Now, without confidering what is to be faid in particular to the feveral Parts of this Train of Folly and Extravagance; what has been above intimated, is a full direct general Anfwer to it, namely, that we may fee beforehand that we have not Faculties for this kind of Speculation. For though it be admitted, that from the first Principles of our Nature, we unavoidably judge or determine Some Ends to be abfolutely in themselves preferable to Others, and that the Ends now mentioned, or if they run up into one, that this One is abfolutely the beft; and confequently that we muft conclude the ultimate End defigned, in the Conftitution of Nature and Conduct of Providence, is the most Virtue and Happiness poffible: Yet we are far from being able to judge, what particular Difpofition of things would be moft friendly and affistant to Virtue; or what Means might be abfolutely neceffary to produce the moft Happiness in a Syftem of fuch Extent as our own World may be, taking in all that is past and to come, though we should fuppofe it detached from the Whole of things. Indeed we are so far from being able to judge of this; that we are not Judges what may be the neceffary Means of raifing and conducting one Perfon to the higheft Perfection and Happiness of his Nature. Nay even in the little Affairs of the present

Life, we find Men of different Educations and Ranks are not competent Judges of the Conduct of each other. Our whole Nature leads us to afcribe all moral Perfection to God, and to deny all Imperfection of him. And this will for ever be a practical Proof of his moral Character, to fuch as will confider what a practical Proof is; because it is the Voice of God, fpeaking in us. And from hence we conclude, that Virtue must be the Happiness, and Vice the Mifery, of every Creature; and that Regularity and Order and Right cannot but prevail finally in a Univerfe under His GoBut we are in no fort Judges, what are the neceffary Means of accomplishing this End.

vernment.

Let us then, instead of that idle and not very innocent Employment of forming imaginary Models of a World, and Schemes of governing it, turn our Thoughts to what we experience to be the Conduct of Nature with refpect to intelligent Creatures; which may be refolved into general Laws or Rules of Administration, in the fame Way as many of the Laws of Nature refpecting inanimate Matter may be collected from Experiments. And let us compare the known Conftitution and Course of Things, with what is faid to be the moral Syftem of Nature; the acknowledged Difpenfations of Providence, or that Government

which we find ourselves under, with what Religion teaches us to believe and expect; and see whether they are not analogous and of a piece. And upon fuch a Comparison, it will I think be found, that they are very much fo: that both may be traced up to the fame general Laws, and refolved into the fame Principles of divine Conduct.

The Analogy here proposed to be confidered, is of pretty large Extent, and confifts of feveral Parts; in Some, more, in Others, less, exact. In some few Inftances perhaps it may amount to a real practical Proof; in others not fo. Yet in these it is a Confirmation of what is proved other Ways. It will undeniably show, what too many want to have shown them, that the Syftem of Religion both natural and revealed, confidered only as a System, and prior to the Proof of it, is not a Subject of Ridicule, unless That of Nature be fo too. And it will afford an Anfwer to almost all Objections against the System both of natural and revealed Religion; though not perhaps an Anfwer in fo great a Degree, yet in a very confiderable Degree an Answer, to the Objections against the Evidence of it: For Objections again ft a Proof, and Objections against what is said to be proved, the Reader will observe are different Things.

Now

Now the divine Government of the World, implied in the Notion of Religion in general and of Christianity, contains in it; That Mankind is appointed to live in a future State; That There, every one shall be rewarded or punished f; rewarded or punished respectively for all that Behaviour Here, which we comprehend under the Words, Virtuous or Vitious, morally good or evil: That our prefent Life is a Probation, a State of Trial, and of Discipline, for that future one; Notwithstanding the Objections, which Men may fancy they have, from Notions of Neceffity, against there being any fuch moral Plan as this at all; And whatever Objections may appear to lie against the Wisdom and Goodness of it, as it stands fo imperfectly made known to us at present1: That this World being in a State of Apoftacy and Wickedness, and consequently of Ruin, and the Senfe both of their Condition and Duty being greatly corrupted amongst Men, this gave Occafion for an additional Difpenfation of Providence; of the utmost Importance; proved by Miracles"; but containing in it many Things appearing to us strange and not to have been expected; a Difpenfation of Providence, which

e Ch. i. i Ch. v. ■ Ch. ii,

f Ch. ii. * Ch. vi. • Ch. iii.

Ch. iii.
Chap. vii.

h Ch. iv.
Part II. Ch. i.

is a Scheme or Syftem of things ; carried on by the Mediation of a divine Person, the Meffiah, in order to the Recovery of the World; yet not revealed to all Men, nor proved with the strongest poffible Evidence to all those to whom it is revealed; but only to fuch a Part of Mankind, and with fuch particular Evidence as the Wisdom of God thought fit. The Defign then of the following Treatise will be to fhew, that the several Parts principally objected against in this Moral and Chriftian Difpenfation, including its Scheme, its Publication, and the Proof which God has afforded us of its Truth; that the particular Parts principally objected against in this whole Difpenfation, are analagous to what is experienced in the Conftitution and Course of Nature, or Providence; that the chief Objections themselves which are alledged against the former, are no other, than what may be alledged with like Juftness against the latter, where they are found in Fact to be inconclufive; and that this Argument from Analogy is in general, unanswerable, and undoubtedly of Weight on the fide of Religion', notwithstanding the Objections which may seem to lie against it, and the real Ground which there may be for Difference of Opinion, as to the particular Degree of Weight

? Ch. iv. 4 Ch. v. Ch. vi, vii. f Ch. viii.