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habits of intemperance are the chief cause of crime, is the testimony of all judges of large experience. More than two hundred years ago, Sir Matthew Hale, the chief justice of England, to whom as a writer and judge we are greatly indebted for our criminal law, speaking on this subject, said: The places of judicature I have long held in this kingdom have given me an opportunity to observe the original cause of most of the enormities that have been committed for the space of nearly twelve years, and by due observation, I have found that if the murders and manslaughters, the burglaries and rob. beries, the riots and tumults, the adulteries, fornications, rapes and other enormities that have happened in that time, were divided into five parts, four of them have been the issue and product of excessive drinking-of tavern and ale-house drinking.'

Leaping over two hundred years of English history and jurisprudence, I call one other eminent judge of great experience to testify. Lord Chief Baron Kelly, perhaps the oldest judge now on the English bench, says in a letter to the arch-deacon of Canterbury: Two-thirds of the crimes which come before the courts of law of this country are occasioned chiefly by intemper ance.'

It is established beyond argument, by official statistics, by the experience of courts, and by the observation of enlightened philanthropists, that the prevalence of intemperance in every country is the standard by which its crimes may be measured."

It is estimated that 400 suicides and 5,000 murders annually result from intemperance.

This mournful array of facts and figures might be multiplied indefinitely, but enough has been shown to convince any candid man that this evil does "threaten the state" does "produce crime," is "injurious to our citizens," does "produce illness, vice, and debauchery," and hence the state" has the right to regulate, restrain, or altogether prohibit it if it thinks proper."

Judges McLean, Canton, Daniel and Grier, in cases of Sam'l Thurlow v.Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Joel Fletcher, v. The State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, and Andrew and Thomas Pierce v. The State of New Hampshire, all causes tried in the United States supreme court, all concur in the opinions of Justices Taney and Woodbury, and declare that there is nothing in the constitution of the United States to prevent a state from either regulating, controlling or entirely prohibiting the traffic in intoxicating liquors, and Mr. Justice Grier goes so far as to include the consumption of liquors as the proper subject of state regulation and probibition (5 Howard, page 505). Justice Bennett, of the supreme court of Vermont, in case of Russell H. Lincoln v. Franklin Smith and others, 27 Vermont reports, page 328, reiter. ates the same docrine.

In the case of People v. Hawley, 3 Mich. 342, the supreme court says: "In the exercise of its police powers the state has full power to prohibit, under penalties, the exercise of any trade or employment which is found to be hazardous or injurious to its citizens and destructive to the best interests of society, without providing compensation to those upon whom the prohibition operates."

In the case of Austin v. The State, 10th Missouri, page 593, the court says: "It is equally true that the state legislature have the power, unless there be something in their own constitution to prohibit it, of entirely abolishing or placing under restrictions any trade or profession which they may deem expedient."

v.

The right of the legislature to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors is expressly held in the case of Jones . The People, 14th Illinois, page 196. The supreme court of Georgia, in 18th Vol., page 586, in an elaborate opinion, in which cases are cited and commented upon, affirm the same action.

This subject was fully discussed in all its constitutional bearings, and all the American cases cited and commented upon in the case of South et al. v. The State, 2 Iowa Reports, page 189, and the conclusion is reached in a very exhaustive opinion that there is no constitutional objection to the right of the legislature to pass prohibitory liquor laws.

L

The following are the other cases in which the same doctrine is held:

25 Connecticut, page 290.

29 Connecticut, page 487.

20 Iowa, page 82.

20 Iowa, page 497.

34 New York, page 657.
5 Rhode Island, page 185.

5 Rhode Island, page 497.

It has been claimed that the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States contains provisions that would render all state laws prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors unconstitutional. Whatever may have been the fact previous to the adoption of this amend. ment, Mr. Justice Bradley, in rendering the decision of the United States supreme court, in an appeal taken from the supreme court of Massachusetts, rendered after the ratification of the fourteenth amendment, affirms in very distinct and unmistakable terms the right of a state to enact laws "prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors."

The court declares: "If the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of any manufacture or traffic, the hand of the legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance, by any incidental inconvenience which individuals or corporations may suffer. All rights are held subject to the police power of the state.

The plaintiff in error takes the ground that, being a corporation, it has a right, by contract, to manufacture and sell beer forever, notwithstanding, and in spite of any exigencies which may occur in the morals or health of the community requiring such manufacture to cease. We do not so understand the rights of the plaintiff. The legislature has no power to confer any such right.

Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the extent and boundaries of the police power, and however difficult it may be to render a satisfactory definition of it, there seems to be no doubt that it does extend to the protec tion of the lives, bealth and property of the citizens, and to the preservation of good order and the public morals.

Since we have already held (in a former case) that as a measure of police regulation, looking to the preservation of public morals, a state law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is not repugnant to any clause of the constitution of the United States, we see nothing in the present case that can afford any sufficient ground for disturbing the decision of the supreme court of Massachusetts."

But we are not compelled to rely upon the opinions of the distinguished jurists Taney, Woodbury, McLean, Caton, Daniel, Grier and Bradley, of the supreme court of the United States, nor yet upon the very learned Justice Bennett, of the supreme court of Vermont, as our supreme court of Wisconsin has declared, in the State ex rel. Henshell. Ludington, 33d vol. Wis. Reports, page 107, that "the legislature, as an exercise of the police power, may entirely prohibit the selling or giving away of ardent or intoxicating liquors to be used as a beverage."

Other authorities might be cited to support the proposition that the state may entirely "prohibit the traffic in intoxicating I quors, except for medicinal or art purposes."

The next question to be considered is, Should this legislature submit the question to the people, or take such measures as it can to allow the voters of the state to decide what shall be the future policy of the state upon this subject?

Your committee believe it should, and submit the following as some of the reasons for such belief:

All power is inherent in the people. Legislators are the representatives or agents of the people, and when uninstructed, are governed in their official action by their convictions of the correct line of policy to pursue for the best interests of the state at large, subject only to the constitution.

Every government on the globe that is republican in form that is of, and for the people, has and does recognize the right of petition, and the right of the people to petition their agents being admitted, the duty of the agent to respect and to grant the prayer of the petitioner or resign his agency is es

tablished, provided the thing or measure of relief asked for is not clearly and undeniably destructive of some well establis ed principle of constitutional law.

In this instance 13,000 voters have in a respectful manner asked this legislature not to legislate upon the question of temperance, but to provide the machinery by which te vo ers of the state may settle it in accordance with the will of the majority.

This they ask, and nothing more.

Loking back over our state's history, we find that in 1862 the legislature submitted the question of an amer.dment to the constitution providing for an increased salary of the governor, which was voted down.

In 1872 they submitted to the people an amendment to the constitution to increase the number of judges of the supreme court, which was voted down. In 1852 the banking law was submitted; in 1858, 1861, 1866, 1868, 1876, amendments to the constitution were submitted by the legislature to the people for their settlement, and in 1853 a prohibitory liquor law was submitted to the people by the legislature; and in the above nine cases it is safe to say that the whole number of petitions aggregated less in number than are asking the adoption of this resolution.

So that if we are governed by either precedent or principle, the conclusion comes home to us irresistibly, that, if we would be true to the principle that the people should rule, that the popular will is the source of all political power, that we are the agents of the people, and not their masters, we must send the question back to them for settlement by the passage of this resolution

Your committee believe that the primary object of all governments should, be the protection of its citizens from whatever harm may menace them, so far as p acticable, and that in obedience to that principle a large majority of the best rules laid down for the well-being of society is predicated; and inasmuch as men can be found bold and reckless enough to deny that the liquor traffic is destructive of both national and individual prosperity and happiness, it is the primary duty of the state to lessen, if it cannot entirely destroy it.

But we are told that it cannot pass the ordeal of popular judgment and receive a majority vote.

This can only be known by a trial upon such submission, and if it fails no harm can come of such failure to either party or interest.

Again we are told that if it should pass and become a part of the fundamental law of the state, it could not be enforced.

Your committee are unwilling to conclue that the friends of the traffic are so unrepublican in sentiment, and so recklessly wedded to an appetite, that they would willingly and wantonly rebel against a law which must be clearly established as the will of the majority before it can have any binding force, nor are they willing to believe that a majority of the voters, backed by the co-operation of that grand army of our best citizens who (to our shame) are not voters, are unable to enforce this law as well as any other law on our statute books against any other crime.

Your committee, in closing this report, desire to say that in recommending te adoption of the resolution under consideration, they do not commit themselves, or their friends, or their party for or against the idea that prohibition crystalized into a law would be beneficial or injurious to the people as that is not a question for them or this legislature to decide at this time, or by their action upon this resolutiun, but that it is the right of the state to adopt suc policy on this subject as it may think proper; but that the legislature may and ought to adopt this resolution, that a settlement of this question may be decided by a majority of the voters of the state in their own way seems to be so plain that further argument is unnecessary. All of which is respectfully submitted.

WM. T. PRICE, Chairman,
W. T. PARRY,
JAMES H. CABANIS,

Messrs. Keogh and Maxon dissenting.

25-A. J.

Select Committee.

RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED.

By Select Committee on Liquor Traffic:

Jt. Res. No. 17, A.,*

Resolved by the assembly, the senate concurring, That the constitution be amended by adding an additional article number XV, to read as follows:

Article XV. Section 1. The manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors in this state, except strictly for use in the arts and for medical or sacramental purposes. is forever prohibited.

Section 2. The legislature shall at its first session after the adoption of this amendment provide for its enforcement by appropriate legislation.

Lies over.

By Mr. Stevens:

Res. No. 43, A.,

Resolved, That 2,000 extra copies of the report of the committee on Liquor Traffic be printed for the use of the legislature. Lies over.

On motion of Mr. McDonnell,

No. 458, A.,

A bill to provide for an institution for the chronic insane and appropriating one hundred thousand dollars therefor,

Was recommitted to the select committee of five to be appointed by the speaker.

Leave of absence was granted to Mr. Loomis indefinitely.

On motion of Mr. Juve,
The assembly adjourned.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1882.

10:00 A. M.

The assembly met.

Mr. Speaker in the chair.

Prayer by Rev. Mr. Richards.

The journal of yesterday was approved.

Was granted

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

To Messrs. McDill, Rewey, Stevens, MacBride, Abert, Krueger and Shepard during the investigation of the overflow of Fox river and Lake Winnebago.

To Messrs. Borchardt, Bishop, B. P., Gray, Hogan, Huntly, Huchting, Eidemiller, McConnell, Meiklejohn and Pierce, H., till Monday evening.

To Messrs. Chamberlain, Milliken and Juve until Tuesday evening.

By Mr. Abert:

LETTERS, PETITIONS, ETC.

Pet. No. 318, A.,

Petition to extend the boundary limits of the second ward of the city of Milwaukee.

To Milwaukee Delegation.

By Mr. Abert:

Pet. No. 319, A.,

Petition to extend the boundary limits of the second ward of the city of Milwaukee.

To Milwaukee Delegation.

By Mr. Abert:

Pet. No. 320, A.,

Petition to extend the boundary limits of the second ward of the city of Milwaukee.

To Milwaukee Delegation.

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