attributes absolutely inconsistent, as we have already seen, with the idea that it is wholly abrogated. He clearly asserts its divine origin and perpetual utility. Now there is no harmony or truth in the apostle's reasoning in all this upon the hypothesis that he here speaks of two different laws. Upon the supposition that he, in the first instance, declared that we are dead to the ceremonial law or any other law that has been wholly done away, and, in answer to an objection made to his positions, proceeded to assert the continued existence and great practical utility of the moral law, or some other law that is not abrogated, would he reason logically? Would he not stand convicted of playing upon an equivocal term? We can never concur in a construction of St. Paul's language which will make him play the part of a sophist. We must believe that he prosecutes his argument logically, and that he meets all objections fairly, and can never consent to the construction which makes him answer the objection that he depreciates one law by showing that he honors another.

If, then, the apostle here speaks of the same law in both instances, the only consistent conclusion is, that he views it in the two instances in two different respects. In the first he finds the law ineffectual, and superseded as a covenant of works-as a condition of salvation; and in the second, he recognizes in it an indestructible principle of righteousness-a rule of moral conduct to moral beings.

If it should be urged here, that man, having lost his ability to keep the law, God cannot now hold him under obligation to do so without gross injustice; we answer, that obligation does not always imply an ability to perform. A debtor may not be able to pay a just debt, but this want of ability does not cancel the obligation, nor would it be proper to say in such a case that the debtor does not owe the creditor. The account, or his bond, stands against him as an evidence of indebtedness, though he may never be able to make payment. But should the creditor offer to compound the matter, or to discharge the debt on certain conditions, he would be morally bound to make such conditions as he considered within the limits of the debtor's means. So that, though the gospel, which is a restoring system, must be presumed to make no conditions not within the scope of our assisted powers, the same cannot be inferred of the law. The gospel is a covenant of grace-proffers pardon to ignorant and guilty sinners upon terms which it furnishes them with the means to understand and strength to perform. If Christ, as a great restorer, had not adapted the plan of salvation to our fallen condition, but required of us, as

the condition of acceptance, the performance of works which could only be performed by unfallen beings, the offer of salvation, upon such terms, would be characterized by a want of sincerity and moral justice. Upon this principle man could not justly be condemned finally for the want of what the gospel requires. The result of this reasoning is, that although obligation does not in all cases imply an ability to perform, yet a covenant of promise does imply such an ability.

Some suppose the law changes and relaxes its claims as moral agents lose their power to obey-that as men pervert their moral nature and become morally enfeebled, the law abates its demands. Now we object wholly to this view, for the following reasons:

(1.) It frees the sinner from all obligations to the law the moment he shall have proceeded in the way of sin beyond the possibility of recovery.

(2.) It does away with the necessity of an atonement in all possible or supposable cases. For if, after transgression, the law immediately brings down its claims to a level with the sinner's fallen nature, all that it requires is such future obedience as he can render. The law making no claims that the sinner cannot meet by future obedience, where the necessity of the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ? This may be Deism or Socinianism, but it is not Christianity.

(3.) This view destroys the force of the law as an instrument of conviction. It has no claims upon the sinner for his past transgressions-only demanding what he is now able to do--and fully releasing him from all its former demands and the consequences of all his failures. There is, upon this system, no thunder, or lightning, or wrath in the law. It comes to the sinner at every step he takes in his downward course, with claims diminished in the exact ratio of his loss of moral power, saying, Do this—that is, just as much as you can now do of what I originally required, for I now demand no more—and you shall live.

(4.) This notion would bring the law into contempt, and indeed turn it into a solemn farce. What respect or attention could a law command which has no claim upon the transgressor for his buried talent for the obedience which he once had power to render, but which, by his own fault, he has lost the power to perform? Such a law would be unworthy of the name of a law-it would be a universal license to sin. The following paragraph from Mr. Fletcher's Appeal is a clear and indubitable expression of his views upon this subject:

"Some indeed flatter themselves that the law, since the gospel

dispensation, abates much of its demands of perfect love.' But their hope is equally unsupported by reason and Scripture. The law is the eternal rule of right, the moral picture of the God of holiness and love. It can no more vary than its eternal, unchangeable Original. The Lord 'will not alter the thing that is gone out of his mouth.' He must cease to be what he is, before his law can lose its power to bind either men or angels; and all creatures shall break sooner than it shall bend; for if it commands us only to love God with all our heart, and our neighbor as ourselves,' what just abatement can be made in so equitable a precept? Therefore man, who breaks the righteous law of God as naturally as he breathes, is, and must continue, under its fearful curse, till he has secured the pardon and help offered him in the gospel."

I must now hasten to my last conclusion from the apostle's teaching upon the law.

4. I infer, from all the foregoing, that the standard of Christian perfection is not the law, but the gospel of God our Saviour.

We understand perfect obedience to the law to amount to Adamic perfection. It is not material whether we suppose man never to have sinned and fallen from original purity, or that he has been raised up to that state by the restoring power of the new covenant. If he, by any means, reaches the perfect obedience of the law, he is, of course, as perfectly exempt from all kinds of offenses and short comings as Adam was before his fall. This state we say, with our fathers, is not attainable in this world. The law makes no allowance for infirmities and short comings, either voluntary or involuntary. But we may not expect to be exempt from infirmities while we tabernacle in clay. Consequently, we never can stand perfectly acquitted in the eyes of the law.

We call the perfection which the law requires—that is, the present practical fulfillment of all its requirements-legal perfection. Others may not use the epithet legal in the same sense. Let them take their course, and we will take ours. We do not wish, if we can possibly avoid it, to contend about words. If others, by legal perfection, mean the perfection of beings who have never sinned-perfect obedience to the law from the beginning we have no quarrel with them. But we still claim the right to call that perfection which implies perfect obedience to the law, no matter how attained, or how short its duration, legal perfection. We so denominate it in opposition to evangelical perfection, which implies, loving God with all the heart-understanding by this simply, rendering to God our little all-just what we, with all our infirmities, are capable of doing, and no more. VOL. VII.-10

And this is what we understand the apostle to urge in the sixth of Romans. The whole is embraced in these few words: "Reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord." Rom. vi, 11. It is the death of sin, and the life and freedom of faith and holiness, according to the gospel, that are held up as our privilege by the great apostle. And all this is within the reach of the poorest and the feeblest child of God.

The following propositions I have received from a worthy correspondent whose name I am not permitted to use. They will constitute a very appropriate conclusion to this article, although they were not originally designed by the author for publication.

"1. God never has had but one moral law, and that law is necessarily immutable.

"2. Anything less than perfect obedience to that law, upon the part of man, is necessarily a moral failure, which, without the atonement, brings upon him its condemnation.

"3. This perfect obedience has become impracticable by the fall; hence salvation, without the application of the atonement, is impossible.

"4. The atonement has made no provisions to supersede or dispense with any part of the law, but to pardon offenders, and purify the depraved by faith in Christ.

"5. The unconditional demands of the gospel cover exactly the grounds of man's gracious ability, which is less than his legal or natural ability would have been. (See prop. 3.) Violations of these demands are conditionally pardoned.

"6. The moral failures which grow out of man's fallen state necessarily, and which are unavoidable, are provided for in the atonement, and thus lose their power to condemn.

"7. Man's gracious ability is the true standard of Christian perfection. Conformity to this standard makes a perfect Christian; whereas, perfect conformity to the moral law, according to man's original natural ability, would make a perfect man. In the absence of this natural ability there are no perfect men. In the presence of this gracious ability there are many perfect Christians."

10*

ART. VIII. (Authorized) Abstract of the Proceedings and Final Resolutions of the Conference, held in Freemasons' Hall, London, on August 19, 1846, and following Days.

THE London Conference is now matter of history; and whatever may be its final results, no movement since the great Reformation has called forth so much interest, and been matter of so much commentary. That an alliance of evangelical Christians should be formed, without serious difficulties, no rational mind could ever have imagined; and that, when formed, it would meet with opposition from many quarters, must have been anticipated by the most sanguine of its friends. The difficulties with which the conference was beset were not small, but were overcome by patience, perseverance, charity, and prayer.

The above tract is the first "authorized" publication of the doings of the conference, and the only one which has as yet reached us. We took full notes of the acts of the conference, and of many of the speeches, but shall make little public use of them at present. When we shall receive the full account of the proceedings and speeches, we may resume the subject. For the present our readers must be satisfied with a meagre sketch. The "authorized abstract" commences thus:

"The conference for the formation of THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE was opened in Freemasons' Hall, London, on Wednesday morning, August 19, 1846, at ten o'clock, and continued its sittings till the evening of Wednesday, September 2.

"The conference consisted of nine hundred and twenty persons, of whom about seven hundred and eighty-six came from Great Britain and Ireland; eighty-seven from the American continent and islands; and forty-seven from the continent of Europe and other parts of the world.

"Each sitting was commenced with devotional exercises, over which the following members of the conference presided."

Here follow nineteen names, which we shall not copy. We next have the names of seventy members who "took part in the devotional exercises."

"Sir Culling Eardly Smith, Bart., was requested to preside over the deliberations of the conference. During the brief seasons of his unavoidable absence, the chair was occupied successively by the Hon. Justice Crampton, Sir T. W. Bloomfield, Bart., Thomas Farmer, Esq., James S. Blackwood, Esq., LL. D., R. C. L. Bevan, Esq., Frederick Wills, Esq., John Henderson, Esq., J. M. Strachan, Esq."

At the first session the standing committees were appointed, namely, "the general arrangement committee-the business com