troverted. Yet his work is not altogether gratuitous. More and more is it the present day tendency to establish paid departments. In these the members are paid for their services. In the volunteer departments, too, the members 456 are usually compensated in one way or another. There is also the fact that where it is made a permanent vocation, as is usually the ease in the paid departments, the individual assumes the responsibility of his own free will. That it is fraught with danger no one will deny, but it is not necessarily more dangerous than other callings in which numbers of men are employed daily. Can the engineer of a locomotive dashing across the country at the rate of from fifty to ninety miles an hour, or the miner working hundreds of feet below the surface of the earth, be said to be more secure than the fireman who answers the alarm bell? Can one be said to render a greater service to humanity than the other? We think not. Nor can it be said that the fireman's duty is more public than that of the engineer. There are numerous callings in a sense quasi public, but not of such nature as to justify the state in granting gratuities or pensions on the ground that the services are public. Any speculation as to this subject, however, is estopped by the constitutional inhibition, article 3, section 32, which provides: "The General Assembly . . . . shall not grant pensions except for military and naval services.” A pension has been defined to be an annuity from the government for services rendered in the past. That the pensions provided for by the act of 1906 fall within this rule is evident. The money is to be obtained by a governmental enactment, and is to be paid to superannuated or disabled firemen who in time. past had been in active service. We do not deem it necessary to continue the discussion further. In our opinion the act is clearly unconstitutional. Therefore, it is the judgment of this court that the petition be granted and the prohibition issue as prayed for. Messrs. Justice Jones and Woods concur on the ground that the statute violates article 3, section 32, of the constitution. A Statute Requiring the Agents of Insurers, doing business in the city of New York, but not incorporated under the laws of New York, to pay a percentage upon the gross premiums received by them for insurance upon property in that city, to the "exempt firemen's benevolent fund," is not unconstitutional as granting an exclusive privilege, or as giving money of the state to a private undertaking, or as a tax: Trustees of Exempt Firemen's Fund v. Roome, 93 N. Y. 313, 45 Am. Rep. 217. And in Firemen's Benevolent Assn. v. Lounsbury, 21 Ill. 511, 74 Am. Dec. 115, it is held that the legislature has power to impose a burden on foreign insurance companies doing business in the city of Chicago for the benefit and support of the Chicago Benevolent Association, and it is not necessary that the revenue derived from such burden should be paid into the treasury of the state. But in Henderson v. London etc. Ins. Co., 135 Ind. 23, 41 Am. St. Rep. 410, it is held that firemen are not servants of the state, nor of a county, but of the municipality in which they serve, and the taxing power of the state cannot be exerted for their benefit upon only a portion of a class of the citizens of the state. And in San Francisco v. Liverpool etc. Ins. Co., 74 Cal. 113, 5 Am. St. Rep. 425, it is decided if a statute requires every agent of a foreign insurance company doing business in the state to pay into the treasury of the county a sum equal to one per cent of the amount of all premiums paid him for insurance effected by him within such county, the money when paid to constitute a fund to be known as the firemen's relief fund of such county, such exaction is a tax, and forbidden by the constitution of California. CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH. VOLKER-SCOWCROFT LUMBER COMPANY v. VANCE. [32 Utah, 74, 88 Pac. 896.] HOMESTEAD-Head of a Family, Who is Within the Meaning of the Laws Exempting.-Under the statutes of Washington, a wife, as well as her husband, must be regarded as the head of a family, for the purpose of asserting their rights to the exemption of the homestead, though he has not deserted her, and is not absent nor infirm. (p. 830.) HOMESTEAD, Plea of, When Sufficient-Failure to Select or File Declaration of. An answer averring that the defendant who makes it was the head of a family, to wit, the wife of the person designated, and that the real property described in the complaint was at all times specified their homestead, and, with the improvements, does not exceed the homestead exemption, is sufficient, though it does not state any declaration or other formal selection of the property as a homestead. (p. 831.) HOMESTEAD-Unconstitutionality of Statute Attempting to Make Subject to Mechanics' Liens.-Under a constitution declaring that the legislature shall provide by law for the selection by each head of a family an exemption of a homestead, together with the appurtenances and improvements, a statute purporting to make the homestead subject to mechanics' liens is unconstitutional and void. (pp. 833, 834.) HOMESTEAD-Mechanics' Liens, When not Consented to by a Contract for the Construction of a Dwelling.-A contract for the construction of a dwelling or other improvements on property constituting a homestead is not a waiver of the exemption of such property from mechanics' liens for improvements, unless the contract, in express terms, stipulates to such exemption. (p. 833.) J. D. Skeen and Geo. Halverson, for the appellant. C. C. Richards and A. E. Prath, for the respondent. 78 STRAUP, J. 1. This action is brought to foreclose a materialman's lien. It is alleged in the complaint that the defendant Mary Flinders Vance was the owner of certain lots in Ogden City, Utah; that she let a contract to defendant Peterson to construct a dwelling on the premises; that the plaintiff, at the request of both defendants, furnished building material which was used in the construction of the house, and which remained unpaid; and that a notice of intention to claim a lien was filed for record. The defendant Vance answered, admitting her ownership of the lots, the letting of the contract to Peterson for the construction of the house, but denied that the material furnished by plaintiff was furnished at her request. It was further alleged by her that at the time of the filing of her answer, and at all times mentioned in 79 the complaint, she was the head of a family, consisting of herself, two children, and her husband; that prior to and at the time of the letting of the contract the lots were, and still are, her homestead; that she let a contract to Peterson to erect a dwelling on the lots for the use of herself and family, and to hold them as a permanent homestead; that she paid the contractor the full contract price; that the value of the lots, with the improvements, does not exceed the homestead exemption, and thereupon she prayed that the real estate with the improvements be declared her homestead and exempt from plaintiff's lien and from sale on execution. The court sustained plaintiff's general demurrer interposed to that portion of defendant's answer which alleged that the homestead was exempt, "upon the ground that the allegations of said answer respecting such claim of exemption do not constitute a defense to plaintiff's action." The defendant refused to further plead. A judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff awarding it a lien on the real estate, and ordering a sale of the premises in satisfaction of plaintiff's claim, from which judgment the defendant Vance has prosecuted this appeal. 2. The homestead statute (Rev. Stats. 1898, sec. 1156) provides: "A homestead is subject to execution in satisfaction of judgments obtained (1) on debts secured by mechanics' or laborers' liens for work or labor done or material furnished exclusively for the improvement of the same." The appellant contends that this statute is in violation of section 1, article 22, of the constitution, which provides that "the legislature shall provide by law, for the selection by each head of a family, and exemption of a homestead, which may consist of one or more parcels of lands, together with the appurtenances and improvements thereon of the value of at least fifteen hundred dollars from sale on execution." Nearly all of appellant's brief is addressed to this question. While the respondent does not concede appellant's proposition, nevertheless it has not offered anything in support of the validity of the statute. It seeks to uphold the ruling of the court upon the ground that the answer does not contain sufficient allegations that the defendant was the so head of a family, that the lots were her homestead at the time the contract was let to Peterson, and that a selection of a homestead had been made by her before plaintiff's lien attached. It is argued that, if the wife be the head of a family consisting of children and her husband, the facts and circumstances which make her such must be alleged; otherwise it will be presumed that the husband is the head. This may be true under a statute designating the husband the head, or in the absence of a statute defining who is the head of a family. Subdivision 1, section 1154, Revised Statutes of 1898, provides that the phrase "head of a family," as used in the homestead statute, includes within its meaning "the husband or wife, when the claimant is a married person; but in no case are both husband and wife entitled each to a homestead under the provisions of this title, except to the extent hereinbefore provided." Subdivision 2 prescribes the conditions and circumstances under which other persons are deemed heads of families. In subdivision 1 the wife, equally with the husband, without conditions or circumstances, is included within the phrase "head of a family." If the statute had intended to make her the head so as to entitle her to lay claim to the homestead only in the event of the desertion, or absence of the husband, or upon his infirmity or inability to render support, or upon other conditions, or under other circumstances, it seems to us the legislature would have said so. So far as the homestead statute is concerned, and so far as giving the one or the other a right to lay claim to a homestead, the husband is no more designated the head of a family than is the wife. This also is manifest from other sections of the same statute, which expressly provide that, "if the homestead claimant is married, the homestead may be selected from the separate property of the husband, or, with the consent of the wife, from her separate property," and "it shall be the privilege of either the husband or the wife to claim and select a homestead to the full extent prescribed in this title, on the failure of the other, being the judgment debtor, to make such claim and selection." Nor do we think, in view of what has been 81 said by this court in prior decisions (Kimball v. Lewis, 17 Utah, 381, 53 Pac. 1037; Kim |