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The Real Meaning of Acts of Pure Will.-The facts stated in the preceding paragraphs provide the real meaning and the explanation of those cases where man appears to act contrary to the laws of association, in spite of instinctive tendencies, pleasurable consequences and frequency of connection, by an exertion of pure will. They show first of all that the exertion of pure will influences acts only indirectly by influencing mental states. The will to do a thing is the will to keep a frame of mind that will result in the doing of that thing. "The will is a relation between the mind and its ideas.” "The point to which the will is directly applied is always an idea." We do not choose movements, but the ideas leading to movements. In the second place, the contradiction of the laws of association is not real, only apparent. The ascetic who scourges himself really illustrates those very laws, in particular the law of partial activity; for his act is the sequent, not of the mere total mental state 'whip in hand,' but of the thought, 'Strike, bruise, crucify your flesh, feel pain for the glory of God! Yes! Yes!', to which his act is the natural sequent. The connection would be unexpected if the instinctive tendencies felt were those of self-preservation, but they are not: they are those of self-sacrifice. It would be unexpected if the painful consequences were attended to, but they are not: the satisfaction of repentance, restitution and peace is the main resultant. It would be unexpected if the antecedent state of mind were that which an ordinary mortal would face when thinking of giving himself a beating, but it is not: the 'Yes! Yes!', the feeling of acceptance, means that the ideas that would lead to opposing acts are all banished and that the way is open and unimpeded to the movements of scourging oneself, which are, in view of the circumstances, the most frequent connection. In

the third place, since the exertion of pure will works always upon mental states, it is a feature of thought as well as of conduct. Man contributes to the world by knowledge and belief in the same way as by choice and action.

The real fact to which experiences of the choice of the hard instead of the easy and the rare instead of the usual, refer, the real meaning of the exertion of pure will,— is the law of partial activity, the power of man to attend to and cherish whatever frame of mind appeals to his general purpose in life or to the ideal of the moment. In rational thinking he may discard the customary and obvious in favor of some abstract element which appeals perhaps to none but him. In controlled action he may banish ordinary likes and dislikes, usual habits and impulses, and elevate to the leadership of his mind some ideal purpose,-some motive which defies the claims of the majority of men and even those of his own past. His will is free in the sense that at any moment what he will attend to and cherish depends upon him, upon his attitude toward the situation he confronts. Whether it is free in the further sense that this attitude would be unpredictable even by a perfect intelligence that knew his inborn nature and entire previous experience, is a question unanswered by science and disputed by philosophers.

§ 52. The Nature of the Mental States Which Precede Movements

The Problem.-Psychologists have argued much about what kinds of mental states are the antecedents of movements in purposive action. The arguments concern chiefly (1) the so-called feelings of innervation, (2) the feeling of decision, of consent, of 'let this act be,' the fiat, and (3) the memory images of the feelings produced by the movement.

By feelings of innervation are meant feelings directly due to the passage of the nervous impulse to efferent neurones and through them to the muscles. It is very doubtful whether any feelings are so caused. They certainly are not essential to the execution of a purposely made movement. The feeling of decision has been already described. Though of frequent occurrence, notably in action after deliberation, it cannot be regarded as a sine qua non of purposive action, as defined in this book; for of the thousand intentional acts of a day, only a small number are preceded by it. The memory images of the feelings produced by the movement are of two sorts, Resident and Remote. By resident feelings are meant the feelings of tension, movement and the like of the moving part, due to the movement itself. By remote feelings are meant the feelings of any sort secondarily caused by the movement, e.g., the sound due to the movements of saying a word, the pressure due to grasping a stick, or the sight of the clinching and clinched fist due to the same movements.

Any Variety of Mental State May Precede a Voluntary Act.-Nearly all writers on psychology seem sure that some special sort of feelings must be present in purposive action. Some think the feeling of decision must always be there; some think that feelings of innervation must be there; nearly all think that at least memory images of the feelings produced by the movement must be there. Only recently has it been argued that after all there is no justification for the assumption that any peculiar sort of feeling is a necessary element of purposive action; that really any mental state whatever may be the antecedent of an intentional act. Yet this seems easily demonstrable. For instance, I just now completed the purposive action of writing, 'Yet this seems easily

demonstrable.' The act was certain finger and arm movements and certain eye movements involved in guiding them. But my antecedent state of mind contained no images whatever of feelings in my fingers, arms or eyes, nor even of the sight of the words. It was simply the judgment, 'Yet this seems easily demonstrable,' felt with the auditory images of the words. A few hours ago I signed a lease, and I can confidently affirm that the thought antecedent to the act contained no images of any sensations in any way connected with the act of writing my name, but only the auditory images, 'He came to my terms after all.' Professor James, who maintains that "whether or no there be anything else in the mind at the moment when we consciously will a certain act, a mental conception made up of these sensations (of the movement's results) *** must be there," (Principles, Vol. II, p. 492) gives illustrations which prove precisely that the antecedent to a movement need never have been its result. "We say, 'I must go downstairs,' and ere we know it we have risen, walked and turned the handle of a door." (Idem. p. 519) "Hallo! I must lie here no longer," is the antecedent to getting out of bed. (Idem. P. 524).

The Feelings Produced by a Movement Rarely Cause It. In fact, the doctrine that the image of some one of the previous results or effects of a movement is its necessary antecedent in purposive action makes the perversest of mistakes. The antecedent is some one of its previous preliminaries or causes. Occasionally what was first a result or effect of a movement may later be thought of as a preliminary, and so become its antecedent in still later connections, but in general what has led to a movement, not what has come after it, will lead to it on future occasions. It is not the image of a mouth full of liquid

but the sight of the bottle, that makes the baby reach out its hands. It is not the feeling of a brush on one's head, but the thought 'I must comb my hair,' that assists our toilet. It is not the thought of feeling warm but of feeling cold, that commonly makes one build a fire. It is the thought of a bill as due, not as having been paid, which makes us draw a check. We do not move our eyes so as to focus them on an object because we see it clearly, but because we don't. We do not eat because we feel full in imagination, but because we feel empty in reality.

Motives. So also there is no need of restricting the word motive to any particular class of feelings. Any mental state many serve as a motive. For a motive to an act is simply any fact which assists to be present and to be approved, a mental state which will have the act as its sequent. A motive against the act is simply any fact which hinders the presence and approval of a mental state which will have the act as its sequent. One of the most artificial doctrines about human nature which has ever acquired prominence is the doctrine that pleasure and pain, felt or imagined, are the only motives to action, that a human being is constantly making a conscious or unconscious calculation of the amount of each which the contemplated act will produce, and that his entire behavior is the result of such a lifelong series of complicated sums in addition and subtraction. Pleasure and pain do play a leading rôle in determining action, but the cast of characters includes also percepts, ideas and emotions of all sorts.

Exercises

1. State in the case of each of the following whether it is an instinctive or an acquired connection:

Situation

A bright light.

Response

Blinking.

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