more than half a century it had been a favourite object with France to effect the ruin of our empire in the East; it was the aim of that memorable expedition to Egypt: and would gentlemen say, that when, by a glorious campaign, we had consolidated and secured that empire, that the war had not been successful? Though nothing was more evident than that the more we deprived the enemy of colonies, the more we abridged his power; yet the strange doctrine was preached, that our very maritime successes were detrimental to the interests of England; but I trust that in any future war we may have with France, the people of this happy island will never be led to believe that we have derived no advantage from conquering the colonies, destroying the navy, and totally ruining the commerce of the enemy. The House divided: there no resistance at Martinique? no resistance at St. Lucie? no resistance at Tobago? no resistance at Guadaloupe? The Dutch expedition was again alluded to, and in this we were said to have been also unsuccessful. Whereas, the grand object had been accomplished by the capture of the Dutch fleet, which, consequently diminished the power and influence of the enemy. Could the gentlemen say, that there was no resistance at the Helder? There certainly was; and the British army had gained additional glory by that achievement. As to our armaments respecting St. Domingo, we had on that occasion acted with true policy. Through the medium of general Williamson, we had checked the insurrection of the Blacks, and saved Jamaica and all our West India settlements. The success of the war had been proportionate to the resources afforded. At its commencement, we had not more than 10,000 men who could be employed offensively against the enemy. The first object of administration was, to attack the French settlements, to diminish their navy, and to control or engross their commerce. For the accomplishment of all these ob jects, our plans had been well concerted, and our exertions had been crowned with the most unprecedented success. It is contended, that because ministers consented, on a former occasion, to negociate for a peace which might have turned out a bad one; they must treat at a disadvantage were they to negociate now, and that their peace must therefore be a bad one. Why must it be done? Because, by means of our successes, ministers had now got into their hands materials for a good one! This, indeed, was a singular argument, and carried its own refutation on the face of it. With respect to the government of France, he said now, as he had done before, that the restoration of its monarchy would be a desirable object; but he must also add, that to diminish the power of France, whether it was a republic or a monarchy, was of greater importance to the true interests of England. The question, therefore, was, had we diminished its power by the operations of this war? We had most materially diminished it. Did gentlemen mean to assert, that if France were now in possession of Martinique, Tobago, St. Lucie, &c. she would be much more powerful than she was at present? The same ob. servation applied to the East Indies. For Debate on Mr. Sheridan's Motion relative to the Negotiation for Peace with France.] Dec. 1. Mr. Sheridan rose, and, after the clerk having read that part of his majesty's speech which refers to the late negotiations for peace, spoke as follows:-Every one, Sir, who beard this speech delivered from the throne, and every one who has read the papers which were laid before the house, must expect that we should take the subjec: into our solemn consideration, and state our opinion upon it to his majesty in a humble address. This, Sir, is a step which reason dictates, and it is strictly conformable to parliamentary usage. Whenever any communication of this nature has been made to the house, the invariable practice has been, to canvass the conduct of ministers in the affair to which it refers, and to state the result of that inquiry to our sovereign. Ministers, however, seem to be of a different opinion, and, for some reason or other, seem averse to all investigation of their conduct. I, therefore, thinking it of the utmost importance to the public that it should be fully investigated, shall proceed to state the result of my most serious and mature consideration. That result, I trust, will mect the sentiments of the house, and the motion, which is founded on it, be agreed to. Instead of entering into the subject at large, as I once intended; instead of pointing out with minuteness where ministers have been guilty of insincerity, where of prevarication, where of weakness, where of hypocrisy-I shall content myself with endeavouring to prove, from the past conduct of our allies and their present views, that we ought to disentangle ourselves from all continental connections as soon as possible, and, by entering into a separate negotiation, conclude a separate peace. In doing this, I shall lay down two propositions; and establish, upon these, two separate conclusions. The first is, that, from the commencement of the confederacy, there has existed in the different states who composed it a mercenary spirit, a sole view to private aggrandisement, the grossest and the most shameful insincerity. By these its object has been defeated; these now exist in their full force; and there is no prospect of its object being attained. It will hence follow, that it is our interest and our duty to withdraw from it; to avoid the obstacles which it throws in the way of peace, and no longer pledge ourselves to continue to make war till those states which are called our allies shall be completely exhausted. The next proposition I shall lay down and support is this, that there appears the strongest ground to suspect, that in all the negotiations for peace which ministers have carried on, although they may not have thwarted their plenipotentiaries, although there may have been conditions to which they would have acceded, still that they have never sincerely wished for suc cess, and never sincerely lamented the want of . The inference arising from this is plain: Since the same ministers remain in office, the interference of parHament is necessary; that alone can alter their intentions, counteract the mischiefs which their views are calculated to produce, or afford the least chance of salvation to the country. have all been thrown into prison. I hope things will not turn out so ill as there is at present reason to apprehend; but, allowing that there have been great exaggerations, there cannot be a doubt that the boasted friendship of Russia is at an end, and that by our vaunted ally we are forsaken, betrayed, insulted and outraged. For having said that the emperor Paul was insincere, and not to be relied upon, a person was not long since fined and imprisoned; yet this same emperor Paul has done a most unjustifiable act, which shows that he was undeserving of confidence. This embargo is not all; there is every reason to fear that almost every port in the Elbe is shut against us; that the king of Prussia and the duke of Brunswick have interfered, and that, except by way of Mecklenberg, we can neither draw supplies of grain from the continent, nor send thither our manufactures. If these things are true, it is surely time for the house to consider whether this bar to negotiation should be allowed to continue, whether ministers should be allowed to keep possession of this pretext for carrying on the war. The right hon. gentleman lately allowed, that our allies had treated us ill; he talked of the dereliction of some, and the perfidy of others; to some he ascribed unaccountable fickleness, and to others shameless atrocity. But (said he) who could have thought it? We were not endowed with a faculty of certainly foreseeing future events, and without that no one could have suspected what has happened. Sir, this is not the language of an enlightened statesman, or of an upright man. Did it require more than human prudence to foresee that Prussia, after the first ebullition of her resentment against the French revolution, would soon perceive that it was not her interest to waste her blood and her treasure for the aggrandizement of Austria; and that the best way to extinguish Jacobinism, and to check the spirit of innovation, was, to attend to internal regulations, to promote industry, to secure plenty, and to alleviate the public burthens? Did it require any great sagacity to foresee that Spain, unable to withstand the shock of republican arms, would, to save herself from ruin, consent to any terms of accommodation? Could it not be suspected that the empe ror would prefer his own interest to that of Great Britain, and that he would not pay a very scrupulous regard to any en. gagements which ought to have prevent I take upon me then to say, Sir, that there is no one power with whom we have been in alliance, which has not deceived, defrauded, and deserted us. It is melancholy, that while I am speaking, additional arguments, and new proofs, should spring up to strengthen my position. Not only has an embargo been laid upon all British vessels by our late magnanimous ally, but it would seem that their captains timents of abhorrence for the regicide republic, ministers were the first who neglected the professed object of the war, and who consulted individual gain. While they were calling upon all to join in a contest such as never appeared beforewhile they were maintaining that, to bring the awful and unprecedented struggle to a happy termination, they thought they must have an indemnity for their troublethey fitted out an expedition, and stole the West India Islands. This was the way in which we were to destroy usurpation, and to set an awful example of the punishment which awaits disloyalty and irreligion. In two right hon. gentlemen opposite to me I think I see the true reasons for carrying on the war personified, and their union is equally compatible. The one (Mr. Pitt) says, I will admit that the principle of the war is to suppress Jacobinism, and destroy its leaders, if I am not required to act upon it. I will admit that our only object is to establish the throne and the altar, provided I am allowed to carry on my plans of aggran disement. This is the reason why our exertions have been so ill directed, and why the means employed have been so inadequate to the end proposed. ed him from giving this preference? Has it only been discovered of late years, that the petty states of Germany must all act in concert, either with the emperor, or the king of Prussia? Was it a thing very improbable that, when magnanimous Paul saw all his allies fighting to promote their own interest, and when he discovered that he himself could gain nothing in the contest, his magnanimity should abate, his ardour for martial glory should cool, and that he should abandon the cause of morality, religion, and social order? But, Sir, they should surely have been better able to appreciate the operation of this mercenary spirit, since it first animated their own bosoms, and they infused into the confederacy. On what principles and pretences did they enter into the war? We are severely censured for ascribing various motives to them, and different ones to-day from what we mentioned a few days before. But the fault is theirs; they change their language with every change of circumstances, and make their inducements for performing past actions to depend upon what happens years after they were performed. I cannot forget that it was once said, we had gone to war because France would not allow us to remain at peace. This assertion is again repeated in lord Grenville's letter; and it is there positively asserted, that our only reason for going to war was the unprovoked aggression of France. No sooner was this language held at home, than another ground of warfare was stated to the rest of Europe. The enormities of the French were painted in glowing colours; the dangerous nature of their designs was laid open; the overthrow of all regular governments was represented as inevitable if they should succeed; their private proceedings were represented as a sufficient reason for attempting to subdue them; neutrality was denounced as impolicy, as pusillanimity, as treason against the human race. We declared to Tuscany, we declared to Sardinia, we declared to Swisserland, that they need not wait for aggression, that all had already received sufficient provocation, who had any regard for domestic happiness, for social comforts, or the consolations of religion. Was there not here the grossest hypocrisy, and the most shameful double-dealing? Must not our allies have been disgusted or corrupted by our bad example? After all these protestations of respect for the rights of humanity-after all these sen From that moment all dignity forsook us; and the variance between our professions and our practice was by turns the subject of laughter, of censure, and of reprobation to our allies. We were en titled to salvage for the civilised world, a right hon. gentleman (Mr. Dundas) I heard once say; but it would have been time enough to be paid when the work was accomplished, when the job was done." He first insists upon salvage, and then sets out in pursuit of the vessel. Our example, Sir, had the most deplorable effects. It infused a spirit of insincerity, and a desire of aggrandisement among all the confederates, and they have ever since assisted each other as long only, and to as great an extent, as they thought would be productive of their own individual advantage. Prussia soon after deserted us, in a manner which I need not recall. The emperor's whole attention was turned to the acquisition of a barrier, in place of the one which Joseph had destroyed; and his only object was to get possession of Valenciennes, Quesnoy, and the other fortresses in French Flanders. The fall of Dunkirk was anxiously expected, that it might be delivered up to Great Britain. This has been attempted to be denied, but it can be denied with gion. We have been obliged to be the no shadow of reason. Thus, though we recruiting-serjeants and paymasters-genedid not absolutely break faith with our ral to Europe. The right hon. gentleman allies, we introduced the principle which will not be pleased, perhaps, if I find fault led others to do so; and we have no rea with the emperor of Germany. He will son whatever to reproach their miscon- allow me to abuse the Spaniards, to comduct. To apply what I have said to Rus- plain of the versatility of Paul, and to sia. I never was a friend to magnanimous apply the epithets of perfidious and disPaul, and am so now less than ever. honourable to the king of Prussia. [Mr. But I must "render unto Cæsar the things Pitt seemed to dissent.] Perhaps the that are Cæsar's." His mother, the em- right hon. gentleman has thoughts of press Catherine, was very liberal of pro- forming an alliance with that sovereign, clamations and promises; but her magna- by means of a handsome subsidy, to make nimous son declared it to be his unaltera- up for his northern neighbour. I am at ble resolution not to sheath the sword till a loss to conceive on what other account he had restored the House of Bourbon. he can dislike to hear his name mentioned He, in fact, sent numerous armies into with disrespect. But, to proceed to his the field, and was prepared to make still imperial and royal majesty. It may apgreater exertions: but he soon discovered pear odd in me to use such liberties with that his allies were not equally magnani- crowned heads; but it should be recolmous with himself; that private interest lected, that when we speak of kings and was their only guide; and that, whilst his emperors, we mean only to speak of their forces were cut in pieces, and his resources ministers. Sovereigns are all immaculate expended, he merely saw those made and infallible, and their bad counsels are more powerful who might one day become alone to be attributed to those who surhis enemies. He took upon himself the round them. Still it is an ungracious task title of Grand Master of Malta, to be to expose the conduct of the cabinet of sure (a most ridiculous step in every Vienna; but at the call of duty I do not point of view, particularly as he is a mem- hesitate to perform it. I set out then by ber of the Greek church), but not an declaring, in the most positive and uninch of the island does he possess. Over equivocal manner, that the emperor of this subject there hangs a considerable Germany has failed in his engagements degree of mystery, which I should like with us more than any ally that it has to see developed. There are several cir- been our misfortune to be burthened with, cumstances which look as if, though no and that he is not now performing the absolute promise was made to Paul, of the contract which he lately subscribed. island, some hopes had been held out to Ought I not then to say what I feel, and him, or at least he was allowed, without to endeavour to impress it upon the being undeceived, to cherish sanguine House? On one occasion he completely hopes of being, presented with it. It is broke his faith: he entered into the prenot long since a fleet, with troops on liminaries of Leoben, and signed the peace board, sailed from this country, for the of Campo Formio, when he had promised express purpose of taking possession of not to treat but in conjunction with us. I the place when it should surrender, and need not be told that he was compelled to ensure its good government. No re- to do so; all that I say is, that he once monstrances were made when he assumed broke his engagements, and that what the title; arid when he pretended to make once happened may happen again. But captain Home Popham a knight of that I do not urge so strongly against him his order, his power to do so was recognised conduct on that occasion, as the manner in the Lordon Gazette. There are, I in which he behaved when, after the think, strong reasons to suspect that his breaking off of the negotiations at Rastadt, magnanimo us mind was led to believe he he again took the field. The right hon. would receive this as a reward for his ex-gentleman having then concluded a treaty ertions in tl is magnanimous scramble. It is strange, Sir, that not a man on the continent could be found who would take a part in a cause of such a nature without being subsidized. We have been obliged to bribe them to do their duty, to protect their property, and to defend their reli with Russia, although the emperor of Germany refused to come under any engagements, boasted of the triple alliance, and maintained that France could not possibly withstand its efforts. He continued to hold this language after he must have known that Paul 1st was disgusted and about to withdraw his forces. When to take effect from the beginning of March that event at last took place, as every last. He thus pledges his imperial word one had long foreseen, he applied in the that he will exert every effort to annoy most urgent manner to the emperor of the enemy for four months which are Germany, and, if he would enter into a gone, and that for the same period of past new treaty with him, offered him his own time he will not make a separate peace terms. The emperor was then undis- with the French Republic. He received puted master of Italy, and victory crowned the first instalment for carrying on in his arms; he turned a deaf ear to all Italy his schemes of foul ambition and these solicitations. Would he have he- unprincipled aggrandizement; the next, sitated a moment had he been zealous in for making an armistice. This was using the common cause, or had taken the all his means, this was struggling, as he smallest interest in it? He wished to promised, to the last gasp!-But he wishes carry on unmolested his own nefarious to make amends; when the armistice is schemes, by overturning independent near expiring, he leaves his capital, he states to enlarge his dominions; and to be springs from the couch of ease, he repairs able to make peace as soon as he had to the field, he is confident that he will acquired enough to satisfy his ambition: be able to re-establish his affairs. Who he therefore kept aloof from the treasure would not second such an heroic prince? which was temptingly held out to his Every subject in his dominions must flock view. On the 13th of February a mes- to his standard. But no sooner had he sage was brought down from his majesty, arrived at the army with these magnaniin which our Russian alliance, the advan- mous views, than his courage failed him, tages of which had been stated to be in- and he was seized with a most magnaniconceivable, was talked of in the highest mous panic. There are some things manner: it was said, that Bavaria and which one would think might as well be other German states were about to bring done by proxy, and some prerogatives of immense armies into the field, and that a sovereignty which it must be pleasant for treaty was forming with the emperor of the sovereign to exercise by delegation Germany. Now, Sir, his majesty does But it would seem, on the other hand, not state that he will propose an alliance that there are degrees in all things in with the emperor, but that he is actually power, in aggrandizement, in humility, in treating with him. The emperor was still meanness; and that he who has one in a prosperous, and our two millions were de- supereminent degree, is apt to give proof spised. At length, on the 20th of June, of all the rest. Francis, therefore, would when the battle of Marengo, which made not allow another to act now in his place; such a melancholy reverse in his history, but, by signing, with his own hand, the had been fought on the 14th; when he convention of Hohenlenden, gave proof found that Melas had been obliged to of the most super-imperial pusillanimity. vield up the greatest part of Italy, and that Moreau, having gained three great pitched battles, was advancing rapidly to Vienna, being in the extremity of distress, and utterly unable, however well inclined, to promote the common cause, he pledges himself to assist us to the utmost, and, unless in conjunction with us, not to treat with the enemy. There is something extremely injurious in the alliance itself, which ought to be pointed out and exposed. On the 20th of June, it is agreed that his majesty the emperor and king shall have two millions of money, to be paid at three instalments, in July, September, and December. For this, what was to be done? He was to carry on the campaign with all possible vigour, and not to treat except in conjunction with his Britannic majesty. But it has likewise a retrospective operation, and was [VOL. XXXV.] The next question is, whether he has since been faithful to his engagements. The right hon. gentleman says, he never has had the slightest idea of entering into a separate negotiation with France, though to be sure it has been impossible for him openly to carry on the war. I must use the liberty to say, that that is impossible. I make no doubt that ministers have been told so; but they have not been told the truth. I regret that the documents I moved for on a former night were not laid before the House. It was said, that count St. Julien had no credentials. It is asserted in one of M. Otto's notes, that he carried with him a letter from the emperor to the chief consul, and this assertion has never been contradicted. I may be told, that this could convey no power to an ambassador; as a sovereign, not responsible himself, must act by those who [2U] |