1545-8] Murder of Pierluigi Farnese at Piacenza

83

May Paul had sent a commissary to the kingdom, with a brief which hinted at the establishment of the Inquisition. A rebellion at once. followed; and the small Spanish garrison was in difficulties. But the prompt and judicious measures of Toledo, and the assurance of Charles himself that he had no intention of introducing the Inquisition or of allowing it to be introduced, soon restored order; yet an uneasy feeling remained that the brief had been sent with the secret intention of provoking revolt. Siena had already in 1545 risen in arms against the imperial commissioner, Juan de Luna, and the Monte dei Nove, whom he supported, and had driven out the Spanish garrison. Cosimo succeeded in preventing any great excesses, but Francesco Grassi, whom Charles sent from Milan to appease discontent, failed to effect a compromise. The citizens took up arms again and accepted the protection of the Pope, protesting against any foreign garrison, and excluding the Noveschi from any share in the government. Cosimo, however, succeeded in procuring the acceptance of his own mediation, and on September 28 a garrison of Spaniards was admitted. Mendoza arrived in October, restored the Noveschi, and set up as before a governing body of forty, ten from each Monte, but insisted on naming the half of them himself (November, 1548).

In Piacenza the rule of Pierluigi Farnese was hated. His measures for reducing the nobility to obedience, by depriving them of their privileges and forcing them to live in the city, though salutary, made him many enemies. Private wrongs increased their number. Gonzaga, who represented the forward policy in Italy, was anxious to take advantage of the troubles at Genoa and Siena to establish direct Spanish rule over those cities, and the discontent at Piacenza was much to his mind. Aware of the hostile movements directed against him, and of the support given by Gonzaga from Milan to his assailants, Pierluigi prepared to defend himself by the building of a fortress at Piacenza. This accelerated the blow which had been long prepared by Gonzaga. On September 10, 1547, the conspirators took up arms; Pierluigi was killed in his palace; and the city was in the power of the rebels. Gonzaga's promptitude is a sufficient proof of his complicity. On the 12th he entered the city, and occupied it in the name of Spain. Of the projects of his minister Charles had been sufficiently informed, and, although he had counselled prudence, he had not discouraged the enterprise. It was an act of open war against the Pope, wounding him where he was most sensitive. Charles de Guise, the newly elected Cardinal, appeared at Rome in October, and this seemed to give the Pope his opportunity of revenge. Conditions for a league with France were drawn up; Parma and Piacenza were to be given to Orazio Farnese, not to Ottavio, the Emperor's son-in-law; the King was to supply troops for the defence of the Papal States; French bishops were to attend the Council at Bologna; the Pope was to contribute 7000 men, if the King was to be attacked in his

84

The policy of Gonzaga and Mendoza

[1547-9

own States. The projected league like many others, though ostensibly defensive, was really intended for offence.

The Diet of Augsburg (1547) gave Charles a lever in his negotiations. He was able to offer the submission of all Germany to the Council as a price for its return to Trent. But the Pope referred the decision to the Fathers at Bologna, who decided in favour of that city. Charles could do nothing but enter a solemn protest before the assembly at Bologna and in the Consistory (January, 1548); and the Spanish Bishops remained at Trent. Negotiations continued while the Council remained in effect suspended. Threats made by the Pope of an attack upon Naples came to nothing, and a fresh plot conducted by Giulio Cibò against Genoa failed. On the other hand Henry II was not satisfied with the terms of the league offered by the Pope. Meanwhile France was arming; the Pope was arming; and Charles put his possessions in a state of defence. Cosimo de' Medici occupied Elba and Piombino for the further defence of his coasts in the imperial interest. The remonstrances, however, of the Genoese, who feared an attack upon Corsica, led Charles to take these places into his own hands. The visit of Henry II to Savoy and Piedmont (May, 1548) proved to be no more than a reconnaissance in force and led only to the seizure of the Marquisate of Saluzzo. Further delay was caused by the French war with England which broke out in 1548 over the Scottish question, and the Pope's revenge had to be postponed. The Interim (May, 1548) agrees with the tone of general European politics at the time. Every Power was seeking to enjoy the benefits of time, and in such a policy Charles was a master.

And so the stormy year 1547 passed into the sullen peace of 1548, while the Pope was still offering ecclesiastical concessions as the price for the restitution of Piacenza, and Charles replied by asserting his right not only to Piacenza but to Parma also. Gonzaga continued to push his adventurous plans upon the Emperor, and hoped to take advantage of the passage of the Archduke Philip through Northern Italy in the autumn of 1548, at least to secure the building of a castle in Genoa; but nothing could be done except by force, and the Emperor was above all anxious to preserve the existing equipoise, as is shown by his instructions to Philip, written in February, 1548. With Gonzaga was co-operating Mendoza; he increased his personal authority over Siena, disarmed the citizens, and finally proposed the erection of a castle. The Pope proceeded with his negotiations with France, and although he allowed certain ecclesiastical concessions to be extorted from him, nothing certain resulted. The affairs of the Council became more and more desperate; and finally, in September, 1549, the order came to suspend it. The proposal to give Parma to Orazio Farnese or to incorporate it with the domains of the Church had alienated Ottavio ; who, after a futile attempt to seize the city, took refuge with Gonzaga.

1549-51]

Accession of Pope Julius III

85

Paul III died on November 10, 1549, his last days embittered by dissension with his family, whose advancement had been his chief thought, and for whom he had sacrificed the friendship of the Emperor and the interests of the Church. His last act was to sign an order to place. Parma in Ottavio's hands; but the Orsini, who were holding the town, refused compliance.

The Conclave which followed was unusually prolonged. The imperial. party, with whom the Farnese party made common cause in the hopes of winning Parma at least, if not Piacenza, for the family, were in a majority, and aimed at the election of Pole or the Cardinal Juan de Toledo, both known to be well disposed towards ecclesiastical reform. But the French party, though not able to elect any of their own candidates, were fully able to prevent the election of any other; and, after the Conclave had lasted more than two months, the two parties agreed to elect the Cardinal del Monte, who took the name of Julius III (February 7, 1550). Although his sympathies on the whole had been French, although he had been associated with the removal of the Council to Bologna, although he had the reputation of frivolity and vice, the imperial party accepted him as likely to choose tranquillity rather than war and intrigue. Tranquillity meant the continued domination of Spain. His good disposition towards the Emperor soon became evident in a number of matters, trifling in themselves, but important in the aggregate. More important still was the intention which he soon announced of reopening the Council at Trent. In fact, on November 14, 1550, he published a Bull summoning the Council to meet at Trent in the following May, notwithstanding the opposition of France, and the impossibility of settling the conditions in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor, the demands of the German Diets, and the interests of the Curia.

Julius had restored Ottavio Farnese to Parma in fulfilment of promises made in the Conclave, but he could not effectually protect him against the hostilities of Gonzaga from Milan. Nor could he persuade Charles to restore to his son-in-law Piacenza also. On the contrary the pressure of Gonzaga on the borders of Parma and his intrigues within the Duchy drove Farnese to apply for aid from France (December, 1550). Terms were arranged with France, and Ottavio passed into the service of Henry. The King assembled troops at Mirandola. The Emperor pressed for a sentence of confiscation against Ottavio, and offered a loan to enable Julius to carry it out. Gonzaga seized Brescello (to the north-east of Parma) from the Cardinal d'Este. The Pope hesitated, but finally decided that it was more dangerous to offend the Emperor, and (May, 1551) declared Ottavio deprived of his fief. It then became necessary to resort to force, and Giambattista del Monte, the Pope's nephew in command of the papal troops, received orders to co-operate with Gonzaga in the occupation. of the Parmesan (June).

86

War with the Turks and with France

[1550-1

The war opened badly. On his way to join Gonzaga Giambattista suffered a slight reverse. Bolognese territory was attacked by the Farnesi, and the safety of Bologna itself was doubtful. The Pope was anxious to protect Bologna and called off the chief part of his troops for its defence. Reinforcements reached Parma from Mirandola. Although Mirandola was under French protection it became necessary to attack it, and the double enterprise against Parma and Mirandola proved too much for the scanty forces. The country was ruined but nothing was effected. War had not yet opened between the French King and the Emperor, but the peace concluded with England by Henry II (March 24, 1550) by which Boulogne was restored for a money payment, left him free on that side; and he could choose his own moment for overt hostilities. Meanwhile the truce between Charles and the Sultan had been broken. A new corsair, Dragut, had established himself on the Tunisian coast of Africa at Mehedia, known as the Port of Africa. His ravages on the neighbouring littoral of Sicily and further afield had rendered action imperative; and in September, 1550, the united fleet of Charles' dominions had attacked and captured his headquarters, though his fleet escaped on this occasion, and again from Doria's blockade in the following spring. Charles could represent that this act of reprisal had been abundantly provoked, but the Sultan had made Dragut his commissioner to rule over the whole of Barbary, and regarded the attack upon him as an attack upon himself. On his return from an expedition against the Sophy of Persia, which the truce with Charles had permitted, the Sultan prepared for war. In July, 1551, a great Turkish fleet appeared in Sicilian waters, and after vainly demanding the restoration of Mehedia, the Ottomans turned upon the Knights of St John, and captured Tripoli (August 14). In September of the same year the Turkish war began afresh in Hungary. Once more Charles had to withstand the simultaneous hostility of the Most Christian King and of the infidels. In the course of 1551 Henry was submitting plans for common action to the Porte, and the use of the Turkish fleet was recommended; war in Hungary being calculated to unite the Germans. in defence. The King of France was also in relations with Magdeburg and with Maurice of Saxony.

Under these auspices the Council met once more at Trent in May, 1551, though it was autumn before formal proceedings could be begun. Its prospects were not rosy, for in September, 1551, war opened on the side of Savoy. Although François de Brissac, the French commander, did not push his attack, the necessity of action in two distant fields completely disorganised the imperial finances in Italy. The blockades of Parma and Mirandola were in consequence slackly pursued; the Pope saw little prospect of gain from the war; his debts were burdensome; French hostility threatened him with the failure of French funds; he began to think whether an arrangement with France was not possible.

1551-3] French occupation of the Lorraine bishoprics 87

In April, 1552, he concluded a truce with France, which allowed Ottavio Farnese to hold Parma unmolested for two years. About the same time the Pope's nephew, Giambattista, died in action. Charles was fain to accept the truce, for the same reason which mainly influenced the final decision of the Pope; the rising of Maurice of Saxony in alliance with the French, and the news of a French invasion. A fresh advance of the Turks in September, 1551, was another of the intolerable burdens which Charles had to bear at this, the darkest moment of his life.

The alliance between Henry II of France and the Protestant Princes of Germany was concluded at Chambord on January 15, 1552. It opened the way for a new development of French policy, the acquisition of territory, not Burgundian, at the expense of the Empire. On March 13, 1552, Henry invaded Lorraine, took the government from the Duchess and her infant son, and, in accordance with his agreement with the Protestant princes, occupied the principal towns of the three great bishoprics of Toul, Metz, and Verdun.

Since the accession of René de Vaudemont the power of the Dukes had been consolidated in the Duchy of Lorraine, by the extension of their influence over the Bishoprics, and the election of relations or partisans to the several Sees. But the policy of the duchy in the wars between France and Burgundy had been to preserve neutrality as far as possible; and thus up to this time immunity had been secured. The marriage of Christina, the Emperor's niece, to the heir of Lorraine in 1540 had not during the life of her husband disturbed this neutrality; but Christina had been recently left a widow, and her regency in the duchy gave a plausible excuse for French intervention. Lorraine was

easily subdued, but an attempt to seize Strassburg failed. The Netherland forces created a diversion by invading France and devastating Champagne; and Henry replied by marching on Luxemburg and occupying the southern part of the duchy.

But

The Emperor had hoped before the crisis arrived in Germany to reach the Netherlands, but his way was barred by the confederates; in Innsbruck he was not safe, and he was a fugitive at Villach in Carinthia, while the French worked their will in Lorraine and Luxemburg. in August, 1552, after the confederates had been brought to terms, he issued once more with an army, and passing through Southern Germany, was well received at Strassburg, which had refused to admit the French. Thence notwithstanding the lateness of the season he proceeded to the siege of Metz, which meanwhile had been strongly fortified by François, Duc de Guise, and was ready to hold out. In spite of Charles' discreditable alliance with Margrave Albert Alcibiades of BrandenburgCulmbach, the siege, which did not begin until October, proved a complete failure, and on January 1, 1553, Charles had to order a retreat. These events had their reaction on the Council of Trent, which was suspended in April, 1552, for two years or until the troubles should be overpast.