mentioned in the decree from Jacksonville to Chattahoochee and branches, on account of alleged newly-discovered matter.

On June 19, 1897, Judge White entered a decree in the suit as follows:

(1) That the decree made February 20, 1896, overruling the demurrer to plaintiff's supplemental bill, in the nature of a bill of review, be, and the same is hereby, reversed and set aside, and that said demurrer be sustained and said bill dismissed, at plaintiff's costs.

(2) That so much of the decree made November 25, 1893, as holds the lines of railroad therein described subject to taxation in 1882, 1883, 1884, 1885, and 1886, and refuses an injunction against the assessment and collection of taxes thereon for 1886, and refuses to direct a return of taxes paid for 1882, 1883, and 1884 by the Florida Railway & Navigation Company, except that portion which holds the line from Ocala to Tampa subject to taxation as aforesaid, is affirmed.

(3) That said decree is reversed in so far as it makes subject to taxation for the years named that portion of the line from Ocala to Tampa, described in the bill of complaint as the line from Wildwood to Plant City and the line from Plant City to Tampa.

(4) That so much of said decree as holds that the statute under which the assessment was made, and under which proceedings are taken by the defendants to collect taxes of the complainant, is a special statute for the collection of general revenue, and unconstitutional and void, is also reversed.

(5) That so much of said decree as holds that the several lines of railroad sought to be subjected to the payment of taxes herein were not assessable against the Florida Railway & Navigation Company for the years 1879, 1880, and 1881, and which enjoins the defendants from selling or attempting to sell the same under the assessment aforesaid, or any part thereof, for the taxes for the said years, or from in any manner attempting to collect said taxes, is also reversed.

(6) That the said defendants, W. D. Bloxham, the comptroller, etc., and John A. Pearce, as sheriff, etc., their agents and servants, and each and every of them, be, and they are hereby, perpetually enjoined and restrained from selling or attempting to sell that portion of the plaintiff's railroad from Jacksonville to Tampa, and described in the bill of complaint as the line from Wildwood to Plant City, and the line from Plant City to Tampa, under said assessment for the years 1879, 1880, and 1881, and the line from Ocala to Wildwood under said assessment for the years 1879 and 1880.

(7) That the plaintiff pay the costs of this suit, to be taxed by the clerk.

On September 7, 1897, the railroad company served notice upon William H. Reynolds, as comptroller, and Pearce, as sheriff, that it would apply to Judge White, at a fixed time, for leave to file a bill of review, under the permission granted to make such application

by the supreme court in its opinion, and by its mandate sent down on May 24, 1897; the grounds of such application to be set out in the petition to be presented at such hearing. On the date named in the notice (September 13, 1897) the railroad company filed its petition, setting out therein the original bill and exhibits filed November 2, 1892, the proceedings had thereupon, and the decree of November 25, 1893. It also alleged that there was an appeal from that decree; that this court reversed same in part, and affirmed and modified other portions thereof, and commanded further proceedings to be had according to right, justice, the judgment of this court, and the laws of Florida. It also alleged the filing by the railroad company of the supplemental bill, in the nature of a bill of review, the filing of a demurrer thereto, and the appeal from the order overruling such demurrer; and the mandate of this court upon its judgment rendered on that appeal, as well as the mandate issued upon the former judg ment of this court, are set forth in extenso, as well as the decree entered by the circuit court June 19, 1897, which purports to have been entered "in obedience to the mandate of the supreme court of the state of Florida." The petition also alleged that William H. Reynolds on January 1897, was duly qualified and commissioned as comptroller of Florida, and that at the time of the entry of the decree of June 19, 1897, the term of office of William D. Bloxham as such comptroller had expired. The petition then sets forth what purport to be newly-discovered matters relating to the ownership and possession of the line of railroad from Jacksonville to the Chattahoochee river, with branches to Monticello and St. Marks, during the period of time from September, 1879, to February, 1882, and alleges further that this court reached its conclusion that this line was during said time owned and operated by Edward J. Reed and associates by a wholly mistaken view of facts not in issue in the case or submitted, and upon an interpretation of the statements of the original bill that is entirely at variance with the facts as they existed, and the understanding and purport of such statements at the hearing below. It further alleged that certain stated allegations of facts were made in the original bill, and not denied by the answer thereto, which it is claimed in the petition constituted petitioner a bona fide purchaser for value of the whole of its property formerly owned by the Florida Railway & Navigation Company, and that it should have been so adjudged by the court, and decreed to hold said property exempt from the taxes assessed for 1879, 1880, and 1881; and the petitioner suggests and assigns the failure of the court to so decree as error in law, apparent on the face of said decree, for which same should be reviewed and reversed. The petition further alleges that the decree of June 19, 1897, as a final decree, is informal and imperfect, and within itself unintelli

gible, as it can only be read in connection with, and by reference to, the decree of November 25, 1893, and that it was rendered for and against W. D. Bloxham, as comptroller, who was not at the time comptroller of the state of Florida, and there were no proper parties to said cause at the date of the rendition of the decree. The petitioner prayed "that leave be granted it to file a bill of review to review the aforesaid final decree rendered as herein aforesaid, upon the grounds of the newly-discovered evidence aforesaid, and the error in law appearing upon the face of the said decree aforesaid," and that petitioner be permitted, by way of supplement, to make William H. Reynolds, as comptroller, a party thereto, in lieu of the original defendant, W. D. Bloxham, who has ceased to be such comptroller.

On September 13, 1897, Judge White made an order reciting that the cause came on to be heard upon petition of complainant for leave to file a bill of review in said cause, and for an order to substitute William H. Reynolds, comptroller, in place of William D. Bloxham, late comptroller, and decreeing that "William H. Reynolds be, and is hereby, made party defendant in place of William D. Bloxham, late comptroller and defendant herein," and "that the complainant be, and he is hereby, allowed to file a bill of review in this cause as prayed for in its said petition."

The railroad company thereafter, on September 18, 1897, filed its bill of review, containing substantially the same allegations as in the petition, and praying that the suit be revived against William H. Reynolds as comptroller; that the final decree and all proceedings therein be reviewed, revised, and set aside; that each and every of the assessments made by W. D. Barnes, late comptroller, for state or county taxes, on the lines of road and railroad property for each of the years 1879, 1880, and 1881, be decreed to be illegal and void; that said property be declared exempt from such taxes; and that an injunction issue to restrain any sale on account of such assessments. To this bill a demurrer was interposed by relators November 1, 1897; one ground of same being that no leave of this court had been obtained for the filing of a bill to review any part of the final decree, except that part relating to the line of road extending from Jacksonville to Chattahoochee and branches. This demurrer has never been brought to hearing.

On March 22, 1898, the relators filed in this court their suggestion for a writ of prohibition, and made a part thereof a certified transcript of the proceedings in said cause, from which we have extracted this statement of the facts. The suggestion prays that a writ of prohibition issue to defendants, commanding them to desist from taking any further proceedings in the cause, or otherwise entertaining jurisdiction against relators. Upon the filing of this suggestion a rule to show cause was issued, and the railroad company has

interposed a demurrer to the suggestion upon the following grounds:

(1) The suggestion sets forth no sufficient ground for the writ of prohibition.

(2) The suggestion shows no exercise of jurisdiction by the circuit judge beyond authority of law.

(3) Leave to file the bill was granted, the bill filed, and jurisdiction entertained by the court below after notice to relators, without objection from them.

(4) The circuit court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and the right of discretion as to the filing of said bill.

(5) The circuit court, being a court of general jurisdiction, had and exercised by leave of this court the right to permit the filing of a bill of review, and is in the exercise of proper jurisdiction over such bill of review, with power to decide the cause. If errors occur in the progress of the cause, they may be corrected by this court on appeal. And this is the proper remedy, and not by prohibition.

(6) The suggestion of relators fails to show that relief on the ground of a want of jurisdic tion has been unsuccessfully sought in the court below, and it cannot be presumed that the circuit court will go beyond its legitimate powers.

(7) The review sought was right and proper to be had, (a) because no final decree was properly entered in said cause; (b) because the decree of June 19, 1897, purporting to be a final decree, as entered, was and is informal and imperfect, and within itself unintelligible, as it can only be read in connection with, and by reference to, another decree rendered in said cause on November 25, 1893; that it was rendered for and against W. D. Bloxham as comptroller, who was not at the date of such entry the comptroller of the state of Florida, and there were no proper parties to said cause at the date of the rendition of said decree.

William B. Lamar, Atty. Gen., for plaintiffs. John A. Henderson and T. L. Clarke, for defendants.

CARTER, J. (after stating the facts). I. It is insisted by the seventh ground of demurrer that the review sought by the bill filed by defendant was proper, because (a) no final decree was properly entered in the cause; (b) the decree of June 19, 1897, was informal and imperfect, and within itself unintelligible, as it can only be read in connection with, and by reference to, another decree rendered in the same cause November 25, 1893; (c) that William D. Bloxham, one of the parties to said decree, had ceased to be comptroller of the state of Florida at the time it was entered.

(a) If, as contended by defendant, the decree of June 19, 1897, is not a final one, then the bill of review filed was premature; for it is an elementary proposition that such a bill lies only to a final decree. Putnam v. Lewis, 1 Fla. 455; Owens v. Love, 9 Fla. 325; 2

Beach, Mod. Eq. Prac. § 852; Story, Eq. Pl. § 408a. If this was the only objection to the proceeding sought to be prohibited, we might well leave the relators to their remedy by appeal; but we think other grounds for prohibition exist, and that the objections to this decree are without force. It is argued by defendant that a decree is final only when it fully decides and disposes of the whole merits of a cause, and reserves no further questions or directions for the future judgment of the court; but counsel fail to point out any matter in issue not disposed of by this decree, and there certainly is no reservation therein of any question for the future judgment of the court. It is said that the decree is a repetition and recital of the mandate of this court upon the first appeal, reversing certain features of the former decree of November 25, 1893, and leaving the case exactly where it was before that decree was rendered. We do not so construe it. It makes a final disposition of the supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, adjudges the entire costs of suit against defendant, reverses those features of the decree of November 25, 1893, which held that the lines of railroad from Wildwood to Plant City and from Plant City to Tampa were subject to taxation, and grants a perpetual injunction against the enforcement of assessments on those lines, as well as another named. It also reverses that portion of the former decree which held the statute to be unconstitutional under which the assessments were made, and also certain features of the former decree which held that the several lines of railroad sought to be subjected to the payment of taxes were not assessable against the Florida Railway & Navigation Company for 1879, 1880, and 1881, and which enjoined the collection of taxes for those years. It affirms so much of the former decree as held the lines of railroad therein described subject to taxation for certain years named, which refused an injunction against the collection thereof, and which refused to direct a return of taxes collected from the Florida Railway & Navigation Company. It seems to us that this decree finally disposes of every question involved in the case. It certainly leaves nothing open for future decision, nor does it contemplate that any further action is to be had in the cause, other than to enforce the decree rendered. It was wholly unnecessary for the circuit court to "reverse" or "affirm" any portion of its former decree, as the judgment and mandate of this court, upon the appeal therefrom, operated directly upon that decree, without the intervention of any action of the circuit court. Merritt v. Jenkins, 17 Fla. 593. While there

may be some technical objections to the form of the decree of June 19, 1897, it is, when construed in connection with the pleadings, the former decree, and the mandate from this court, a definite and intelligible final decree.

(b) The decree of November 25, 1893, referred to in the decree of June 19, 1897, was a matter of record in the same suit, and the

maxim, "Id certum est quod certum reddi potest," will sustain a decree in equity which refers to record data for determining what is otherwise uncertain on the face of the decree. 5 Enc. Pl. & Prac. p. 1067, and authorities cited; Shepard v. Kelly, 2 Fla. 634.

(c) If there is any merit in the contention that a defect of parties existed at the time of the rendition of the decree of June 19, 1897, because Gov. Bloxham had ceased to be comptroller, it is difficult to perceive the ground upon which such defect can avail the defendant in this proceeding, or become the basis of a bill of review. Gov. Bloxham had not ceased to be a party to the suit, although his official capacity had ceased. The decree was entered in his name as comptroller, but afterwards, and before the bill of review was filed, Comptroller Reynolds, upon defendant's application “for an order to substitute William H. Reynolds, comptroller, in place of William D. Bloxham, late comptroller," was "made party defendant in place of William D. Bloxham, late comptroller and defendant herein." It may have been irregular to thus substitute one party for another in a final decree, but it was done upon defendant's application, and by its consent; and it has no ground to complain that the error, if any, in the final decree, for want of proper parties, was corrected upon its own application before its bill of review was filed.

II. (a) The first, second, fourth, and fifth grounds of demurrer will be considered together. Upon the appeal from the decree of November 25, 1893, this court considered and decided every question involved in the case at that time, and left nothing open for the decision of the circuit court. The circuit court, instead of obeying the mandate issued upon the judgment of this court, granted defendant leave to file a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, and entertained jurisdiction of the bill filed in accordance with such leave. Upon appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to that bill, this court held that where an appellate court affirms a decree of the circuit court, or when such a decree is modified on appeal, either as to questions of law or fact necessarily involved, with directions for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, the circuit court has no authority to open the case for a new trial, or to enter any other judgment than that directed to be entered, unless authority to do so is expressly given by the appellate court; that when the appellate court has examined the record of a cause, and affirmed the decree appealed from, or has modified or reversed such decree, with directions as to the decree to be entered, whether the decision was on questions of law or fact, it is not the province of the court a qua to allow further proceedings, but the judgment and mandate of the appellate court must be obeyed. Bloxham v.

Railway Co., 39 Fla. 243, 22 South. 697. This holding is not only in accordance with our constitution and statutes, but it inevitably results from the inherent nature of courts of error and trial courts. The supreme court of this state is the final arbiter of all questions of law and fact properly presented to it by appeals from other courts. The superior authority of its judgments depends upon the jurisdiction of the court to render them, and not upon the question as to whether they are right or wrong. There is and can be no authority in an inferior court to correct mistakes made by this court in its conclusions of fact or its interpretation of the law. An appeal to a superior court to correct errors committed by an inferior one cannot be followed by proceedings in the inferior to correct errors committed by the superior. If so, litigation would be interminable, the superior would be subordinated to the inferior, and the judgments of the superior could only be enforced when they coincided with the judgments of the inferior. The defendant does not deny that this court had jurisdiction of the subjectmatter and the parties, and to render the judgment rendered by us upon the first appeal. In its petition to file the bill of review, defendant does not deny such jurisdiction, but it claims that this court reached a certain conclusion of fact, necessary to be determined, by a wholly mistaken view of facts not in issue in the case or submitted, and upon an interpretation of the statements of the bill entirely at variance with the facts as they existed, and the understanding and purport of such statements at the hearing below, and that this court ought to have found, as a matter of fact, from the allegations of the bill and the answer, that defendant was an innocent purchaser of the lines of road assessed for taxes, and consequently not liable for same. It is insisted by the petition that these were errors of law apparent upon the face of the decree, and that for this reason the whole decree should be reviewed and reversed, and a decree entered directly the reverse of the one directed by this court. It is not contended that Judge White erred in any of his conclusions, but he is asked to find that this court did err, and to set aside its findings and judgment, and substitute his own therefor, He is asked to invade our jurisdiction, to deny the authority and binding force of our judgments, and to proceed to set them aside because he may think them wrong. It is a familiar rule of law that one court, in proceedings not appellate, has no power to review or reverse or disregard the judgment of another court, of equal or even inferior authority, for errors of law or fact not affecting jurisdiction. How much stronger do the reasons for such a rule become when applied to the judgments of superior courts! The circuit court was without power under any circumstances to set aside, reverse, or

annul the judgment of this court rendered upon the former appeal, or to review the decree entered in obedience thereto, for alleged errors of law or fact committed by us in rendering our judgment. The attempted exercise of such a power is subversive of that subordination which has been established by the constitution. It not only assumes a jurisdiction nowhere granted to the circuit courts, but usurps that which appertains to this court, or some other to which an appeal may be taken. The question is not one of procedure. It is one of power,— of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. When the mandate of this court goes to the court below, directing the entry of a specific judgment, that court has no discretion in the matter of obedience thereto. It is without power to say that the judgment was wrong. Its duty, and only duty, is to obey the mandate. It is charged with no responsibility for the errors alleged to have been committed by this court, nor does it possess any power to correct them. For these reasons a bill does not lie in that court to review errors attributable to this court upon the face of a decree affirmed by it, or one entered in pursuance of its mandate. Perry v. Tupper, 71 N. C. 380; Pinkney v. Jay, 12 Gill & J. 69; Stallworth v. Blum, 50 Ala. 46; Lore v. Hash, 89 Va. 277, 15 S. E. 549; Inman v. Foster. 72 Ga. 79; Meyer v. Johnson, 60 Ark. 50, 28 S. W. 797; Brewer v. Bowman, 3 J. J. Marsh. 492; Southard v. Russell, 16 How. 547; Kingsbury v. Buckner, 134 U. S. 650, 10 Sup. Ct. 638; Gaines v. Rugg, 148 U. S. 228, 13 Sup. Ct. 611; Dennison v. Goehring, 6 Pa. St. 402.

(b) It is insisted that the circuit court, in granting permission to file the bill of review, was acting under the authority given by this court upon appeal from the order overruling the demurrer to the supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review. In that case (39 Fla. 243, 22 South. 697) it was said that the petition for leave to file a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, considered with the bill permitted to be filed in the lower court, could not be regarded as affording any sufficient ground for reviewing the judgment directed to be entered by this court under its mandate, if it had been entered, beyond the exemption of taxation in question of the line of railroad from Jacksonville to Chattahoochee. The court said: "We are satisfied from the entire record before us that there is sufficient shown to authorize this court to grant leave to appellee to be heard on an application in the circuit court to file a bill of review of the judgment, when entered, to the extent of the line of railroad and branches from Jacksonville to Chattahoochee, formerly known as the Florida Central & Western Railroad Company; and, after a careful examination of all that has been disclosed, we are of opinion that justice requires that an order be made in this court granting permission to appellee to be further

heard in the circuit court, to the extent | mentioned, on account of the alleged newlydiscovered matter." The leave granted the company did not extend to a review of the decree as to all of defendant's property, nor as to errors committed by this court; but the leave was expressly confined to the line of road from Jacksonville to Chattahoochee and branches, and extended no further than a review for newly-discovered matters. In the same connection the circuit court was advised that it had no authority to entertain a bill to review the decree to be entered by it, unless the appellate court had given permission to one of the parties to apply for leave to file such a bill. When defendant applied for leave to file a bill to review the entire decree, it exceeded the permission granted it; and, when the circuit judge granted leave to file such a bill, he acted in disregard of a judgment of this court rendered in the same cause, that such a bill could not be filed without leave first obtained from this court. This judgment had become res judicata. The principles announced in the opinion had become the law of the case, binding alike upon the parties and the court. Wilson v. Fridenberg, 21 Fla. 386. Under these circumstances the relator's remedy by appeal is inadequate as well as useless. The matter has already passed to final judgment in this court, and, if that judgment is enforced, the proceedings in the circuit court in disregard thereof will cease. We are given power (section 5, art. 5, Const. 1885) to issue all writs "necessary or proper to the complete exercise of" our jurisdiction. There is no doubt that the attempt to open up for review the decree entered in pursuance of our mandate, for errors committed by us, as well as the attempt to exercise jurisdiction over other features of the decree, in disregard of our decision that such jurisdiction must not be exercised without leave first granted by this court, constitute an unwarranted interference with and disregard of the judgments of this court, for the correction of which prohibition is the proper remedy. State v. Spokane Co. Superior Court, 8 Wash. 591, 36 Pac. 443; Harriman v. Commissioners, 53 Me. 83.

III. The third ground of the demurrer is untenable. The order granting leave to file the bill of review does not show that relators were present when it was made. It recites that notice had been given them, which I would indicate that they were not present. The notice served upon them stated that the application would be made under the permission granted by this court in its opinion and by its mandate sent down May 24, 1897, and the notice did not intimate that the application would be broader than the permission granted. At any rate, the relators demurred to the bill filed on the ground that it sought to review the decree as to lines of road other than those mentioned in the order from this court granting leave; and this ac

tion of the relators, followed by the suggestion for prohibition in this court, indicates very clearly that they have not waived their right to this remedy, nor given their consent for the circuit court to review the decree in respects not authorized by this court, even if such consent could give it jurisdiction so to do.

IV. As to the sixth ground of demurrer, the circuit court has already taken a step in the exercise of an assumed jurisdiction to review the decree for alleged errors of law, and in other respects not authorized. The order made permitted the filing of a bill of review as prayed in the petition. The prayer of the petition was for leave to file a bill to review the decree for newly-discovered evidence, and the error in law appearing on the face of the decree. It appeared upon the face of the petition presented to the judge that the permission desired was to review the entire decree for errors committed by this court, and that permission had not been obtained from this court to review any part of the decree except that relating to the line of road from Jacksonville to Chattahoochee and branches, and that only for newly-discovered matters. The petition on its face disclosed a lack of jurisdiction in the circuit court to grant part of the relief prayed, and, instead of confining the leave to file the bill within the limits of the permission granted by this court, the circuit court granted the leave in accordance with the prayer of the petition, and thereby assumed and exercised authority denied by this court, and a jurisdiction clearly beyond its powers. Under these circumstances, it was not necessary for relators to tender a plea to the jurisdiction in the circuit court, and obtain a ruling thereon, before resorting to the remedy by prohibition. Where the want or excess of jurisdiction relates to the subject-matter, and is apparent upon the face of the proceedings, and the court has made some order in the exercise of such unauthorized jurisdiction, as is the case here, prohibition will lie, even though no plea to the jurisdiction has been tendered. While there are some authorities to the contrary, we think this was clearly the rule of the common law, and therefore binding upon us. Wadsworth v. Reg. 17 Adol. & E. (N. S.) 215; Mayor, etc. v. Cox. L. R. 2 H. L. 239; Farquharson v. Morgan [1894] 1 Q. B. 552; Swinburn v. Smith, 15 W. Va. 483; State v. Wilcox, 24 Minn. 143; U. S. v. Peters, 3 Dall. 121; Ex parte Phenix Ins. Co., 118 U. S. 610, 7 Sup. Ct. 25.

V. It is insisted in argument that the suggestion does not deny that the circuit court has jurisdiction to review the decree, to the extent of the line of road from Jacksonville to Chattahoochee with branches, for newlydiscovered matter, but that it prays for a prohibition against any further proceedings whatever upon the bill for review filed. It is claimed that the writ ought to be refused because, if issued, it must be as broad as