of common thought and speech are called 'an impulse to sneeze,' 'an impulse to laugh,' 'an impulse to run,' and the like. Many feelings are so intimately connected with acts that the only names for them are names of the acts to which they lead. E.g., the feelings that lead us to yawn and to cough appear almost never save as impulses to these acts; are not felt by themselves; do not reappear as images; and play but a slight part in the development of the fabric of ideas and judgments as a whole. Yet strictly speaking these two feelings are sensations, are feelings of bodily condition comparable to the sensations. of tickling, heat, cold, pain, and the like. And in a strict classification there need be no separate heading for impulses. The feelings that are commonly called impulses are those sensations and emotions which are vague, obscure and little emphasized in the mind in comparison with the acts to which they lead.

It is further true that any mental state whatever may be an impulse, may take on the aspect of impeller to an act. Feelings of relationships and feelings of meaning do so but infrequently and slightly; images and memories do so somewhat more; percepts, sensations and emotions do so most of all. Those among the last that do so preeminently are commonly called impulses.

Although we must abandon the notion of impulses as a group of feelings distinct from all others, we might have a right to speak of an impulse-quality which could add itself to any feeling, but was itself a new kind of mental stuff. But the psychologists of to-day deny that one has that right. By the impulsive quality of a mental state is meant, they say, not any peculiar aspect of it as felt, but only its quality of being connected directly with an act. The description of this impulsive quality comes then

under the description of the connections between mental states and bodily acts.

Desires and Wishes.-Desire and wishing are emotions, and have been so classified in the previous chapter. When we feel, 'I wish I had that picture,' the feeling includes the thought of the object and an emotional attitude toward it. The particular sort of emotion is, it is true, somewhat more frequently and emphatically connected with conduct than are emotions of other sorts, but the difference is only one of degree. The 'I wish' represents a state of mind not in general character different from 'I hate' or 'I pity' or 'I fear.' It represents a special activity of the mind no more and no less than do they.

Deliberation.-The word deliberation is used in ordinary speech to mean any state of mind in which some topic is considered attentively. It then means little more than a state of attention. In the more restricted use of the word to describe a state of will, psychologists mean by it the consideration of a topic calling for mental choice or bodily action. In such cases the state of mind is likely to include different and more or less opposed motives. We think over the alternatives, have ideas favoring this, that or the other, and swing suspended between them. The presence of percepts, images and feelings of meaning plus an emotion of doubt or uncertainty describes deliberation from the inside. From the outside, it is a state of hesitation before action.

Decision and Choice.-The termination of this hesitation, suspension or conflict of ideas is sometimes marked by a feeling of decision or choice. We must not confuse here the fact of decision with the feeling of decision. The fact of decision or choice, which means simply that one motive has conquered.-that one idea or act has prevailed in the mind,-may have much or little or no feeling

of choice accompanying it. Thus, in writing the last sentence, I thought first of writing 'little or nothing' and then of writing 'little or no.' The latter was chosen, but there was no feeling of choice or decision,-no consciousness of anything but the two phrases and the grammatical superiority of the second. On the other hand we often have an intense feeling of acceptance of the one course and of rejection of the other, a feeling of 'yes to this, no to that.' Such feelings are akin to, if not identical with, the feelings of belief and disbelief and of attraction and repulsion and belong properly among the emotions.

The Fiat. The term, the 'fiat' of will, is applied to a feeling which may perhaps be analyzed out in some cases from the feeling of acceptance, a feeling of 'Go ahead,' 'Let the act occur,' 'Let the consequences of my decision become real.'

Willing. The words to will are used as general words to express the fact of decision in favor of or consent to any course of action which has been the topic of thought. The word is used especially of cases where the decision is accompanied by a feeling of effort, where we decide against natural tendencies. We do not say that we willed to breathe because no decision was involved. We do not say that we willed to eat our breakfast this morning because the action was not the topic of thought. We do not often say that we willed to stay in bed this morning because, though the issue may have been the topic of thought and a decision may have been involved, the action accepted was easy and natural. We do say, 'I got up this morning by sheer will,' because thought, decision and effort were markedly present. In all this there is no description of any special feeling of willing or volition, but only of a general experience involving certain feelings and tendencies to action. The feelings present

when one wills to do or think something are in fact those already described.

The Will.-The phrase 'the will' is used most often to mean the source of all purposive action. In this sense it equals the general fact of connections between mental states and acts. Thus we say, 'To educate the will is more important than to educate the intellect.' It is used at times to mean the power to inhibit attractive in favor of less attractive ideas and acts. Thus we say, 'It re quired will to do that.' It is used at times by psychologists as a class name for all those feelings which are closely associated with acts. Thus we say that mental states comprise states of thought, states of feeling and states of will, or are divided among cognition, emotion and volition or will.

The terms effort and motive have been used without description. The feeling of effort needs no description, for anyone who has ever attended to an uninteresting piece of mental or bodily work, or chosen the disagreeable, repulsive duty, or willed to do and done the painful task, has had direct experience of the feeling. The term motive is used for any sensation, percept, image, feeling of meaning, judgment or emotion which shares in swaying one's decisions. In so far as it influences our willing, any idea is called a motive.

On the whole the feelings concerned in the life of conduct are in the main, perhaps entirely, made up of intellectual and emotional stuff. Action itself is not thought nor emotion, but it is felt in and guided by thought and emotion. The special psychology of the will is chiefly not a descriptive account of the feelings connected with conduct, but an account of capacities for and habits of action and of the connections between thoughts and acts. This will be found in Part III.

Exercises

Notice your feelings as you follow the directions given in this paragraph. Follow them without question. a. Choose a certain number between 100 and 200. b. Will to turn to that page (i. e., the page of the chosen number) or not to do so. c. It is left to you whether you will take the trouble to write to the author' of this book a description of how you feel (a) when you decide to go to church rather than to stay at home, and (b) when you will to continue studying, though bored and sleepy. The information is seriously and earnestly requested by him. Decide whether you promise to do so or not.

1. Did you or did you not in choosing the number have any feeling of decision or of indecision?

2. In case you willed to turn to that page, what was your feeling of willing to do so? (i. e., describe the feeling).

3. In case you willed not to turn to the page, what was your feeling of willing not to do so? (i. e., describe the feeling).

4. In case you decided to promise to write to the author, describe your feeling of deciding to.

5. In case you decided not to do so, describe your feeling of deciding not to.

As before, follow the directions, noticing your feelings.

d. Take a pencil and write your name.

e.

Make up your mind to buy ten cents worth of stamps to-morrow.

6. Did you, before taking the pencil and writing your name, (I) feel nothing but the words read; or did you (II) have an image of the movements to be made; or did you (III) have a visual image of the name as written?

If you had any other feelings as components of the 'willing,' what were they?

7. Did you, in resolving to buy the stamps, (I) feel nothing but acquiescence to the words read; or did you (II) feel 'All right,' or 'Yes,' or 'I will'; or did you (III) feel also an image of yourself handing out money; or did you (IV) feel also yourself going to the purchasing place, taking out money and handing it over to the clerk; or did you (V) feel, in place of III and IV or

1 The author will indeed be very glad if some of the students of this book are willing to send him descriptions of their feelings of willing. He has already many such records.