ment thereto, I would leave it to the reflection of any reasonable mind, whether it be not presumable that those meanings, which so much ingenuity, labour, time, and expense, have been employed to disguise, are not likely to be of far more importance than the mere sculptured symbols which are the vehicles of them? Indeed, every presumption leads forcibly to the conclusion that they were intended to commemorate things highly useful to mankind in general, or to the particular nations by whose encouragement they were composed, or at whose expense they were wrought. But is it credible, that, if the ancients wished to transmit their knowledge to posterity, instead of following the plain and simple method of the moderns, they would have resorted to a mode so abstruse and complicated? and (since it is often thought sufficient, in examining a statue or relief, to decide, in respect of a given figure, that it was intended for a Bacchus rather than a Mercury, a Mars rather than a Hercules, and the like,) would they wilfully have exposed their labours to such risk, that their aim should in the end be totally defeated? that what they intended only as the shadow should be mistakenly grasped for the substance, and the fable itself become the object of research with posterity, instead of the mystery lying beneath it? In answer to these questions it may be observed, that the same objections lie against the secret languages of the Chinese and of the Indians, which are well known to be confined to the learned of those nations, and to be out of the reach of the common people; but as to the fact itself, it most certainly appears to have been the universal practice of antiquity, ως παντ' άγαν γ' άινικτα κ ασαφή λέγειν. Soph. Ed. Tyr. In conformity with which, it is said of Apollo, the God of Poetry, (by Heraclitus in Plutarch,) δε λεγει, εδε κρύπτει αλλα σημαίνει, and when, in the beginning of the sixth Encid, the Sybil, inspired by the same god, horrendas canit ambages, it is added that she does so, obscuris vera involvens. So again, the declaration of Socrates in the second Alcibiades of Plato goes most strongly to the same effect. Ανιττεται, ω βελτιςε, και στις και άλλοι δε ποιηται σχεδόν τι παντες" εστι δε φύσει ποιητική η σύμπασα προςυχοντος ανδρος αινιγματώδης, και 8 τ8 wwgical. And thus again, the common prelimiγνωρισαι. nary necessary, according to the old adage, to constitute a poet, viz. in bicipiti somniâsse Parnasso, would seem to imply that one of that profession must of necessity know how to deal in double or enigmatical meanings. In truth, it would be much more useful to seek for a solution of those meanings as found in the ancient poets, than to condemn all poetry, (in respect of the knowledge contained under it,) as a collection of fiction, vanity, and folly. The high functions of poetry, on the contrary, as conversant in such enigmatical meanings, are noticed by numberless passages in the ancient writers, and, among the more modern, by Milton himself in his Co mus. -'tis not vain or fabulous (Tho' so esteemed by shallow ignorance) What the sage poets, taught by th' heavenly Muse, It is indeed beyond all dispute, that the poetry of the ancients, differing widely from that of the present day, was full of the most useful, solid, and instructive information; and so effectual was their poetry found to be to its end, that the same method was adopted also by their prose writers; in proof of which it may be sufficient to set out the open avowal which Lucian makes of his own practice in the following words; αλλ' εώρων, ότι ει μεν τα συνήθη και ταυτα τοις πολλοις νομίζοιμι, ηκιστα επισπάσομαι τις ανθρωπος ες το θαύμα όσω δε αν ξενίζοιμι, τοσέτω καινότερος ωμην αυτοις εσεσθαι. Δια τέτο καινοποιειν ειλόμην, απορρητον ποιησα μενος την αιτίαν, ως εικάζοντες αλλοι αλλῶς, άπαντες εκπληττώνται, καθαπερ εν τοις ασαφεσι τῶν χρησμῶν. Lucian. Μικυλλος η Αλεκτρυών. It is true indeed that this method of writing might have occasionally degenerated into excess, and certain, that ancient poetry, history, and philosophy contain a vast variety of names that have a tendency to puzzle and mislead. But what good thing exists that is not in its turn a subject of abuse? This was a vice that Lucian (himself a perfect master of this method) has not forgotten to notice in his Θεων εκκλησία, in which he takes care τοις φιλοσόφοις προειπειν, μη αναπλάττειν нама спормата. But, however the method may have been abused, it is beyond all question that if the labours of antiquity in all their various branches be not interpreted in the manner supposed, they present little else to us but childish amusement, or a barren waste of time and expense; while, on the other hand, by resorting to such a mode of interpretation, the most inestimable results are to be attained. The only previous steps necessary for the study of the works of the ancients after this method, seem to be these: first, that we should admit it to be likely, à priori, that the social system of the world should have been in old times much as it is at this day; or, in other words, that power and wealth, and all that is consequent upon them, should be seated in the same countries where we now find them; and not that great maritime power should exist in countries without a port, or vast armies be constantly kept on foot |