(p. 13)? "The limitation of the amount of land, which was under a penalty, must at once have brought a great quantity of land into the market, and consequently have greatly lowered the value of land, so that even the poorer citizens soon found an opportunity of again acquiring lands by purchase. But in order to raise to their usual honourable occupation the class of cultivators (which had been completely depressed, and could not easily again acquire land by purchase), Licinius compelled the rich to manage the cultivation of their land by a proportionate number of free overseers (villici), instead of slaves, who had been hitherto exclusively employed." The reference is to the passage of Appian (1. 8); and the author also refers to the beginning of Niebuhr's third volume, where he treats of the Licinian Rogations. He adds in a note to this passage (p. 14, n. 28): herein respect was had to the number of iugera of land, and the number of head of cattle.' But how does Huschke know this? Does he also know things about the Licinian law which the ancients do not mention? Appian does not say that the rich were compelled to employ free persons, nor does he say that any respect was had, in fixing the number of such persons, to the quantity of land, or to the number of head of cattle3.

Huschke enumerates (pp. 14, 15) five provisions of the Licinian law as given by Niebuhr, for which there is no authority; and I agree with him that several of them should be expunged, because there is no sufficient authority for them; which, however, is not the only ground on which he objects to them. The remarks of Huschke in pp. 15, 16, should be read.

He then proceeds (pp. 16, 17) to contrast the Lex Sempronia Agraria of Gracchus, which he admits to be a purely agrarian law, with this of Licinius, which he contends was a lex de modo agri. The law of Gracchus was, as he affirms, a political law; this of Licinius was a sumptuary law. He refers, among other authorities, to Plutarch (Tib. Gracchus, 8, 10, 13) to prove that the law of Gracchus affected the public land, and yet the only perfectly distinct declaration of Plutarch, that the law of Gracchus did affect public land, is contained in the beginning of chapter 8, in which he says that the former law

3 Compare with μηνύσειν ἔμελλον (Appian 1. 8), the expression in Dionysius, μηνύσιν ἀπενεγκάτω. I do not

pretend to know what this passage of Appian means.

(that of Licinius) affected public land. Plutarch, as observed in a previous article, begins by speaking of the public land, and of the rich contriving to engross it. This, he says, was remedied by a law which limited the amount of land that a man should have. The law was observed for a time, and then neglected, so that the rich got all the land again. This was the state of things which the law of Gracchus proposed to remedy. I set little value on Plutarch's account; but Huschke, who has read it, feels that it is altogether against him, and he gets rid of this difficulty by the devices which I have shewn.

Huschke apparently relies on the expression De Modo Agri, as tending to shew that the law of Licinius was a sumptuary law. He adds in a note (p. 19, n. 39): "The lex Sempronia is called an agraria by Cicero, Pro Sextio, 48; Livy, Epit. 58. 60; Victor, De Vir. Illust. c. 65; while the law of Licinius is entitled De Modo Agri by Varro, De Re Rust. 1. 2, Gellius, xx. 1, rogatione illa Stolonis iugerum de numero præfinito; Pliny, N. H. xviii. 7 (6), § 3; Columella, 1. 3:" to which he might have added, that it is entitled De Modo Agrorum by Livy, vi. 35. Now Huschke remarks, with reference to this passage of Pliny, Modum agri in primis servandum antiqui putavere,' &c., that it was an old rule of husbandry that the land should not be stronger than the man'-'satius esse minus serere et melius arare, qua in sententia et Virgilium fuisse video.' This is a good rule which all farmers should follow. But if a writer wished to lay down the rule, how is it to be expressed otherwise? 'Modus agri,''modus cibi,' 'modus vini,' are all very intelligible Latin expressions, and may all contain good rules according to their application. But it does not follow that a law which fixes a 'modus agri' fixes the amount which would correspond with the modus meant by Pliny. If a law fixes a modus of 500 acres to cultivation, it does not by that rule proportion every man to his land. It allows any man to have 500, and to cultivate it all. Whereas, if it were such a law as to establish the kind of modus which Pliny recommends, it would take care that no man had more than he could well cultivate, whether it were 50 or 500. This is really one of the most frivolous points in the whole essay of Huschke. Again, the passage of Gellius does not contain the expression De Modo Agri; and lastly, the passage in Columella is perfectly consistent with Livy. It is as follows, quoted by Huschke (p. 20, n. 40): "Mox

etiam cum agrorum vastitatem victoriæ nostræ et interneciones hostium fecissent, criminosum tamen senatori fuit supra quingenta iugera possedisse, suaque lege C. Licinius damnatus est, quod agri modum quem in magistratu rogatione tribunicia promulgaverat, immodica possidendi libidine transcendisset. Nec magis quia superbum videbatur tantum loci detinere, quam quia flagitiosum, quos hostis profugiendo desolasset agros, novo more civem Romanum supra vires patrimonii possidendo deserere.” There is no 'habeo' here; no ambiguity in support of his theory: all is clear and distinct. Yet it is quoted by Huschke. It is not my design to examine the rest of Huschke's essay, on which I offer no opinion; but if he is wrong in his view of this Licinian law, the error must affect the rest of the essay, as will appear from the extract at the head of this article.

This essay is often ingenious, and if the author had really been bent on discovering the truth instead of merely refuting Niebuhr's opinion, we might have had from him some further insight into the subject of the Licinian Rogations. But the desire to uphold his own theory, in spite of all evidence, is too apparent. I ought to add, that though I have attempted to defend Niebuhr's general view of the Licinian Rogations, I do not maintain the accuracy of the details.

GEORGE LONG.

NOTE.-On the Appius Claudius mentioned by Livy (IV. 36) as the son of the Decemvir, and in Iv. 48 as the nepos of the Decemvir; and on the Appius Claudius (vI. 40), who is also called the nepos of the Decemvir, see the notes in Drakenborch's Livy, and Drumann, Geschichte Roms, Claudii.

XXII.

ON THE PARTICLES ΟΠΩΣ AND ὩΣ "AN, WITH A CONJUNCTIVE AND OPTATIVE.

WHEN Alcibiades is urging the Lacedæmonians to send assistance to Syracuse, he recommends them above all things to despatch a Spartan officer thither, ὡς ἂν τοὺς τε παρόντας ξυντάξῃ καὶ τοὺς μὴ θέλοντας προσαναγκάση (VI. 91). Upon this Dr. Arnold remarks: "The meaning of wc av seems to be pretty nearly the same as that of the other reading ös av. In both cases the particle renders the expression more doubtful; is av is, that he may if possible organize; öç av would signify, if a man can be found to organize. See Hermann's note on Viger, 285." Thus much Dr. Arnold. On the other hand, the learned editor of the Agamemnon, Dr. Peile, in an elaborate note upon the 353rd line of that play, comes to the conclusion, "that owe and oç av express a consequence necessarily arising out of the nature or manner of the action which goes before." He then subjoins: "Apart from, and it may be even independent of, any formal and premeditated purpose.”

This, it must be admitted, is "a very pretty quarrel as it stands;" the one doctor asserts that the addition of the particle av makes the consequence contingent, the other that it makes it necessary. In a case, therefore, where "doctors" so manifestly "disagree," we propose to avail ourselves of the licence then conceded to disciples, and to inquire which interpretation best suits those passages where we happen to have met with the formula. Some of course there are, in which, for all practical purposes, both explanations pretty nearly coincide. These consequently prove nothing for either side. If, however, we encounter passages where the one meaning is necessary and the other is absurd, while the converse cannot be shewn ever to be the case, then, according to a well-known canon of criticism. (Porson ad Hec., v. 392), we are bound to accept the meaning proved to be necessary in particular passages, as proper in all. Let us then apply this principle to the point in question, and first of all take the suffrages of the dramatic poets as to whether av makes the expression necessary or contingent. Afterwards

we wish to say a few words upon the general theory which regards the formulæ ὡς ἄν, ὅπως ἄν, &c. as denoting a necessary consequence, apart it may be from any purpose expressed or implied.

That Dr. Arnold is neither singular nor original in his opinion is evident from the commentary of Göller on the passage: "Krueg. ad Dionys., p. 332, emendat öç ǎv, ut habent Ar. Chr. Cl. Ven., nam &c cum conjunctivo ibi tantum locum habere, ubi consilii eventus dubius est." He himself adds, "ut wc et wc av finem ac consilium indicant nihil amplius,”—an explanation of the matter which is not very definite or intelligible. Poppo denies that öç av would be Greek at all in this place; i. e. it would mean quicunque continuerit, and not qui contineat, which is the sense required here.

To this we shall recur hereafter; at present let us proceed by an examination of particular cases to determine the meaning of the controverted phrase. We commence with Eschylus. When Prometheus says, addressing the chorus with reference to Io,

ὅπως δ ̓ ἂν εἰδῇ μὴ μάτην κλύουσά μου

ἃ πρὶν μολεῖν δευρ' ἐκμεμόχθηκεν φράσω. P. V. v. 843. We conceive that he intends this promised display of a supernatural acquaintance with her past wanderings, to act as a positive assurance that those predictions of her future wanderings already given will certainly be fulfilled. Nay, it is not left to conjecture, for in the very next line he assumes the correctness of his narrative to be a тεкμýριoν of his veracity :

τεκμήριον τοῦτ ̓ αὐτὸ δοὺς μύθων ἐμῶν.

Now every reader of Aristotle knows Teкμńρiov to be the technical term for a certain, indisputable ground of proof, opposed to oŋuttov (when used in its specific sense), or a ground of presumption:

τὸ γὰρ τεκμήριον τὸ εἰδέναι ποιοῦν φάσιν εἶναι.

Analyt. Prior. II. c. 29.

τούτων τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον (necessary in its inference) τεκμήριον.

Rhet. Lib. I.

Again, the exhortations of Io's nightly visitant were, we are told, couched in these words: