should be strictly private, and it was held, that a member of the committee could not be interrogated as to what took place within the committee, nor as to his reasons for his vote, nor as to what he deemed proper and sufficient ground for the expulsion of a member; that the minutes and reports in writing of the committee afforded the best evidence of what took place therein.1 § 88. The member entitled to notice and a hearing.-A member of a voluntary association can not be legally expelled without notice and an opportunity of meeting the charges preferred against him. It is not necessary that he should re 1 Loubat v. Le Roy, 65 How. Pr. officers in the army take upon them138; s. c. 40 Hun, 546. 2 Knights of Honor Supreme Lodge v. Johnson, (1882) 76 Ind. 110; Delacy v. Neuse River Nav. Co., (1821) 1 Hawks, (N. C.) 274; Southern Plank R. Co. v. Hixon, (1854) 5 Ind. 165; Niblack on Mutual Benefit Societies, § 65; Innes v. Wylie, 1 Car. & K. 257; Labouchere v. Wharncliffe, 13 Ch. Div. 346; Wachtel v. Noah Widows' & O. Soc., (1881) 84 N. Y. 28, 31, where Danforth, J., said: "In the absence of any agreement by the member or any provision in the charter or by-laws, for a different mode of service, it should be made personally, as required at common law, where the object is to deprive a party of his rights or property; or if that can be dispensed with, then in such other mode as will be most likely to effect its object;" Fitz v. Muck, 62 How. Pr. 69, 74; Downing v. St. Columba's &c. Soc., 10 Daly, 262; notwithstanding the rules do not expressly provide for notice. In Fisher v. Keane, (1878) 11 Ch. Div. 353; s. c. 49 L. T. Ch. 11; s. c. 41 L. T. 335, it is said: "But I ought not to part with the case without also giving my opinion on the second ground of complaint: that a committee of English gentlemen and selves to decide ex parte without notice to the member accused, and without hearing all the circumstances of the case, that his offense is, in the words of the rule, 'of so grave a character as, in the interests of the club, to warrant his immediate expulsion.' More than that, the expulsion is to take effect unless twenty members of the club shall within twenty-one days demand an extraordinary general meeting to take the conduct of the offending member into consideration.' It is said that under the latter part of the rule there is an appeal to a general meeting. But what appeal? It by no means follows that a man can get twenty members as a matter of course within any twenty-one days; and if he does, he does not appeal to an ordinary tribunal. One black ball in ten is to exclude, so that if ninetenths of the members at that meeting shall be of opinion that the man has been unjustly expelled, the voting being by ballot, his character will still be blasted before the world at large. One must recollect, too, that the meetings of clubs are not always fair for another reason quite independently of any personal impropriety of conduct on the part of quest to be heard.1 But if he has been fully heard, he can not raise technical objections not affecting his rights. And a neglect to notify the member of the time when the committee's report will be presented and considered, will not necessarily invalidate the expulsion if the member has been fully heard. If, however, a member admits the offense warranting his expulsion, it is then not necessary that he should have the members. Some may say, 'Well, so-and-so is a man we ought to get rid of, and I shall put in a black ball.' Another may say, 'Oh, we must support the committee; they have acted to the best of their judgment. They are all honorable men, men in whom we have the greatest confidence. If we do not support them, they will resign, and it will break up the club; I shall put in a black ball.' It is not like an appeal to a judicial tribunal, or even to a quasi-judicial tribunal. As I said before, it behooves a committee who are a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, to be very careful before they expose one of their fellow members to such an ordeal. A committee ought not, as I understand it, according to the ordinary rules by which justice should be administered by committees of clubs, or by any other bodies of persons who decide upon the conduct of others, to blast a man's reputation forever perhaps to ruin his prospects for life, without giving him an opportunity of either defending or palliating his conduct. In my opinion upon this ground also, the committee have not acted properly or fairly. I have no doubt they acted according to the best of their judgment, and with the utmost desire to do what was right, but I think that they have made a mistake, and that the right course is to grant an injunction, so that they may have an opportunity of re-considering this matter in a fair and impartial spirit." Judgment for plaintiff, with costs. In the case of Labouchere v. Wharncliffe, 13 Ch. Div. 346, no new principles are laid down, but it is a striking example of the necessity of a committee or club, when carrying out a quasi-judicial proceeding, to do so in strict accordance with the rules under which they profess to be acting, especially in regard to giving due notice of meetings and of the charges to be met. This case came before Sir George Jessel, Master of the Rolls, on 28th of November, 1879, on motion for an injunction to restrain the defendants, the committee of the Beefsteak Club, from interfering with the enjoyment by the plaintiff as a member of the club of the use and benefit of the club and the buildings and property thereof. Leach's Club Cases, 38. See also, review of the case in Canada L. Jour., Oct. 15, 1881, 381. 1 Loubat v. Le Roy, 40 Hun, 546; s. c. 15 Abb. N. Cas. 1. 2 Loubat v. Le Roy, 40 Hun, 546; s. c. 15 Abb. N. Cas. 1. The notice may be waived; but it is held that the accused does not waive it by attending a meeting and entering on his defense. Downing v. St. Columba's &c. Soc., (1884) 10 Daly, 262; a somewhat questionable ruling. 3 Loubat v. Le Roy, (1885) 40 Hun, 546; s. c. 15 Abb. N. Cas. 1; s. d. 65 How. Pr. 138. a formal hearing and trial, because he, in effect, pleads guilty.' It has been held that under a provision of the superior body of a benevolent association guarantying a fair hearing to every member before expulsion, except where such member has been expelled from the subordinate lodge of which he was a member, one who is expelled from the subordinate lodge may be expelled from the superior body without notice. A member of a corporation having capital stock is entitled to notice of a purposed forfeiture of his shares, which must state the amount due thereon, the time within which payment is to be made and the place of the forfeiture sale,3 and legal tender at any time before actual sale will entitle the shareholder to stay or set aside the forfeiture. For notice of forfeiture is not equivalent to actual forfeiture. There must be a due declaration thereof and sale." 1 Moxey's Appeal, 9 Week. N. Cas. 430; 8 Vic. ch. 16, § 30; Knight's 441. Pfeiffer v. Joerges, 13 Daly, 161. Lake Ontario &c. R. Co. v. Mason, 16 N. Y. 451; Lexington &c. R. Co. v. Chandler, 13 Met. 311; Mississippi &c. R. Co. v. Gaster, 40 Ark. 455; Rutland &c. R. Co. v. Thrall, (1863) 35 Vt. 536, 546, where it was held that the contents of the published notice is material upon an issue as to the validity of the forfeiture sale, the court saying: "The subscriber, by incorporating this [the statutory requirement of notice] into his subscription, secures this notice as a condition precedent, without compliance with which he is not liable to suit. Hence proof of a publication containing notice of these facts is indispensable to maintain the suit. The newspaper which contains the notice is clearly the best evidence of its publication and contents." Lexington &c. R. Co. v. Staples, 71 Mass. 520; Lewey's Island R. Co. v. Bolton, 48 Me. 451; s. c. 77 Am. Dec. 236; Hearton v. Cincinnati &c. R. Co., 16 Ind. 275; s. c. 70 Am. Dec. Case, L. R. 2 Ch. 321; Birmingham &c. Ry. Co. v. Locke, 1 Q. B. 256; Watson v. Eales, 23 Beav. 294; where the time of forfeiture was stated to be Monday the 9th, that date falling on a Friday, and the notice held insufficient. Cf. Bangs v. Duckinfield, 18 N. Y. 592; Schenectady &c. R. Co. v. Thatcher, 11 N. Y. 102; Eppes v. Mississippi &c. R. Co., 35 Ala. 33; New Albany &c. R. Co. v. McCormick, 10 Ind. 499; s. c. 71 Am. Dec. 337. As to railway corporations see N. Y. Laws of 1850, ch. 140, § 7, as amended by N. Y. Laws of 1875, ch. 108, § 8. 4 Mitchell v. Vermont, 67 N. Y. 280, holding also that tender of a check was sufficient; Walker v. Ogden, 1 Biss. 287; Sweeney v. Smith, L. R. 7 Eq. 324. Water Valley Manuf. Co. v. Seaman, 53 Miss. 655; Macon &c. R. Co. v. Vason, 57 Ga. 314; Cockerell v. Van Dieman's Land Co., L. R. 26 C. P. 203; Biggs' Case, L. R. 1 Eq. 309. But see Knight's Case, L. R. 2 Ch. 321. $89. Of the notice - Nature and service thereof. If a certain notice is prescribed by the constitution and by-laws, the expulsion is invalid, if it be not given or waived.1 And where the rules of an association imply that notice shall be given on assessments becoming due, there can not be a forfeiture of membership for non-payment without notice. The notice, it seems, should be served personally, if the constitu tion or by-laws do not provide for a different mode of service.' But where the intent appears, from the by-laws of a mutual aid association, to be that the mailing of the notice of an assessment shall fix the liability of the member, his rights may be forfeited, although through a miscarriage of the mail the notice failed to reach him. Where a by-law of a mutual relief society provides for notice of assessments by the local secretary to members and another by-law declares that a member, by a failure to pay after notice by the general secretary, shall forfeit his right to benefit; a member is entitled to a notice from both secretaries, and a card on which the name of the general secretary is printed, but which is filled up and 1 Washington Beneficial Soc. v. Wachtel v. Noah Widows' & O. Soc., Bacher, 20 Pa. St. 425. (1881) 84 N. Y. 28; s. c. 9 Daly, 476; s. c. 38 Am. Rep. 478. 2 Covenant Mut. Benefit Assoc. v. Spies, 114 Ill. 463. Thus, a by-law of a benevolent association, whose members had pecuniary interest therein, made provision for a fine, in case of a member failing to give notice of a change of residence. Another by-law provided that notice should be given to each member who should be six months in arrears, calling his attention to the fact that he should be stricken from the roll in case he should not pay his dues in thirty days. A member changed his residence without giving notice, and it was held that he could not be expelled without a personal service of notice upon him, there being neither agreement nor provision in the charter or by-laws for a different mode of service. 3 Wachtel v. Noah Widows' & O. Soc., (1881) 84 N. Y. 28, 31, quoted supra, p. 166. As to personal service of notice, service by letter and by publication, see further: Schenectady &c. Plank Road Co. v. Thatcher, 11 N. Y. 102; Mississippi &c. R. Co. v. Gaster, 20 Ark. 455; Lexington &c. R. Co. v. Chandler, 13 Met. 311; Lewey's Island R. Co. v. Bolton, 48 Me. 451; s. c. 77 Am. Dec. 236; Knight's Case, 2 Ch. 321; Birmingham &c. R. Co. v. Locke, 1 Q. B. 256; South Staffordshire Ry. Co. v. Burnside, 5 Ex. 129; Cockerell v. Van Dieman's Land Co., 26 L. J. C. P. 203; Graham v. Van Dieman's Land Co., 1 Hurl. & N. 541. 4 Weakly v. Northwestern Benevolent &c. Assoc., 19 Ill. App. 327. addressed by the local secretary, is not sufficient to constitute a notice from the general secretary.1 § 90. Expulsion to be at a regular meeting Of the quorum. A member can not be lawfully expelled at an irregular meeting of which he had no notice. And it is requi site that a quorum of the committee be present. But where the constitution of a club provides that a member may be expelled by a two-thirds vote of the governing committee, and that a majority of the members of the committee shall constitute a quorum, a two-thirds vote of a quorum of the committee as it existed at the time of the vote, is sufficient, although vacancies exist. In proceedings for the expulsion of a member, one of the governors of the club is not disqualified from taking part because he is a relative of the member whom it is sought to expel. An irregularity under the bylaws, in the appointment of the committee to try a member, is waived by the appearance of the accused, who having knowledge of the irregularity, does not object thereto. § 91. Of the nature of the inquiry before the committee. In order to disfranchise a member of a voluntary association, the offenses charged must be stated as found after a formal investigation, and not rest on inference alone. Nor, it has been held, has a society the right to expel a member merely because he does not appear, and without proving the charges against him; even if he does not appear, proof should be required of his offense. But while the committee must not act 1 Payn v. Rochester Mut. Relief Soc., 17 Abb. N. Cas. 53. 2 Medical & Surgical Soc. v. Weatherby, (1885) 75 Ala. 248, where it was held also that declaring a member to have forfeited his membership at a meeting other than the one specially designated by the constitution for the purpose, and of which he had notice, is ground for a mandamus to compel his restoration. Loubat v. Le Roy, (1885) 40 Hun, 546; s. c. 15 Abb. N. Cas. 1. 6 Sperry's Appeal, 116 Pa. St. 391. 7 Schweiger v. Voightlander Benevolent Assoc., (1883) 13 Phila. 113. 9 People ex rel. Corrigan v. Young Men's Father Matthew Ben. Soc., 65 Barb. 357. In the leading English case on this subject, Labouchere v. Wharncliffe, 13 Ch. Div. 346, the Master of the Rolls after reading the Loubat v. Le Roy, (1885) 40 Hun, rule of the club providing for expul 546; s. c. 15 Abb. N. Cas. 1. sion "after inquiry," said: "The 4 Loubat v. Le Roy, (1885) 40 Hun, committee are not to form an opin546; s. c. 15 Abb. N. Cas. 1. ion without inquiry. They are not |