« السابقةمتابعة »
The action of the appellant in expelling the respondent from its membership was therefore without authority, and the order of the superior court directing that he be reinstated in his membership was correct.
STRIKES-PICKETING-INJUNCTION--Pope Motor Car Company v. keegan, United States Circuit Court, Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, 150 Federal Reporter, page 148.—This was a hearing on the question as to the issuance of a preliminary injunction against certain persons named, among whom were J. J. Keegan and J. M. Keck, officials of the International Association of Machinists, and a considerable number of other persons, former employees of the Pope Motor Car Company, at the time engaged in a strike against the company. Judge Taylor in granting the injunction said in part:
There is little controversy among counsel as to the law applicable to a case of this kind; the chief contention arising as to the application of the law to the facts in this case. The rules of law which I conceive to be well established, and which I shall apply to the consideration and determination of the questions now before the court, are, substantially, as follows: To interfere, by violence, by threats or by intimidation, with others who are pursuing their natural and constitutional right to labor when and where they please, is always wrong, and always unlawful. No sense of personal wrong, however great, however natural, or however excusable, can justify such interference. No offended sense of right, as, for instance, that another is unjustly "taking his job,” gives warrant to such interference. The strikers themselves are entitled to no more rights than those whom they find working in their old places. Individual freedom is the chief of the rights of each. It can not be said that a job is held except by mutual consent. It can not be claimed by any intelligent man that one holds his job whether his employer desires it so or not. As well might we say that the workman, against his will, can be held to service by his employer.
But nothing can be better settled, either in law, in conscience, or in common sense, than that every man may seek or refuse work wheresoever he will; that workmen may combine for their mutual advantage; that they may persuade fellow-workmen, or others, to leave their employment; but such persuasion must be such as to persuade by reason, and not compel by threat, or violence, or intimidation. One of the forms of persuasion which, under proper circumstances, the law recognizes as permissible, is “picketing” by strikers; that is to say, the detachment of men in suitable places for the purpose of coming into personal relations with the new workmen, in order, if possible, to induce them, by means of peaceful argument, to leave the places which they have taken, for such natural and proper reasons as may appeal to men in such circumstances.
Much has been said by the courts, and by others, as to the peacedisturbing quality of picketing; and it is claimed by many that picketing, though intended to be peaceable, and engaged in by no more than two or three at each station, necessarily results in violence or intimidation, and is itself intimidating. A learned judge, in 1867, said that, in his opinion, “it was impossible to have an effectual system of picketing without being guilty of that alarm, intimidation, and obstruction which is a breach of the law." Possibly that may still be true, but it can not now be said without qualification, as it then could. In knowledge of their rights, in law-abiding spirit, in general intelligence, there has been a great advance, especially among skilled artisans. In this country, at least, they make up a large part of our intelligent and law-abiding citizens.
304B— No. 70--07-19
If we can apprehend anything, we must observe that a better practice is prevailing, due, doubtless, to the increasing intelligence and good sense of those involved, and also to the fact that courts have come to be recognized as ready to protect persons in their rights, and to punish those who unlawfully interfere with them. Undoubtedly violence and intimidation have, to some extent, been associated with picketing in this case; not always, though perhaps generally, at the hands of the strikers themselves. The idle, the dissolute, and the lawless are likely to take advantage of such a situation as this to commit unlawful acts, and the state of mind into which striking mechanics are likely to come, in such a case as we have here, is more or less likely either to make them indifferent to these acts when committed by others, or, in some instances, to encourage them. Nevertheless, I can not believe that, under proper circumstances, and with such a sense of self-restraint as men can exercise, picketing may not be properly conducted
A very instructive case in this connection is Karges Furniture Co. V. Amalgamated Woodworkers' Local Union et al. (Ind. Sup.) 75 N. E. 877, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 788. [Bulletin No. 63, page 564.)
Some of the defendants named in this (present) case are shown to have participated in violence and intimidation. As to most of the defendants, there is a total absence of testimony respecting them. True, it is stated by some of the witnesses that large numbers of strikers were congregated in the neighborhood of the works, and used threatening and intimidating language to employees and officers of the complainant. Undoubtedly such conduct is unlawful. The in itself intimidating. But no proof has been offered identifying any of the persons who made up this intimidating crowd of strikers. It is, as I have said, menacing and intimidating for any considerable number of strikers to assemble for the purpose of “picketing" or “persuading.” And so, also, would be the establishing of many picketing stations in the same neighborhood, for the effect of the mass would be the same, in either case. No intelligent man fails to understand what is meant by picketing which is solely for the purpose of lawful persuasion.
Some claim is made on the part of the complainant that, in view of the testimony of the general character to which I have just referred, any injunction allowed in this case ought to reach all of the defendants named in the bill; and the chief ground upon which the propriety of this claim is rested is that, except Keegan and Keck, all of the men went out on strike, and that, if they were law-abiding and did not intend to participate in acts of intimidation or violence, they would not be harmed by the issuance of an injunction against them. I can not escape the conclusion that, under the circumstances of this case, where the defendants are made such in their individual
capacity, and not in any organized capacity, it would be a gross injustice to attach to persons who have not been shown to be participants in these transactions the stigma of an injunction, or to make them--as they might be without further order of the courtsubject to the payment of any costs which necessarily accrue in such a case. In the case in Indiana, to which reference has just been made, a somewhat similar situation arose, and there the injunction was allowed against such of the defendants as were shown to have participated in the violence or intimidation. Those who were not thus found to be unlawful participants in wrongful acts were not enjoined. That will be the order in this case. Nor is it necessary, in order to hold the defendants who are not enjoined to a strict compliance with the terms of such an injunction as will be issued in this case, that they should be named as defendants who ought to be enjoined.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Ex parte Lennon, 166 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 658, 41 L. Ed. 1110, has definitely determined the law under such circumstances. It is there held that, to render a person amenable to an injunction, it is neither necessary that he should have been a party to the suit in which the injunction was issued, nor to have been actually served with a copy of it, so long as he appears to have had actual notice. That was a case which arose in this jurisdiction, and the question to which I have just referred was distinctly made and decided. That rule would apply, not only to persons named in this bill who are not found guilty of any violation of the rights of the complainant, but also to any other persons who, with knowledge of the issuance of the injunction, violate its terms.
As to those who are parties to this bill, and not included by name within its terms as violators of the rights of others, they must be held to have knowledge of this opinion, and of the decree herein. (Union Pacific Ry. Co. (C. C.) v. Ruef, 120 Fed. 116.) I can not help but believe that the officers of the International Association of Machinists, and the leading and influential spirits among the men who have gone on strike, will fully understand the views of the court as to their rights and duties, and that a real and successful effort will be made to keep the conduct of those with whom they are associated within the limits which are defined in this opinion. The propriety of the rule as to picketing as I have laid it down is, as to them, on trial.
LAWS OF VARIOUS STATES RELATING TO LABOR, ENACTED SINCE
JANUARY 1, 1904.
[The Tenth Special Report of this Bureau contains all laws of the various States and Territories and of the United States relating to labor, in force January 1, 1904. Later enactments are reproduced in successive issues of the Bulletin, beginning with Bulletin No. 57, the issue of March, 1905. A cumulative index of these later enactments is to be found on page 783 et seq. of this issue.]
ACTS OF 1906.
CHAPTER 52.- Employment of children]Ionis of labor-- Age limit -- Factory inspection.
SECTION 1. Vo child under sixteen years of age, employed in any manufacturing establishment, mine, mill or workshop in this Commonwealth, shall be required, permitted or suffered to work therein more than sixty hours in any one week, nor more than ten hours in any one day, unless for the purpose of making a shorter work day on any one day of the week, and in no case shall any child under sixteen years of age work in any manufacturing establishment, mine, mill or workshop after seven o'clock in the evening or before six o'clock in the morning of any day; and every person, firm, corporation or company employing any child under sixteen years of age in any manufacturing establishment, mine, mill or workshop shall post, and keep posted, in a conspicuous place in the office, a printed notice, stating the number of hours of labor per day required of such persons for each day of the week, and the number of hours of labor exacted or permitted to be performed by such persons shall not exceed the number of hours of labor so posted as being required. *The time of beginning and ending the day's labor shall be the time stated in such notice.
Sec. 2. No child under fourteen (14) years of age shall be employed at any time in any factory, workshop, will or mine, unless said child shall have no other means of support. No such child shall be employed in any mercantile establishment, nor in any service of any telegraph, telephone or public messenger company, laundry, printing establishment, except luring the vacation of the public schools. No child under sixteen (16) years of age shall be employed at any occupation dangerous or injurious to health or morals. And in event of disagreement between the labor inspector and proprietor, the city or county physician shall be called in as referee, and his decision shall be final. It shall be the duty of every person employing children to keep a register in which shall be recorded the name, birth place, age and place of residence of every person employed by him under the age of sixteen years; and it shall be unlawful for any proprietor, agent, foreman or other person in or connected with a manufacturing establishment, mine, mill or workshop to hire any child under the age of sixteen years to work therein without there is first provided and placed on file in the office an affidavit made by the parent or guardian, stating the age, date and place of birth of said child. If said child has no parent or guardian, the said affidavit shall be made by the child, which affidavit shall be kept on file by the employer, and said registerand affidavit shall be produced for inspection on demand by the labor inspector. There shall be posted conspicuously in every office of every factory, mill, workshop or mine, where children under sixteen years of age are employed, a list of their names, with their ages, respectively. The labor inspector shall have the power to demand a certificate of physical fitness from the city or county physician in the case of children whom he deems physically unable to perform the labor at which they may be employed, and shall have the power to prohibit the employment of any child that can not obtain such a certificate.
Sec. 3. No person, firm or corporation shall employ or permit any child under the age of sixteen years to have the care, custody, management of, or to operate any elevator, nor shall any person under sixteen years of age be employed at sewing belts or [to) assist in sewing belts.
Sec. 4. It shall be the duty of the owner of any manufacturing establishment, or his agents, superintendents or other person in charge of the same, to furnish and supply, when practicable, or cause to be furnished and supplied therein, belt shifters, or other safe mechanical contrivances for the purpose of throwing belts on or off pulleys; and, whenever practicable, machinery therein shall be provided with loose pulleys. All vats, pans, saws, planes, cogs, gearing, belting, set screws and machinery of every description therein, which is palpably dangerous, where practicable, shall be properly guarded, and no person shall remove or make ineffective any safeguard around or attached to any planer, saw, belting, shafting or other machinery, or around any vat or pan, while the same is in use, unless for the purpose of immediately making repairs thereto, and all such safeguards shall be promptly replaced. No person under eighteen years of age shall be allowed to clean machinery while in motion.
Sec. 5. Suitable and proper wash rooms and water-closets shall be provided in each manufacturing establishment, and such water-closets shall be properly screened and ventilated and be kept at all times in a clean condition; and if women and girls are employed in any such establishment, the water-closets shall have separate approaches and be separate and apart from those used by men. All closets shall. be kept free [from] obscene writing and marking. A dressing room shall be provided for women and girls when required by the labor inspector in any manufacturing establishment in which women and girls are employed.
Sec. 6. Every person, firm, corporation, association, individual or Partnership employing girls or adult women in any manufacturing, mechanical or mercantile industry, laundry, workshop, renovating works or printing office in this ('ommonwealth shall provide seats for the use of the girls and women so employed, and shall permit the use of such by them when not necessarily engaged in the active duties for which they are employed.
Sec. 7. The walls and ceilings of each room in every manufacturing establishment shall be lime washed or painted, when, in the opinion of the labor inspector, it shall be conducive to the health or cleanliness of the person working therein.
Sec. 8. The grand jury shall have inquisitorial powers to investigate violations of this act, and judges of the circuit courts of the State shall specially charge the grand jury at the beginning of each term of the court to investigate violations of this act.
Sec. 9. The words "manufacturing establishment," wherever used in this act, shall be construed to mean any mill, factory or workshop where labor is employed.
Sec. 10. A copy of this act shall be conspicuously posted and kept posted in each workroom of every manufacturing establishment, mill, mine or workshop in this Commonwealth.
Sec. 11. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act, or who suffers or permits any child to be employed in violation of its provisions, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than fifty dollars for the first offense and not more than two hundred dollars for the second offense.
Sec. 12. The provisions of this act shall not apply to the handling of fruits and vegetables in season, and the delivery of tobacco at the warehouses, and preparing same for the manufacturer. Approved March 17, 1906.
CHAPTER 108.- Mine regulations Inspectors. SECTION 1. * * The governor is hereby authorized and directed to appoint two additional assistant inspectors of mines, who shall hold office for four years and until their successors are appointed and qualified. Said assistants shall have a thorough knowledge of the different systems of working and ventilating coal mines and of the nature and properties of mine gases, especially of explosive gas, and shall have a thorough and practical knowledge of mining gained by at least five years experience at and in such mines, Said assistant inspectors before entering upon the discharge of their official duties, shall be sworn to discharge them faithfully and impartially, which oath shall be certified by the officer administering it and said certificate shall be filed with the secretary of state in his office and each of said assistants shall give bond in the penal sum of two thousand dollars, with surety to be approved by the governor, for the faithful discharge of his official duties. Each of said assistants shall give his entire time and attention to the duties of his office, which shall consist of aiding, under the directions of the chief inspector of mines, in carrying out the provisions of this act and of all other acts relating to the inspection of mines. He shall keep a record of all inspections made by him and make monthly report of the same to the chief inspector, and he shall at all times in all things pertaining to the duties of his office be subject to the orders of the chief inspector. Said assistants shall not be interested in operating any mine in this State, and they shall each be liable to dismissal for willful neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.