PART the Practice of it is to them unavoidable, unII. lefs they will do a conftant Violence to their

own Minds; and Religion is fcarce any more a Discipline to Them, than it is to Creatures in a State of Perfection. Yet thefe Perfons may poffibly stand in Need of moral Discipline andExe rcife in a higher Degree, than they would have by fuch an easy Practice of Religion. Or it may be requifite, for Reafons unknown to us, that they should give fome farther Manifeftation what is their moral Character, to the Creation of God, than fuch a Practice of it would be. Thus in the great Variety of religious Situations in which Men are placed, what conftitutes, what chiefly and peculiarly conftitutes, the Probation, in all Senfes, of fome Perfons, may be the Difficulties in which the Evidence of Religion is involved: and their principal and diftinguished Trial, may be, how they will behave under and with Respect to thefe Difficulties. Circumstances in Mens Situation in their temporal Capacity, analogous in good Measure to This refpecting Religion, are to be observed. We find some Perfons are placed in fuch a Situation in the World, as that their chief Difficulty with regard to Conduct, is not the Doing what is prudent when it is known; for this, in numberlefs Cafes, is as eafy as the contrary: but to fome the princi4. p. 152.

pal

pal Exercife is, Recollection and being upon CHAP. their Guard against Deceits, the Deceits fup- VI. pose of thofe about them; against falfe Appearances of Reason and Prudence. To Perfons in fome Situations, the principal Exercise with refpect to Conduct, is, Attention in order to inform themselves what is proper, what is really the reasonable and prudent Part to act.

But as I have hitherto gone upon Suppofition, that Mens Diffatisfaction with the Evidence of Religion is not owing to their Neglects or Prejudices; it must be added, on the other hand, in all common Reason, and as what the Truth of the Cafe plainly requires should be added, that fuch Diffatisfaction poffibly may be owing to those, poffibly may be Mens own Fault. For,

If there are any Perfons, who never fet themselves heartily and in earneft to be informed in Religion: if there are any, who fecretly wish it may not prove true; and are lefs attentive to Evidence than to Difficulties, and more to Objections than to what is faid in answer to them: these Perfons will scarce be thought in a likely Way of feeing the Evidence of Religion, though it were most certainly true, and capable of being ever fo fully proved. If any accuftom themselves to

2

confider

PART confider this Subject usually in the Way of II. Mirth and Sport: if they attend to Forms Wand Reprefentations and inadequate Manners

of Expreffion, instead of the real Things intended by them: (for Signs often can be no more then inadequately expreffive of the things fignified:) or if they substitute human Errors, in the Room of divine Truth: Why may not all, or any of these things, hinder fome Men from feeing that Evidence, which really is seen by Others; as a like Turn of Mind, with refpect to Matters of common Speculation and Practice, does, we find by Experience, hinder them from attaining That Knowledge and right Understanding, in Matters of common Speculation and Practice, which more fair and attentive Minds attain to? And the Effect will be the fame, whe-› ther their Neglect of seriously confidering the Evidence of Religion, and their indirect Behaviour with regard to it, proceed from meer Careleffnefs, or from the groffer Vices; or whether it be owing to this, that Forms and figurative Manners of Expreffion, as well as Errors, adminifter Occafions of Ridicule, when the Things intended, and the Truth itself, would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous Turn fo far as to lofe all Senfe of Conduct and Prudence in worldly Affairs, and even, as it seems, to impair their Faculty of Reafon And in general, Levity, Careleffnefs,

nefs, Paffion, and Prejudice, do hinder us CHAP. from being rightly informed, with respect to VI. common things: And they may, in like Manner, and perhaps in fome farther providential Manner, with refpect to moral and religious Subjects: may hinder Evidence from being laid before us, and from being feen when it is. The Scripture does declare, that every one Shall not understand. And it makes no Difference, by what providential Conduct, this comes to pafs: Whether the Evidence of Christianity was, originally and with Design, put and left fo, as that those who are defirous of evading moral Obligations, should not fee it; and that honeft-minded Perfons should: Or, Whether it comes to pass by any other Means.

Farther: The general Proof of natural Religion and of Chriftianity, does, I think, lie Level to common Men; even those, the

See alfo If. xxix. 13, 14. and xiii. 11, 12.

f Dan. xii. 10. Matt. vi. 23. and xi. 25. Joh. ii. 19. Joh. v. 44. 1 Cor. ii. 14. and 2 Cor. iv. 4. 2 Tim. iii. 13. and That affectionate, as well as authoritative Admonition, fo very many Times inculcated, He that hath Ears to hear, let him hear. Grotius faw fo ftrongly the thing intended in these and other Paffages of Scripture of the like Senfe, as to fay, that the Proof given us of Chriftianity was lefs than it might have been, for this very Purpose: Ut ita Sermo Evangelii tanquam lapis effet Lydius ad quem ingenia fanabilia explorarentur. De Ver, R. C. L. 2. towards the End.

PART greatest Part of whofe Time, from ChildII. hood to Old-age, is taken up with proviWding, for themfelves and their Families, the

common Conveniencies perhaps Neceffaries of Life: thofe, I mean, of this Rank, who ever think at all of afking after Proof or attending to it. Common Men, were they as much in Earnest about Religion, as about their temporal Affairs, are capable of being convinced upon real Evidence, that there is a God who governs the World: and they feel themselves to be of a moral Nature, and accountable Creatures. And as Christianity intirely falls in with this their natural Senfe of Things; fo they are capable, not only of being perfuaded, but of being made to fee, that there is Evidence of Miracles wrought in Atteftation of it, and many appearing Completions of Prophecy. But though this Proof is real and conclufive, yet it is liable to Objections, and may be run up into Difficulties; which, however, Perfons who are capable, not only of talking of, but of really feeing, are capable alfo of feeing through: i. e. not of clearing up and answering them, fo as to fatisfie their Curiofity, for of such Knowledge we are not capable with refpect to any one Thing in Nature; but capable of feeing that the Proof is not loft in thefe Difficulties, or deftroyed by these Objections.

But