the Mind in Doubt concerning the Truth. CHAP. Indeed in all thefe Cafes, there is no more VI. Evidence on one Side, than on the other; but there is (what is equivalent to) much more for either, than for the Truth of a Number of Facts which come into one's Thoughts at random. And thus in all these Cafes, Doubt as much prefuppofes Evidence, lower Degrees of Evidence; as Belief presupposes higher, and Certainty higher ftill. Any one, who will a little attend to the Nature of Evidence, will eafily carry this Obfervation on, and fee, that between no Evidence at all, and That Degree of it which affords Ground of Doubt, there are as many intermediate Degrees; as there are, between That Degree which is the Ground of Doubt, and Demonstration. And though we have not Faculties to distinguish these Degrees of Evidence, with any Sort of Exactness; yet, in Proportion as they are difcerned, they ought to influence our Practice. For it is as real an Imperfection in the moral Character, not to be influenced in Practice by a lower Degree of Evidence when difcerned, as it is, in the Understanding, not to difcern it. And as, in all Subjects which Men confider, they difcern the lower as well as higher Degrees of Evidence, proportionably to their Capacity of Understanding: fo, in practical Subjects, they are influenced in Practice, by the lower as well as higher Degrees

2

PARTgrees of it, proportionably to their Fairnefs II. and Honesty. And as, in Proportion to Dewwfects in the Understanding, Men are unapt to

fee lower Degrees of Evidence, are in Danger of overlooking Evidence when it is not glaring, and are eafily impofed upon in such Cafes: fo, in Proportion to the Corruption of the Heart, they feem capable of fatisfying themselves with having no Regard in Practice to Evidence acknowledged real, if it be not overbearing. From thefe things it muft follow, that Doubting concerning Religion implies fuch a Degree of Evidence for it, as joined with the Confideration of its Importance, unquestionably lays Men under the Obligations before mentioned, to have a dutiful Regard to it in all their Behaviour.

Thirdly, The Difficulties in which the Evidence of Religion is involved, which Some complain of, is no more a juft Ground of Complaint, than the external Circumstances of Temptation, which others are placed in; or than Difficulties in the Practice of it, after a full Conviction of its Truth. Temptations render our State a more improving State of Difcipline, than it would be otherwife: as they give Occafion for a more attentive Exercife of the virtuous Principle, which confirms and ftrengthens it more, than an easier

e Part I. Ch. v.

or

Now CHAP.

or less attentive Exercife of it could. fpeculative Difficulties are, in this Refpect, VI. of the very fame Nature with thefe external Temptations. For the Evidence of Religion not appearing obvious, is, to fome Perfons, a Temptation to reject it, without any Confideration at all; and therefore requires fuch an attentive Exercise of the virtuous Principle, ferioufly to confider That Evidence, as there would be no Occafion for, but for fuch Temptation. And the fuppofed Doubtfulness of its Evidence, after it has been in fome Sort confidered, affords Opportunity to an unfair Mind of explaining away, and deceitfully hiding from itself, That Evidence which it might fee; and alfo for Men's encouraging themfelves in Vice from Hopes of Impunity, though they do clearly fee thus much at least, that these Hopes are uncertain: In like Manner as the common Temptation to many Inftances of Folly which end in temporal Infamy and Ruin, is, the Ground for Hope of not being detected, and of efcaping with Impunity; .e. the Doubtfulness of the Proof beforehand, that fuch foolish Behaviour will thus end in Infamy and Ruin. On the contrary, fuppofed doubtfulness in the Evidence of Religion calls for a more careful and attentive Exercise of the virtuous Principle, in fairly yielding themselves up to the proper Influence of any real Evidence, though doubt

ful;

PAR T ful; and in practicing conscientiously all VirII. tue, though under fome Uncertainty, whether the Government in the Universe may not poffibly be fuch, as that Vice may escape with Impunity. And in general, Temptation, meaning by this Word, the leffer Allurements the Wrong and Difficulties in the Discharge of our Duty, as well as the greater ones, Temptation, I say, as fuch and of every Kind and Degree, as it calls forth fome virtuous Efforts, additional to what would otherwise have been wanting, cannot but be an additional Discipline and Improvement of Virtue, as well as Probation of it in the other Senses of that Word. So that the very fame Account is to be given, why the Evidence of Religion fhould be left in fuch a Manner, as to require, in Some, an attentive, follicitous, perhaps painful Exercise of their Understanding about it; as why Others fhould be placed in fach Circumftances, as that the Practice of its common Duties, after a full Conviction of the Truth of it, fhould require Attention, Sollicitude and Pains: Or, why appearing Doubtfulness fhould be permitted to afford Matter of Temptation to Some; as why external Difficulties and Allurements fhould be permitted to afford Matter of Temptation to Others. The fame Account alfo is to be given, why Some should be exercised with Part I. Ch. iv, and p. 152.

Tempta

Temptations of both these Kinds; as why O-CHAP• thers fhould be exercised with the latter in VI. fuch very high Degrees, as fome have been, particularly as the primitive Chriftians were.

Nor does there appear any Abfurdity in fuppofing, that the fpeculative Difficulties in which the Evidence of Religion is involved, may make even the principal Part of fome Perfons Trial. For, as the chief Temptations of the Generality of the World, are, the ordinary Motives to Injuftice or unrestrained Pleafure; or to live in the Neglect of Religion from That Frame of Mind, which renders many Perfons almost without Feeling as to any thing diftant, or which is not the Object of their Senfes: So there are other Perfons without this Shallowness of Temper, Perfons of a deeper Senfe as to what is invifible and future; who not only fee, but have a general practical Feeling, that what is to come will be present, and that things are not lefs real for their not being the Objects of Sense; and who, from their natural Conftitution of Body and of Temper, and from their external Condition, may have fmall Temtations to behave ill, fmall Difficulty in behaving well, in the common Course of Life. Now when these latter Perfons have a distinct full Conviction of the Truth of Religion, without any poffible Doubts or Difficulties,

the