if martial-law was not to be allowed, the same system of terror would prevail, and the government could not expect, from the loyal and wellaffected, that allegiance which it would be incapable of protecting. I trust I have fully acquainted the House with the circumstances under which government originally applied to have martial-law sanctioned by parliament. It now remains to state the grounds why a continuance of

that measure is necessary. It will strike the House, that a conspiracy, like that developed in the report of the secret committee, could not be easily done away. No government, except that of this country ever did survive such a wide-extended conspiracy. The government which watched this conspiracy and dissolved it, has some claim to the praise and confidence of the House. If it be granted, that it is not possible for a conspiracy of such an extent to be easily dissolved, it will be no difficult task for me to show that the rebellion has never altogether ceased. I wish I could state, that the exercise of martial law had ever been suspended. From the period when the bill was revived, to the present, it has been uniformly exercised; and some particular part of the country has been so disturbed as to call for the exercise of it. The lord lieutenant has been under the necessity of trying 63 persons under the bill; 34 were condemned to death. When I state, that during the last year 207 have been tried, I think I give a sufficient proof that rebellion has unfortunately existed during that period. I am sure the House will think that the noble lord entrusted with the government of Ireland would not have exercised the power confided to him if the necessity had not existed. In fact, the parliament has not authorised government to exercise martial law, only where rebellion exists. The present bill ought to be intituled," a bill to authorise martial law, notwithstanding the courts of law may be open." The facts I have mentioned are not the only ones upon which the measure rests; but I may add, that the whole of the disturbances in Ireland are directed, first, against the persons and properties of the well-affected, and, secondly, against the courts of justice. Therefore the House must feel, that unless there be some mode of bringing those persons who are engaged in acts of rebellion summarily to trial, we are subjecting our friends to certain destruction. There is another consideration: you will see, in the report of the committee, that the rebels have their own courts-martial against the well-affected; and it is impossible to keep up any system of coercion, if you can only have the ordinary process of the municipal law against persons guilty of rebellion, when those who are called as the jury may afterwards be tried by the tribunals of the party of the offenders for the offence of having sat in

judgment upon them. The system of re bellion in Ireland is one unparalleled in history; it is, however, a great satisfaction that, from the energy of the law, the evil is greatly circumscribed. Last year, ex. cept in three districts, Ireland was quiet. In the summer the county of Antrim was disturbed; and Limerick, and most parts of the county of Wicklow, have been in fested by a ferocious banditti. Under the vigorous protection afforded Ireland, tranquillity has been generally restored; the people showed the utmost zeal in assisting the measures of government as soon as they were assured that government had the means of providing for their security. The House may suggest, that it might be better to give this law a local operation; I will say why I think not. My greatest objection is a constitutional one: it would be limiting the responsibi lity under which this law is exercised. We are giving no new power, but only strengthening a prerogative. I think the House will feel that it has sufficient secu rity that the law will not be abused. In the first place, there is the security of the parliament. It is true, the parliament never has interfered with the government of Ireland, as to the execution of this law: but it does not follow that parliament could not interfere. We have this security, that the law will not be called into execution, except in cases of rebellion. First, the lord lieutenant considers the case of every person before he sends him to trial; next the courts-martial are composed of offi cers, men of honour and character, acting upon their oaths: in the next place, it must be either rebellion, or an act in fur therance of rebellion, that is cognizable by a court martial. There is then the additional security of the lord lieutenant re vising the proceedings, and giving his opinion upon the whole transaction laid before him: therefore I think we have a full assurance that the law so controlled will never be vexatiously applied to im proper purposes; and we should neg lect our duty if we did not interfere, and take care to prevent a second instance of abuse occurring. I think it is natural for every gentleman to feel, that, in passing a law of this nature, he is making no great surrender of a constitutional right. The only circumstance, in my mind, is, whe ther, if the necessity exists, this is the proper remedy? If it be so, we ought not to take alarm at a departure from princi ple, which is necessary for the preserva

tion of the constitution itself. Look to the principles of freedom which pervade the whole empire, and in particular the legislative body; and then say, whether it is posssible such a measure can be continued one moment beyond absolute necessity. As long as the measure continues in existence, there is a superintendance to prevent the abuse of it, and under that superintendance the public look forward to the continuance of the measure without apprehension. The freest governments are those which have furnished instances of the greatest delegation of power in particular instances; but the circumstance in which they have all fallen short of the British government consists in this, that the latter affords a rational control over the abuse of it. We find in history, that those persons who delegated an extraordinary power became often the victims of it; but in this country there is a power alive to watch over every extraordinary delegation; and if the exercise of that power was dead in the legislature, it would be of no use to have a trial by jury. Our liberties would not be long preserved by the trial by jury, which this measure goes for a time to suspend. It is some consolation, that the moment when the feelings of the country are so agitated, is not that when the trial by jury is of the greatest benefit. It is some consolation, that if we are driven to keep this measure alive, and suspend the trial by jury, it is at a time when that mode of trial would be less beneficially exercised for the ends of justice, and at a time when, by convicting one criminal, we should be exposing twelve loyal subjects. Before I conclude, there is one topic, the introduction of which into the debate I would deprecate; and that is, the question of policy as to the future regulations of police in Ireland. When that question is discussed, I trust it will be with temper. It would be better that the question of the system of police should not be touched upon in this debate. I only hope the House will not pass from one consideration to another. While the rebellion exists, it must be met by energetic meaI know of no measure to meet rebellion, but martial-law. By continuing it, you will prevent the rebellion, which is only local, from becoming general, you prevent the necessity of employing the king's forces for the protection of a large body of his majesty's loyal subjects. I have stated thus much to the House,

sures.

will

satisfied that I have shown the necessity for the measure to exist, and that it is congenial to the character of the constitution, which justifies the sacrifice of a part to preserve the whole. Upon the question of responsibility, the House will allow me to say, that the measure is not brought forward at a time when there are no ministers responsible to the House and the public. I do not consider my right hon. friend (Mr. Pitt) less responsible than ever he was. I am persuaded he will consider himself responsible for any act of government till he has resigned his trust into the hands of his majesty. I will only add, that the present measure has the sanction of lord Cornwallis, the lord lieutenant of Ireland, whose exertions in extending the British empire, and whose eminent qualities, entitle him to the res pect and admiration of the country. The power entrusted to him by this bill he will exercise with fidelity, humanity and discretion. I do not expect that rebellion will cease to exist during the war, I know that the spirit of rebellion has too many friends in every portion of the empire, but I do not at present propose to extend the continuation of this act beyond three months. There are persons in custody in Ireland under the suspension of the Habeas Corpus. I wish to leave them in the hands of the civil power; and for that purpose I shall to-morrow move, that the act for suspending the Habeas Corpus be continued for the same period as this act.

Sir Lawrence Parsons said, that he had opposed the act in the separate parliament: and the reasons for his conduct at that time were the same as those by which he was now actuated. He thought the measure brought forward by the noble lord wholly unnecessary. The executive government could resort to martial law, if it was necessary to repress rebellion. The government had resorted to martial-law at the time when lord Camden was lord lieutenant. He did not condemn lord Camden: he thought he would have deserved to be impeached, had he not called in the aid of martial-law at that period. But then, he would ask, what was the object of this bill? If there existed any necessity for martial-law, the lord lieutenant could resort to it; and if there was no necessity, then the object of the bill was to establish martial-law without necessity. He would ask, were not the courts of law in Ireland open at this mo ment to try rebels? The noble lord had