My lords, the law on this subject is pro- | mulgated in the sermon on the Mount, and in the 19th chapter of Matthew, verse 9. In the first it is said, that "whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery; and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced, committeth adultery." I would here ask your lordships, what construction is to be put upon the expression, that he who putteth his wife away causeth her to commit adul. tery? The merely putting away his wife, would not, in any case, necessarily cause her to commit adultery, unless that putting away left her at liberty to marry another man; and if the expression in the text be so understood, there is no difficulty or ambiguity in the interpretation of the whole: whosoever putteth his wife away for fornication, putteth her away upon a just ground of divorce, and therefore does not cause her to commit adultery if she marries again; but if he putteth her away for any other cause, saving that of fornication, he putteth her away upon grounds that do not justify divorce, and causeth her to commit adultery, by inducing her to marry another, when she could not be lawfully separated from him. In the 19th chapter of Matthew this doctrine is more fully laid down; for, being pressed by the questions of the Pharisees, our Saviour enters into a more detailed explanation. Being asked whether it were lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause, he explains the near connexion of man and wife, and that those whom God has joined no man shall put asunder" How comes it then," say the Pharisees, "that Moses commanded a writing of divorcement?" to which it is answered, that Moses, on account of the hardness of their hearts, suffered them to put away their wives, and that it was not so from the beginning: "And I say unto you, whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and whoso marrieth her who is put away doth commit adultery." Here the law attaches upon both parties, and they equally sin if they separate and marry after, without the exception provided: and if the exception operates in exculpation of one party, on what ground of reasoning can it be withdrawn from the other? Taking this text with that which I before quoted, the interpretation appears to me to be fixed beyond dispute. Put a similar case of a I

human law, and let us see what the conclusion must of necessity be. Suppose a law should declare, that whosoever shall take goods from a shop, except he pay for them, committeth a felony, and whoso receiveth the goods that are taken committeth a felony: would my learned friend upon the woolsack be disposed to give a charge upon such a law to those who have been called the unlearned lords, as a jury, directing them to acquit the taker of the goods, because he had complied with the exception which exculpated him; but at all events to find the receiver guilty, because the exception did not apply to him? And yet the violence of construction is not greater in the one case than in the other. But if I am mistaken in my conception of the law of God as I have stated it, sure I am that no distinction is any where made in the Scriptures between the seducer of the woman and any other man, and in either case the provision of the bill upon your table is defective-either it exceeds the limits of the law of God, or it falls short of them; either it prohibits what that law permits, or it permits what that law prohibits: and this dilemma induces me to suppose that the right reverend prelate has not afforded the subject his full attention; for I give him too sincere credit for all the feelings which belong to him, to suppose that he would compromise the law of God to gratify and conciliate any human legislator. And if the interpretation of the text bears out the right reverend prelate in his declaration of adultery in the woman divorced, whosoever she might marry; it was in that case incumbent upon that right reverend prelate to have moved an amendment in the committee, to prevent the marriage of the adultress with any person whatsoever. I am however not disposed to reproach him with any neglect or omission on this subject. I am satisfied that such an amendment would only have removed the provisions of the bill still further from the plain and obvious interpretation of the gospel.

My lords, the principles of justice are uniform, clear, and simple: disguise them by sophistry, or pervert them by refinement, and mark what inconsistencies will follow: The clause to which I object violates an established maxim in jurisprudence, "That where no mutual relation exists, no duty can attach;" for it proposes to dissolve the bond of matrimony on one part to all intents and purposes, as if no

such marriage had ever taken place; fixing at the same time one link of the chain upon the other party, even beyond the usual duration of duties, for death will not release her from this partial and prohibitory tie. But we are told, my fords, that the marriage of the woman never was in the contemplation of the legislature, because it is not expressly provided in the act of divorce. To this I answer, that the act is framed in the terms of the petitioner's prayer, and that it would be a degree of liberality that would favour somewhat of collusion if the petitioner were to join the offending party with himself in this application for relief. I say further, that the liberty is implied by the terms in which the dissolution is expressed in the act; and that this interpretation is confirmed by the constant and unquestioned practice of the parties. Let me then ask your lordships, upon what principle of justice, upon what sanction of experience, upon what ground of reason, we are now called upon to place a man in the situation of having at once a wife and an half, maintaining with the whole wife all the reciprocal duties and mutual claims of affection and support which belong to matrimony, and receiving at the same time from the half wife the solitary duty, not of personal fidelity, but of matrimonial restriction, without awing her any return of protection, or maintain ing with her any common ties of intercourse, interest, or affection? Where, my lords, is this woman, this half-shackled wife, to seek the comforts of society, or the support of affection to promote in her the seeds of returning virtue? Not from the virtuous part of society, for she is an outcast from it; not with her own family, for we are told that her reception there would be a bad example to her sisters, if she has any, or, should she have none, to the daughters of other families, which your lordships are called upon as fathers to consider on general principles; not in the name and duties of wife, which practically has been found to produce reformation, must she seek refuge. My lords, to none of these must she fly, but (if she has not resolution for absolute seclusion) she must, under this bill live in a state of continued adultery with her seducer, and fall into a more debased and vicious state, by mixing with such society as may be disposed to receive a woman under such circumstances of degradation and disgrace.

And now, my lords, a few words upon that part of the bill to which I should gladly have given my poor support, had not its succeeding clause, " like a mildewed ear blasting its wholesome brother," rendered the bill altogether inadmissible. My lords, I am so unfortunate as not to agree with the right reverend prelate in the part which he has selected to defend; even in that clause, the object of which, upon the whole, I approve. I mean that part of it which has been objected to as giving a power of inflicting a double punishment for the same crime, by not taking away from the husband his action of damages when it makes the adulterer liable to indictment, and which has been defended by the right reverend prelate as only affording an option of such mode of prosecution as the offended party may prefer, and which election he will be called upon by the attorney-general to make. Now, my lords, my objection to this part of the clause is, that it does neither the one nor the other, though it professes to do both: I think it always a ground of serious objection to the provisions of any law, when they do not plainly profess what they virtually enforce; and in the way the clause in question must operate, I had rather it should either have expressly declared that no obstacle should be opposed to the double proceeding, or that the action for damages should have been specifically taken away, though that, in fact, would inflict a certain degree of penalty on the injured party on whom the whole expense of legal process, and of the act of divorce would fall, which else might have been paid out of the compensation in damages. But, my lords, it is a mockery, as the bill now stands, to say that the injured party has any real option; it is a nominal option, in the nature of what is vulgarly called Hobson's choice; for the attorney-general indeed says, Here are two ways of proceeding, make your election; but, says the act of parliament, If you do not fix upon the mode by indictment, you shall not have your bill of divorce; and the option being thus virtually fixed, the act should plainly declare that criminal process shall alone be resorted to in cases of adultery.

And now, my lords, having gone through the arguments which have been brought by the two noble lords in support of the bill, I come to the concluding admonition, by which your lordships have been

urged to its adoption, and warned against the dangers of its rejection. If, (it is said) this bill should be rejected, after having been brought forward and discussed by your lordships, the state of public morals will not be left as they were found at the introduction of the bill into the House: vice will be encouraged; and the public will receive an impression that your lordships think lightly of the crime, and are not disposed to discountenance or correct it. My lords, I, for one, do not see those dangers, or apprehend those consequences from your rejection of this bill. The unanimous opinion of your lordships upon the detestable nature of the crime, has been strongly and repeatedly expressed in the course of the frequent discussions which this subject has undergone. But if such ill effects be indeed likely to arise from the rejection of the bill as have been suggested, it would have well become those who brought it forward to have considered the danger before they stirred the question. Upon them, and not upon the opposers of the bill, must the responsibility of the ill effects of its rejection fall. If your lordships were to be influenced by such representations, there would not only be an end of the freedom of discussion, but of free agency, in this House, upon delicate subjects. My lords, I have already stated, that I do not apprehend the evil consequences which are represented as likely to ensue from the rejection of the bill, but sure I am, at all events, that they never can equal those which I dread from its being passed into a law; to which, my lords, I give my most hearty dissent, because the bill appears to me calculated to promote the crime which it professes to repress: and because I think it at once adverse to the interests of morality, contrary to sound policy, and at variance with the law of God.

The Bishop of London highly approved of the bill: the only objection he had to it was, that it did not go far enough. The clause on which it had been so keenly opposed, he thought fair, equitable, and politic. If the adulterer were not to be punished, then indeed the bill would be unequal, and the least culpable party would bear all the punishment of their mutual guilt. That it was right to prevent the marriage of the seducer with the unhappy object he had seduced, there could not be a doubt. In this there was [VOL. XXXV.]

no cruelty displayed to the unfortunate female, who was only left to the natural consequences of her guilt. At present, she received a reward for her misconduct : she got quit of a husband whom she disliked, and became the wife of the man whom she adored. It was a fundamental principle of morality and justice that no one should profit by his own crimes; and it was upon this principle that the present bill was framed. The silent hope of being able to marry the man who attempts her virtue, though no express contract should be made, must have a powerful tendency to weaken her principles, and to make her fall a more easy prey to her betrayer. The laws with regard to the detestable crime of adultery, were at present extremely inadequate to check it, and some new regulation was absolutely necessary. His lordship deprecated all sentiments of an irrational humanity and tenderness for the offender on such occasions: were sentiments such as these to be entertained, no judge sitting on a criminal, could sentence him to death for the commission of his crimes, without being checked by sentiments of pity that would naturally arise on such a trial; the wretched condition of the criminal, the condition of his wife and children, who might be innocent, and who yet must suffer severely, would be sufficient to awaken such emotions, and stand as an impediment to justice. This was an illjudged humanity; and, in the case of the bill now before them, it was better to admit a certain portion of severity against the offending party, by withdrawing from her hopes the object of her wishes, her seducer, than suffer her, by his suggestions, to become instrumental to the corruption of her offspring and her family, and consequently of society. The whole nation was now looking up to the decision of their lordships, and if they should precipitately reject the present bill, the most unfortunate consequences would ensue.

Lord Grenville said, that every noble lord had declared, that the crime of adultery was becoming daily more frequent, and that some measure was loudly called for to put a stop to it. It was not, then, the title nor preamble of the bill which gave such offence. By most, the first clauses of the bill had been approved of; by one noble lord, who spoke on the other side, they had been called just, politic and humane. Should then, the bill be thus pre[T]

maturely cast out, because some of its provisions seemed inexpedient? It was allowed by all, that the law could not be permitted to remain as it, was, without ruin to the morals and happiness of the community. They were told by a greater authority than Cowper (a poet for whom he felt the highest respect), that parliaments assembled only to release the adulteress from her bond. His learned friend on the woolsack, and the other two learned lords who presided in the courts of law had declared that the greatest abuses wwere committed, and that at present there was no remedy for these abuses, that in many cases, there was collusion between the parties, and that in no instance was there a possibility of adequately punishing the guilty. They found their proceedings on the bench, in such cases, a farce, and a mockery. The ecclesiastical courts were equally deficient, there was no way in which the injured party could obtain redress, or vice could receive its punishment. He had long been sensible of these truths, nor had he ever been present when a divorce bill was passed, that he did not think the House disgraced and degraded. The only argument of any weight that he had heard urged against prohibiting the intermarriage of the adultress with her seducer, was, that one bar would be removed from men of gallantry pursuing their unlawful designs, as at present they are afraid lest they should be obliged to choose as their companions for life those women whom they have polluted and disgraced. But, though more disposed to storm the citadel of virtue, they would find conquest much more difficult. All hope of being reinstated in society being taken away, every woman of common prudence must lend a deaf ear to the solicitations of the man who would alienate ber affections from a husband, to whom she must continue to be true, or give up all hopes of enjoying the comforts of life. The means of defence were increased in the exact proportion of the disposition to assail. He hoped that the unhappy female would not, after her lapse from the paths of virtue, be turned loose into the world, and become abandoned and wretched: but if a few should be reduced to this deplorable situation, what a motive to fidelity would their example hold out! The education of the children would in no way be injured by the proposed regulation, as it would be easy to show, that the mothers who married their para

mours, were in no degree better behaved than those who, after their divorce, continued through life unmarried. A detesta. tion of vice must be generated in children by witnessing the unhappy effects it had had upon their deluded parents. The bill, he was confident, would produce the happiest effects.

The bill was ordered to be printed.

May 21. The House being in a committee on the bill, lord Eldon proposed a variety of verbal amendments thereto, which, after a long and desultory conversation, were agreed to.

May 23. Lord Auckland moved the third reading of the bill, and replied to the various arguments which had been adduced against it, expressing his astonishment at the opposition which had been set up, and his inability to account for the principle on which it arose.

The Earl of Coventry expressed his decided disapprobation of the bill. The marriage of the divorced woman, by her seducer might, he observed, be regarded as a penalty imposed upon him by the imperious laws of gallantry. Some parts of the bill, he was ready to say, he could approve of, but not knowing how to se parate the good from the bad, he should oppose it in toto.

The Earl of Westmorland said, he was more and more convinced that the bill would not be attended with the good effects which its framers proposed. It had been said, that the bill passed some years ago by their lordships, prohibiting the marriage of the guilty parties, had been thrown out by the House of Commons. He believed that the bill was thrown out upon motion to leave out the word "not," and he was not sure that the person who made that motion was not a better judge of the legislation which this subject required, than the supporters of the present measure. Moses seemed to have had the same sentiments when he enacted, that a man who seduced a female should marry her. In Deuteronomy it was expressly said, "He that lyeth with a damsel shall be married to her for all the days of her life." When his noble friend said, that he had examined into the legislation of other countries respecting adultery and divorce, he expected that he would have adduced the example of Rome, of Spain, of Naples, and of France, to show the efficacy of penal laws to pre