J.

who did that Action, namely, Himself, the D Is S. Person who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the Action was at all done. Nay w very often a Perfon's Affurance of an Action having been done, of which he is abfolutely affured, arifes wholly from the Consciousness that he himself did it. And this He, Perfon, or Self, muft either be a Substance, or the Property of fome Substance. If He, if Perfon, be a Subftance; then Consciousness that He is the fame Perfon, is Consciousness that He is the fame Subftance. If the Perfon, or He, be the Property of a Substance; ftill Consciousness that He is the fame Property is as certain a Proof that his Subftance remains the fame, as Consciousness that he remains the fame Subftance would be: fince the fame Property cannot be transferred from one Subftance to another.

But though we are thus certain, that we are the fame Agents, living Beings, or Subftances, Now, which we were as far back as our Remembrance reaches; yet it is asked, Whether we may not poffibly be deceived in it? And this Queftion may be asked at the End of any Demonftration whatever: because it is a Question concerning the Truth of Perception by Memory. And he who can doubt, whether Perception by Memory can in this Cafe be depended upon, may

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doubt

Diss. doubt alfo, whether Perception by Deduction I. and Reasoning, which alfo include Memory, or indeed whether intuitive Perception can. Here then we can go no farther. For it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the Truth of those Perceptions, whofe Truth we can no otherwise prove, than by other Perceptions of exactly the fame Kind with them, and which there is just the fame Ground to fufpect; or to attempt to prove the Truth of our Faculties, which can no otherwise be proved, than by the Ufe or Means of those very suspected Faculties themselves.

DIS

DISSER T. II.

Of the Nature of Virtue.

TH

451

I

II.

HAT which renders Beings capable of D 1 ss. moral Government, is their having a moral Nature, and moral Faculties of Perception and of Action. Brute Creatures are impreffed and actuated by various Instincts and Propenfions: fo alfo are We. But additional to this, We have a Capacity of reflecting upon Actions and Characters, and making them an Object to our Thought: And on doing this, we naturally and unavoidably approve fome Actions, under the peculiar View of their being virtuous and of Gooddefert; and difapprove Others, as vicious and of Ill-defert. That we have this moral approving and difapproving a Faculty, is certain

:

a This way of fpeaking is taken from Epictetus*, and is made ufe of as feeming the moft full, and leaft liable to Cavil. And the moral Faculty may be understood to have these two Epithets, δοκιματική and αποδοκιματική, upon a double Account Because, upon a Survey of Actions, whether before or after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil; and also because it determines itself to be the Guide of Action and of Life, in Contradiftinction from all other Faculties, or natural Principles of Action in the very fame Manner, as fpeculative Reafon directly and naturally judges of fpeculative Truth and Falfhood; and, at the fame Time, is attended with a Consciousness upon Reflection, that the natural Right to judge of them belongs to it.

* Arr. Epict. L. 1. c. I.

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from

DISS. from our experiencing it in Ourselves, and II. recognizing it in each other. It appears from w our exercifing it unavoidably, in the Appro

bation and Difapprobation even of feigned Characters: From the Words, right and wrong, odious and amiable, bafe and worthy, with many others of like Signification in all Languages, applied to Actions and Characters: From the many written Systems of Morals which fuppofe it; fince it cannot be imagined, that all these Authors, throughout all these Treatifes, had abfolutely no Meaning at all to their Words, or a Meaning merely chimerical: From our natural Sense of Gratitude, which implies a Distinction between merely being the Inftrument of Good, and intending it: From the like Distinction, every one makes, between Injury and mere Harm, which, Hobbs fays, is peculiar to Mankind; And between Injury and just Punishment, a Distinction plainly natural, prior to the Confideration of human Laws. It is manifeft great Part of common Language, and of common Behaviour over the World, is formed upon Suppofition of fuch a Moral Faculty; whether called Confcience, moral Reafon, moral Senfe, or divine Reason ; whether confidered as a Sentiment of the Understanding, or as a Perception of the Heart, or, which feems the Truth, as including both. Nor is it at all doubtful in the general,

general, what Course of Action this Facul-D 1 s 9. ty, or practical difcerning Power within us, II. approves, and what it difapproves. For, as much as it has been difputed wherein Virtue confifts, or whatever Ground for Doubt there may be about Particulars; yet, in general, there is in reality an univerfally acknowledged Standard of it. It is That, which all Ages and all Countries have made Profeffion of in Publick it is That, which every Man you meet, puts on the Shew of: it is That, which the primary and fundamental Laws of all civil Constitutions, over the Face of the Earth, make it their Bufinefs and Endeavour to enforce the Practice of upon Mankind : namely, Justice, Veracity, and Regard to common Good. It being manifest then, in general, that we have such a Faculty or Difcernment as this; it may be of Use to remark fome things, more diftinctly, concerning it.

First, It ought to be observed, that the Object of this Faculty is Actions, comprehending under that Name active or practical Principles: thofe Principles from which Men would act, if Occafions and Circumstances

· ἐν

• ουδὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία - εν πείσει, ἀλλὰ ἐνεργεία. Μ. Αuton. L. 9. 16. Virtutis laus omnis in Actione confiftit. Cic. Off. 1. 1. c. 6.