court exercised jurisdiction in the instant case what is stated as having the force of a bar may be considered arguendo or obiter rather than essential.

For ourselves, we do not see why, if visitorial powers are necessary to be exercised for completer relief, directors, stockholders or creditors, resident or non-resident, for a sufficient reason might not be called into a foreign court. The principle of estoppel, if nothing else, ought to work out this result.

Estoppel is easily deduced so far as directors and stockholders are concerned. Either directly or mediately they are bound by the corporation's submission to the laws of another state. So far as creditors are concerned if they trust a corporation in an outside transaction, it is to their advantage that visitorial power be exercised and that jurisdiction be as general as may be required. If the transaction is as domestic as is the corporation, they either know or ought to inquire, if it does business abroad. At all events, they are presumed to know whether the domestic law permits such business.

Inquiry into this kind of a question pertains very specially to this country with its dual system of government. It scarcely could arise in England. It naturally had more exploitation or received more attention prior to the growth of statutes in states conditioning the transaction of business outside of the home states of corporations. Some of these statutes directly say that foreign corporations are subject to the same liabilities as are domestic corporations. All of them seem to us to imply this much. The figment our courts have evolved is subject to readjustment in our changing. law. Then there will remain the rule that the first state court obtaining jurisdiction should be allowed to proceed uninterrupt-edly to the end.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

COMMERCE

INJURY ΤΟ EMPLOYE LOADING CARS WITH SAND AND GRAVEL FOR REPAIR OF TRACK.-The policy in Workmen's Compensation Acts, as discussed by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in Railroad v. Winfield, 37 Sup. Ct. 546, referred to in 85 Cent. L. J. 37, and the narrow line between employes engaged and those not engaged in interstate commerce, come to mind in reading a late decision by Mississippi Supreme Court. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Houston, 75 So. 690.

This case shows that an employe of an interstate carrier was a day laborer engaged in loading cars with sand and gravel for the repair of its roadbed. In the course of his work he was buried by sand falling upon him and thus smothered to death. His representative brought suit under state law and a judgment in her favor was affirmed.

The Supreme Court said: "The appellant relies on Pedersen v. Railroad, 229 U. S. 146, 33 Sup. Ct. 648, 57 L. Ed. 1125, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 153, for a reversal of this case. The appellee stands behind Railroad v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439, 35 Sup. Ct. 902, 59 L. Ed. 1397. It is insisted by appellee that all of the decisions of the Supreme Court since the decisions in the Pedersen and Yurkonis cases clearly indicate that the Supreme Court has intended to limit the influence of the Pedersen case rather than to extend it. Whether this be true or not is not for us to say, but since appellant stands squarely upon the Pedersen case, saying, 'If this case is sound, this case must be governed by the federal act,' we will examine the Pedersen case and its applicability to the present case. The gist of the Pedersen case, as interpreted by appellant's briefs, is that Pedersen was 'engaged in the repair of an interstate highway,' and for this reason he was 'employed in interstate commerce.' This analysis of the Pedersen case seems to be sound, but it seems to us that the Supreme Court of the United States, in the Yurkonis case drew in the lines somewhat, by holding that Yurkonis did not bring himself within the federal act. He was mining coal intended to be used in interstate commerce, but the manner of receiving the injury was too remote to justify the conclusion that he was employed in interstate commerce. A consideration of the facts developed upon the trial of the instant case, taken most favorably for appellant, indicate that the deceased was employed in mining gravel for the ultimate repairing or building

of the highway over which the interstate commerce of the railroad would be operated. Yurkonis was employed in mining coal to be used by the carrier to make steam power for the transportation of its commerce between the states, and yet the Supreme Court said:

"The manner of the receiving of the injury by plaintiff showed conclusively that it did not occur in interstate commerce.

"May we not say the same about Mr. Houston?

"It seems to us that the character of the work and the manner in which the injury was received in the Yurkonis case and in the present case are strikingly similar. On the other hand, Pederson was working directly upon the highway, and received his injury by a train operated on the highway. So as we interpret the situation, this case is controlled by the principles of the Yurkonis case."

The difference between "tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee," or between "McCarthy, come out" and "Come out, McCarthy" has something of illustration in the cases the court cites. Whether the Pedersen case controls the hauling of sand for repair of a track instead of putting it under the rule in the Yurkonis case presents a very debatable question. Our inclination is to say that, if carrying a bolt for a bridge puts an employe in interstate commerce, then carrying gravel for a track does the same. But, why not mining coal for an interstate engine? At all events, why have such a mix-up when policy expressed in a Workmen's Compensation Act is weakened by taking citizens from under its influence? peal the Federal Employers' Liability Act.

Re

ANIMALS-INJURY FROM BITE OF MAD DOG.-In Legault v. Malacker, 163 N. W. 476, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin holds that, notwithstanding a statute making the owner of a dog responsible for any injury by it, yet, as it is not intended by such a statute to forbid the keeping of dogs, but only as they manifest symptoms of danger to others, an owner of a dog that was afflicted with rabies is not responsible for his biting another, where the dog suddenly became thus afflicted.

This conclusion seems correct, but as matter of fact the question has come before the court very infrequently. The opinion cites only one case and that was affirmed by an evenly divided court and the instant case is decided by a majority of four to three.

The dissent in the instant case says: "The statute abrogates the common law and does

not make any exception. It was competent to make the law cover all cases, and if its language is given full effect, it does so." We think, however, it is more just to confine its application to vicious dogs, and thus give to ownership of this class of property a status equal to ownership of other property. Dogs are taxed and the keeping of them licensed, and, if any infirmity like rabies overtakes them, this would seem rather in the category of that which is within what may be called act of God.

BANKS AND BANKING OBLIGATION OF NON-RESIDENT DIRECTOR MEASURED BY HIS OATH.-Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, holds that where one takes office as director of a national bank and executes the statutory oath that he will "diligently and honestly administer the affairs of such association and will not knowingly violate or willingly permit to be violated any of the provisions of this title," he will be held liable for losses arising out of the managing officers permitting overdrafts by parties beyond the tenth part of a bank's capital stock, the director being a nonresident of the city where the bank is located and paying no attention to its affairs. McCormick v. King, 241 Fed. 737.

The court said: "The fact that Mr. Bowerman lived 200 miles away is not an excuse for him. He lived that distance from Salmon when he voluntarily accepted the directorship and to exonerate him from neglecting to attend a meeting of the board or inquiring into the conduct of the institution would be practically to hold that there was no meaning and significance whatever to the oath he took that he would, so far as the duty devolved upon him, honestly and diligently administer the affairs of the association. No one would contend that a director must look into details of management, or keep closely in touch with routine matters, or know intimately to whom credits are given; but he is responsible for the exercise of supervisory control, and musi be held to know something of the more important concerns of the association and his duty in these respects is not lessened by the fact that to do this duty means some personal inconvenience. If continued omission to give any attention could excuse, then the greater the inattention of a director to his duties, the less the liability he would incur."

While the conclusion was right in this case, we find some fault with the latitude of rule that might excuse. The common law duty in this case would seem sufficient to hold this

director and the statute does not appear to abate from that.

The court also says: "The interest of persons who have given their money to the custody of the bank, relying upon the belief that the directors, being men of integrity and business capacity, would at least make some effort to see that those in charge of the affairs of the institution would keep within the statutes and by-laws."

Here again the statement is rather broad. Those in charge are, or should be, bonded officers. They have to make reports to the comptroller when called for. If they are trusted in any particular it is the directors who trust them-not the stockholders or depositors. The slightest infraction of rules, statutory or otherwise, ought to earn dismissal from their positions or directors should shoulder the consequences Frequently decision attempts to draw a line between managers of corporations and trustees and at the same time oaths committing to trustee responsibility are required for induction into office.

RESPECT FOR LAW FUNDAMEN

TAL IN A DEMOCRACY.

"Every day it is becoming more apparent that if this republic is to endure, something must be done to inspire a higher regard for law and for lawful authority. Thinking men and women realize that liberty depends upon law and that without law and respect for the law there can be no liberty."

With these words Judge Martin J. Wade opened his address before the meeting of the Iowa Bar Association at Council Bluffs, June 27, 1917.

Judge Wade is not the first or only public official whose experience has induced them to sound a word of warning. Only a few days ago in the United States Senate, Senator Sherman of Illinois, attributed the East St. Louis massacre to lack of respect for law and public authority. But Judge Wade's address is so earnest, so devoid of mere pleasantries, so full of homely illustrations, so rich in suggestion, that we are sure a few quotations there from will be read with interest:

"A few months ago," said Judge Wade, "I was riding in a car in a neighboring city. Two men, evidently from the middle walk of life, were sitting behind me, and I could not help hearing the following conversation: "Well, I see they arrested Bill for stealing a couple of hams;' to which his companion responded: 'Yes, and I suppose he will go to prison; if he was a rich guy, there wouldn't be any danger, but a poor devil don't stand no show in the courts.'

"The other agreed with him, and they proceeded to discuss the subject and to 'cuss' the courts. I wanted to turn to explain to them that the statement we often hear quoted: If a man steals a loaf, he goes to prison, and if he steals a railroad he goes to the United States Senate,' is a gross exaggeration-nay, a positive libel upon our institutions.

"I wanted to say to them: 'Go down to the police court of your own city, and you will find that the arrests for minor of fenses for the past year have averaged some forty-five each day; and then go to the records and find that in 90 per cent of the cases, the courts and the law have permitted the unfortunates to keep out of prison by the imposition of a nominal fine, or the favor of a suspended sentence. I wanted to tell them that as a matter of fact out of the thousands of cases tried every day in this country that only in a very small per cent (I would say less than 1 per cent) substantial justice is not adminis

tered.

"I wanted to cry out in protest against the source from which the mis-information comes, which is conveying this dangerous idea to the American people-the yellow newspapers and magazines, and other purveyors of falsehood and scandal.

"I recognized in the expressions of the men on the car a deep-seated and dangerous condition of the public mind. Gloss it over as we will, we know that a large and growing percentage of our people have no confidence in the law or in the courts; and they are not limited to what we call our uneducated classes, either. It is nothing unusual to hear men prominent in business, give utterance to expressions which indicate at least a doubt, lingering somewhere back in the mind, as to whether or not the courts are on the square.'

If it is the duty of every lawyer to uphold the honor and integrity of the courts, this burden should not be left to the

judges themselves. If every lawyer felt as intensely as does Judge Wade about the false and despicable attacks now so frequently made upon the courts, judges themselves would not be compelled so often to come out on the huskings to defend their office. Too often lawyers by their silence lend credence to these attacks. For this reason, it seems to the writer, lawyers should assume much of the responsibility for the present lack of public confidence in the courts which are due in no small part to their failure to resist and resent the first false reflections cast upon the judicial office. But amends can be and should be made by every lawyer for past misprisions by increased diligence and earnestness in correcting the false impressions now so generally held by the ignorant and uninformed.

It is with respect of the ignorance of American institutions of justice that Judge Wade attributes much of the success of the campaign of slander on the courts. He pleads, therefore, for a wider dissemination of the principles of American law, constitutional and civil, the source of our laws, customs and institutions and the wonderful growth and adaptation of these principles to the changes made in the rapid progress of modern society. On this point Judge Wade said:

"Is it too much to ask that American citizens, when they reach the estate of manhood and womanhood, shall have at least a general knowledge of the details of the government of their country? That they should understand that this is a government of laws and not of men;' that in this nation we have no such thing as government except as it exists in the law of the land. That they should know something of this law; not that they be lawyers, but that they should know sufficient of the law to inspire a respect for the law, to guard them against the danger of unwittingly violating the law, and to enable them to discern the danger point in business transactions where they should hesitate to depend upon their own judgment, and seek competent legal advice.

"Should they not know something of the constitution of the United States and its

source of power, and it binding nature, and its supreme place as a fundamental law of the land?

"But above all, and most important of all, should they not know-not only know, but feel the source of the law-the necessity for law-the power of the law-the justice of the law-the mercy of the law; yea, the kindness of the law in dealing with the frailities of humanity; and should they not, as they start out on life's highway, clothed with the responsibility of citzenship, know --nay feel, that there is not a law in force in a state or in the nation which the people cannot change within constitutional limitations; and also that there is not a con

stitutional limitation which cannot be modified by the people if they so desire."

Judge Wade's suggestion seems at first to startle him and he stops to justify himself in holding to it by repeating again the suggestion in question form. He says:

"Am I demanding too much? Should the average man and woman not know something of the protection which the law gives. to the poorest of God's creatures by penalties imposed upon the wrongdoer for the violation of the criminal laws; how earnest1; the home is protected; how effectually the hand of the murderer is stayed; how carefully the rights of property are guarded against the criminal or the trespasser?

"Should they not feel what a dignity is conferred upon the humblest whose cottage is his castle, sacred under constitutional guarantees from invasion, even from unwarranted search or seizure?

"Should they not realize (what is too little realized), in what a splendid spirit of sympathy with the misfortunes and weaknesses of men, even though they be selfinvited, the law deals with their transgressions? How the law as a rule exempts the homstead from seizure for debt, and even preserves to the family its household reasonable goods, wearing apparel, and food and immediate earnings, and the usual tools with which the head of the family earns his living, all guarded against attachment or execution at the hands of creditors.

"Is it not well, especially for those inclined to criticise our civilization and our government, that they be reminded that the debtor's jail is closed, and that misfortune and poverty is no longer a crime?

"What a pity it is that Wilkins Micawber could not have lived in this age and in this nation where he could let his creditors walk the floor while he enjoyed life with Mrs. Micawber and the twins, peacefully waiting for something to 'turn up.'

Gaining confidence in the practicability of his suggestion, Judge Wade insists that the study of American law and judicial institutions be made a part of the common grammar school curriculum, the "university" of nine-tenths of the American people, as well as of high schools and colleges. Here Judge Wade properly ob

serves:

"Perhaps you will say that they will get some of this much of this, in present courses in political science-sociology, history, and government, as presented in these later days in the universities. As to this, I make two observations. First, that it is not sufficient that those who are enabled to take a course in a university, shall have this knowledge. The great majority never enter a university. General Booth used to speak of the Salvation Army as intended. for the 'submerged tenth.' I appeal for an opportunity for knowledge of the law for the submerged nine-tenths, the majority of whom never get through the high

school.

"It is in the ranks of the poorly educated, and uneducated, the ranks of those who struggle for a livelihood that discontent and doubt, and the spirit of rebellion is developed. Here is the fertile field for the agitator, the radical socialist-the I. W. W., and other teachers of anarchy, who cry out 'Down with the law;' "The courts are corrupt;' "The courts are owned by the rich; The poor are slaves;' "The rich are our masters;' 'The government is owned by the plutocrats,' etc.

The course of study in law and government is then set forth by Judge Wade with

such remarkable attention to detail and regard for the very ? of the instruction thus to be given that one is led to believe that the learned judge has been Lurning the midnight oil in his earnest attempt to find a solution for a problem which he believes demands an immediate attempt at solution. We have not the space

to set forth or dwell at length on the details of Judge Wade's plan, which the writer thoroughly approves, but shall be content to close this brief review of Judge Wade's unusual address by quoting his own summing up of the character of the instruction in law and government which should be afforded the American youth of the future. Judge Wade said:

"I would teach the origin of property rights-the sacredness of the principle of private ownership. I would try to dispel the notion which creeps early into life, that only the sharper who is allowed to evade the law, can succeed in life's battle.

holds under the law, by pointing out the "I would show what a high place labor many provisions for protecting the laborer, by liens for his wages, and by preference of claims for wages, and by exemption of his earnings from attachment or execution.

"I would try to have the children learn. the simplicity and universality of contractional relations and the duty under the law of faithfully living up to every obligation. I would emphasize the fact that the obligation of obedience to parents, teacher, guardian, city, state and nation, is not only a moral, but also a legal duty. I would teach the fundamentals of criminal law, showing how every offense invites a penalty, and how closely the law prohibiting crimes and offenses, conforms to the moral rules which men should obey without fear of punishment.

"And then I would have them understand how in social organizations, we must all yield something of what is termed our natural freedom of action, for general good, and for the promotion of harmony in community life.

"I would have them understand how far humanity has traveled from the days when under the Mosaic law, recognition was

given to the principle of private vengeance -when an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a life for a life, were given legal

sanction.

"I would have them realize what they owe to a civilization which has advanced in the settlement of controversies between of fire and water, and hot iron, to the calm, men, from the wager of battle-the ordeal peaceful proceedings before a court of justice which makes no show of power, but