The present commissioners are Edward Cahille, of Lansing; Dan H. Ball, Marquette, and George W. Bates, of Detroit, Michigan.

The commissioners have recommended the adoption by the legislature at the present session the following acts:

1. The Uniform Partnership Act. The subject of a uniform act governing partnership was first taken by the national commissioners in 1903. It has been almost continuously under consideration since that time. The present act is the culmination of eight previous tentative drafts each drawn with care and discrimination and considered at great length by the several conferences. It is believed that the present act adopted at the meeting in Washington, October, 1914, represents an accurate, practical and just codification of the law upon one of the most important business subjects.

It was originally drawn by Dean Ames of the Harvard Law School, and redrawn and completed by Professor William Draper Lewis, of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, assisted by Professor Lichtenberger of the same institution.

The national conference adopted the collective or aggregate theory and what is known as the so-called common law theory of a partnership. This is a compact and definite statement of the law on all the principles of partnership.

2. The Uniform Act for the Extradition of Persons of Unsound Mind. This act provides for the extradition of persons of unsound mind in a foreign state and who fled from another state in which at the time of their flight they were under detention by law in a hospital, asylum or other institution for persons of unsound mind, or had been theretofore determined by legal proceedings of unsound mind, or was subject to detention in such state, being then his legal domicile, based on legal proceedings there

found, a copy of the commitment, decree or other judicial proceedings certified as authentic by the governor of the state, whence he has fled, with an affidavit showing the person to be such a fugitive, and it shall be the duty of the executive authority of such foreign state to cause him to be apprehended and secured, if found in such state, and to cause immediate notice of the apprehension to be given to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within thirty days from the time of the apprehension, such person may be discharged. 3. The Uniform Land Registration Act. This is what is commonly known as the Torrens System.

For the proper execution of this act, it provides for a court of land registration.

On a petition being presented to the court it shall bring to view all the material facts and material parties before the court at once. A notice of lis pendens is, at the same time, recorded in a proper deed book. Such petition is then referred to one of the examiners of title, and on his report being filed the court makes an order of publication and every precaution is taken to notify any one who may have any interest in or claim against the land. The case is then set down for hearing after the due proof of the publication has been filed. Surveys are made of the land and the court finally makes a final adjudication of the title. The final decree differs radically from any other decree "to quiet title" in an ordinary chancery suit. For this is a proceeding in

rem good against all the world, while that is only good against the parties to the suit.

The final decree becomes the certificate of title which is registered in the Register of Titles and never goes out of the registrar's office.

The owner is given an exact copy of the original certificate by the registrar.

When one wishes to transfer registered title, the owner's duplicate certificate riust be carried to the registrar's office before any voluntary transfer can be 1egistered.

Land once registered is to remain forever registered and cannot be subject to rights of adverse possession or prescrip

tion.

Farm Mortgage Loans and Uniform Land Registration.-In 1916, the Conference also adopted the Uniform Land Registration Act, based upon what is popularly known as the Torrens System, which is now the law in the state of Virginia. There are similar land registration acts in thirteen states, including California, Colorado, Illinois, South Carolina, North Carolina, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon and Washington, and Hawaii and the Philippine Islands.

The basis of a rural credit system in this country similar to that of Europe based on long term farm mortgages must be some method of uniform land registration by which titles will be certain and standard, and thereby become unquestioned security for bonds or debentures of any federal system of land banks.

Mr. Eugene C. Massie, of Richmond, Va., an authority on the so-called Torrens System, delivered an able and instructive address on the subject of "Commercial land titles," and made this statement in reference to the effect of such an act: "Nothing short of registered title can

give the land any of the true attributes of a commercial asset. To answer the great public needs we must make the land in a sense negotiable."

Hon. David F. Houston, Secretary of Agriculture, makes this statement before the Senate Committee on this subject: "There are only $3,500,000,000 of farm mortgage loans in this country on $40,the clamor of the rural districts for capi000,000,000 worth of farm property. Still tal to develop the agricultural industry is countrywide."

He also makes a statement that the rate of interest with commission on farm mortgage loans in the United States range from 5.3 to 10.5 per cent, the average rate in no less than twenty different states being 8 to 10 per cent; while the prevailing farm loan rates under modern rural credit systems in Germany, France, Norway, Denmark, Great Britain and Australia are only 31⁄2 to 4 per cent.

The effect then would be that, under the proposed rural credits plan—with a federal farm loan board and 12 regional farm land banks to give negotiability to the agricultural lands of the United States-the aggregate, actual capital of America available in negotiable form for bankable purposes would readily be more than doubled and thereby become one of the greatest and most dependable assets in our national finance.

Section 30 of the Rural Credits Bill, authorizing the farm loan board to declare ineligible for farm loans the lands of such state as fails to provide the necessary uniform laws relating to the conveying and recording of land titles, and the foreclosure of mortgages and other instruments securing loans, will have an important effect in securing a more prompt compliance with the state uniformity principle.

In view of the fact that the farm property of the United States in 1909 was

as has been brought about in the case of personal property by these uniform acts.

The desire for uniformity is still a beacon light of hope to those interested in. the work of the Conference. Uniformity, it is said, is not simply a name, it is a principle, and a principle which is of the very essence of democracy, if we mean by democracy that state of of society in which there is one law equable in its application to the rights of all men alike everywhere.

The Uniform State Laws in Michigan. -Under special act of the Michigan legislature, an allowance is made for the actual expenses of the commissioners and for the expense incurred in drafting uniform laws. This now amounts to $500 a year. Various amounts have been contributed by many of the states and by some of the bar associations of the country. In 1915, Michigan contributed $150 and in 1916, $200. The entire amount contributed from all sources in support of the Conference last year was the sum of $5,822.46, and the disbursements were the sum of $3,915.69, leaving a balance of $1,906.77 in the treasury for the future requirements of the conference.

Michigan has adopted six out of the ten leading uniform acts passed by the national conference down to and including August, 1916. This has placed the state among the leading states represented in the Conference on this subject. And the attitude assumed by the legislature in the past towards the uniform acts subnitted to it for adoption, has been that of great appreciation of the work done by the national conference in the promotion of uniformity of legislation in the United States, as being a subject, which has commended itself to their best judgment and merited their cordial support, thus showing, "that it is not more law which we want-but more uniform law." GEORGE W. BATES.

Detroit, Michigan.

LARCENY-POSSESSION BY TRICK.

JARVIS v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Florida. March 14, 1917.

74 So. 796.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

A person who has lawful possession of property cannot commit larceny thereof; the possession, however, must have been originally obtained lawfully and without the intent to appropriate the property to his own use; one who obtains the possession by trick, device, or fraud, with intent to appropriate the property to his own use, the owner intending to part with the possession only, commits larceny when he subsequently appropriates it. The consent of the owner in surrendering the possession of property must be as broad as the taking.

SHACKLEFORD, J. W. B. Jarvis seeks relief here from a conviction of the crime of grand larceny and a sentence to confinement in the state prison for a term of two years. The sole error assigned is the overruling of the motion for a new trial, which is based upon six grounds, and which we shall treat in the order in which they are argued.

The first two grounds, which are argued together, are that "the verdict is not supported by the evidence," and that "the verdict is contrary to law." The first count in the indictment charges the defendant with the larceny of a contract entered into by the defendant and M. L. Dekle, of the value of $1,500, the property of M. L. Dekle, and the second count charges the defendant with the larceny of a chattel mortgage, executed by the defendant to M. L. Dekle, of the value of $500, the property of M. L. Dekle. The defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Very concisely stated, the evidence establishes that, in compliance with a request of the defendant, M. L. Dekle brought the contract and chattel mortgage with him to Greenwood for the purpose of meeting the defendant and having a full settlement of the amount due. Upon the meeting between the defendant and Dekle, after some conversation between them, the defendant requested Dekle to hand him (the defendant) such two instruments in order that the defendant might write a note to Mr. Lewis Smith, the cashier of the Bank of Greenwood, who was temporarily absent at Marianna, nine miles away, to get such cashier to advance the money to the defendant with which to take up the mortgage and contract;

that Dekle complied with the defendant's request, and the defendant began to write, but after a few minutes stopped writing, crumpled the paper up which he was writing, dropped it on the floor, folded up the contract and chattel mortgage, and put the same in his pocket, stating to Dekle, "I believe I will keep these papers and you can mark them paid out of the money I paid you last year." Further conversation took place between Dekle and the defendant, but it would serve no useful purpose to set it out. Suffice it to say that the evidence establishes that the defendant retained such papers of which he had thus possessed himself and refused to return them to Dekle. The defendant contends that this did not constitute larceny, and cites decisions of this court, as well as of other jurisdictions, which, he claims, support his contention. We have examined these authorities, but find ourselves unable to agree with the defendant. It is undoubtedly true, as we held in Bird v. State, 48 Fla. 3, 37 So. 525, that:

"In larceny it is essential to a conviction that the property was taken 'animo furandi;' and where it clearly appears that the taking was perfectly consistent with honest conduct, although the party charged with the crime may have been mistaken, he cannot be convicted of larceny."

It is also true, as this court held in Long v. State, 11 Fla. 295:

"A taking by mistake or accident, where the animus furandi forms no part, is not felony."

We also approve of the holdings by this court in the other decisions which the defend

ant cites and upon which he relies: Charles v. State, 36 Fla. 691, 18 So. 369; Finlayson v. State, 46 Fla. 81, 35 So. 203; Lowe v. State, 44 Fla. 449, 32 So. 956, 103 Am. St. Rep. 171; Minor v. State, 55 Fla. 77, 46 So. 297-but do not see wherein they help the defendant. In Finlayson v. State, supra, we held that:

"A bailee who has lawful possession cannot commit larceny; the possession, however, must have been originally obtained lawfully and without the intent to appropriate the property to his own use; one who obtains the possession by trick, device, or fraud, with intent to appropriate the property to his own use, the owner intending to part with the possession only, commits larceny when he subsequently appropriates it."

We might well repeat here what we said in the opinion rendered in that case:

"It cannot be said, therefore, that the owners 'consented' to part with the possession of their money; there was no conventio mentium, the one party intending only to part with the bare possession, the other intending to acquire the property in the thing itself; the consent was not as broad as the taking. The fraud vitiated whatever right might otherwise have been acquired by virtue of the apparent voluntary parting with the possession by those rightfully entitled thereto. Such act was at the common law larceny, and no statute was needed to make it a crime; nor does it come within our embezzlement act."

Also see Flowers v. State, 59 Fla. 16, 52 So. 11, which is well in point. We must hold that the contention of the defendant in support of the first two grounds of his motion for a new trial has not been sustained.

NOTE.-Intent at Time of Receiving Property and its Subsequent Appropriation as Constituting Larceny. It seems to us that the instant case states the rule of law applicable to obtaining possession of property by trick, but the evidence fails to show there was a trick or that there was animus furandi at the time defendant received possession of the contract and chattel mortgage. The case of Flowers v. State, 59 Fla. 16, 52 S. E. 11, shows a much plainer case of animus furandi as to one of the defendants than does the instant case and as to the other the court admitted that as an original proposition it would hesitate long before returning a verdict of guilty, but it would not overturn the finding of the jury supported by the action of the trial judge in refusing to disturb it. But what this defendant did was shown to be furtive from the very start and before a transaction was fully consummated both of them slipped away with the papers in hand, the one more clearly guilty running to get out of sight between the two was very clearly established. after being "hunched" by the other. Confederacy

In State v. Edwards, 51 W. Va. 220, 41 S. E. 429, 59 L. R. A. 465, there is a very elaborate opinion, in which a great abundance of authority is cited. For example, in Pear's Case, 1 Leach, C. L. 213, it was ruled that to obtain a horse under pretense of hiring it for a day is larceny, if the jury find that the hiring was animo furandi. And where there were confederates to the obtaining of money by the practice of "ring dropping," there was proof of an agreement to divide what was obtained. Moore's Case, 1 Leach, C. L. 238. There the judges were divided on the question whether there was a parting with possession only or parting with property, the majority holding to the latter, and, therefore, there was larceny. That case would be a ruling against the instant case for there could be no pretense of any parting other than of mere possession.

In Loomis v. People, 67 N. Y. 322, 23 Am. Rep. 123, one of two confederates obtained money from the prosecutor to bet on a "brace" game. This was held to be a parting with possession upon a