in that they are unselfish, not proprietary, do not imply the possession of, or exclusion of others from, the object causing the pleasure but only its presence; and second, in that they arise from the intrinsic qualities of the object, not from its derived values. The pleasures of taste are thus not called aesthetic because one cannot eat his cake and leave it for others to eat too. The pleasure one has in seeing a coin because of its form and chasing is called aesthetic, while the pleasure in its money value is not. The pseudo-emotions1 are distinguished from their real correspondents in that they do not arouse the same bodily reactions and impulses and are free from excessive pain or pleasure. Thus the sorrow felt for the suffering hero in the story is unlike real sorrow (1) in that one does not rush around wringing his hands and seeking to offer help nor feel like doing so, and (2) in that, whereas real sorrow is very uncomfortable, the pseudo-sorrow of the reader of the story is more or less enjoyable. In place of both the violent pangs and delights of real jealousy and affection, the reader of a novel has only a rather mild excitement, which is commonly pleasant regardless of the quality of the corresponding real emotion. § 16. The Attributes of Emotions Their Bodily Expression.-Omitting from consideration the feelings of tendency and the aesthetic feelings, one finds that emotions as a class are characterized by emphatic bodily expression; e. g., fear expresses itself far more than does a feeling of seventeen. It is usually not difficult to tell whether a person is frightened, happy, 'It is conceivable, and has, I believe, been by some literary critics suggested, that these pseudo-emotions occupy the same position toward real emotions that mental images do to percepts. They are on the whole rather a mystery. angry or eager by his facial expression and bodily movements, whereas it is impossible to tell whether he is thinking of seventeen or of seventy, of a cat or of a mat. Other thoughts and feelings do influence the bodily organs, the facial muscles especially, but not to such an extent as do the emotions. Doing arithmetic does raise the pulse, but it cannot make the heart go pit-a-pat as fear does. Attention leads to a frown, but not to the tremen dous wrinkles of the man in a rage. Their Impulsive Power.-Emotions, especially the coarser ones, cause not only these expressive movements, but also further movements of effect. They tend to arouse some emphatic acts, running, jumping, seizing, biting or the like. Our ideas and judgments more often guide and restrain, while the emotions more often arouse, action. The more intellectual feelings also, in so far as they do arouse action, lead to the more orderly and restrained movements of face, eyes and throat; while the emotional states impel to more gross and violent movements. Their Early Development.—The emotions are older in the individual and in the race than images, feelings of meaning and relationships, or judgments. They come along with vague sensations, as early steps in the growth of the infant's mind. During the first year anger, joy, impatience and other emotions are evident. They appear in animals below man in the scale of development. Birds and mammals that give few signs of the possession of images and almost certainly lack feelings of meaning, relationships or judgments, manifest many of the coarser emotions of the human mind. It is when we are absorbed in emotional feelings that we act more or less as the lower animals do. In general the progress of development involves a weakening of the coarser animal-like emotions and their transformation into sentiments by the mixture of ideas with them. The Infrequency of Reproduced Emotions.-Emotions are less often and less easily imaged than are percepts. One can easily remember that he did feel angry; but he then has not a real image of the anger feeling, but only a judgment that at such and such a time he was angry. Occasionally individuals do have, or at least report that they have, a feeling of anger as not present comparable to the image of a sight or a sound. But such cases are surely rare and may really be cases where the individual by recalling certain circumstances gets a real but lesser emotion of anger, not a true image of it. It may be, as was hinted in the note on page 81, that the revival of an emotion in imagination takes the form of the pseudo or aesthetic emotions. 3. Name one or two emotions characterized by much tension. 4. Name one or two emotions characterized by much relief. 5. Name one or two emotions characterized by much restlessness. 6. Name one or two emotions characterized by much definite bodily feeling. 7. Name one or two emotions characterized by little definite bodily feeling. 8. Name one or two emotions characterized by much outward expression. 9. Name one or two emotions characterized by little outward expression. IO. Name one or two emotions which are common to man and the lower animals. II. Name one or two emotions which are primarily individual, that is concern chiefly oneself. 12. Name one or two emotions which are primarily social, that is concern chiefly others. 13. What is the bodily expression of rage? 17. (a) What part of speech almost invariably expresses an emotional state? (b) What parts of speech almost never do? 18. What kind of sentence almost always expresses an emotion? 19. Which can animals express to us most clearly, their sensations or their emotions? Why? References A. James, Briefer Course, XXIV. Stout, Manual, 276-311, 562-580. James, Principles, XXV. Wundt, Physiologische Psychologie, XVIII. CHAPTER VI MENTAL STATES CONCERNED IN THE DIRECTION OF CONDUCT: FEELINGS OF WILLING § 17. Definitions and Descriptions Feelings of Willing in General.-Books on psychology commonly announce three divisions of mental life, cognition, emotion and volition, or, in the older phraseology, the intellect, the feelings and the will, but give nine-tenths or more of their space to cognition and the emotions. In so far as psychology attempts merely to describe states of consciousness, this subordination is not unfair. For, although the will in a broad sense deserves as much study as the intellect, the feelings of willing do not require lengthy explanation. For that purpose this one section will suffice. The will, in the broad sense of the entire basis of human action, will receive due attention in Part III. The important mental states concerned primarily in the direction of conduct are usually stated to be feelings of impulse, wishing or desire, deliberation, motives, decision and choice, will, effort, consent, and of the so-called 'fiat.' It is, of course, true that mental states of all sorts may appear in intimate connection with the life of action. But it will be best to follow the custom that singles out for treatment under one head the mental states named. Impulses. One is tempted to desire a special name for the class of feelings which in the round-about phrases |