does or undertakes to do something which he is not bound to do, which he has not been in the habit of doing with his employer's knowledge and consent, or which is not in pursuance or protection of any interest of the master, and which is undertaken in the absence of any peril requiring him to act as on an emergency. 5. SAME when an injury occurs in the course of the employment. An injury occurs in the course of the employment, within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation act, when it occurs within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of the employment or is engaged in doing something incidental to it. 6. SAME-Workmen's Compensation act does not make the Industrial Board's legal conclusions binding upon the Supreme Court. While the Industrial Board's findings of fact, under the Workmen's Compensation act, are conclusive on the Supreme Court, the legal conclusions of that board, based upon such findings, are subject to review, and if it is clear, upon the facts, that as a legal conclusion an injury was not accidental or that it did not arise in the course of the employment, a contrary conclusion awarding compensation will not be upheld. WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. OSCAR M. TORRISON, Judge, presiding. THOMAS C. ANGERSTEIN, (GEORGE W. ANGERSTEIN, of counsel,) for plaintiff in error. Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court: Guiseppe Cappucio, while in the employ of plaintiff in error on July 15, 1914, sustained a serious injury to his right hand, for which he filed a claim before the Industrial Board. Upon hearing before the committee of arbitration an award was entered in his favor. On petition for review filed by plaintiff in error, the Industrial Board, without the introduction of additional evidence, entered an award in Cappucio's favor, requiring plaintiff in error to pay him five dollars a week for 112 weeks. The case was duly taken by certiorari to the circuit court of Cook county, which, after a hearing, affirmed the award of the Industrial Board, the trial judge certifying that in his opinion the cause was one proper to be reviewed by this court. The case was thereafter brought here by writ of error. Cappucio began work for plaintiff in error on June 27, 1914. He first worked at nickel-plating, but a few days before his injury was put to work on a buffing machine. This machine consisted of an upright stand, shaped somewhat like the letter T, along the top of which was a revolving spindle. At one end of the spindle was a soft buffing wheel and at the other end a hard buffing wheel. Cappucio was employed to work on the soft buff, his sole duty at the time being to polish small metal handles for tape lines, these handles being about three inches in size each way and shaped similar to a stirrup. His work was to take one of these metal pieces out of a box, hold it against the cloth buff and polish it and place it in another box. When one box was completed it was taken away and another box brought. Just below the buffing wheel at which he worked was a small box-like receptacle into which the dust from the work fell. The receptacle was supported by a tripod of three iron rods attached to the floor but was not in any way attached to or a part of the buffing machine. From this receptacle a pipe, something like a jointed stovepipe, led downward and away from the operator as he stood facing the machine, this pipe curving to connect with a larger exhaust pipe. This larger pipe in turn connected with a large case of sheet metal, which was fully enclosed and in which was a fan, a few feet distant from the buffing machine. The pipe connecting with the box-like receptacle could be detached from the exhaust system if by chance any piece of metal that was being polished should be accidentally dropped into it. There was a similar arrangement below the hard buffing wheel, connecting in the same manner with the exhaust system. Between the buffing wheel and the fan there was located on the top of the larger pipe an opening, covered by a tight cover. The only proper way to get into the exhaust system near the fan was to take off this tight cover and reach down into the pipe and then over into the case in which the fan was located. The evidence shows, without contradiction, that the exhaust system was entirely separate from the buffing machine. This exhaust system was in charge of a special, responsible man for the purpose of cleaning and oiling, which work, the evidence tends to show, was done by this man on Saturday of each week. Before he began this polishing work Cappucio was instructed by another employee, Anders, an expert metal polisher of about nineteen years' experience. Anders testified that he told Cappucio his sole duty was to take the metal pieces and hold them against the buffing wheel; that he should not lift the cover and reach into the exhaust pipe. He testified that he instructed Cappucio, if anything went wrong, to notify him. Cappucio stated in his testimony that he had been instructed by Anders that if anything went wrong to come and see him, and that he had notified Anders on several occasions when things went wrong. Cappucio knew that the exhaust system was to carry away the dust and dirt, and there was a loud noise made in the case, so it is argued he must have known that a fan or some other revolving machinery was in the large part of the exhaust system where the fan was located. Anders testified that on a previous occasion he had seen Cappucio take the cover off of the hole in the large exhaust pipe and start to reach into the pipe and that he had instructed Cappucio not to do it; that he (Anders) would attend to that. Cappucio denied receiving such orders and instructions, although two witnesses called on behalf of the plaintiff in error testified that while Cappucio was in the hospital recovering from the injuries he told them he had been so instructed by Anders. Cappucio testified that on the day he was injured he accidentally dropped one of these metal pieces that he was polishing, into the receptacle immediately below said buffing wheel; that he did not notify anyone but went to the opening in the pipe to which we have referred, took off the cover and reached his hand down into the exhaust pipe and around inside, and was injured by the fan, which broke and cut his hand. Section 1 of the Workmen's Compensation act provides, among other things, that the employer is required to pay "compensation for accidental injuries sustained by any employee arising out of and in the course of the employment," etc. (Hurd's Stat. 1916, p. 1272.) It is conceded this injury was accidental and that the award is not unjust if an award of any nature should be allowed. The sole question raised here is whether the injury arose "out of and in the course of the employment" of Cappucio. It is not sufficient that the injury occurs in the course of the employment. It must also arise out of the employment. These words are used conjunctively, and the circumstances of the accident must satisfy both the one and the other. "The words 'out of,' point, I think, to the origin or cause of the accident; the words 'in the course of,' to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. The former words are descriptive of the character or quality of the accident; the latter words relate to the circumstances under which an accident of the character or quality takes place." (Fitzgerald v. Clarke & Son, 1 B. W. C. C. 197; Boyd on Workmen's Comp. sec. 472.) It must be an accident resulting from a risk reasonably incidental to the employment. "An accident arises 'in the course of' the employment if it occurs while the employee is doing what a man so employed may reasonably do within a time during which he is employed and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time to do that thing." (Bryant v. Fissell, 86 Atl. Rep. (N. J.) 458. See, also, I Honnold on Workmen's Comp. sec. 113.) "An accident arises 'out of' the employment when it is something the risk of which might have been contemplated by a reasonable person, when entering the employment, as incidental to it. A risk is * * incidental to the employment when it belongs to or is connected with what a workman has to do in fulfilling his contract of service. * ** It may be incidental to the employment when it is either an ordinary risk directly connected with the employment, or an extraordinary risk which is only indirectly connected therewith." (Bryant v. Fissell, supra, on p. 461.) It is stated that it may be "difficult to conceive of any injury which arises 'out of' the employment which does not arise in the course of' it; but the converse, however, is not true. * * The determination of this question presents one of the most difficult problems in connection with the act. It has been said that each case must depend upon its own circumstances and cannot be solved by reference to any formula or general principle." (Glass on Workmen's Comp. Law, 40.) "An accident only arises out of and in the course of a workman's employment when it arises from his doing or omitting to do some act within the sphere of his employment. If he chooses to step outside the sphere of his employment and to do something he is not expected or required to do, he does so at his own. risk and is not under the protection of the act. * A sharp distinction is drawn between doing of a thing recklessly or negligently which a workman is employed to do and the doing of a thing altogether outside and unconnected with what he is employed to do, and if an accident happens in the former case it arises out of and in the course of the employment but not in the latter case. "There are prohibitions which limit the sphere of employment and prohibitions which only deal with conduct within the sphere of employment. A transgression of a prohibition of the latter class leaves the sphere of employment where it was, and consequently will not prevent the recovery of compensation. A transgression of the former class carries with it the result that the man has gone outside the sphere.' (Elliott on Workmen's Comp. Act,-7th ed.-50. See, also, I Honnold on Workmen's Comp. sec. 114.) "If the * * |