special circumstances this duty may 21 arise: Allender v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 37 Iowa, 264; New York etc. R. Co. v. Doane, 115 Ind. 435, 7 Am. St. Rep. 451, 17 N. E. 913, 1 L. R. A. 157; Cartwright v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 52 Mich. 606, 50 Am. Rep. 274, 18 N. W. 380; Baltimore etc. R. Co. v. Leapley, 65 Md. 571, 4 Atl. 891. The court called the attention of the jury to certain facts shown in evidence, proper to be considered by them in determining whether in this case there was such duty, and left it for them to say whether there was negligence on the part of defendant's conductor in not giving plaintiff assistance. In this there was no error.

7. An instruction as to contributory negligence is complained of, on the ground that it allowed the jury to take into account the knowledge, if any, which plaintiff had as to the distance from the step to the ground at the place where she was invited to alight, and it is argued that she should have been required also to take into account what she could have known in the exercise of ordinary care. An instruction embodying this thought was requested for defendant. But the complaint of the instruction given, as well as of the refusal to give the instruction asked, is predicated on the claim that plaintiff was, as matter of law, negligent if she did not for herself ascertain whether it was dangerous to attempt to step to the ground at the place where the car was stopped, and she was invited to alight. This view is erroneous, as already pointed out in this opinion. Plaintiff had the right to assume that she was not invited to alight at a dangerous place.

8. In two respects there is complaint as to the direction to the jury with reference to the measure of damages. In the first place, it is said the jury were allowed to take into account loss of earning capacity, which would be erroneous, as plaintiff was a married woman. But we understand the 22 instruction complained of to limit recovery to physical pain and suffering and mental anguish. For this she could recover in her own right. As there was no evidence with reference to loss of earning capacity, it was not error to refuse defendant's requested instructions that plaintiff could not recover damages on that account.

The second ground of objection to the instruction on this subject is that the jury were told in no event to allow plaintiff more than fifteen thousand dollars, which was the amount claimed in her petition. It is said that this was misleading, as the jury might infer that a verdict up to that amount would be proper; whereas, the evidence would not justify any such verdict. It is no doubt improper to so state the limita

tion as to suggest a verdict for the amount claimed: Rost v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 41 N. Y. Supp. 1069, 10 App. Div. 477; Gilbertson v. Forty-second St. etc. Ry. Co., 43 N. Y. Supp. 782, 14 App. Div. 294; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Souders, 178 Ill. 585, 53 N. E. 408; Joyce on Damages, sec. 207. But the verdict was for three thousand dollars, and there is no occasion to surmise that the amount fixed was in any way influenced by the statement that it should not exceed fifteen thousand dollars. Under the evidence, the amount allowed was not excessive, and we think it clearly appears that defendant was not prejudiced by the language used. Some direction on the subject is proper in connection with an instruction as to measure of recovery, and the court would not have been justified under the evidence in fixing an absolute maximum less than that named in the petition. We do not find in the language used any suggestion that a verdict of fifteen thousand dollars would be proper under the evidence. It might have been safer to explain in a few words that the maximum was stated because that was the sum claimed which must limit plaintiff's recovery; but in this case it clearly appears that the jury was not misled by the omission. of such explanation.

9. Exceptions were taken to the overruling of objections 23 to questions asked medical witnesses as to what was the cause of the injury for which plaintiff asked recovery, and error is assigned on such rulings, because, as claimed, the witnesses were asked to usurp the functions of the jury. But the questions and answers, taken together, show that the witnesses only testified that plaintiff's injuries were due to some such external violence as that which plaintiff suffered, and there could have been no prejudice. There was no question under the evidence as to the fact that the injuries complained of resulted from the accident.

We have noticed as fully as reasonable space will allow all the alleged errors set out in appellant's argument.

Finding no error which would justify a reversal, the judgment is affirmed.

It is the Duty of a Railway Company to Keep Its Station Premises in a comfortable, safe and proper condition: See Klugherz v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 90 Minn. 17, 101 Am. St. Rep. 384, and cases cited in the cross-reference note thereto. And the rule that the duty of a railroad company to keep safe station premises extends to all who rightfully come there in pursuance of the invitation which it holds out to the public, and to all who come there on legitimate business to be transacted with its agent, applies to flag as well as regular

stations: Pineus v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 140 N. C. 450, 111 Am. St. Rep. 856.

A Railway Company must Assume that if it fails to stop its train at the usual place for a passenger to alight, he will, if he thinks he can properly do so, endeavor to get off, and if he is injured in getting off, the failure to stop the train is the proximate cause of the injury: Martin v. Southern Ry., 77 S. C. 370, 122 Am. St. Rep. 575. A street railway company is not under any duty to caution passengers in alighting from cars against stepping into a gutter or defeet in the street for the existence of which the corporation is not blamable, and a passenger injured by so stepping cannot recover: Thompson v. Gardner etc. Ry. Co., 193 Mass. 133, 118 Am. St. Rep. 459. A conductor does not perform his duty by simply waiting a reasonable time for a passenger to alight. He must exercise reasonable care to see that the passenger is off the car: Millmore v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 194 Mass. 323, 120 Am. St. Rep. 558. Though a railway company is under no obligation to supply servants to assist a passenger in descending from a car, yet if its conductor undertakes to do so, the passenger has a right to rely on his careful performance of his undertaking and may recover of the railway for injuries suffered by the conductor's failure to use reasonable care, as where he, suddenly withdrawing his support, causes the passenger to fall: Hanlon v. Central R. R. Co., 187 N. Y. 73, 116 Am. St. Rep. 591.

WOOD v. WOOD.

[136 Iowa, 128, 113 N. W. 492.]

JUDGMENTS-Divorce Attack After Death of Parties.-After the death of one or more of the parties to a decree of divorce, it may be assailed the same as any other decree for fraud in so far as property rights are directly affected. (p. 225.)

JUDGMENT-Divorce Attack After Death of Parties.-An administrator, or the heir of a party divorced and since deceased, may prosecute an application for the modification or vacation of the judgment, or for a new trial, when, such judgment directly affects the interests of the parties. (p. 226.)

JUDGMENT-Insanity-Limitation for Time for Attack.— The disability of an insane person terminates with his death, and a proceeding to vacate a judgment fraudulently obtained against him must be commenced within one year thereafter. (p. 226.)

JUDGMENTS-Setting Aside for Fraud.-A decree will not be set aside on the sole ground that an issue directly raised by the pleadings has been decided on perjured testimony. (p. 227.)

JUDGMENTS-Annulment for Fraud.-If a decree of divorce is obtained on false allegations and proof of the insanity of the defendant at the time of the marriage, and such issue has been previously adjudicated against the plaintiff by the same court and the fact thereof fraudulently concealed, such a fraud is perpetrated upon the court as justifies it in annulling the decree. (p. 227.)

JUDGMENT-Death of Party-Effect of Decree.-The status of a person while living cannot be affected by a judgment entered after his death, as it can only affect the property rights of others. (p. 229.)

Francis & Owen, for the appellants.

Deacon & Good and Prouty & Prouty, for the appellees.

129 LADD, J. The petition alleged that B. H. Wood was married to Celista H. Wood, April 22, 1854, and there were born to them three children, C. H. Wood, Eva B. Anderson, and Etta S. Shealy, plaintiffs herein; that Celista H. Wood was insane and confined in one of the state hospitals for the insane and the county asylum of Linn county from 1884 until her death in 1904; that B. H. Wood began suit to annul his marriage with her in the district court of Linn county. in 1886, caused notice to be served on her as provided by statute, defense being made by a guardian ad litem, and that on hearing, a decree was entered April 24, 1886, dismissing his petition; that on August 10, 1886, said Wood, through a different attorney, filed a second petition praying for like relief, caused notice to be served as before, and a guardian ad litem to be named, who filed answer, but did not plead a former adjudication; that evidence was introduced and a decree entered November 3, 1886, annulling said marriage; that the proceedings in the two suits were identical, save the decrees; that neither decree was appealed from; that thereafter, though in the same month, B. H. Wood was married to the defendant Lottie A. Wood, who survives him; 130 that said Wood died in 1903; that subsequent to the first marriage he had acquired title to several lots in Cedar Rapids now claimed by Lottie M. Wood and to two tracts of land claimed by the defendants Eby and Finch, respectively, in the conveyance of which the said Celista did not join. Plaintiffs, who are the administrator of the estate of and heirs of Celista H. Wood, in addition to the foregoing, aver that said Celista was not insane at the time of her marriage to B. H. Wood, and did not become so until 1879, which fact B. H. Wood well knew; that he was guilty of fraud in bringing the second suit, and concealed from the court the fact that on identical issues the relief sought had been denied and adjudicated against him; that the proceedings were erroneous as against an insane person, and, owing to the unavoidable casualty and misfortune of her condition, she was unable to make defense; that this action was begun within one year after her death; that the first decree referred to was not defeated by the second decree entered, and plaintiff's pray that the decree annulling the marriage be set aside, and held for naught. A general demurrer was sustained.

1. The proceeding purports to have been begun under the provisions of section 4091 of the Code, authorizing the district court, after the term at which rendered, to vacate or modify a judgment or grant a new trial; (1) for fraud practiced in obtaining the same; (2) for erroneous proceedings against a minor or person of unsound mind, when such errors or condition of mind do not appear in the record; (3) for unavoidable casualty or misfortune preventing the party from prosecuting or defending. It is apparent from a reading of the petition that plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on either of the last two grounds. No error is complained of, save such as appeared in the record, and the condition of the mind of the defendant in the divorce suit was disclosed by the record. Even if it were conceded that the casualty or misfortune mentioned in the statute contemplates unsoundness of mind, yet this did not prevent a defense by 131 guardian ad litem such as is provided for persons laboring under disability.

2. The only basis for the action, then, is the fraud alleged to have been practiced in obtaining the decree. The parties thereto are both dead, and their status while living is no longer a proper subject of judicial inquiry, save as it may affect the property rights of their heirs or survivors. On this ground, an action by the unsuccessful party to annul a decree of divorce was sustained in Lawrence v. Nelson, 113 Iowa, 277, 85 N. W. 84, 57 L. R. A. 583, while in Barney v. Barney, 14 Iowa, 189, where no property interests were involved, the court held that the action owing to its nature abated even after the entry of decree in the district court, so that an appeal could not be prosecuted by the survivor. Where property interests are directly affected, the rule quite generally prevails that the decree in a divorce suit may be assailed by appeal or otherwise the same as any other judgment. Thus in Nickerson v. Nickerson, 34 Or. 1, 48 Pac. 423, 54 Pac. 277, after recognizing the rule as announced in Barney v. Barney, 14 Iowa, 189, the court declared that, where the consequences of the divorce are such as affect the property rights of the parties to the suit, the heirs and personal representatives may have such an interest as that the cause may survive, not for the purpose of continuing the controversy touching the right of a divorce within itself, but for the ascertainment of whether the property has been rightly diverted from its appropriate channel of devolution, and to this end the court held that the heirs of deceased might prosecute the appeal to determine whether the divorce was rightly granted, in order that conAm. St. Rep., Vol. 125-15