I.

would be in a manner certain that we fhould CHA P. furvive Death, provided it were certain that Death would not be our Deftruction, it must be highly probable we shall survive it, if there be no Ground to think Death will be our Deftruction.

Now though I think it must be acknowledged, that prior to the natural and moral Proofs of a future Life commonly infifted upon, there would arise a general confufed Sufpicion, that in the great Shock and Alteration which we fhall undergo by Death, We, i. e. our living Powers, might be wholly destroyed; yet even prior to those Proofs, there is really no particular dictinct Ground or Reafon for this Apprehenfion at all, so far as I can find. If there be, it must arife either, from the Reafon of the thing, or from the Analogy of Nature.

unavoidably ambiguous; and may fignify either the Deftruction of a living Being, fo as that the fame living Being shall be uncapable of ever perceiving or acting again at all: Or the Defruction of thofe Means and Inftruments by which it is capable. of its prefent Life, of its prefent State of Perception and of Action. It is here ufed in the former Senfe. When it is ufed in the latter, the Epithet prefent is added. The Lofs of a Man's Eye is a Destruction of living Powers in the latter Senfe. But we have no Reason to think the Destruction of living Powers, in the former Senfe, to be poffible. We have no more Reafon to think a Being endued with living Powers, ever loses them during its whole Existence, than to believe, that a Stone ever acquires them.

C 3

But

PART

I.

But we cannot argue from the Reason of the thing, that Death is the Destruction of living Agents, because we know not at all what Death is in itself; but only fome of its Effects, fuch as the Diffolution of Flesh, Skin, and Bones. And these Effects do in no wife appear to to imply the Destruction of a living Agent. And befides, as we are greatly in the Dark, upon what the Exercise of our living Powers depends, fo we are wholly ignorant what the Powers themselves depend up

on;

the Powers themselves as diftinguished, not only from their actual Exercise, but also from the present Capacity of exercising them; and as opposed to their Deftruction: For Sleep, or however a Swoon, fhews us, not only that these Powers exift when they are not exercised, as the paffive Power of Motion does in inanimate Matter; but fhews also that they exift, when there is no prefent Capacity of exercising them: or that the Capacities of exercising them for the prefent, as well as the actual Exercise of them, may be fufpended, and yet the Powers themselves remain undeftroyed. Since then we know not at all upon what the Existence of our living Powers depends, this fhews further, there can no Probability be collected from the Reason of the thing, that Death will be their Deftruction: because their Existence may depend,

upon

I.

upon fomewhat in no Degree affected by CHAP. Death; upon fomewhat quite out of the reach of this King of Terrors. So that there is nothing more certain, than that the Reafon of the thing fhews us no Connection between. Death, and the Destruction of living Agents. Nor can we find any thing throughout the whole Analogy of Nature, to afford us even the flightest Presumption, that Animals ever lose their living Powers; much less, if it were poffible, that they lose them by Death: for we have no Faculties wherewith to trace any beyond or through it, fo as to fee what becomes of them. This Event removes them from our View. It deftroys the fenfible Proof, which we had before their Death, of their being poffeffed of living Powers, but does not appear to afford the leaft Reason to believe that they are, then, or by that Event, deprived of them.

And our knowing, that they were poffeffed of these Powers, up to the very Period to which we have Faculties capable of tracing. them, is itself a Probability of their retaining them, beyond it. And this is confirmed, and a fenfible Credibility is given to it, by obferving the very great and astonishing Changes which we have experienced; fo great, that our Existence in another State of Life, of Perception and of Action, will be but according

C4

I.

PARTcording to a Method of providential Conduct, the like to which has been already exercised even with regard to Ourfelves; according to a Course of Nature, the like to which, we have already gone through,

However, as one cannot but be greatly fenfible, how difficult it is to filence Imagination enough to make the Voice of Reason even distinctly heard in this Cafe; as we are accustomed, from our Youth up, to indulge that forward delufive Faculty, ever obtruding beyond its Sphere; of fome Affiftance indeed to Apprehenfion, but the Author of all Error: As we plainly lofe Ourselves in grofs and crude Conceptions of things, taking for granted that we are acquainted with, what indeed we are wholly ignorant of; it may be proper to confider the imaginary Prefumptions, that Death will be our Deftruction, arifing from thefe Kinds of early and lafting Prejudices; and to fhew how little they can really amount to, even though we cannot wholly devest our.felves of Them. And,

I. All Prefumption of Death's being the Destruction of living Beings, must go upon Suppofition that they are compounded; and so, difcerptible. But fince Consciousness is a fingle and indivifible Power, it should seem that the Subject in which it refides, must be

fo

I.

Parti-CHAP.

fo too.
For were the Motion of
any
cle of Matter abfolutely one and indivifible,
fo as that it should imply a Contradiction to
fuppofe Part of this Motion to exist, and
Part not to exist, i. e. Part of this Matter to
move, and Part to be at reft; then its Power
of Motion would be indivisible; and fo alfo
would the Subject in which the Power in-
heres, namely the Particle of Matter: for if
this could be divided into two, one Part might
be moved and the other at reft, which is con-
trary to the Suppofition. In like manner it
has been argued, and, for any thing appearing
to the contrary, juftly, that fince the Percep-
tion or Consciousness, which we have of our
own Existence, is indivifible, fo as that it is
a Contradiction to fuppofe one Part of it
fhould be here and the other there; the per-
ceptive Power, or the Power of Consciousness,
is indivifible too: and confequently the Subject
in which it refides; i. e. the confcious Being.
Now upon Suppofition That living Agent
each Man calls himself, is thus a fingle Being,
which there is at leaft no more Difficulty in
conceiving than in conceiving it to be a Com-
pound, and of which there is the Proof now
mentioned; it follows, that our organized Bo-
dies are no more ourselves or Part of ourselves,
than any other Matter around us. And it is

See Dr. Clarke's Letter to Mr. Dodwell, and the Defences of it.

as