of the Reader: To which I will not diffemble, he is fometimes happy enough in addrelling himself.

But I am fo far from defigning to weaken his Arguments in any respect, that in order to a more clear Difcovery of the Point in Question, I shall endeavour to give them an additional Force, by making the following Conceffion.

That a Custom, for Inftance, may be introduced, and publickly approved, not only concerning fuch Cafes, as are propofed by him, confeffedly in their own Nature arbitrary and indifferent; but concerning Things, that must be acknowledged to have fome real Inconvenience and Irregularity in them.

I fall fuppofe, that in a certain Nation, or in a Tract of Land, not very remote, confifting of feveral Nations, hard drinking, so as to diflurb the Powers, and Ufe of Reason, is thought no Crime. This comes much nearer to a Proof, that the Nature of moral Actions depends on Mode or Opinion, than the different Fashion of fhaving or wearing a long Beard, of a broad or narrow brimmed Hat; becaufe upon the Principles of those, who contend for the innate Excellency or Turpitude of certain human Actions; That is excellent, which tends to the greater Perfection of human Nature, to the Improvement of Reason, and towards the promoting of Order. That, on the contrary, is morally unfit or evil,

which tends to debafe human Nature, and to confound, as Drunkenness does in particular, all Reafon and Order. Shall we infer, then, from the Practice or Opinion, however general, of the fe Nations, that there is no real Diforder or Immorality in Drunkennefs? No; the only Confequence we can draw from fuch an Inftance, is, that Men, thro Ignorance, Stupidity, naturalTemper, the Air they breathe, or other accidental Occafions of Error, may believe there is no Crime in certain Things, of themselves really criminal. It might, as justly, be argued, that because the Generality of the World have been Polytheifts and Idolaters, therefore, in the Reafon of the Thing, there is no certain Proof of the Unity of God. When we speak of the

un

unalterable Measures of moral Virtue, we fuppofe Men, indeed, reafonable Beings; but we do not fuppofe them all equally reafonable, either with refpect to the Powers, or the Exercife of Reason.

It is fufficient to establish the Truth of Morality, that Men, in all Ages, bave agreed in the general Notion of it. If they have been at any time divided in their Opinion concerning it, when they applied their general Notions of it to particular Subjects, fo as to transfer the Name of Virtue to Vice, or of Vice to Virtue; this very Mifapplication fuppofes Virtue and Vice to be two Things really fubfifting and diftinguifbed; for what is not cannot be mifapplied. As Idolatry therefore proceeded from fome erroneous Belief of the

one

one true God, and, when traced up to its original, rather fuppofed his Existence, than a Plurality of Beings, that were by Nature no Gods; fo the appropriating the Name of Virtue to certain Vices, does by no means tend to prove, that there is no fuch thing in reality as Virtue; but only that Men are capable of miftaking the Nature of Things, and of drawing falfe Confequences from true Principles. This may be done through Ignorance; but, in moral Life, is very often the Effect of fome irregular Inclination: For we more easily affent to those Things without Scruple or Examination, the Truth of which we are willing to believe; to which may be added as one Reafon, why immoral Practices are fometimes openly introduced; that tho Men

really