the motion, that the bill from the Commons be read the first time, Lord Holland said, he knew it was not customary to oppose a bill on its first reading, and for a very obvious reason, that it was right they should be in some measure acquainted with the nature of a bill, before they entered upon any discussion of it. However much he might approve of this custom in general cases, he could not adhere to it with regard to the present bill; for the nature of this bill was at once known from the title which it bore, and its object was such, that the moment it was proposed for a first reading, he felt himself called upon to remonstrate against it as the most flagrant breach of the constitution. At a moment when parliament had met for the great purpose of relieving the distresses of the people, a bill was brought in, whose purpose was, to place their persons, and even their lives, under the arbitrary control of those ministers by whom that control had already been so grossly abused. Never was attempt to demand confidence more misplaced; never was a proposal to give new powers more absurd. If ministers thought it necessary at the present time to suspend the Habeas Corpus act, their reasoning must be, "this suspension has saved the country from ruin, and it must be continued for the sake of security." But allowing, for the sake of argument, that the original suspension was necessary, and had been beneficial, this was no reason for continuing it, when the evil which it was intended to meet no longer existed. For what would this reasoning tend to? It would be the physician saying to his patient, "You were in a state of violent disease; I gave you a violent medicine to cure you; its efficacy is proved; you are cured; therefore you must take a double dose of the same medicine."-It was perhaps difficult to determine what combination of circumstances ought to authorize a measure like this; but certain it was, that our ancestors had never thought general assertions of danger any reason for its adoption. They admitted it only either when there was strong, clear, and decisive evidence of a conspiracy among a large body of men, among whom individuals could not be convicted and brought to punishment without giving the alarm to the rest, and allowing them an opportunity to conceal their crimes, or escape the reach of law; or, when some grand conspiracy actually did exist which it might be difficult to counteract by the general effect of the national policy. These were the only cases in which our ancestors had thought it expedient to suspend the operation of that invaluable privilege which gave security to all their rights. Ministers had now, however, thought it expedient to renounce this long established constitutional ground. They had chosen to publish a new doctrine; and instead of a striking and specific case of necessity, had risked the measure on an undefined avowal of danger. Ministers seemed to argue, that because the measure had, under certain circumstances, been productive of good, it was therefore to be continued when those circumstances had ceased to operate. He was somewhat at a loss to understand what was the real meaning of such language. Was it really their object, that all the ancient laws, which gave security and permanence to the liberty of the subject, that all the wise regulations of our ancestors to check the influence of the crown, should for ever be suspended, and that on their ruins should be established a regular system of oppression and despotism? If these were in reality their principles, it was tantamount to saying to the people of England, that their constitution was never to be restored.-That discontents did exist to a certain extent was not to be denied; that there might be some individuals who, notwithstanding the scenes of anarchy which a neighbouring county had displayed, might entertain a wish to overthrow the constituted authorities, was not impossible. He believed that never was there a country in which such discontents did not exist; in which some factious spirits were not to be found. But allowing that in this country discontents did exist to a certain degree, the true question for their lordships determination was, whether this partial evil, arising out of the best privilege of human nature, was to sanction a measure which superseded the exercise of all those rights, which had for ages distinguished the inhabitants of this favourite land?-But in considering this subject, it was farther important to contrast not merely the constitutional ground of a bill like the present, with the ground adopted by ministers, but also the use which was made of that power which it placed in their hands. It had never been the practice in the better times of the constitution to exert the § power granted to seize and detain seditious persons, except when there was an intention to bring to trial, or when the apprehension was preceded by an accusation on oath. But what had been the use which ministers had made of their discretionary power? Had there ever been displayed on their part a determination to bring those individuals to open trial? They had detained them nearly three years without the form of accusation, and according to the still existing statutes, they could not legally hold them in confinement when that term should expire. Yet, was there the least reason to suppose that they would be able to collect, during the few months that remained, any evidence adequate to their conviction, since they had been unable to establish their guilt in a period of much longer duration? Ministers pretended that these men were detained for the sake of general security; but would any noble lord assert, that their liberation would have the least tendency to disturb the public repose? There was a time when the bare idea that ministers could have confined in some solitary cell, any individual against whom there was no charge, would have suggested the strictest scrutiny. These days he hoped would again return. He referred to the assertion, that the prison in which ministers immured the objects of their suspicion, was formed on the plan of the philanthropic Howard. Had that been the case, would a grand jury have recommended an inquiry into the internal economy of it, in consequence of the miserable situation of a person not confined for any offence, but for safe custody only? Was that a prison upon the plan of Howard, where the governor extorted money from the wretched sufferers, and made their miseries the pretence of his rapacity? But why were persons who were only objects of suspicion, sent to penitentiary houses at all? Why were persons to be sent in chains to them, as he understood had been the case with regard to some who came from Manchester?-Convinced as he was, that there was nothing in the circumstances of the country, which, even at the first introduction of the bill, could justify so violent a measure, he had opposed its enactment. The alarm excited by temporary circumstances had subsided, and the people would not now look to the continuance of the measure with the sentiments they had formerly indulged. They were alarmed, not at the prevalence of sedition and disaffection, but at the extraordinary increase of the influence of the crown. They were alarmed at the system of profusion adopted by ministers, supported by taxes now too severe to be endured. They were alarmed that a contest begun for the purpose of restraining the ambition of France, had tended to increase her aggrandizement. They were alarmed lest a war, in which they were told at its commencement France would be reduced by famine and distress, should end in producing famine and distress in this country. They were alarmed that a war carried on for the purpose of checking the designs of one state which threatened the destruction of every other, should have deprived us of every ally, and given birth to a confederacy against our exist ence as an independent nation. Lord Grenville said, he would put one simple question to their lordships-Whe ther they were not convinced that there had existed in this country the seeds of a conspiracy against its government and constitution-a conspiracy of the same nature with that which had arrived at such a lamentable maturity in Ireland? The table was covered with proofs of its exist. ence, and if these were not thought suffi cient, there was the further evidence of the confession at the same time of their own guilt, made by some of the persons now detained in confinement. To counteract a conspiracy which involved the ruin of our religion, our liberties, our property, in a word, of whatever was excellent or useful, their lordships had judged it expedient, to give up for a time the exercise of one most important privilege, by that means to preserve the system itself from the destruction prepared for it. The only question now was, whe ther their lordships were satisfied of the propriety of their former resolution? If they were persuaded that, under the influence of the bill on the table, principles destructive of all order, subversive of all happiness, had been materially weakened; if they believed that dangerous machinations had been prevented; that scenes of anarchy, disorder, and misery witnessed in a neighbouring land, had been kept at a distance from our abodes, that the fair inheritance of genuine liberty, handed down from age to age unimpaired, had been preserved in its original perfection; if they believed this, they would have no hesitation in entertaining the present bill. -But it had been said that there was no evidence brought forward in support of its necessity. Was not all the information formerly laid before the House now open for the inspection of their lordships ? Did not the reports on the table furnish ample evidence of the facts on which the bill was founded? Would it not, then, be to act inconsistently with their former deci sions to refuse to receive the bill, under the present circumstances of the country, when sedition had so favourable an opportunity to work up the spirits of the people to disaffection? From a firm conviction that the measure had been productive of incalculable advantages, and that the present state of the country required its continuance, he should move that the bill be read a second time. The Duke of Bedford could not give a silent vote against a measure which was not even defended by the shadow of an argument. He should ever reckon it as a most unjustifiable violation of the rights and liberties of the people. The noble secretary had not produced a single fact, which could induce the House to sanction its continuance. No new ground having been brought forward in support of it, and there appearing to him nothing in the state of the country to justify it, he should oppose the bill. not be disputed. In support of this posi- now confined here under this act who had sent measure. The House divided: Contents, 17; NotContents, 3. The bill went through its subsequent stages without opposition. Lord Eldon admitted that it was the duty of every noble lord to spare no op portunity of resisting any bill that suspended the Habeas Corpus; as no bill to deprive the subject of that invaluable blessing ought to pass, unless the neces sity was great, and felt to be so. He Mr. Nicholls's Motion respecting the himself would have gone much farther Interference of Lords of Parliament in the than the noble lords on the point of re- Election of Members to serve for the Comsistance, if he was not convinced, most mons. ] Dec. 12. Mr. Nicholls rose to thoroughly, that a strong necessity had call the attention of the House to the asexisted for the passing such bills as the sumption of power by certain of our present, from time to time, for some fellow subjects, which he considered a years, and still remained for now passing violation of the law and of the fundaIt. If such bills had not been passed, the mental principles of the constitution,-he Sovereign not only would not have been meant the power which peers had asnow upon the throne, but our religion, sumed, of interfering in the election of our laws, and our freedom, would have | members of that House. He was of opi been overturned. He denied the principle nion, that whenever a peer interfered in laid down, that the ground on which the the election of a member of the House Habeas Corpus act could only be sus- of Commons, he was guilty of a high pended, was to enable government to crime and misdemeanor; and it was his keep men in prison, lest, by bringing intention to move, "That this House them to trial, a disclosure of evidence in. should resolve, that it is a high crime and jurious to the country should necessarily misdemeanor for any lord of parliament take place. On the contrary, there might or lord lieutenant of a county, to concern be a case in which there could be no trial, himself in the election of a member to yet the necessity of the measure could serve for the Commons in parliament." [VOL. XXXV.] [3 C] Should he be so fortunate as to prevail | boroughs, viz. to enable him to curb on the House to come to this resolution, the influence of his great barons in parhe should then move the House to re- liament. Lawyers and historians agreed, solve itself into a committee of the whole that this was the origin of the attendance House, for the purpose of considering by of representatives of the Commons in what means peers might be most effec- parliament: it could not therefore be tually restrained from interfering in the called a novel doctrine. He was aware election of members of that House. Be- that it was an unfashionable doctrine, and fore he proceeded farther, he would state might be revolting to many. Those who his ideas of the constitution; and those considered the House of Commons as ideas, he said, were not drawn from new resting on the basis of universal suffrage, philosophy, but from the old law books would be offended at the doctrine he had of his country. The first author he stated. No man conversant in the hisshould cite was Bracton, who lived in tory of this country could ever bring himthe reign of Henry 3rd. Bracton, speak- self to believe, that the House of Coming of the king, has this expression, "Et mons was built on the foundation of unirex sub lege, quia lex facit regem;""The versal suffrage. Universal suffrage never will of the people created the king." could be established without the previous But when the people willed that there abolition of the existing constitution. should be that magistrate whom we call Those who wished to establish the system a king, the people willed that all the other of great families possessing a pre-emibranches of the government should ema- nence over the rest of the nobility, and nate from him. Thus the king creates controlling the government by their inthe peer, an hereditary legislator, an he- fluence in the House of Commons, would reditary judge, an hereditary adviser of be equally revolted at these positions. the crown; the king creates corporations, But he challenged any man to say that and confers on those corporations the the lawyers and historians had not agreed right of sending representatives to parlia- in assigning this origin to the House of ment; the king gives activity to parlia- Commons. Antecedently to the 40th ment, by commanding it to assemble; Henry 3rd, parliament had consisted of the king sanctions the resolutions of par- peers, bishops, who were sole corporations, liament, and gives them the force of and abbots, the representatives of ag laws. Thus the people are the roots, the gregate ecclesiastical corporations. It king the trunk; from that trunk proceed was an easy transition from the represen the limbs, the branches, the twigs, and tatives of aggregate ecclesiastical corpoeven the leaves. In the early periods of rations to the representatives of aggre our history, those who had a right to sit gate lay corporations. If the histories of in parliament were not precisely of the the other feudal monarchies of Europe same description as at present. Indivi- were consulted, it would perhaps be duals to whom the king had granted the found that the same motives had, in other rights of peerage, bishops as sole corpo- states, induced the monarch to summon rations, and abbots as the heads and re- to his great council the representatives of presentatives of aggregate ecclesiastical aggregate lay corporations. A fable, corporations, composed the parliament. which we learn in our boyish days, exIt is agreed, by all our lawyers and his- plains the policy of this measure. We torians, that no representatives of bodies are told, that the Gods of the higher of the commonalty sat in parliament be- order confederated to fetter Jupiter: Ju fore the 40th Hen. 3rd. It is supposed piter called to his assistance Briareus, the that some few representatives of bodies giant son of Earth, who with his hundred of the commonalty were summoned to hands defended the throne of Jupiter, parliament in that year. But it was not and defeated the efforts of the confedeuntil the 49th Hen. 3rd that they were rate Gods. What is the lesson of insummoned in any considerable number. struction conveyed to us by this fable? Mr. Nicholls here read two passages, one It is this, that in all mixed governments, from sir Robert Cotton, the other from of king, nobles, and commons (and such, Mr. Prynne, to show the opinion of our perhaps, were all the governments of lawyers and antiquarians with respect to Greece at the time the fables of mythothe motives which induced Henry 3rd logy were invented), the nobles are ever in the 49th year of his reign, to summon prone to encroach on the power of their representatives from counties, cities, and sovereign. It is the Commons; it is the § giant son of Earth, with his hundred created in the burgage immediately transhands, who defends the throne of his so-ferred back to the peer. Here the peer, vereign, and defeats the efforts of confede- by a subtle unlawful contrivance, prorated nobles. At an early period the cured the nomination of the two memgreat nobles endeavoured to deprive the bers: for the law had directed, that the king of the protection he derived from two members should be elected by the the representatives of the Commons; for, proprietors of burgages; whereas, in fact, in the 3rd Edw. 1st, we find a statute to these men were not the proprietors, but restrain the nobles from compelling the only the instruments of the peer, to whom corporations of the commonalty to re- the peer had made fictitious colourable turn such representatives as the nobles conveyances, that they might have the might recommend. The statute is in semblance of proprietors, and procure for these words "Et pur ceo, que elections the peer the nomination of the two memdoivent etre franches, cy defend le roy, bers. He said, there could be no transfer sur la greeve forfeiture, que nul haut of property from one man to another, homme, ni autre, per poiar des armes, ni without a bond fide intention to transfer; per malice ou menaces, ne disturbe de that the deeds of conveyance were only faire franke election." The resolutions of evidence of that intention, and that if the the House of Commons, grounded on intention to transfer was wanting, there this statute, had fixed the meaning of was no transfer. Suppose the peer, apthe expression," haut hommes," viz. that prehensive that a creditor might obtain a it signified, lord of parliament, or lord judgment against him, and that these lieutenant of a county. The same reso- burgage houses in execution, had exelutions fix the meaning of the word cuted these conveyances to protect his pro"disturbe," viz. that these great men perty from being taken in execution, shall not concern themselves in the elec- would the conveyances have been valid? tion. Whenever a statute forbids an act Certainly not. The law would have said, to be done, he who commits that act is the conveyances were colourable and ficguilty of a high crime and misdemeanor. titious, and that the property in the On this ground, he contended, that the houses still remained in the peer. Could peer who concerned himself in an elec- these conveyances be void against a cretion was guilty of a high crime and mis- ditor, and valid against the king?-He demeanor. He was aware that it would be would not trouble the House with a contended, that peers were only forbid to minute detail of the manner in which the disturb elections by force of arms or me- kings of England had availed themselves naces; but, in fact, they were forbid to of the representation of the Commons to interfere at all, and force of arms and curb the power of their great nobles; menaces were mentioned in the statute, only remarking, that, from the accession because they were the ways by which the of Hen. 8th to the close of sir Robert great barons at that time most usually in- Walpole's administration, the great noterfered. But there was another expres- bles appear to have been restrained from sion which applied to every species of exercising any undue influence in parliaunlawful interference, viz. "per malice." ment. Soon after the fall of sir Robert The meaning of which was, that they Walpole, the system of great families was should not disturb the election by any brought forth; the object of this system subtle unlawful contrivance. He said, was, to dictate to the king in the choice that there were in that House about sixty of his minister. This was to be effected members who ought to be elected by the by procuring the nomination to seats in majority of the proprietors of burgage the House of Commons. The pretences houses in their several boroughs; that in on which this power was claimed were, these boroughs the great families had that their ancestors had placed the purchased the majority of the burgage Brunswick family on the throne, that they houses; that the night before the election had therefore a right to dictate to the the peer, who was the proprietor of the king in the choice of his minister; that burgage houses, executed deeds of con- the great Whig families acknowledged veyance of each of these burgage tene- the sovereignty of the people; and that ments to some one or other of his de- the ancient nobility of England would pendents. That these dependants, the ever esteem it their highest glory to be next day, were polled as proprietors of the defenders of the rights of the people. the burgage houses; and the interest so Under these pretences, and by these |