2 of babyhood; to feel jealousy when rivalled by one of the same sex and to act conspicuously when attracted by one of the opposite sex, are instincts of youth. The common usage of the words instinct and instinctive differs from the psychologist's usage. People commonly say that they do or feel certain things instinctively when they act or feel without deliberation or forethought or clear consciousness of what or why; e.g., "He instinctively lifted the glass to his lips." "By instinct I realized that the only way of escape was directly through the fire." Neither of these cases would be called instinctive by the psychologist. For to him an instinct means an act that is the result of mere inner growth, not of training or experience. Habits.-Tendencies to respond which are created in whole or in part by experience, practice or training are called Habits. The instinctive tendencies become habits as soon as experience alters them. Practically all of human behavior is a series of illustrations of habits. In common talk the word is used only of tendencies to respond which have become very frequent and very habitual, such as eating three meals a day, taking off our clothes when we go to bed, bowing to acquaintances, thinking four when we see 2+2, and the like. But the essential nature of the behavior is the same whether the habit is partially formed and rarely used or fully formed and always used. Indeed, for psychology every tendency for anything to go with anything else is either a case of a pure instinct or of habit. Powers. Habits not in action and possibilities of forming habits are called Powers. For instance, that man has the power to avoid theft who would be habitually honest, though tempted, or who will habitually, when tempted, not thieve. Capacities. The inborn qualities which are the partial basis for the development of mental powers might be called instincts of possibility rather than of fact, they being qualities which will result in the presence of the powers or habits corresponding to them when the proper circumstances arise. The common word for these instincts of possibility is Capacities. Thus the capacity for composing music means the qualities which, though themselves unknown, will, when the proper opportunity comes, blossom out into the power to compose music and the habit of doing so. Associations of Ideas.-Those habits of thought by which any one state of mind tends to call up a certain other idea are called Associations of Ideas. Thus we should say that the thought of AB calling up the thought of C, or the thought of 90 degrees calling up the thought of heat or of a right angle, were cases of the association of ideas, or, more clearly, of habits in the realm of ideas. Inferences. When one thought or judgment calls up another leading on to some related conclusion the process is called an Inference. Thus, whereas we would call the sequence, 'John is sick. I like John,' a mere association of ideas, we should regard as an inference the sequence, 'John has the measles. Fred has been playing with him. Fred will probably have the measles.' A series of such directed thoughts or inferences is called Reasoning or Rational Thinking. In general the term Situation is used for any total set of circumstances in the outside world and in one's body by which the mind is influenced; Stimulus is used for any particular part of a situation; Reaction and Response are used for the act, and sometimes for the mental state that occurs as a result of the stimulus. Exercises 1. Classify the following cases of connection as (1A), (1B), (2A), (2B), (3A) or (3B), or at least as (1), (2) or (3). 2. a. Shutting the eyes when a bright light is flashed into them. b. Bowing to an acquaintance seen. c. Hearing ten times eight and thinking eighty. d. Seeing a pin and picking it up. e. Feeling pain at a severe blow. f. Thinking of an engagement at a distance and taking one's hat and coat and starting. g. Thinking of 'I cannot tell a lie' and then of George Washington. h. Feeling disbelief at seeing, "England has voted to do away with the King and the House of Lords." i. Seeing red when light waves of 460 billion vibrations per second strike the retina of the eye, and violet when the waves have a vibration rate of 790 billions per second. j. Thinking of 8 after thinking 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. Which of the cases above are reflexes? Which are associations of ideas? 3. Why might ideo-motor connections or ideo-motor actions be a suitable name for d and f? 4. Name two connections between a mental state and a bodily act which are acquired. Two that are unlearned or native. 5. What are some common connections between thoughts that are acquired in the study of arithmetic? In the study of Latin? Of what sort are the connections formed in learning to play the piano? 6. Give cases illustrating the difference between mere association of ideas and inference. 7. Name two or three beneficial instincts. Two or three undesirable ones. References A. James, Briefer Course, I., XXIII. Stout, Manual, 1-14, 56-70. Titchener, Outline, §§ 1-4, 61. B. Ebbinghaus, Grundzüge, §§ 1, 2, 3, 12. James, Principles, I., XXIII. Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, Einleitung. PART I DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY CHAPTER II FEELINGS OF QUALITIES AND THINGS AS PRESENT: The topic of this and of the next five chapters will be the nature of the different groups of mental states. These six chapters may be grouped together under the general title, Descriptive Psychology or Structural Psychology. § 5. The Nature of Sensations Definitions. The word Sensations is used by writers on psychology with several different meanings. Sometimes they include under this term only feelings of brightness, color, size, pitch, loudness, timbre or tonequality, taste, smell, touch, pressure, resistance, movement, heat, cold, pain, position, rotation, hunger, thirst and other feelings of definite qualities of things and well known conditions of the body. But often they include also the feelings of fatigue of different sorts, of effort or strain, of suspense or expectancy, of shock, shuddering, trembling, well-being, malaise, dizziness and other feelings of vague and little understood bodily conditions. Ordinarily they include only the simple, bare, uncombined feelings under the term sensation and treat the actual complex feelings (e.g., of the taste of a mouthful of acid, the smell of the woods or the touch of a pin) as mixtures or combinations of simpler elementary feelings. But they also use the word more vaguely for all direct feelings of the qualities of things or of conditions of the body which are not the definite feelings of things classed as percepts or the rich combinations of feelings classed as emotions. This being the usage, the complex sound of a city street, the taste of coffee or the shock of a cold plunge would be called a sensation. Sensations are sometimes defined as the primitive, bare elements of mental life, the first things in consciousness. From this point of view only the original appearance of any feeling can be called sensation; after that the mental state equals sensation plus association or experience. The fact of importance that appears from these various definitions, is that they and all others are arbitrary, that in fact we cannot draw clear lines of distinction between sensations of qualities of things and sensations of bodily conditions,-between sensations from special, well-known stimuli like sounds and from vague, illknown stimuli like the condition of the blood or the gnawings of dyspepsia,-between atomic, indivisible bits of brightness or pain or bitter and complex masses of color, toothache or tones,-between the first sensation of any sort and the subsequent ones modified by it. Nor can we draw a clear line around sensations (taken in the broad sense shown by the group of samples above) so as to infallibly separate sensations from percepts or from emotions or from certain feelings of relationships. It is indeed as important to know that these mental states shade off the one into the other as to know the general features of difference which lead us to separate them into groups. Realizing then that definitions must be rough, one |