taken possession of his soul. His imagination has been dazzled by visions of diadems, of stars and garters, and titles of nobility. He has been taught to burn with restless emulation at the names of great heroes and conquerors. His enchanted island is destined soon to relapse into a wilderness; and in a few months we find the beautiful and tender partner of his bosom, whom he lately 'permitted not the winds of 'summer' to visit too roughly"—we find her shivering at midnight on the wintry banks of the Ohio, and mingling her tears with the torrents that froze as they fell. Yet this unfortunate man, thus deluded from his interest and his happiness, thus seduced from the paths of innocence and peace, thus confounded in the toils that were deliberately spread for him, and overwhelmed by the mastering spirit and genius of another—this man, thus ruined and undone, and made to play a subordinate part in this grand drama of guilt and treason-this man is to be called the principal offender, while he by whom he was thus plunged in misery is comparatively innocent, a mere accessory! Is this reason? Is it law? Is it humanity? Sir, neither the human heart nor the human understanding will bear a perversion so monstrous and absurd, so shocking to the soul, so revolting to reason! Let Aaron Burr, then, not shrink from the high destination which he has courted, and, having

already ruined Blennerhassett in fortune, character, and happiness forever, let him not attempt to finish the tragedy by thrusting that ill-fated man between himself and punishment.

Upon the whole, Sir, reason declares Aaron Burr the principal in this crime, and confirms herein the sentence of the law; and the gentleman, in saying that his offence is of a derivative and accessorial nature, begs the question, and draws his conclusions from what, instead of being conceded, is denied. It is clear from what has been said that Burr did not derive his guilt from the men of the island, but imparted his own guilt to them; that he is not an accessory, but a principal; and, therefore, that there is nothing in the objection which demands a record of their conviction before we shall go on with our proof against him.

But suppose you should think otherwise; suppose you were of opinion that, on principles of law and reason, notwithstanding the seeming injustice and inhumanity of considering him as inferior in guilt to them, Aaron Burr was not a principal, but an accessorial offender in the treason: would you, for that reason, stop the evidence from going to the jury? Now, to inquire whether the conduct of Aaron Burr makes him liable as a principal or accessory is only arguing in a different shape the whole question, whether he has committed an overt act of war or not. The jury are to

consult and decide whether he be a principal offender or not. Whether he be a principal or accessory is a question of fact, which they are sworn to decide. The Court must judge of the weight of evidence before it can say that the accused is either a principal or accessory. Suppose one part of the evidence contradicts another. Is it not judging of the weight of evidence to decide whether he be a principal or accessory? If it be not, I know not what judging of the weight of evidence is. Nothing is more peculiarly within the exclusive province of the jury than the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence.

But the Court never says that the evidence is or is not sufficient to prove what it is intended to establish. No Court has such right. The course in such cases is to give instructions in a general charge to the jury, after all the evidence shall have been heard. Will you, because of your impressions on this subject, from a merely partial view of the evidence, compel the jury also to decide on that necessarily partial view? If you do, do you not thereby divest the jury of their peculiar functions? Their province should not be invaded. The invasion is big with danger and terror. I trust that you will see this subject in the awful light in which it really stands, and that you will suffer the trial to take its natural course.

Mr. Martin has referred you to a number of cases

from Cooper and other authors, but they do not prove the position intended. The Court, in all these cases, leaves the jury to decide on the overt act. You will find those cases to amount to simply this: a dialogue between the Court and the counsel of the prisoner as to the overt act. The Court was required to say whether the overt act were proved or not. There was no judicial determination. The judge merely told his opinion; but he told the jury, at the same time, that the decision belonged to them and not to him.

There is a wide difference between criminal and civil cases; and as it is of much more importance to preserve the trial by jury in the former, to protect the lives of the people against unjust persecutions, than, in mere civil suits, to preserve the rights of property, the Constitution has secured that trial in all criminal prosecutions.

Should the Court interfere for the purpose of stopping the evidence, and to wrest the cause from the jury in favor of the accused, would there not be a reciprocal right? If it can interfere to save the prisoner, can they not interfere equally against him?—a thing unprecedented in the annals of jurisprudence! Have the counsel on either side a right to call on the other side to state all their evidence before it be introduced, and then to address the Court without hearing it, if they think they have a better chance before the Court than the jury?

Has either party a right to substitute the Court for the jury, or the jury for the Court, at pleasure; to address the Court on facts, or the jury on points of law? Such an attempt would not be a greater encroachment on the right of the proper tribunal than the present motion is on the rights of the jury.