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and lockouts, industrial statistics, laws and decisions affecting labor, and some account of public employment offices and of the influence of bureaus of labor. Extracts are also given from the reports of the secretary of the American Federation of Labor covering various features of the working of that organization, and from the Eighteenth Annual Report of the United States Commissioner of Labor on the cost of living in the United States.
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS.—Returns are given by localities in detail, showing membership, average weekly earnings of members, their hours of labor, days of idleness and principal causes, benefits paid, special work for members, etc. No summary is presented.
In 1903 there were 82 strikes in Ontario, involving 429 establishments and 10,564 persons. The total duration was 994 days, the average per strike being 12.12 days, and per individual 10.62 days. Twenty-seven of the strikes were reported as successful, 14 unsuccessful, 35 settled by compromise or otherwise, while for 6 no report as to settlement was given. In 11 cases the secretary of the bureau of labor acted officially as conciliator under the Trades Disputes Act of 1902.
In 1904, 54 strikes were reported, involving 171 establishments and 8,945 persons. The total duration of these strikes was 878 days, the average per strike being 14.41 days, and per individual engaged 10.18 days. Fourteen strikes were successful, 14 unsuccessful, 2 partly successful, 18 compromised or otherwise settled, and for 6 the result was not reported. The secretary acted officially as conciliator in 8 instances and unofficially in a number of others.
In 1905, 31 strikes were reported, involving 133 establishments and 2,094 persons. Eleven of the strikes were successful, 5'unsuccessful, 2 partly successful, 2 compromised, 6 unsettled, and for 5 the nature of settlement was not reported. The total duration of these strikes was not stated.
MANUFACTURES.—Statistics for manufactures relate to 205 establishments for 1902, 169 for 1903, and 130 for 1904. The items presented include capital invested, days in operation, value of product and whether increased or decreased as compared with previous year, value of materials used, number of employees, total and average wages paid per annum, percentage of labor cost and of cost of mxterials of gross value of product, etc. Only partial summaries are given.
DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR.
(Except in cases of special interest, the decisions here presented are restricted to those rendered by the Federal courts and the higher courts of the States and Territories. Only material portions of such decisions are reproduced, introductory and explanatory matter being given in the words of the editor. Decisions under statutory law are indexed under the proper headings in the cumulative index, page 473 et seq.)
DECISIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW.
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY—ALIEN BENEFICIARIES-RIGHT TO SUELow Moor Iron Company v. La Bianca's Administrator, Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, 55 Southeastern Reporter, page 532.— This was an action to recover damages for the death of a mine laborer, the judgment to be for the benefit of his nonresident alien widow and son. The Circuit Court of Craig County awarded damages, and from this judgment the company appealed, maintaining among other things that the provisions of sections 2902–2906 of the Code of 1904, which give right of action for injuries, are not available for the benefit of nonresident aliens. The supreme court maintained that they are, basing its conclusions on grounds that appear in the quotation from the opinion of that court as delivered by Judge Harrison, given herewith:
In the case of Pocahontas Collieries Co. v. Rukas' Adm'r, 104 Va. 278, 51 S. E. 449, it was decided that the action could be maintained for the wrongful' death of a resident alien, for the benefit of his resident alien widow and children, residing in another State. The question now before us, where the alien beneficiaries reside in a foreign country, was discussed in that case, with citation of authority on both sides, but was not decided. The investigation of the cases then made led Judge Whittle to remark that “the weight of authority in this country, however, maintains the right even of nonresident alien relatives of the deceased to receive the benefit of these statutes."
Further investigation affords abundant proof of the accuracy of this statement. The earlier cases, both in this country and in England, denied the benefit of these statutes to nonresident aliens, but, more recent judicial utterance is practically united in favor of their right to the benefit of such statutes.
In the case of Mulhall v. Fallon, 176 Mass. 266, 57 N. E. 386 [Bulletin No. 32, p. 153), Holmes, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, observes: “One or two cases may be found where a general grant of a right of action for wrongfully causing death has been held to confer no rights upon nonresident aliens.
On the other hand, in several States the right of the nonresident to sue is treated as too clear to need extended argument”-citing Philpott v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 85 Mo. 164; Chesapeake, etc., Co. v. Higgins, 85 Tenn. 620, 4 S. W. 47; Augusta Ry. Co. v. Glover, 92 Ga. 132, 18 S. E. 406; Luke v. Calhoun County, 52 Ala. 115.
This case establishes the right of nonresident aliens to the benefit of the Massachusetts wrongful death statute, which is similar to our own, The most recent cases all follow the Massachusetts rule. (Kellyville Coal Co. v. Petraytis, 195 Ill. 215, 63 N. E. 94, 88 Am. St. Řep. 191; Szymanski v. Blumenthal (Del. Super.) 52 Atl. 347; Renlund v. Commodore Mining Co., 89 Minn. 41, 93 N. W. 1057,99 Am. St. Rep. 534; Bouthron v. Fenix Light and Fuel Co. (Ariz.) 71 Pac. 941, 61 L. R. A. 563; Romano v. Capital City Brick & Pipe Co., 125 Iowa, 591, 101 N. W. 437, 68 L. R. A. 132, 106 Am. St. Rep. 323; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Osgood (Ind. App.) 73 N. E. 285; Alfson v. Bush, 182 N. Ý. 393, 75 N. E. 230, 108 Am. St. Rep. 815; Trotta's Adm'r v. Johnson (Ky. 1906) 90 S. W. 540.) In the Iowa and Kentucky cases, supra, the beneficiaries were citizens of Italy; the other cases relate to citizens of Canada, Great Britain, Norway, Russia, etc. These cases fully sustain the affirmative of the proposition under consideration.
The theory of the cases, which deny the benefit of wrongful death statutes, as a general rule, to nonresident aliens is that statutes have no extraterritorial force and effect, and, in the absence of any words in the statute expressly conferring this right upon nonresident aliens, the statute will be presumed to apply only to persons residing within the jurisdiction of the State.
"It is true that legislative power is territorial,” said Holmes, C. J., in Mulhall v. Fallon, supra, “and that no duties can be imposed by statute upon persons who are within the limits of another State. But rights can be offered to such persons, and if, as is usually the case, the power that governs them makes no objection, there is nothing to hinder their accepting what is offered.". This learned judge further says: "In all cases the statute has the interest of the employees in mind. It is on their account that an action is given to a widow or next of kin.
We can not think that workmen were intended to be less protected if their mothers happened to live abroad.
In view of the very large amount of foreign labor employed in this State, we can not believe that so large an exception was silently left to be read in."
The latest case in England (1901) overrules a former decision to the contrary, and holds that the fatal accidents acts apply as well for the benefit of representatives of a deceased foreigner as for those of a British subject; and the principle contended for in the prior case by the defendant, that acts of Parliament do not apply to nonresident aliens, unless the language of the statute expressly refers to them, is repudiated, and the former case so holding is overruled. Kennedy, J., uses this language: “It appears to me, under all the circumstances, and looking at the subject matter, more reasonable to hold that Parliament did intend to confer the benefit of this legislation upon foreigners, as well as upon subjects, and certainly that, as against an English wrongdoer, the foreigner has a right to maintain his action under the statutes in question.” (Davidson v. Hill, 2 K. B. 606.)
In a recent New York case (1905), where this question is fully considered, it is said: “The principle underlying the legislation we are
considering is manifestly the protection of those who suffer pecuniary loss when å laborer or servant is killed by the negligent act of the individual or corporation employing him. The clear intention of the legislature is that the negligent employer shall no longer escape the consequences of his act by the death of his servant, but shall respond in damages to those who have suffered pecuniary loss. It is difficult to conceive of any argument springing from public policy, sound reason, or a proper discrimination between the rights of the citizen and the alien, that should prevent the alien husband, wife, or next of kin of a laborer, killed by reason of his employer's negligence, from receiving those damages that a jury has awarded a local legal representative, who derives his authority from and acts under the control of the surrogate's court. The damages are imposed upon a negligent employer as compensation to those who suffer by his act, and there is no valid reason, as it seems to us, why they should not be paid to the survivors, whether residing here or in some foreign jurisdiction. The statute not only benefits the survivors, but protects the laboring man, as it tends to enforce observance by the employer of the rule requiring him to furnish his servant a safe place in which to work. The laborer, leaving wife and children behind him and coming here from abroad, has a right to enter into the contract of employment, fully relying upon the statute. The conflict of authority in England and our sister States leads us to deal with this question on principle, and to base our answer to it on reasons that are weighty and controlling.” (Alfson v. Bush Co., supra.)
These statutes are regarded by the courts as remedial in their character, as affording compensation for injuries unknown to the common law, and are to be liberally construed to promote the object the legislature manifestly had in view. (Balto. & Ohio R. Co. v. Wightman's Adm'r, 29 Grat. 431, 444, 26 Am. Rep. 384.) While-our statute, like other wrongful death statutes, does not expressly include nonresident aliens, yet the language employed is general, containing nothing that would necessarily limit its operation to citizens or residents of this State. Both upon reason and authority, we have no hesitation in upholding the right of the nonresident alien to maintain this action, and we are therefore of opinion that there was no error in the ruling of the circuit court in sustaining the motion of the plaintiff to reject the plea of the defendant which denied that right.
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-MINE REGULATIONS-SAFE PLACE-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE.--- Kellyville Coal Company v. Bruzas, Supreme Court of Illinois, 79 Northeastern Reporter, page 309.--Action was brought by Jennie Bruzas, to recover damages for the death of her husband, caused by accidental injuries received in a coal mine of the company above named. Damages were awarded in the circuit court of Vermilion County, and on appeal, in the appellate court.
A statute of the State requires inspection of mines and prohibits entry into any mine at the beginning of the day, “except under the direction of the mine manager, until all conditions shall have been made safe.” The manager had indicated some dangerous rock in the roof of an entry and gave instruction as to making the place safe. Bruzas was one of a gang whose duty it was to attend to such matters, and while attempting to carry out these instructions was killed by the fall of the rock. The manager's directions were communicated to Bruzas by a third person, the manager himself not being present at the time, and it was for this reason that the lower courts gave the judgment indicated.
The appeal to the supreme court resulted in a reversal of the rulings of the courts below, on grounds that appear in the following extracts from its opinion, as delivered by Judge Wilkin:
In our opinion the construction given to the statute by the circuit court and approved by the appellate court is entirely too strict. All will agree that the language quoted, “except under the direction of the mine manager," should receive a reasonable construction and one which will render the statute capable of practical enforcement. То illustrate: The mine in question was a large one, requiring almost the entire night for the mine examiner to make an examination of the places where the men were to work the next day. The rock men were under the direction of the assistant mine manager, and the evidence shows that, after he had notified the men as to the places where the dangerous conditions existed, it was their duty to go to such places and remove the dangerous conditions. The rock gang were men skilled and experienced in the performance of their duties. On account of the amount of work to be performed it was practically impossible for the mine manager to be personally present and direct these experienced men specifically as to what they should do and how they should do it. It is not claimed in this case that those men were not in every way competent to perform their particular duties. If the statute must receive the construction placed upon it by the courts below, it would be a matter of no particular consequence whether they were experienced in the performance of that work or not, because the mine manager would be required to be personally present and specifically direct what should be done, and therefore any common laborer could perform the mere manual labor. There were in this mine a large number of rooms or entries in which there were liable to be fallen rock, loose roofs, etc., rendering them more or less dangerous, and we think where the mine owner has employed a competent licensed mine manager and competent rock men, and when the mine manager has been informed by the report of the examiner as to the various dangerous conditions, placing his danger signal at such places, as required by the statute, and the mine manager determines that the rock gang shall enter the rooms and entries for the purpose of removing the dangerous conditions, and so orders, the employees whose duty it is to make the place safe should be held to be working under the manager's directions, within the meaning of the statute. One of the accepted meanings of the word "direction” is “the act of governing, ordering or ruling," and it would seem that where the language is general, as here, “under the direction,” anything which brings the conduct of the rock men reasonably within the control of the mine manager in the performance of their duties would be a compliance with the statute. At the time of this accident the deceased and those with whom he was working were under the direction of the assistant