here, as there, consisted of statements made by the courts. at different times in efforts to explain the meaning of the words. Every one of these instructions objected to has been at various times especially sanctioned by this court. If every instruction, considered by itself, was in accordance with the law they certainly would not be objectionable when taken in the series. We have held, however, that the giving of numerous instructions as to reasonable doubt was not good practice. People v. Wallace, (ante, p. 139.)·

Counsel for plaintiff in error especially object to instruction 19 given for the People with reference to the credibility of plaintiff in error, because it singles out the defendant as a witness and argues with the jury that they should consider his demeanor on the stand, and the fact, if such was the fact, that he had been contradicted by other witnesses. This instruction, substantially in the same wording, has been approved by this court. See People v. Tielke, 259 Ill. 88; Hirschman v. People, 101 id. 568; Rider v. People, 110 id. 11; People v. Scarbak, 245 id. 435.

We find no reversible error in any of the instructions or in the instructions considered as a series.

Counsel for plaintiff in error further insist that a remark the court made in striking out a certain part of an answer by plaintiff in error was prejudicial. Plaintiff in error was asked the following question: "If you said anything to him about the State's attorney being fixed, and the parole officer and the court, tell the jury." He answered: "No, sir; I did not say anything of the kind; there was not anything mentioned about that; I would have been a foolish man to have sent anybody over there." Counsel for the People objected and moved that the last part of the answer be stricken. The court then said, "The foolish part will be excluded." The argument of counsel is that this remark of the court reflected upon the witness' testimony and would tend to prejudice his case. We think this objection is without force.

Counsel for plaintiff in error argue earnestly that the evidence is not sufficient to support the verdict. The evidence as to the guilt of the plaintiff in error was sharply conflicting. Upon controverted questions of fact courts of review are reluctant to substitute their opinion for that of the jury, and will not do so unless it clearly appears that the jury found contrary to the weight of the evidence. (Parsons v. People, 218 Ill. 386; Henry v. People, 198 id. 162; People v. Hubert, 251 id. 514.) It is argued that the only evidence showing the guilt of plaintiff in error was by his accomplices who had pleaded guilty and were let out on probation, and that their evidence should be viewed with suspicion. There is no conflict in the testimony as to Davis having been indicted for burglary and grand larceny and that plaintiff in error had gone on his bond, or that he talked with Parks and Richardson about Richardson pleading guilty. Neither is there any conflict in the testimony that plaintiff in error had been energetically endeavoring to look up Davis after his bond had been forfeited and that he had offered rewards for the finding of Davis. There is no question that he gave Parks a small sum of money for bringing in Richardson, and that all the acts of plaintiff in error in the matter were consistent with the stories told by Parks and Richardson and that his own story is not entirely consistent. The evidence shows, without contradiction, that Snyder had been trying to find Davis for some time and that Richardson was brought in by Parks and introduced to Snyder as Davis on Saturday night. Knowing these facts, why should he permit Richardson to go at large until Monday morning without any effort to have him taken into custody by the public authorities if he thought Richardson was Davis? The evidence also tends to show that he took no pains himself to see that Richardson plead guilty as Davis but was willing to trust all that to Parks and Richardson, and that he afterwards saw Richardson in the jail after he had plead guilty and talked with

him about how soon he would get out if he went to Pontiac and was a good boy and behaved himself. From this record we think the verdict was justified by the evidence. The judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

On petition for rehearing the following additional opinion was filed:

Per CURIAM: Counsel for plaintiff in error urge many reasons why the opinion adopted by this court at the last term of court was incorrect. Among others, that the trial court erred in refusing to allow a former attorney of Richardson's to testify that Richardson had told him that he knew plaintiff in error had offered a reward of $300 or $100 for the finding of Davis, the real defendant, and that Richardson, on cross-examination on this trial, had denied that he knew such a reward had been offered. Without going into the question as to whether the attorney's testimony was proper for impeaching purposes on the trial, we deem it sufficient to say that this question was not raised in the original briefs of plaintiff in error in this court. The rule of this court has been for many years that questions not raised in the original briefs in the trial of a case in this court cannot be brought to the attention of the court for the first time on petition for rehearing. The reason for this practice on this question is self-evident. The cause should not be heard by piecemeal. All the points that counsel desire to rely on in any case, criminal or otherwise, should be raised in the original hearing in this court. This question was not referred to in any manner, either in the statement, brief or argument of counsel for plaintiff in error, on the original hearing in this case, and therefore can not be raised for the first time on the petition for rehearing. The petition for rehearing is denied.

Rehearing denied.

(No. 11382.-Reversed and remanded.)

THE LOCKWOOD & STRICKLAND COMPANY, Appellant, vs. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, Appellee.

Opinion filed June 21, 1917-Rehearing denied October 4, 1917.

I. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-city cannot convey the fee in a vacated street or alley. Whether a city owns the fee in an alley or merely an easement, when it is vacated because no longer needed for public use the law disposes of the reversionary interest either to the dedicator or to the owner of the adjoining land, dependent upon whether the city received the use of the alley by common law or statutory dedication, and the reversionary rights cannot be granted or conveyed by the city.

2. SAME-city is liable for damages caused by vacating a street or alley. If the vacation of a street or alley causes damages to private property the municipality is liable for the same, and if damages are not determined before the vacation of the street or alley the property owner may bring an action at any time within the Statute of Limitations.

3. SAME when city may demand indemnity for damages for vacating street or alley. A city may demand and receive indemnity against damages before it vacates a street or alley where the damages are not ascertained in the manner required by law before the vacation, but it is the duty of the city to return the indemnity after the running of the period of limitation and there is no longer any possibility of damages, and a promise to do so will be implied.

4. SAME a city cannot sell legislation as a means of obtaining revenue. The legislative powers of a city must be exercised for the public benefit, but that does not authorize a municipality to sell or bargain legislation as a means of obtaining revenue, and the question whether an alley is no longer needed for public use or whether the public interest will be subserved by its vacation can not be made to depend on how much the city can get for vacating it.

APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. WILLIAM F. COOPER, Judge, presiding.

WINTERS, PRICE & STEVENS, GEORGE W. UNDERWOOD, and JULIAN CLAY RISK, (GEORGE M. STEVENS, of counsel,) for appellant.

SAMUEL A. ETTELSON, Corporation Counsel, (DONALD P. VAIL, and CHESTER E. CLEVELAND, of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court:

Appellant, the Lockwood & Strickland Company, a corporation, filed its declaration in assumpsit in the superior court of Cook county against the city of Chicago to recover $2694 paid by appellant to appellee under the terms of an ordinance of said city passed June 27, 1910. The ordinance was set out in the declaration. A demurrer to the declaration was sustained, and appellant electing to stand by its declaration, judgment for costs was entered against it. On appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District the judgment was affirmed, and the case has been brought to this court for review by appeal, a certificate of importance having been granted by the Appellate Court.

The ordinance was in three sections, and such parts thereof as are necessary to an understanding of this case are as follows: Section I provided that a certain alley described be "vacated and closed, inasmuch as said portion of said alley is no longer needed by the general public for use as an alley and the public interest will be subserved by the vacation thereof." Section 2 provided: "The vacation herein provided for is made upon the express condition that Lockwood & Strickland Company, a corporation, shall within sixty (60) days after the passage of this ordinance pay to the city of Chicago the sum of twenty-six hundred ninety-four ($2694) dollars toward a fund for the payment of any and all damages which may arise from the vacation of said alley." Section 3 is as follows: "This ordinance shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage: Provided, however, that the said Lockwood & Strickland Company shall within sixty (60) days of the date of the passage thereof file for record in the office of