which we might gain by a violation of it. This, then, was one of the advantages which we had gained by our decision upon that occasion. This alone was most mate. rial; but it was not all-we had since obtained other compensations. No man certainly could enter into a comparison of the value of the lives of men, and the glory and advantages which we might obtain at such an expense; but, the loss having been incurred, it certainly was proper to consider the advantages that we had obtained. It would not, he supposed, be contended, that the reputation of a country did not constitute part of its strength, particularly in the present times. It did so happen, that since the commencement of that system which was to make all men brethren, and consequently to introduce universal peace among mankind, war seemed to have become the whole business of life; since the time that arms and warfare were to be laid aside for ever, the whole of Europe had become as it were one camp. It did so happen, that the very people who first introduced this system of universal peace, immediately formed themselves into a nation of armed robbers, and made war upon all their neighbours solely for the purposes of plunder; and no nation was safe that did not immediately convert itself into a nation of soldiers. This being the case, he could not but think that the military reputation of a country was now more important than it ever was in former times; because France, which was always one of the most warlike states in Europe, had now become more so than ever. He therefore never liked those who, while they put no bounds to their eulogiums on the military merit of France, at the same time held a very different language to this country. We were advised not to hope to form an army, and almost to renounce the use of arms. It always ap peared to him, that thus to exalt the merit of the enemy, and to depress the spirit of the people of this country, was (to use no harsher expression) very! unseasonable. If every country would do the same, and renounce arms for ever, it would certainly be fortunate for man kind; but while we had an armed nation at our door, such as France was, these who advised us to diminish our means of defence, must be either so stupid or so depraved, that all attempts to convince them must be hopeless. When we consi dered the effect which the recent events

hon. gentleman could succeed in his motion, there were two points which it would be necessary for him to maintain. In the first place, it would be necessary for the hon. gentleman to show that the decision of ministers was, at the time it was made, unwise and improper; and, supposing the decision to have been wrong, then that the consequences were such as had been stated. If the hon. gentleman failed in establishing the first point, there was an end of the question; because, if it appeared that the decision was proper under all the circumstances at the time it was made, ministers could, upon no fair reasoning, be considered censurable for the consequences, however unfortunate they might be. With regard to the first point then, he should only say a very few words. At the time that decision was made, he thought it was right; and he now, after maturely considering all the circumstances, was of the same opinion. In defending the conduct of the late ministers upon that occasion, he contended, that among other advantages derived from it, it had added much to the character of the country; and therefore he was not a little surprised to hear the hon. gentleman state, as one of his objections to the measure, that it had injured our national reputation. In order to show that our national character had been injured, the hon. gentleman had contended that we had broken our faith with our allies-he supposed by allies he meant the Turks; but the hon. gentleman should recollect that we had other allies, viz. the Austrians; and what would they have said, if, at a moment when they were contending in Italy against the French with forces so equally balanced that the contest was at last decided by a battle, or rather by a fraction of a battle (for three-fourths of the battle was in favour of the Austrians), what would they have said, if, when matters were so nearly balanced, we had suffered 15,000 or more of the best troops of France to have been thrown into the scale against them? It had been stated, that the French would have been landed in France, not in Italy; but that would only make a difference of about three weeks; for they certainly would have been marched into Italy. But by acting in the manner in which the government of this country acted upon that occasion, we had shown the world, that we preferred a strict adherence to our public faith, to any advantages, however great,

in Egypt must have upon our military, it =could not but be observed, that it was perhaps more necessary now than at any former period. We could not dissemble from ourselves, that while our naval glory had been great beyond all former example, it became, somehow or other, a fashion to depress the military character of the country. Every traitor in this country willingly took up the notion, and propagated it with activity and pleasure; it even gained ground among foreign nations, who were either actuated by a love of wonder, or perhaps they could not look upon our unexampled naval successes without feeling something like envy; and therefore it was said, that though we had, by some means or other, got a knack of conquering by sea, yet that at land we were inferior to the French. There certainly were some causes that led people in this country to entertain that opinion; and one was, the state and condition of the army. He did not mean to say, that our army, in its worst state, was superior to any other army in Europe; but he would contend, that, for a certain species of service, they certainly were inferior to no troops in the world. One reason why our army was not in every respect so good as some of the troops upon the continent was, that our establishment before the war, was so low, that we had, as it were, to make up an army on a sudden. Then the great mortality which was occasioned by unwholesome climates was to be taken into consideration; so that, in point of fact, our army had always been composed, if he might use the expression, of raw materials. If we looked to the expedition which was sent to Holland, every #gentleman must know the manner in which that army was formed; but he believed that those who would be inclined to speak the most in its praise, were those who had to contend against it; and though that expedition failed in some of its objects, yet upon every occasion in which our troops were engaged in that country, whether in offensive or defensive operations, they were always successful. Notwithstanding this, the circumstances of the war did certainly throw a kind of shade over our army. The glory of our navy was so great, that every other service was overlooked; all our attention was engaged on one side; and we were, as it were, lame of one leg. It was under these circumstances that the events in Eygypt occurred. Whole wars might pass over without

[VOL. XXXV.]

affording an opportunity of fairly measuring our strength with the enemy. But in Egypt the very scene seemed to be chosen for a fair trial of strength-the two armies seemed as it were to be withdrawn from the world. They were both left without any other resource than that which they could draw from their own courage and discipline; they had no allies to share the merit of victory, or bear the disgrace of defeat. Their motto seemed to be "Vae Victi!" and all they asked was a clear stage, and no favour. Who were those that we conquered? not Greeks or Copts, Batavians nor Cisalpines, who have been found to recruit these armies by which they had been conquered; but the tried, the chosen, the best troops of France: we were contending with the pride and glory of the republic, with troops whom the French themselves would have chosen as the depositaries of their military character. He would not say that those we had beaten were the best of those troops who had been sent to Egypt; but undoubtedly, having remained the longest, they had more of that character which is supposed to belong to veterans. We knew what they thought of themselves-we knew that they boasted that they would destroy us if they once caught us out of our ships; but, like the young and untried Orlando, we overthrew the experienced wrestler; and he might say, that upon this occasion we had given them a Rowland for their Oliver. He would not say, that "no one would entreat them to another encounter." He would not do the French army in Egypt injustice: he did not doubt but that they would venture another encounter; he would not say that fortune might not be favourable to them in it; but this he would say, that from this time forth no French army would ever meet an English army with any thing like feelings of contempt; they would know that they could not rely upon any superiority of courage or discipline.-He thought he had a right to urge all these to the House as compensations for our losses. We might sustain still greater ones, the expedition might (which God forbid !) ultimately fail; for no man could say that we were out of fortune's reach; but whatever the event might be, it could not take from us our glory; in that respect we were out of the reach of chance. He did not urge these considerations as a justification of the conduct of ministers, but as compensa[42]

"GEORGE R.

"His Majesty thinks it proper to acquaint the House of Commons, that an establishment has been formed, under his majesty's directions, for promoting the study of military science. This institution, his majesty is persuaded, must conduce to the preservation and improvement of the skill and discipline which, combined with the native valour of British troops, have so often maintained the rights and asserted the honour of his kingdom. His majesty therefore recommends it to his faithful Commons to consider of making the provision that may be necessary for enabling his majesty to accomplish, in the most effectual manner, an object of so much national importance.

G. R.

Debate in the Commons on the Establishment of a Military College.] June 8. The House went into a committee of supply, for the purpose of taking into consideration his majesty's message.

The Secretary at War (Mr. Yorke) spoke to the following effect:-It is my duty to call the attention of the committee to the measure recommended by his majesty's message, which is one of very considerable importance to the British army. The proposition applies to the institution of a royal college or seminary for Military Instruction, comprehending as well the education of such young men as are, from early life, intended for the army, in the rudiments of military science, previous to their attaining the age which enables them to hold a commission, as the perfecting and forming a certain number of officers of maturer years, and riper experience, in the more arduous and important duties of their profession; I mean those which belong to the general staff of the army, and in particular to the quarter-master-general's department in the field. It is unnecessary to observe, that it is this department of the service that is particularly charged with all the combinations, movements, positions, and supplies of an army.-The papers and estimates which I presented to the House, will sufficiently explain the nature and details of the proposed institution. From these it will appear, that it is intended to consist of a senior and

will include thirty officers, selected from the service, and recommended by their zeal and intelligence; grounded at least in the rudiments of their profession, and of an age capable of reflection. It is to this class more particularly that the chief military director and superintendant will devote their time, and apply their personal instructions; the nature and design of which, I presume, it will not be necessary for me to enlarge upon in this place, as the object to be attained will naturally suggest to every mind the mode and system of information necessary to be afforded and required. It will be sufficient, perhaps, to state that the plan of instruction for this class appears to have been conceived on the justest practical military principles; adapting itself particularly to the nature of ground actually under examination at the time; to the choice of camps and positions; to the best mode of occupying, attacking, or defending them with a given force; to the proper combination of all the component parts of an army; to its movements from place to place, either in advancing or retreating; and, among other essential acquirements, to the most ready and effectual means of affording assistance to the commanding general, in making his dispositions, by military plans, rapidly designed by the habitual accuracy of the eye, corrected by the scientific preparation and judgment of the mind. This plan of instruction, so described in its nature and details, has been already acted upon, and brought to maturity, by the very able and skilful general officer whose services in this line this country has at present the advantage of possessing (I mean general Jarry); first in the Prussian service, under the inspection and with the approbation of Frederick the Great; and latterly in this country, at High Wycombe (with the assistance of a very able and intelligent officer of our own, colonel Le Merchant), though on a very limited scale, in a manner the most useful and advantageous to the service. I must also observe, that this institution is nearly of the same sort and description with that which is now in use for the formation of staff officers in the Austrian, Prussian, and French armies; and that it has the advantage of having been examined and recommended by his Royal Highness the commander in chief, +

assisted by the quarter master and adjutant generals, and by a board of general officers of the highest reputation in the British army. The second, or junior department, is intended to receive 300 young men, from the age of 14 to 16; 100 the sons of noblemen and gentlemen intended for the profession of arms; 50 cadets of the East India Company; 100 the sons of officers actually in his majesty's service; and 50 the sons of officers who have died or been disabled in the service, leaving families in distressed circumstances. For these, masters and professors of all the arts, sciences, and accomplishments relating to the military profession will be provided, of the descriptions, and under the details specified in the papers and estimates, to which I beg leave to refer for the particulars. It is further proposed, that as the establishment is intended to be entirely of a military nature, it shall be governed and regulated as a military body, by the rules and ordinances prescribed for the discipline of his majesty's service; with such additional regulations and restrictions as may be found necessary for the conduct of youth, and the good order of the institution.

Such being the nature and design of this institution, I conceive that the national benefits likely to arise from its adoption, are so obvious to every discerning mind, as not to require much elucidation from me. I am persuaded that there is no man, whose observation and experience had enabled him to form a tolerably correct judgment on the great events recorded in history, and particularly on those which have happened within the last eventful ten years, who can hesitate to decide, that if the situation of any country is such as to require an army (be it larger or smaller) for its defence, that army ought to be constituted not only upon the most economical plan, consistent with the service it is expected to perform, but upon the justest and most approved military principles; among the very first and most important of which, undoubtedly, is the scientific education and instruction of the officers who are to command and direct it; without which, zeal and bravery are of little comparative advantage, and discipline itself of no avail-if, indeed, discipline can be supposed to exist to any considerable extent, in an army which is deficient in skill and knowledge among the higher departments of its service, and

consequently in respect and confidence among the lower. It is, indeed, a melancholy truth, but it is one founded in all experience and history, that war is a science. A dreadful and bloody science it is! but such is the state and condition of the human race, that it must be cultivated, to enable us to defend ourselves effectually against the ambition, the malice, and the envy of other nations. Little would it avail a nation to be eminent and flourishing in all the arts of peace; to excel in agriculture, manufac tures, and commerce, and in the sciences connected with, and producing these advantages; to abound in wealth; to pos sess all the comforts and conveniences of civilized life, if it did not at the same time possess the skill and the knowledge, as well as the power and the spirit neces sary to protect itself against those who would inevitably be excited, by their envy of such prosperity, to attack and destroy it at any favourable opportunity. In this view of the subject it must be acknowledged, that all those nations who have neglected or forgotten the military science, have by degrees sunk into the most deplorable state of abject and de fenceless apathy; while others, by culti vating the art of war, have risen to the zenith of power. It must also be observ. ed, that in proportion as a nation has found it necessary in its own defence to turn its attention to the art of war, and to habituate itself to its practice and disci pline; it has been also found expedient to adopt institutions similar to that now proposed with a view to the preserving and diffusing a knowledge of the military science, and for instructing officers in all that it might be necessary for them to know. Such has been the uniform prac tice of the greatest military nations which have appeared in Europe. For it must be obvious to every understanding, that an army deficient in science must ever be inferior to one that is conversant with the theory and practice of it, whatever may be its composition or its numbers. Dis cipline and economy cannot be carried to perfection without science; and military economy is much more connected with military knowledge than one is at first inclined to imagine; for the latter, being necessarily conversant with all the details of

professional expense, can with facility distinguish such as are necessary and useful, from such as are unnecessary and useless in the conduct of a campaign.