of his will and his authority, than they could ever derive from the principles of expediency.

But an objection has probably presented itself to the reader, that the greater part of mankind have no access to the written expression of the will of God and how,

it may be asked, can that be the final standard of right and wrong for the human race, of which the majority of the race have never heard? The question is reasonable and fair.

We answer then, first, that supposing most men to be destitute of a communication of the Divine will, it does not affect the obligations of those who do possess it. That communication is the final law to me, whether my African brother enjoys it or not. Every reason by which the supreme authority of the law is proved, is just as applicable to those who do enjoy the communication of it, whether that communication is enjoyed by many or by few; and this, so far as the argument is concerned, appears to be a sufficient answer. If any man has no direct access to his Creator's will, let him have recourse to "eternal fitnesses," or to "expediency;" but his condition does not affect that of another man who does possess this

access.

But our real reply to the objection is, that they who are destitute of Scripture, are not destitute of a direct communication of the will of God. The proof of this position must be deferred to a subsequent chapter; and the reader is solicited for the present, to allow us to assume its truth. This direct communication may be limited, it may be incomplete, but some communication exists; enough to assure them that some things are acceptable to the Supreme Power, and that some are not; enough to indicate a distinction between right and wrong; enough to make them moral agents, and

If

reasonably accountable to our common Judge. these principles are true, and especially if the amount of the communication is in many cases considerable, it is obvious that it will be of great value in the direction of individual conduct. We say of individual conduct, because it is easy to perceive that it would not often subserve the purposes of him who frames public rules of morality. A person may possess a satisfactory assurance in his own mind, that a given action is inconsistent with the Divine will, but that assurance is not conveyed to another, unless he participates in the evidence upon which it is founded. That which is wanted in order to supply public rules for human conduct, is a publicly avouched authority; so that a writer, in deducing those rules, has to apply, ultimately, to that standard which God has publicly sanctioned.

CHAPTER III.

SUBORDINATE STANDARDS OF RIGHT AND WRONG.

Foundation and limits of the authority of subordinate
moral rules.

The written expression of the Divine will does not contain, and no writings can contain, directions for our conduct in every circumstance of life. If the precepts of Scripture were multiplied a hundred or a thousand fold, there would still arise a multiplicity of questions to which none of them would specifically apply. Accordingly, there are some subordinate authorities, to which, as can be satisfactorily shown, it is the will of God that we should refer. He who does refer to them and regulate his conduct by them, conforms to the will of God.

To a son who is obliged to regulate all his actions by

his father's will, there are two ways in which he may practice obedience-one, by receiving, upon each subject, his father's direct instructions; and the other by receiving instructions from those whom his father commissions to teach him. The parent may appoint a governor, and enjoin, that upon all questions of a certain kind the son shall conform to his instructions; and if the son does this, he as truly and really performs his father's will, and as strictly makes that will the guide of his conduct, as if he received the instructions immediately from his parent. But if the father have laid down certain general rules for his son's observance, as that he shall devote ten hours a day to study, and not less-although the governor should recommend or even command him to devote fewer hours, he may not comply; for if he does, the governor, and not his father, is his supreme guide. The subordination is destroyed.

This case illustrates, perhaps, with sufficient precision, the situation of mankind with respect to moral rules. Our Creator has given direct laws, some general and some specific. These are of final authority. But he has also sanctioned, or permitted an application to, other rules; and in conforming to these, so long as we hold them in subordination to his laws we perform his will.

Of these subordinate rules it were possible to enumerate many. Perhaps, indeed, few principles have been proposed as "The fundamental Rules of Virtue," which may not rightly be brought into use by the Christian in regulating his conduct in life: for the objection to many of these principles is, not so much that they are useless, as that they are unwarranted as paramount laws. "Sympathy" may be of use, and "" Nature may be of use, and "Self-love," and Benevolence ;" and to those who know what it means, Eternal fitnesses too."

Some of the subordinate rules of conduct it will be proper hereafter to notice, in order to discover, if we can, how far their authority extends, and where it ceases. The observations that we shall have to offer upon them may conveniently be made under these heads The Law of the Land, The Law of Nature, The Promotion of Human Happiness or Expediency, The Law of Nations, The Law of Honor.

These observations will, however, necessarily be preceded by an enquiry into the great principles of human duty as they are delivered in Scripture, and into the reality of that communication of the Divine will to the mind, which the reader has been requested to allow us to assume.

CHAPTER IV.

COLLATERAL OBSERVATIONS.

The reader is requested to regard the present chapter as parenthetical. The parenthesis is inserted here, because the writer does not know where more appropriately to place it.

IDENTICAL AUTHORITY OF MORAL AND RELIGIOUS OBLIGATIONS.

Identical authority of moral and religious obligations-The Divine attributes-Of deducing rules of human duty from a consideration of the attributes of God-Virtue: "Virtue is conformity with the standard of rectitude"-Motives of action.

This identity is a truth to which we do not sufficiently advert either in our habitual sentiments or in our practice. There are many persons who speak of

religious duties, as if there was something sacred or imperative in their obligation that does not belong to duties of morality-many, who would perhaps offer up their lives rather than profess a belief in a false religious dogma, but who would scarcely sacrifice an hour's gratification rather than violate the moral law of love. It is therefore of importance to remember that the authority which imposes moral obligations and religious obligations is one and the same-the will of God. Fidelity to God is just as truly violated by a neglect of his moral laws, as by a compromise of religious principles. Religion and Morality are abstract terms, employed to indicate different classes of those duties which the Deity has imposed upon mankind; but they are all imposed by Him, and all are enforced by equal authority. Not indeed that the violation of every particular portion of the Divine will involves equal guilt, but that each violation is equally a disregard of the Divine authority. Whether, therefore, fidelity be required to a point of doctrine or practice, to theology or to morals, the obligation is the same. It is the Divine requisition which constitutes this obligation, and not the nature of the duty required; so that, whilst I think a Protestant does no more than his duty when he prefers death to a profession of the Roman Catholic faith, I think also that every Christian who believes that Christ has prohibited swearing, does no more than his duty when he prefers death to taking an oath.

I would especially solicit the reader to bear in mind this principle of the identity of the authority of moral and religious obligations, because he may otherwise imagine that, in some of the subsequent pages, the obligation of a moral law is too strenuously insisted on, and that fidelity to it is to be purchased at "too great a sacrifice" of ease and enjoyment.