DISS. gave them Power; and which, when fixed II. and habitual in any Perfon, we call, his

Character. It does not appear, that Brutes have the leaft reflex Senfe of Actions, as diftinguished from Events: or that Will and Defign, which constitute the very Nature of Actions as fuch, are at all an Object to their Perception. But to ours they are: And they are the Object, and the only one, of the approving and difpapproving Faculty. Acting, Conduct, Behaviour, abftracted from all Regard to what is, in Fact and Event, the Confequence of it, is itfelf the natural Object of the moral Difcernment; as fpeculative Truth and Falfhood is, of fpeculative Reafon. Intention of fuch and fuch Confequences, indeed, is always included; for it is Part of the Action itself: but though the intended good or bad Confequences do not follow, we have exactly the fame Senfe of the Action as if they did. In like Manner we think well or ill of Characters, abstracted from all Confideration of the good or the evil, which Perfons of fuch Characters have it actually in their Power to do. We never, in the moral Way, applaud or blame either ourfelves or others, for what we enjoy or what we fuffer, or for having Impreffions made upon us which we confider as altogether out of our Power: but only for what

we

we do, or would have done had it been in DISS. our Power; or for what we leave undone II. which we might have done, or would have n left undone though we could have done it.

Secondly, Our Senfe or Difcernment of Actions as morally good or evil, implies in it a Senfe or Difcernment of them as of

good or ill Defert. It may be difficult to explain this Perception, fo as to answer all the Questions which may be asked concerning it But every one fpeaks of fuch and fuch Actions as deferving Punishment; and it is not, I fuppofe, pretended that they have abfolutely no Meaning at all to the Expreffion. Now the Meaning plainly is not, that we conceive it for the Good of Society, that the Doer of fuch Actions should be made to fuffer. For if unhappily it were refolved, that a Man who, by fome innocent Action, was infected with the Plague, fhould be left to perish, left, by other Peoples coming near him, the Infection should spread: no one would say, he deferved this Treatment. Innocence and Ill'defert are inconfiftent Ideas. Ill-defert always fuppofes Guilt: and if one be not Part of the other, yet they are evidently and naturally connected in our Mind. The Sight of a Man in Mifery raifes our Compaffion Gg. 4 towards

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Diss. towards him; and, if this Mifery be inflictII. ed on him by another, our Indignation a

gainst the Author of it. But when we are informed, that the Sufferer is a Villain, and is punished only for his Treachery or Cruelty; our Compaffion exceedingly leffens, and, in many Inftances, our Indignation · wholly fubfides. Now what produces this Effect, is the Conception of That in the Sufferer, which we call Ill-defert. Upon confidering then, or viewing together, our Notion of Vice and That of Mifery, there results a third, That of Ill-defert. And thus there is in human Creatures an Affociation of the two Ideas, natural and moral Evil, Wickednefs and Punishment. If this Affociation were merely artificial or accidental, it were nothing but being most unqueftionably natural, it greatly concerns us to attend to it, inftead of endeavouring to explain it away.

It may be observed farther, concerning our Perception of good and of ill Defert, that the former is very weak with respect to common Inftances of Virtue. One Reason of which may be, that it does not appear to a Spectator, how far fuch Inftances of Virtue proceed from a virtuous Principle, or in what Degree this Principle is prevalent :

fince a very weak Regard to Virtue may be D1s S. fufficient to make Men act well in many II. common Instances. And on the other hand, our Perception of Ill-defert in vicious Actions leffens, in Proportion to the Temptations Men are thought to have had to fuch Vices. For, Vice in human Creatures confifting chiefly in the Abfence or Want of the virtuous Principle; though a Man be overcome, fuppofe, by Tortures, it does not from thence appear, to what Degree the virtuous Principle was wanting. All that appears is, that he had it not in such a Degree, as to prevail over the Temptation : But poffibly he had it in a Degree, which would have rendred him Proof against common Temptations.

Thirdly, Our Perception of Vice and Illdefert arifes from, and is the Result of, a Comparison of Actions with the Nature and Capacities of the Agent. For, the mere Neglect of doing what we ought to do, would, in many Cafes, be determined by all Men to be in the highest Degree vicious. And this Determination must arise from fuch Comparison, and be the Result of it; because fuch Neglect would not be vicious in Creatures of other Natures and Capacities, as Brutes. And it is the fame alfo

with

Diss. with refpect to pofitive Vices, or fuch as II. confift in doing what we ought not. For,

every one has a different Senfe of Harm done by an Idiot, Madman or Child, and by one of mature and common Underftanding; though the Action of both, including the Intention which is Part of the Action, be the fame: as it may be, fince Idiots and Madmen, as well as Children, are capable not only of doing Mischief, but alfo of intending it. Now this Difference muft arife from fomewhat difcerned in the Nature or Capacities of one, which_renders the Action vicious; and the Want of which in the other, renders the fame Action innocent or lefs vicious: And this plainly fuppofes a Comparison, whether reflected upon or not, between the Action and Capacities of the Agent, previous to our determining an Action to be vicious. And hence arifes a proper Application of the Epithets, incongruous, unfuitable, difproportionate, unfit, to Actions which our moral Faculty determines to be vicious.

Fourthly, It deferves to be confidered, whether Men are more at Liberty, in Point of Morals, to make themfelves miferable without Reason, than to make other People so or diffolutely to neglect their own

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