« السابقةمتابعة »
The results of strikes are shown in the following table:
STRIKES, BY RESULTS, 1905.
Of the 4,601 strikers who took part in the 123 strikes for which the results were reported, 21.28 per cent were in strikes which succeeded, 49.42 per cent were in strikes which succeeded partly, and 29.30 per cent were in strikes which failed.
Strikes by causes and results are shown in the following table, the cause being taken as the basis for the tabulation:
STRIKES, BY CAUSES AND RESULTS, 1905. [Strikes due to two or more causes have been tabulated under each cause; hence the totals for this
table do not agree with those for other tables.]
The next table shows the strikes in 1905 by duration and results:
STRIKES, BY DURATION AND RESULTS, 1905.
From the above table it will be seen that of strikes which succeeded, 90.91 per cent lasted seven days or less; of strikes which succeeded partly, 53.70 per cent lasted seven days or less, while of those which failed, 59.57 per cent lasted seven days or less.
The following table shows the number of strikes and their results, also the number of strikers, classified according to method of settlement:
STRIKES, BY METHOD OF SETTLEMENT, 1905. [Where two or more methods of settlement have been employed, the data ware reported in each case;
hence the totals for this table do not agree with those for other tables.]
Negotiations in which one or both parties were represented by their trade organizations resulted in the greatest number of strike settlements, direct negotiation between employer and employees being next in frequency.
LOCKOUTS.--The number of lockouts reported in 1905 was 6, involving 2,707 persons. With regard to the number of persons affected, the most important lockout of the year occurred in the pottery industry. This lockout involved 2,000 persons and lasted one day. A lockout of masons and plasterers involved 650 workmen and lasted forty days, causing an aggregate loss of 22,750 working days.
In the table which follows is presented a summary of the principal lockout data for the years 1901 to 1905:
SUMMARY OF LOCKOUTS, 1901 TO 1905.
DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR.,
[Except in cases of special interest, the decisions here presented are restricted to those rendered by the Federal courts and the higher courts of the States and Territories. Only material portions of such decisions are reproduced, introductory and explanatory matter being given in the words of the editor. Decisions under statutory law are indexed under the proper headings in the cumulative index, page 783 et seq.).
DECISIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW.
BLACKLISTING COMBINING TO PREVENT EMPLOYMENT—CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE-Joyce v. Great Northern Railway Company (two cases), Supreme Court of Minnesota, 110 Northwestern Reporter, page 975.— Thomas S. Joyce sued the railroad company on two separate causes of action-one for injuries to his person, caused by the alleged negligence of the company and its employees, and one for the wrongful and unlawful conduct of the company in preventing the said Joyce from obtaining employment with the Union Depot Company of St. Paul. Only the latter case presents matter of special interest.
The Union Depot Company is a separate corporation, owning and operating a union station in the city of St. Paul, into which the trains of the Great Northern Railway run. Joyce's action was based on the act of 1895, chapter 174, which prohibits blacklisting or other combinations between employers to prevent workmen from obtaining employment, but his case was dismissed in the district court of Ramsey County, whereupon he appealed to the supreme court.
Judge Brown, for the court, delivered an opinion sustaining the law and Joyce's right of action thereunder, and granting a new trial. A syllabus prepared by the court sets forth both the facts and the law in the case, and the paragraphs relating to this cause of action are reproduced herewith:
1. Rev. Laws 1905, sec. 5097, declaring it unlawful for two or more employers of labor to combine or confer together for the purpose of preventing any person from procuring employment, construed, and held. a valid legislative enactment.
2. If one employer by conference with another employer prevents, without excuse or justification, a third person from procuring employment with such other employer, he is liable for damages under the statute to the person so interfered with.
3. A malicious motive or purpose is essential to give rise to a cause of action under the statute; not actual malice, but such as the law implies from the fact that the act complained of was unlawful and without justification. 304B—No. 70—07-16
4. Plaintiff had been in the employ of the Union Depot Company as a track repairer. He was injured while engaged in the discharge of his duties by being struck by a switch engine of defendant, then being operated in the depot company's yards. On recovering from his injury, he sought reemployment of the depot company. Defendant interfered, and by its act induced the depot company to refuse him further employment, except upon the condition that he release defendant from all claim for damages on account of his injury. He declined to release his claim, and the depot company, in consequence of the interference of defendant and plaintiff's refusal to release, refused to reemploy him. Held, That the act of defendant, on the evidence disclosed, was a violation of the statute, and constituted, unexplained by matters in justification, an actionable tort, and the question should have been submitted to the jury under the second cause of action.
BOYCOTTS-COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF INTERSTATE ConMERCE-Loewe v. Lawlor, United States Circuit Court, District of Connecticut, 148 Federal Reporter, page 924.- Lawlor and his associates were members of a local branch of the United Hatters of North America, and had undertaken to compel the plaintiffs to unionize their factory. To this end they withdrew from employment in such factory and prevented, as far as they could, others from taking service therein. They also sought to curtail, and, if possible, to destroy the trade of plaintiffs in other States. The plaintiffs allege that these efforts have resulted in an interference with interstate commerce, in violation of the Sherman antitrust act, prohibiting combinations in restraint of such commerce, and entered a complaint based on this allegation. The complaint was demurred to on general grounds as well as in detail. It was on a consideration of the former, however, that it was dismissed for reasons that appear from the following quotation from the opinion of the court, which was delivered by Judge Platt:
There is no allegation which suggests that the means of transporting plaintiff's product, or the product itself while being transported, were touched, handled, obstructed, or in any manner actually interfered with. There is no allegation that the defendants are in any way engaged in interstate commerce. The argument for the plaintiff's is that by entering into a scheme to curtail the production at home, and the distribution by customers abroad, the defendants have formed a combination to limit and restrain plaintiffs' trade between the two points, which is interstate trade, and that such restraint is the direct, positive, and inevitable result of the general scheme. The manufacture of the hats before they leave the factory in Danbury is not interstate commerce, nor are the hats themselves up to that time the subject of interstate commerce. The distribution of the hats from the hands of the customers in other States to the ultimate consumer is not interstate commerce, nor are the hats themselves during such distribution the subject of interstate commerce.
The real question is whether a combination which undertakes to interfere simultaneously with both actions is one which directly affects the transportation of the hats from the place of manufacture to the place of sale. It is not perceived that the Supreme Court has as yet so broadened the interpretation of the Sherman act (Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3200]), that it will fit such an order of facts as this complaint presents.
EIGHT-HOUR LAW-CONSTITUTIONALITY INDEFINITENESS OF LAXGUAGE-State v. Livingston Concrete Building and Manufacturing Conipany, Supreme Court of Montana, 87 Pacific Reporter, page 980.--This case was before the supreme court of Montana on an appeal from the district court of Park County. The defendant company had been accused of violating the so-called eight-hour law, and, on the claim that the law was unconstitutional, had obtained a ruling in its favor. The State appealed and secured a reversal of the judgment of the lower court, the statute being held constitutional by the supreme court.
The following quotations from the opinion of Judge Holloway, who spoke for the court, present the principal grounds on which this conclusion was reached:
The information states facts sufficient to constitute a public offense, if chapter 50 above is a valid legislative enactment capable of being enforced; but on behalf of respondent it is urged (1) that the act is so indefinite as to be incapable of enforcement, and (2) that, even if sufficiently definite, the act is unconstitutional and void.
The provisions of chapter 50, above, are as follows:
"SECTION 1. A period of eight (8) hours shall constitute a day's work on all works or undertakings carried on or aided by any municipal, county or State government, and on all contracts let by them, and in mills and smelters for the treatment of ores, and in underground mines.
“SEC. 2. Every person, corporation, stock company or association of persons who violate any of the provisions of section one (1) of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than five hundred ($500) dollars or by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than thirty days nor more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
1. It is said that the statute is too indefinite to be enforceable, in that (1) it can not be determined whether it intends to impose the penalty prescribed upon the man who works less than eight hours in a day, or upon the man who works more than eight hours in a day, or upon both; (2) it can not be determined whether it is intended to punish the employer, the employee, or both; and (3) it is so indefinite that, in fact, it can not be said to forbid the employment of a laborer for more than eight hours in a day. While it may be conceded that the intention of the lawmakers might have been expressed in plainer terms, we can not hold a solemn legislative enactment of no force or effect because of the indefinite language in which it is couched, unless